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THE  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS 
IN  FRANCE 


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THE  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS 
IN  FRANCE 


BY 


WILLIAM  BARCLAY  PARSONS,  D.S.O. 

COLONEL,   ELEVENTH    V.   9.    ENGINEERS 


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ILLUSTRATED 


D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK  LONDON 

1920 


COPYBIGHT,    1920,    BT 

D.  APPLETON  AND  COMPANY 


PEINTBD  IN  THE  DNITBD  STATES   OF  AMIIHICA 


^^ 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF  ALL  THE  AMERICAN  ENGI- 
NEERS WHO  FELL  IN  FRANCE,  AND  PARTICU- 
LARLY TO  THE  MEMORY  OF  THE  OFFICERS 
AND  MEN  OF  THE  ELEVENTH  ENGINEERS, 
AMONG  WHOM  WERE  THE  FIRST  UNITED 
STATES  SOLDIERS  TO  BE  KILLED  IN  BATTLE 
IN  EUROPE,  THIS  BOOK  IS  INSCRIBED  AS  A 
SMALL  TRIBUTE  OF  ADMIRATION  AND  RESPECT 


"The  British  attack  at  Cambrai  is  of  special  interest,  since  it 
was  here  that  American  troops  (Eleventh  Engineers)  first  partici- 
pated in  active  fighting." 

Extract  from  Final  Report  of 
Gen.  John  J.  Persuing, 

Commander-in-Chief, 

American  Expeditonary  Forces. 


PREFACE 

This  book  is  not  intended  to  be  a  history  or  detailed 
account  of  the  work  done  by  American  Engineers  in 
France.  Their  work  was  so  extensive  and  so  varied  as  to 
put  the  writing  of  its  record  beyond  the  powers  of  one 
man,  for  none  could  Imow  it  all.  It  is  hoped  that  some 
day  the  record  will  be  properly  set  forth  in  justice  to  the 
men  and  for  the  honor  of  the  profession,  but  it  will  be  of 
necessity  the  joint  product  of  several  collaborating 
authors. 

The  first  contribution  that  America  made  to  the  Allied 
cause  was  the  raising  of  nine  regiments  of  engineers,  with 
one  of  which  the  author  served.  It  is  their  work  that  is 
the  motif  of  this  book.  In  the  writing,  it  has  been  neces- 
sary to  touch  on  all  the  fields  of  engineer  activity,  because 
these  regiments  came  in  contact  with  every  field,  even  if 
they  did  not  invade  each  one,  from  constructing  ports  to 
digging  and  holding  trenches,  in  all  parts  of  France  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Vosges,  from  the  Mediterranean  to 
Flanders.  Consequently  there  results  a  brief  outline  of 
what  all  engineers  did.  Perhaps,  it  may  serve  to  give 
those  who  did  not  go  overseas  a  picture  of  what  is  meant 
by  engineering  in  modern  war. 

There  will  not  be  found  any  description  of  spectacular 
or  dazzling  pieces  of  construction  like  so  many  structures 
in  civil  works  that  arouse  admiration.  There  was  none 
such.  Military  engineering  consists  in  doing  things  in 
the  simplest  and  quickest  way,  where  permanency  in 
character  and  accuracy  in  execution  yield  to  the  imperi- 
ous demands  for  results  that  are  immediately  available 
regardless  of  all  other  considerations.  The  individual 
accomplishments  that  can  be  singled  out  with  pride  were 

ix 


X  PREFACE 

principally  in  the  application  of  physics  and  chemistry. 
The  achievement  in  engineering  construction  that  was  so 
yery  noteworthy  lay  in  a  great  whole. 

No  reference  will  be  made  to  the  Italian  campaign, 
because  no  unit  of  the  original  nine  engineer  regiments 
served  there.  Much  of  the  work,  however,  that  was  done 
by  the  Italian  engineers  among  the  crags  and  precipices 
of  the  Alps  was  exceedingly  brilliant. 

A  few  personal  experiences  of  the  author  and  others 
have  been  introduced,  not  because  they  are  in  any  way 
remarkable,  but  rather  because  they  are  not  remarkable. 
A  narrative  of  the  work  of  the  engineer  would  not  be 
complete  if  it  were  not  accompanied  by  at  least  some  sug- 
gestions of  what  entered  into  his  daily  life  and  what 
were  his  relations  with  the  engineers  of  the  Allied  armies. 

In  this  book  the  words  Allies  and  Allied  Forces  refer 
to  the  union  of  nations  on  the  western  front,  to  whom  the 
designation  Entente  is  very  frequently,  and  perhaps  with 
accuracy,  applied.  The  opposing  forces  were  also  allied 
with  each  other,  but  by  those  serving  in  France  they  were 
always  thought  of  as  the  enemy.  To  the  American 
Engineers  the  word  Allies  meant  friends  only,  and  prin- 
cipally the  French  and  British  Armies  with  which  they 
were  associated. 

The  thanks  of  the  author  are  gratefully  extended  to 
Major  General  Black,  Chief  of  Engineers,  for  permis- 
sion to  obtain  information  from  the  reports  on  file  in  his 
office ;  to  Major  General  Langfitt,  Chief  Engineer  Officer, 
A.  E.  F.,  for  data  contained  in  his  full  report;  to  Colonel 
H.  H.  Maxfield,  General  Superintendent  of  Motive 
Power;  to  Lt.  Col.  J.  P.  Hogan,  G.  S.;  to  Lt.  Col.  H.  W. 
Hudson,  R.  T.  C;  to  Major  N.  A.  Middleton,  23rd  Engi- 
neers ;  to  Major  "W.  A.  Cattell,  officer  in  charge  of  engi- 
neer historical  documents;  to  Captain  Fenwick  Beekman, 
M.  C. ;  to  Captain  E.  G.  Simons,  56th  Engineers,  to  many 
officers  of  the  original  nine  regiments,  and  to  Mr.  Frank-^ 


PREFACE  3d 

lin  D.  Roosevelt,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Nav}^  The 
statistics  have  been  taken  in  large  measure  from 
'' America's  Munitions  "  and  ''  The  War  With 
Germany." 

Wm.  Bakclay  Paesons, 

Colonel,  11th  U.  S.  Engineers. 


CONTENTS 

Chaptes  Tabw 

I.      ThI   NETT    MiLlTABY    EnGLNEEB 3 

Military  and  civil  engineering  —  Engineer  troops  in 
France. 

n.    The  First  Amebican  Engineebs 11 

Engineer  reserve  —  First  regiments  raised  —  Engineer 
commission  to  France. 

III.  AmEBICA'S    PROBLEiT    20 

Franco-British  engineering  problem  —  America's  prob- 
lem—  American  supplies  and  storage. 

IV.  Engixeeb  Oboanizatiox  S3 

Field  force  —  2k)ne  of  the  advance  —  Service  of  Sup- 
plies —  Engineer  control  in  armies,  corps  and  divisions 
—  Engineers  in  Service  of  Supplies. 

V.    Poets 43 

Ports  reported  available — Port  development  —  Porta 
developed  —  Port  control. 

VI.    Fbencii  Railways 67 

Principal  railway  systems  —  Territories  served  by  each, 
company — Meter  gauge  railways  —  ^lileago  and 
traffic  —  War  control  —  Railways  used  by  British  — 
Railways  used  by  Americans. 

VII.    American  Railway  Operations  in  France 69 

British  railway  operating  organization  —  American 
railway  requirements  —  American  equipment  —  Trans- 
portation department  organization  —  American  lines 
of  communication  —  American  operating  staff  —  Train 
control  —  French  rolling  stock  —  Accidents  and  ambu- 
lance trains  —  Railway  transport  officers. 

Vin.    Storage  Yards  and  Other  Rah.way  Construction 88 

Classification  of  storage  —  Base  and  intermediate 
depots  —  Regulating  stations  —  Is-sur-Tille  —  St.-  Sul- 
pice,  Montoir  —  Gievres,  Montierchaume  —  Other  stor- 
age yards — Storehouse  construction  —  Railway  con- 
struction. 

IX.    American  Locomotives  and  Cars 102 

French  design  —  American  repair  troops  —  Novcra 
shops  —  American  locomotiveB  —  American  cars  — 
American  control. 

xiil 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


Chaptbs 


XL 


XII. 


XIII. 


XIV. 


XV. 


XVI. 


x^ai. 


XVIII. 


The  Cahbbai  Offensive 

Battle  of  the  Somme — Campaign  in  spring,  1917  — 
Arrival  of  American  engineers  —  Tanks  —  Military 
movement,  Nov.,  1917  —  American  engineer  preparation 
for  battle  —  Battle  of  Cambrai. 

The  Cambrai  Defensive 

Railway  reconstruction  —  Battle  of  Gouzeaucourt. 
The  Amkbican  "  R.  E.'s "  

Association  of  American  and  British  Engineers  —  Ex- 
perience of  one  American  regiment  —  Character  of 
"Tommy"  —  British  officers  —  Trench  life  on  British 
Front. 

Relations  with  the  Fkench 

French  calmness  — ■  Armistice  day  —  German  oflfensivc, 
July  15,  1918  —  Area  of  destruction — Children  under 
fire  —  Franco  American  review. 

FOBESTRY 

French  forests  —  British  timber  needs  —  American 
timber  needs  —  French  Forestry  Organization  —  Acqui- 
sition of  Forests  —  Prevention  of  waste  and  limit  of 
cuts  —  American  Forestry  Force  —  Timber  cut. 

Water  Supply 

French  and  British  practice  —  Water,  how  supplied  — 
French  Water  Supply  Organization  —  British  Water 
Supply  Organization  —  American  Water  Supply  Organ- 
ization—  Water  purification  —  Water  consumption  — 
Ratio  of  disease  to  battle  deaths. 

Chemical  Engines^rs 

Hague  conference  on  use  of  gases  —  Chlorine  —  Chlor- 
picrin  and  phosgene  —  Treatment  of  gas  casualties  — 
Lachrymator  and  other  gases  —  Mustard  gas  —  Gas 
masks  and  respirators  —  Gas  waves  —  Gas  shells  — 
(>a9  output' — Chemical  Warfare  Service. 

Camouflage  and  Other  Fields  of  Engineering 

Work  of  Signal  Corps  —  New  alphabet  —  Listening  in- 
struments —  Derivation  of  camouflage  —  Application 
of  —  Manufacture  of  —  Eleotro-mechanical  engineering 
—  Engineer  repair  shops  —  Tunnelling  —  Salvage. 

Maps 

Allied  maps  in  1914  —  Photographic  surveying  —  Map 
scales  —  American,  British,  French  and  German  maps 
compared  —  Map  projections  —  Bonne  system  —  Lam- 
bert system  —  French  maps  —  British  maps  — Inter- 
Allied  maps  —  Different  issues  of  maps  —  French  topo- 


Pagb 
111 


124 


133 


143 


153 


167 


182 


198 


216 


CONTENTS  XV 

Chapter  Paos 

graphical  organization  —  British  and  German  organi- 
zation —  American     organization  —  Mobile    and     ba«e 
printing  plants  —  American  map  production. 
XIX.    Flash  and  Sound  Ranging  aj^d  Search  Light  Detection      244 
Guns  and  targets  hidden — "Archies"  and  airplanes 

—  Photographic  detection  —  Gun  flash  detection  — 
Sound  detection  —  Sound  detector  apparatus  —  Air- 
plane detectors  —  Air  resistance. 

XX.     Abtilleey 263 

Indirect  fire  —  Ammunition  expended  —  American  ar- 
tillery —  Gun  recoil  —  Tractors  —  Railway  mounts  — 
Naval  guns  and  mounts  —  Verdun  defense. 

XXI.    Light  Railways 277 

Previous  use  of  light  railways  —  Location  —  Rails  — 
Rolling  stock  —  Locomotives  —  Cars  —  Track  —  Gauge 
and  function — Traffic  —  Transportation  of  wounded  — 
American  light  railways  —  Administration  —  Organi- 
zation. 

XXII.     Roads 296 

French  roads  —  American  road  problems  —  American 
administration  —  St.  Mihiel  and  Argonne-Meuse  offen- 
sives—  Road  department  organization  —  Road  con- 
struction—  Plank  roads — 'Traffic  control  —  ^Material 
needed— "Corp'l  Giles." 

XXIII.  Teenches  and  Trench  Warfare 313 

Allied  and  German  viewpoint  in  1917  —  March  21, 
1918,  movements  of  engineers  —  Trench  warfare  — 
German  system  —  French-British  systems  —  Trench 
psychology  —  Principles  of  trench  location  in  Front 
Support  and  Reserve  —  Communication  trenches  — 
Trench  trace  —  Trench  dimensions  —  Water  in  trenches 

—  Rampart  trenches  —  Forest  defense  —  Daily  tasks 
in  excavating  —  Dugouts  —  Wire  entanglements  — 
Trench  names. 

XXIV.  Final  Phase  347 

American  sector — St.  Mihiel  salient  and  offensive  — 
Engineer  work  during  offensive — Dannemorie  Viaduct 

—  Argonne-Meuse  offensive  —  Beginning  of  battle  — 
Engineer  work  during  offensive  —  Water  supply  in  St. 
Mihiel  and  Argonne-Meuse  offensives^"  Ceas«  firing." 

XXV.    Organization  of  Engineer  Troops  in  the  Field 364 

British  railway  troops  —  French  railway  troops  — 
Work  trains  —  American  special  engineer  troojv*  — 
Size  of  engineer  regiments  —  Suggested  organization 
of  engineer  troops. 


XVl 


CONTENTS 


Chaptib 
XXVI. 


XXVII. 


Engineeb   Organizatiox   and   Engineeb   Work   ik   the 

United  States   

Organization  in  the  United.  States — Activities  of  Corps 
of  Engineers — General  engineer  depot  —  Railway  de- 
partment—  Supplies  purchased  —  Russian  railway  ser- 
vice —  Bureau  of  Research  —  Manufacture  of  gases  — 
Quartermaster  Corps  —  Emergency  construction  of 
buildings  —  Construction  division — Shipping  of  loco- 
motives —  Training  of  engineers. 

Statistics 

Size  of  army  —  Sources  of  the  army  —  Results  of 
physical  examinations  —  Officers  commissioned  by  ser- 
vices—  Training  of  the  army — 'Transportation  of  the 
army  —  Transport  fleet — Cooperation  of  Allies  — 
Ports  of  embarkation  and  debarkation — Tonnage  of 
ermy  cargo  —  America's  part  in  the  actual  fighting  — 
Argonne-Meuse  data  —  St.  Mihiel  data  —  American 
artillery  in  France  —  Toxic  gases  manufactured  — 
Flying  officers  —  Airplanes,  number  of — Battle  deaths 
for  all  belligerents  —  American  casualties  —  American 
deaths  in  four  wars  compared  —  American  deaths  by 
disease  —  War  expenditures  —  War  expenses  of  prin- 
cipal nations  —  Duration  of  war  for  various  partici- 
pants—  Ordnance  production — Extent  of  front  held 
'by  United  States  and  Allies  —  Rifle  strength  of  Allied 
and  German  Armies  —  Guns  in  batteries  —  Battle  air- 
planes—  Comparative  strength  of  American,  French 
and  British  armies  —  Expenditures  of  ammunition  — 
Merchant  shipping  lost  for  various  nations  —  Merchant 
shipping  before  and  after  the  war. 


Paqi 


379 


395 


ILLUSTEATIONS 

FULL  PAGE  INSERTS 
Frontispiece  page 

An  American  Army  Storage  Depot  in  France Facing        92 

French  Civilians  Painting  Canvas  Covers  in  the  American  Cam- 
ouflage Shop  at  Dijon Facing       206 

American  Engineers  Repairing  a  Captured  German  Railway  Yard 

Which  Shows  the  Effect  of  Long  Range  Bombardment.  .Facinjr       270 

United  States  Xa^y  14-Inch  Gun  on  a  Railway  Mount Facing      272 

American  Engineers  Constructing  a  Light  Railway  Through  a  Forest 
Where  It  Could  not  be  Discovered  by  Enemy  Air  Ob- 
servers   Facing      27S 

Dannemoire  Viaduct Facing       354 

May  25,  1915.    French  Reconstruction  Finished 
May  30,  1915.    Effect  of  German  Artillery  Fire 
American  Engineers  Replacing  'a  Bridge  at  Grand  Pr^,  Three  Times 

Destroyed  by  Shells Facing       360 


FIGURES 

1. —  Inter- Allied    System.      Method   of   Lettering   Fifty    Kilometer 

Squares ' .' 230 

2. —  Inter- Allied  System.    Ten  Kilometer  Squares  Enlarged 230 

3. —  Inter- Allied  System.     Kilometer  Square  Enlarged 231 

4. —  Old  French  System.     Kilometer  Square 231 

5. —  Traversed  Trench 330 

6.—  Bastion  Trench 331 

7.—  Zig-Zag  Trench 332 

8.—  W&vj  Trench 333 

9.—  Cross  Section  of  Trench 335 

10.—  Front  Line  Dugout 335 

11. —  Dugout  for  Battalion  Headquarters 340 

12. —  Dannemorie  Viaduct  before  and  after  Bombardment 354 


MAPS 

For  description  see  page  226 227 

Comparative  Extent  of  German  and  Allied  Trenches 322 


THE  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS 
IN  FRANCE 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   NEW  MILITARY   ENGINEER 

The  effect  of  the  war  on  the  military  engineer,  or  rather 
upon  his  relative  importance  and  personal  qualifications, 
has  been  completely  revolutionary.  There  was  a  time 
when  engineers  were  exclusively  military  men,  when  the 
great  pieces  of  construction  other  than  in  architecture, 
or  those  which  were  beyond  the  limits  of  the  art  of  ordi- 
nary builders,  were  fortifications ;  while  the  only  intricate 
types  of  machines,  very  crude  affairs  when  measured  by 
modern  standards,  were  engines  of  war.  There  were  no 
magnificent  specimens  of  structural  or  mechanical  con- 
struction, which  are  such  an  integral  part  of  our  daily 
life  as  to  be  accepted  as  matters  of  course,  and  scarcely 
draw  forth  momentary  comment.  "Works  of  a  civil  char- 
acter which  did  exist,  were  on  a  very  modest  scale,  and 
were  executed  under  the  direction  of  military  engineers 
who  were  described  by  the  single  word  '*  engineer  " — 
there  being  no  other  kind. 

Perhaps  the  most  striking  illustration  of  the  military 
engineer  covering  the  whole  field  of  construction  was 
Leonardo  da  Vinci,  great  artist,  but  greater  constructor, 
whose  life's  work  was  the  designing  and  building  of 
crenelated  walls,  revolving  canon,  hoisting  engines,  canal 
locks,  city  improvements,  and  curious  machines  of  all 
sorts  for  his  illustrious  patron,  Duke  Ludovico  Sforza 
of  Milan.  For  his  amusement  only,  he  snatched  occa- 
sional moments  from  his  arduous  tasks  of  computing  to 
place  in  color  such  creations  as  ''  The  Last  Supper,"  or 
the  elusive  smile  of  "  Mona  Lisa.'*  lie  fully  expected  to 
go  down  in  history  famous  as  an  engineer,  and  never 
dreamed  thai;  his  fortifications  and  canals  were  to  be  for- 

3 


4t         'AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

gotten  and  that  his  reputation  was  to  rest  finally  on  his 
brush.  His  survival  as  an  artist  is  a  good  example  of  the 
instability  of  prominence  in  scientific  achievement  where 
each  advance  so  completely  obliterates  previous  efforts 
as  almost  to  eliminate  them  from  the  records,  leaving  the 
latest  word  as  the  sole  thing  that  men  know  and  value. 
Perhaps,  after  all,  it  is  only  success  in  art  that  is  endur- 
ing, because  in  art  it  seems  possible  to  achieve  results 
that  other  generations  delight  to  remember.  Science,  the 
sister  of  art,  is  ever  in  a  state  of  flux  and  unrest. 

The  supremacy  of  the  military  engineer  was  chal- 
lenged in  the  18th  century,  when  canals,  harbors,  light- 
houses, roads,  and  other  works,  disassociated  from  any 
military  connection,  began  to  assume  a  more  ambitious 
character,  so  as  to  approach  in  magnitude  the  works  of 
national  defense.  Smeaton,  the  designer  and  constructor 
of  the  famous  Eddystone  lighthouse,  assumed  the  desig- 
nation of  '*  Civil  Engineer  "  to  distinguish  himself  from 
his  military  confreres.  [With  the  application  of  steam 
as  a  source  of  power,  the  field  of  civil  engineering 
broadened  tremendously,  and  not  only  surpassed  in 
extent  that  of  military  engineering,  but  became  so  large 
that  by  custom  it  has  been  found  convenient  to  subdivide 
it  into  mechanical,  mining,  electrical,  and  other  applica- 
tions of  engineering  science,  leaving  the  original  term 
**  Civil  Engineering  '*  to  cover  general  construction  only. 

As  the  civil  engineer  grew  in  importance,  he  not  only 
invaded  but  took  unto  himself  fields  of  activity  hereto- 
fore considered  as  the  exclusive  property  of  his  military 
brother  and  whilom  superior.  But  contraction  invari- 
ably leads  to  solidification.  As  the  range  of  work  of  the 
military  engineer  became  narrowed,  so  his  experience 
led  him  to  think  more  and  more  in  terms  of  rigidity  as 
shown  in  massive  types  of  military  defense,  great  forts 
with  masonry  walls  as  designed  by  Vauban  and  other 
masters.    "When  progress  in  creating  new  or  developing 


THE  NEW  MILITAEY  ENGINEER  5 

pre\'iously  known  building  materials  gave  him  steel, 
heavy  castings,  modern  concrete,  he  was  carried  still 
further  toward  immobility  with  great  guns  permanently 
fixed  on  solid  emplacements,  mounted  on  intricate  disap- 
pearing carriages  or  covered  with  shields  capable  of 
resisting  any  blow  that  could  be  imagined  by  him.  The 
last  word  seemed  to  have  been  spoken. 

It  had  been  spoken.  Military  engineering  science  had 
imconsciously  reached  an  impasse.  The  old  military  engi- 
neer was,  quite  unknown  to  liimself,  moribund,  and 
needed  but  the  supreme  test  of  experience  to  prove  that 
his  theories  were  dead.  But  in  his  death  he  was  to  have 
his  revenge  on  his  brother  civil  engineer,  for  his  art  was 
to  have  its  resurrection  into  a  new  and  bigger  art,  full  of 
life  and  mobility,  and  he  was  to  become  again  the  great 
exponent  of  applied  science. 

Progress  is  always  made  along  spiral  and  not  straight 
lines,  so  that  after  a  lapse  of  time,  we  seem  to  come  back 
to  our  original  starting  point,  only  it  is  on  a  higher  level. 
It  took  but  a  few  shots  from  the  German  42  cm.  guns 
early  in  the  war  to  smash  the  great  masonry  and  steel 
defenses  of  Belgium  and  northern  France;  defenses 
deemed  impregnable  and  the  very  perfection  of  the  mili- 
tary art.  As  they  cracked  and  crumbled  under  the 
pounding  of  these  new  monster  engines  of  war,  the  whole 
science  of  military  engineering,  as  the  masters  had  con- 
ceived it,  likewise  crumbled  and  what  had  taken  centuries 
to  develop  became  obsolete  in  a  twinkling. 

This  did  not  mean  that  the  military  engineer  had 
ceased  to  exist;  quite  the  contrary.  It  soon  was  appar- 
ent that  a  new  military  engineering  science  had  been  born 
enormously  greater  in  extent  and  composition  than  the 
old  that  lay  buried  under  the  ruins  of  Namur  and  Mau- 
beuge.  The  new  field  included  every  form  and  applica- 
tion of  civil  engineering,  using  the  term  in  its  broadest 
significance,  and  with  it,  electricity,  chemistrj^  physics, 


6  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

metallurgj^  geology,  and  bacteriology.  Wliile  formerly 
the  military  engineer  need  only  know  about  tenailles, 
bastions,  glacis,  counterscarps,  and  other  details  of  per- 
manent fortification,  together  with  only  the  rudiments  of 
roads,  bridges  and  surveying,  to-day  there  is  almost 
nothing  in  the  whole  range  of  applied  science  that  he 
should  not  know  something  of,  and  in  much  of  it  he  must 
bo  expert.  Railroads  and  roads,  their  construction  and 
maintenance,  bridges,  locomotives,  cars,  engines  of  all 
types,  buildings,  tunnels,  accurate  mapping  and  range 
finding,  water  supply  and  its  purification,  photography, 
the  laws  and  practical  application  of  electricity,  and  the 
chemistry  of  gases,  liquids  and  explosives,  are  part  of 
his  eveiy-day  work.  Nor  are  these  things  to  be  known 
only  in  an  elementary  way.  In  the  military  text- 
books of  not  many  years  ago,  instruction  regarding 
bridges  was  confined  to  pontoon  bridges  or  very  simple 
structures,  where  perhaps  the  component  members  were 
held  together  by  small  ropes.  Such  structures  could 
carry  infantry,  or  at  most,  light  artillery  drawn  by 
horses.  Occasionally  a  bridge  of  this  nature  must  still 
be  erected,  but  the  bridges  with  which  the  military  engi- 
neer has  to  deal  to-day  must  be  strong  and  stiff  enough 
to  support  locomotives  weighing  100  tons  each,  drawing 
trains  of  cars,  each  car  with  its  load  weighing  fifty  tons. 
These  weights  in  the  late  war  were  not  the  maxima, 
since  after  the  failure  of  permanent  gun  emplacements, 
it  was  decided  to  mount  the  largest  types  of  guns  on  rail- 
way cars,  so  as  to  provide  the  maximum  of  mobility.  At 
the  conclusion  of  the  war,  sixteen-inch  guns,  heretofore 
considered  possible  to  use  only  on  the  most  substantial  of 
foundations,  had  been  actually  mounted  on  and  fired  from 
specially  designed  railway  cars  weighing  300  tons. 

Troops  without  equipment  are  worthless,  and  equally 
so  would  be  a  bridge  that  would  carry  the  former,  but 
not  the  latter.    The  infantry  must  have  artillery  and  the 


THE  NEW  MILITARY  ENGINEER  7 

greater  part  of  artillery  is  now  motor  drawn  by  tractors 
weighing  ten  or  more  tons,  the  gun  itself,  speaking  only 
of  those  that  usually  were  moved  on  roads,  weighing  as 
much  more.  Tanks,  which  also  had  to  be  provided  for, 
weighed  as  much  as  thirty-five  tons.  These  few  figures 
show  that  the  bridges  now  to  be  built  are  vastly  different 
in  design  and  detail  from  what  would  have  been  erected 
to  carry  an  army  of  previous  wars.  So  it  was  with  all 
the  problems  facing  the  engineer. 

The  military  engineer  of  the  future  must,  therefore, 
know  more  of  various  kinds  of  engineering  than  any 
other  engineer.  At  last  he  has  emerged  from  the  eclipse 
that  began  with  Smeaton,  and  can  claim  to  be  again  the 
leading  type  of  engineer  in  that  he  supervises  the  highest 
and  most  varied  applications  of  science. 

In  our  own  service,  it  has  been  the  custom  of  the  War 
Department  to  use  the  officers  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
on  work  other  than  what  was  known  as  military  engineer- 
ing, principally  in  the  development  and  improvement  of 
our  rivers  and  harbors.  This  practise  brought  them  in 
contact  with  many  phases  of  engineering  which  they 
would  not  have  met  had  they  been  confined  to  strictly 
military  problems  as  they  existed  before  1914,  and 
undoubtedly  had  great  effect  in  preparing  them  to  handle 
the  unexpectedly  new  problems  that  were  thrust  upon 
them  during  the  war.  As  the  art  of  war  now  stands,  mili- 
tary engineering  is  advanced  civil  engineering,  with  the 
application  of  every-day  methods  and  engines  to  the 
requirements  of  war.  The  proper  training  of  military 
engineers  should,  therefore,  be  largely  along  lines  of  civil 
practise  and  experience.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  War 
Department  will  maintain  its  wise  policy  of  the  past  and 
give  the  army  engineers  as  wide  and  broad  a  connection 
as  possible  with  all  matter  of  public  works.  Wliatover 
the  Government  has  to  do  in  such  matters  should  be  given 
to  the  officers  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers  of  the  army, 


8  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

thereby  training  them  during  periods  of  peace  for  the 
very  duties  that  they  will  be  called  on  to  perform  should 
war  again  come. 

One  measure  of  the  importance  of  the  engineer  arm 
was  the  number  of  engineer  troops  engaged.  In  April, 
1917,  when  the  United  States  declared  war,  the  engineer 
forces  of  the  regular  army  consisted  of  256  officers  and 
2,198  men,  with  but  one  general  officer,  the  Chief  of  Engi- 
neers holding  the  rank  of  Brigadier-General.  This 
force,  small  as  it  was,  nevertheless  had  been  increased 
greatly  to  meet  the  requirements  arising  out  of  the  trou- 
bles with  Mexico  along  the  Rio  Grande  beginning  in  the 
previous  summer.  It  was  widely  scattered  in  different 
parts  of  the  United  States  and  our  overseas  possessions. 
Nineteen  months  later,  when  the  armistice  was  signed, 
there  had  been  sent  to  Europe  considerably  more  than 
11,000  commissioned  engineer  officers  and  234,000 
enlisted  engineer  men,  while  there  were  in  camps  in  the 
United  States  15,000  more  men  ready  and  waiting  sailing 
orders  to  join  the  expeditionary  forces  in  France. 

These  troops  were  distributed  approxi^nately  as 
follows : 

With  armies  at  the  front 86,400 

Transportation  Corps 60,000 

Construction 43,000 

Forestry 18,500 

Training  schools,  etc 18,500 

Supplies 7,600 

234,000 


But  this  total,  great  as  it  was,  did  not  represent  the 
whole  of  the  engineer  force.  In  addition  to  the  units 
classified  as  engineers  and  the  attached  service  bat- 
talions, there  were  twenty-four  regiments  Imown  as 
Pioneer  Infantry  who  went  overseas.     Although  these 


THE  NEW  MILITARY  ENGINEER  9 

regiments  were  organized,  armed,  and  drilled  as  infantry, 
and  equipped  and  trained  to  figlit  in  an  emergency,  they 
were  intended  primarily  to  act  as  assisting  forces  to 
other  arms.  Nineteen  of  these  regiments  aggregating 
about  1,600  officers  and  52,000  men,  were  assigned  to  the 
engineers  and  were  used  chiefly  in  constructing  railways 
and  roads  in  the  advanced  area.  Besides  the  Pioneer 
Infantry,  there  were  employed  by  the  engineers  prior  to 
the  conclusion  of  hostilities,  34,000  civilians  and  15,000 
jjrisoners  of  war. 

The  total  aggregate  of  engineer  troops,  officers  and 
men,  actually  in  France  can  be  put  down  as  approximately 
347,600.  This  was  a  long  step  from  the  2,454  officers 
and  men  who  constituted  the  Corps  of  Engineers  on  the 
6th  of  April,  1917.  Had  the  war  continued  another  year, 
the  above  total  would  have  been  exceeded  by  a  consider- 
able figure,  because  plans  were  already  formed  to 
increase  the  transportation  corps  alone  to  150,000  men. 

To  direct  the  work  of  this  army  of  engineers,  there 
were  four  major-generals,  sixteen  brigadier-generals  and 
many  colonels  acting  as  brigadiers,  most  of  whom  would 
have  been  given  that  rank  had  not  the  armistice  cut  short 
operations  and  all  promotions. 

It  is  frequently  said  that  figures  do  not  lie.  Perhaps 
so,  but  at  any  rate,  when  stated  thus  baldly,  they  do  not 
accurately  convey  the  whole  truth  through  failing  to  give 
a  complete  and  perfect  impression  of  their  full  meaning. 
As  a  measure  of  comparison,  it  may  be  convenient  to 
recall  that  the  combined  federal  and  confederate  forces 
under  Meade  and  Lee  at  Gettysburg  numbered  less  than 
160,000,  while  the  whole  of  the  great  armies  under 
[Wellington,  Napoleon,  and  Bliicher  at  Waterloo,  armies 
that  represented  the  best  part  of  the  peoples  of  Europe, 
totalled  about  .345,000  officers  and  men. 

As  the  new  military  engineer  had  been  created  during 
and  as  the  result  of  the  war,  so  the  engineer  forces  had 


10        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

to  be  developed  on  a  scale  wholly  out  of  proportion  to 
those  needed  in  any  previous  war.  It  was  a  great  task 
that  faced  the  American  engineers;  it  was  a  great  force 
that  was  needed  to  cope  with  it.  The  force  was  raised 
and  the  task  was  accomplished. 


CHAPTER  II 

THE  FIRST  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  war,  the  great 
majority  of  the  American  people  deceived  themselves 
with  the  comforting  belief  that  the  Atlantic  Ocean  sepa- 
rated them  so  effectually  from  European  politics  that,  in 
no  case,  could  the  war  be  any  affair  of  theirs  beyond  sell- 
ing to  the  belligerents  supplies  that  temporarily  they 
could  not  produce  for  themselves.  The  people  could  not 
see  that  mighty  forces  beyond  their  control  and  the  con- 
trol of  statesmen,  no  matter  how  wise,  were  slowly  but 
inexorably  drawing  them  into  the  conflict. 

The  echoes  of  Louvain,  of  Charleroi,  of  Joffre's 
masterly  retreat  and  victory  on  the  Marne  had  scarcely 
ceased  to  sound  before  some  American  engineers  realized 
that  the  war  had  already  brought  to  the  front  not  only 
new  problems  for  the  engineer  to  solve,  but  that,  if  the 
war  were  to  continue  beyond  the  stage  of  a  short  sharp 
campaign  on  which  the  Germans  based  their  plans  and 
hopes  for  victory,  there  would  be  a  call  for  engineers  and 
engineering  science  beyond  even  the  most  liberal  esti- 
mates of  military  authorities.  They  also  recognized,  if 
the  majority  of  their  fellow-countrymen  did  not,  that  each 
day  the  war  lasted,  made  our  participation  nearer  the 
inevitable.  To  the  lay  mind,  the  ocean  might  appear  to 
be  an  insuperable  barrier.  As  engineers  these  men  could 
see  in  their  trained  imagination  the  possibilities  of 
improvements  already  at  hand,  by  which  trooj^s  could  be 
transported  in  large  numbers,  and  to  them  there  was 
needed  but  the  demand  to  make  the  crossing  of  the  ocean 
feasible  not  only  by  ships  upon  the  surface,  but  by  sub- 
marines beneath  it  and  by  airplanes  or  dirigible  balloons 

11 


12        AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FEANCE 

above  it.  Tliey  knew  that  their  science  recognized  no 
limits  that  could  not  and  would  not  be  surpassed. 

As  early  as  February,  1915,  a  small  group  of  engineers 
met  at  a  luncheon  in  New  York  to  consider  plans  to 
prepare  the  members  of  the  civil  branch  of  the  profession 
to  meet  the  call  that  they  saw  coming. 

At  that  time  there  was  no  extensive  machinery  by 
which  either  engineers  could  receive  military  training  or 
whereby  the  Government  might  call  on  them  for  service 
if  needed.  A  very  few  engineers  in  some  states  could 
attach  themselves  to  units  of  the  National  Guard.  That 
was  all.  Some  years  previously,  the  United  States  Gov- 
ernment had  organized  the  Medical  Eeserve  in  which  doc- 
tors could  be  commissioned  as  offcers  of  the  army  in 
reserve,  to  be  called  to  service  when  needed,  and  again 
to  be  released  to  the  reserve  when  the  emergency  had 
passed.  This  groujD  of  engineers  decided  that  there 
might  well  be  organized  an  engineer  reserve  on  precisely 
similar  lines,  because  engineeTs,  like  doctors,  were  doing 
in  peace  time  and  in  their  ordinary  occupation  the  very 
things  that  they  would  be  required  to  do  if  called  to  war. 
As  a  result  of  this  quite  informal  gathering,  the  five 
national  engineering  societies  appointed  committees  to 
formulate  a  plan.  In  order  to  correlate  efforts,  a  joint 
committee  representing  all  the  engineering  institutions 
was  organized,  composed  of  the  chairmen  of  the  separate 
committees.  This  joint  committee  was  instructed  to  lay 
the  suggestion  of  an  Engineer  Officers'  Eeserve  Corps 
before  the  War  Department  for  consideration.  The  com- 
mittee was  cordially,  and  the  plan  proposed  sympa- 
thetically, received  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Garri- 
son, th:^  officers  of  the  General  Staff,  and  the  Chief  of 
Engineers,  Brigadier-General  Bixby. 

After  a  careful  analysis,  Brigadier-General  (after- 
ward General)  Tasker  11.  Bliss,  assistant  Chief  of  Staff, 


THE  FIRST  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS         13 

remarked  to  the  committee,  '*  You  have  proved  your  case 
so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  engineers,  but  why  restrict  it! 
"Why  not  extend  it  to  include  all  arms  of  the  service?  " 
Fifteen  months  later,  this  plan  became  an  actuality 
through  clauses  in  the  so-called  National  Defense  x\ct  of 
3rd  June,  191G,  whereby  the  Officers'  Reserve  Corps  was 
authorized  as  part  of  the  army  of  the  United  States. 
This  reserve  provided  the  highly  valuable  machinery  for 
quickly  commissioning  officers  during  the  spring  follow- 
ing, when  war  was  declared,  without  waiting  for  the 
complete  legislation  creating  the  National  Army,  the 
preparation  of  which  necessarily  involved  considerable 
delay.  The  basic  idea  of  the  Reserve  and  the  carrying  of 
it  into  effect  were  the  first  and  not  the  least  important 
contribution  by  the  engineering  profession. 

In  February,  1917,  Brigadier-General  (later  Major- 
General)  "William  M.  Black,  Chief  of  Engineers,  seeing 
that  the  storm  was  about  to  break  and  realizing  the  abso- 
lutely inadequate  size  of  engineer  troops  at  his  disposal, 
took  advantage  of  the  Reserve  Act  and  quietly  gave 
orders  for  the  organization  of  certain  reserve  regiments 
of  engineers,  and  thus  found  himself  in  a  position  to  com- 
ply with  the  first  call  made  on  the  United  States  when 
war  actually  came  —  a  call  for  engineers. 

Immediately  following  the  declaration  of  war  by  the 
United  States,  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and 
France  appointed  commissions  known  as  the  Balfour  and 
Viviani-Joffre  commissions,  to  discuss  with  the  Ameri- 
can Government  how  and  to  what  extent  it  could  most 
effectively  and  quickly  aid  the  common  cause.  These 
commissions  arrived  in  Washington  during  the  last  week 
in  April  and  after  suggesting  certain  general  principles 
of  financial  and  military  cooperation,  they  stated  that 
the  most  pressing  immediate  need  was  for  engineers. 
So,  while  our  Government  should  create  and  send  an 
army  as  quickly  as  possible,  they  requested  that  there 


14        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

be  raised  immediately  some  regiments  of  engineers. 
These  men,  while  they  must  be  equipped  and  made  ready 
for  any  emergency,  were  to  be  used  at  first  in  transporta- 
tion, in  the  building  and  maintaining  of  railway  lines 
from  the  coast  ports  to  the  front  line  trenches. 

The  War  Department  acted  promptly  on  the  Anglo- 
French  request  for  engineers,  and  ordered  nine  regi- 
ments raised.  These  regiments  were  known  later  as  the 
Eleventh  to  Nineteenth  Engineers,  both  numbers  inclu- 
sive. As  they  were  intended  primarily  for  railway  work, 
the  word  *'  railway  "  was  included  in  their  designations, 
but  in  actual  ser\ace,  as  their  work  broadened,  and  as 
they  were  called  on  for  all  classes  of  engineer  duty,  the 
word  *'  railway  "  was  soon  omitted  from  their  title. 

To  raise  them  quickly,  they  were  distributed  as  widely 
geographically  as  possible,  but  with  headquarters  at 
large  railway  centers,  so  as  to  reach  more  easily  the  class 
of  men  specially  sought.  The  places  of  concentration 
with  the  numbers  of  the  regiment  were : 

New  York Eleventh  Regiment 

St.  Louis Twelfth 

Chicago Thirteenth 

Boston Fourteenth 

Pittsburg Fifteenth 

Detroit Sixteenth 

Atlanta Seventeenth 

Pacific  Coast Eighteenth 

Philadelphia. . .  .  Nineteenth 

At  first,  they  were  spoken  of  as  *'  reserve  *'  regiments 
with  numerical  designations  beginning  with  No.  1,  but  on 
the  passage  of  the  act  authorizing  the  National  Army, 
the  term  **  reserve  **  was  dropped,  and  the  numbers 
changed  as  above.  Enlistment  for  the  New  York  regi- 
ment was  already  well  advanced  when  the  Anglo-French 


THE  FIRST  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS         15 

call  came,  but  its  commanding  officer,  realizing  that  an 
opportunity  was  presented  for  the  regiment  to  be  sent 
immediately  to  France,  accepted  the  offer  that  it  become 
one  of  the  first  nine  regiments. 

The  men  were  secured  for  the  most  part  by  calling  on 
the  executives  of  the  large  railway  systems  for  assistance 
and  for  permission  to  seek  volunteers  among  the  per- 
sonnel of  their  companies.  As  some  of  these  reg^iments 
were  intended  originally  for  specific  duties,  for  railway 
operation  like  the  Thirteenth,  for  railway  maintenance 
like  the  Fourteenth,  and  for  locomotive  and  car  repairs 
like  the  Nineteenth,  care  was  exercised  in  selecting  men 
and  officers  with  corresponding  experience.  But  in  the 
construction  regiments,  no  such  nice  distinction  was  nec- 
essary, and  an  intelligent  recruiting  officer  judged  appli- 
cants on  general  personal  qualifications,  so  that  a  strong, 
eager  typist  would  be  classed  probably  as  a  machinist, 
while  a  clear-eyed  clerk  without  any  mechanical  experi- 
ence, but  who  was  obviously  of  the  right  mental  and 
physical  character,  would  be  set  down  as  a  carpenter  if 
it  could  be  shown  that  he  had  even  once  nailed  up  a  pack- 
ing box.  Later  this  gave  the  company  commanders  some 
bad  moments  with  their  consciences  (at  the  beginning 
nearly  every  officer  had  such  a  handicap  as  a  conscience) 
in  their  struggles  to  show  that  their  several  companies 
had  the  proper  distribution  of  mechanical  trades  as 
required  by  the  regulations.  But  the  interesting  thing 
is  that  it  all  came  out  right  in  the  end;  the  typist,  after 
short  practice,  could  wield  a  pick  in  the  trenches  as  well 
as  anyone ;  the  dry  goods  clerk,  whose  knowledge  of  car- 
pentry was  so  limited,  soon  learned  to  lay  the  flooring 
on  a  bridge,  while  the  college  lad  with  no  field  experience 
of  any  land  would  never  fail  to  hit  his  mark  with  his 
rifle. 

One  case  that  comes  to  mind  was  that  of  a  quiet, 
reserved  private  classed  as  a  "  miner,"  but  who  was 


16       AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

found  to  have  been  in  civil  life  a  consulting  engineer 
with  an  extensive  and  lucrative  practice,  and  who,  among 
other  accomplishments,  was  able  to  take  charge  of 
Hindoo  laborers  and  direct  them  in  their  native  tongue. 
Later  he  was  advanced  from  the  ranks  to  be  a  professor 
of  geology  at  the  staff  college  at  General  Headquarters. 
Then  as  an  illustration  of  American  versatility  on  a  large 
and  not  an  individual  scale,  the  commanding  officer  of 
one  of  these  engineer  regiments  was  one  day  called  on 
to  send  200  picked  men  to  complete  a  theatre  with  a  seat- 
ing capacity  of  5,000,  the  assisting  unskilled  labor  to  be 
furnished  to  any  extent  necessary  by  neighboring 
infantry.  The  large  building  was  at  the  time  under  roof, 
but  without  sides  or  any  interior  fittings.  The  colonel 
made  no  selection  other  than  to  send  one  company  whose 
captain  could  be  depended  on  to  do  the  best  possible 
under  the  circumstances.  In  three  weeks  the  building 
was  enclosed,  tarred  paper  on  the  roof  to  make  it 
water-tight,  seats,  including  private  boxes  for  distin- 
guished guests,  in  place ;  electric  lights,  moving  picture 
apparatus  and  colored  spot  lights  for  the  stage  wired  and 
installed,  and  the  scenery  painted. 

The  officers  of  the  nine  regiments  were  for  the  most 
part  practicing  engineers  from  civil  life.  Some  had  had 
National  Guard  experience  or  Spanish  War  service; 
some  had  attended  training  camps  as  at  Plattsburg,  and 
a  few  were  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy  at  West 
Point  who  had  resigned  from  the  army.  In  all  cases  but 
one,  however,  the  colonel  and  adjutant  were  officers  of 
the  permanent  establishment,  the  one  exception  being  an 
officer  who  had  commanded  a  regiment  of  engineers  in 
1898  but  who  had  resigned  from  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
to  follow  a  commercial  career. 

At  the  time  when  these  regiments  were  recruited,  there 
were  no  provisions  of  law  for  a  draft,  so  that  all  enlist- 
ments were  voluntary,  and  an  exceedingly  high  average 


THE  FIRST  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS         17 

grade  of  man  resulted.  Many  university  graduates  and 
engineers  Holding  important  positions,  turned  away 
from  entering  officers'  training  camps  where  their  edu- 
cational advantages  would  have  soon  gained  commission 
recognition,  preferring  to  enlist  as  privates  out  of  a  high 
sense  of  patriotism  and  with  the  desire  to  be  among  the 
*'  first  to  France."  In  consequence,  every  one  of  those 
regiments  provided  a  large  number  of  officers  promoted 
from  the  ranks  to  fill  vacancies  in  their  own  cadre  or 
those  of  other  units,  or  for  staff  duty,  or  for  return  to 
the  United  States  to  officer  and  train  new  regiments  being 
formed.  Thus  the  Eleventh  regiment  created  no  fewer 
than  sixty-eight  new  officers,  and  when  it  returned  home, 
out  of  fifty-two  engineer  officers  on  duty,  forty-one  had 
entered  the  service  as  privates,  including  six  of  the  seven 
company  commanders. 

The  regiments  sailed  as  soon  as  their  equipment  had 
been  received,  men  sufficiently  trained  and  ships  became 
available.  They  readied  Europe  either  through  English 
or  French  ports  and  were  assigned  to  various  commands 
as  follows: 


REQIMENT 

DATE 
ARRIV.\L 

ASSIGNMENT 

15th 

20Julv,  1917 
27  JulV,  1917 
31  Jiilv,  1917 
12  Aug.  1917 
12  Aug.  1917 
12  Aug.  1917 
23x\ug.   1917 
23  Aug.   1917 

Araorican  railwa>-3 
British  forces 

11th 

13th 

French  forces 

14th 

British  forces 

12th 

British  forces 

17th 

Port  construction 

18th 

Port  construction 

19th 

Repairs  French  cars 

Their  work  from  the  very  beginning  formed  a  part  of 
nearly  every  ])liase  of  engineering  activity  in  France 
from  the  heavy  l)nt  highly  im]i(n-tant  construction  of 
docks  and  warehouses  and  terminal  yards  in  southern  or 


18        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

central  France,  where  fortunately  the  devastating  blight 
of  war  was  never  seen,  to  the  culminating  horrors  of  the 
final  weeks  in  the  Argonne,  where  no  less  than  six  of  the 
original  nine  regiments  served  in  unison.  They  con- 
structed and  maintained  railway  lines  all  over  France, 
they  were  charged  with  the  responsibility  for  the  highly 
important  light  railways  that  carried  ammunition  to  the 
forward  guns,  they  repaired  cars  and  locomotives,  they 
dug  and  held  battle  trenches,  they  built  bridges,  assisted 
in  water  supply  and  roads,  and  in  short,  no  group  of 
units  was  more  closely  identified  and  more  intimately 
associated  with  the  whole  field  of  engineering  work  in 
France. 

"When  the  call  for  Engineers  came  so  suddenly  and  so 
unexpectedly  as  the  most  pressing  need  to  be  first  satis- 
fied, the  War  Department  was  without  the  requisite 
detailed  knowledge  of  just  how  these  first  regiments 
should  be  equipped  and  constituted.  To  procure  this 
information  and  to  arrange  for  the  assignment  of  the 
regiments  on  their  arrival  in  France,  a  Commission  was 
despatched  immediately  to  Europe  to  confer  with  the 
British  and  French  military  authorities,  and  study  the 
actual  conditions  in  the  field.  The  Commission,  consist- 
ing of  Majors  Wm.  Barclay  Parsons  and  Wm.  J.  Wil- 
gus,  E.  0.  R.  C;  Capt.  A.  B.  Barber,  Corps  of 
Engineers,  and  Messrs.  W.  A.  Garrett  and  F.  de  St. 
Phalle,  received  their  orders  on  May  10,  1917,  and  were 
thus  the  first  military  men  except  hospital  units,  to  be 
sent  overseas.  The  three  officers  became  colonels  during 
the  war,  the  first  in  command  of  the  Eleventh  Engineers, 
the  second  as  Deputy  Director-General  of  Transportation 
and  the  third  on  the  General  Staff. 

This  commission,  after  a  rapid  inspection  of  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  fronts,  of  the  several  ports  in  France 
through  which  Amrlcan  troops  could  enter,  arid  of  the 
main  lines  of  railway  leading  from  the  ports  to  such  por- 
tions of  the  fighting  line  as  might  become  the  American 


THE  FIRST  AMERICAN  ENGINEERS        19 

sector,  reported  to  the  War  Department  that  the  task 
which  lay  ahead  was  far  bigger  and  more  difficult  than 
had  been  generally  supposed,  and  then  for  the  first  time 
gave  a  picture  of  what  American  engineers  and  Ameri- 
can engineers  only  must  do  if  victory  were  to  be  won. 
They  pointed  out  that  France  could  not  be  relied  on  for 
any  assistance.  Not  only  were  the  men  constituting  the 
army  to  be  sent  across  the  ocean,  but  also  all  their  sup- 
plies of  every  nature,  arms,  ammunition,  clothing,  food. 
To  permit  the  landing  of  the  men  and  their  supplies, 
there  must  be  berthing  places  for  the  ships.  But  these 
berthing  places  did  not  exist  and  the  material  for  them, 
the  piles  and  timbers,  were  probably  still  standing  in 
American  forests.  When  the  piles  and  stringers  for  the 
wharves  had  been  felled  and  sawed  to  size,  had  been 
sent  across  the  ocean  and  erected  into  whar\^es,  there 
were  no  camps  for  the  soldiers  to  move  into  or  stor- 
age buildings  to  house  the  perishable  supplies.  After 
landing  the  men  and  supplies,  they  could  not  be  moved 
from  the  base  ports  until  locomotives  and  cars  should  be 
sent  from  America,  because  France  no  longer  possessed 
enough  rolling  stock  to  meet  its  own  needs.  Nor  could 
France  equip  the  trains  thus  provided  with  the  required 
crews,  as  there  was  no  surplus  of  man  power.  Locomo- 
tive- and  train-men,  like  the  locomotives  and  cars,  must 
come  from  overseas,  and,  finally,  the  very  rails  must  be 
manufactured  and  sent  abroad  to  permit  the  moving  of 
the  trains  from  the  seaboard  to  the  front. 

It  was  an  appalling  picture,  but  subsequent  experience 
has  shown  that  if  the  commission  erred  in  judgment,  it 
was  In  underestimating  and  not  in  overestimating  the 
requirements.  If,  in  the  painting  of  the  picture,  they 
failed  to  make  the  blacks  deep  enough  and  the  reds  suf- 
ficiently Uirid,  they  did  succeed  in  making  clear  to  "Wash- 
ington th^t  at  least  there  was  a  great  part  for  the  engi- 
neers to  take. 


CHAPTER  III 

AMERICA'S  PROBLEM 

The  problem  presented  to  the  engineers  of  the  armies 
of  France,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  was  in 
principle  substantially  the  same  —  the  provision  of  ways 
of  offense  and  defense,  the  maintaining  of  all  lines  of 
communication,  the  transportation  of  men,  arms,  ammu- 
nition, and  supplies,  the  means  for  evacuating  the 
wounded  and  ill  men  and  provision  of  places  for  their 
care.  But  the  conditions  surrounding  the  problem  for 
each  separate  nation  were  so  lacking  in  similarity  that 
the  problems  themselves  differed  so  in  detail  as  to  become 
quite  distinct  one  from  the  other.  This  was  especially 
true  of  the  American  problem. 

If  France  had  the  misfortune  to  furnish  the  battle- 
fields, to  meet  directly  the  shock  of  war,  and  to  be  sub- 
jected to  all  the  intense  suffering  and  physical  destruc- 
tion while  her  cities  and  towns  and  very  fields  were  laid 
waste,  her  armies  had  at  least  the  advantage  of  fighting 
on  home  ground.  Many  supplies  had  to  be  brought  from 
abroad,  but  there  were  French  ports  and  port  facilities  to 
receive  them.  The  main  lines  of  interior  transportation, 
railways,  canals,  highroads,  either  belonged  to  the  Gov- 
ernment or  stood  ready  for  Government  use  with  their 
organizations  as  going  concerns  and  their  full  comple- 
ment of  trained  employees.  On  these  lines  there  might 
be  needed  from  time  to  time  some  readjustment  of 
details  or  connections  to  meet  the  changing  conditions 
brought  about  by  the  war,  but  comparatively  little  in  the 
way  of  the  creation  of  new  facilities.  For  France's  own 
supplies  that  were  produced  at  home,  every  farm,  every 
farm  building,  every  mine,  every  forest,  every  factory, 

20 


AMERICA'S  PROBLEM  21 

became  a  part  of  a  great  system  of  national  storehouses. 
From  the  mines  and  forests  conld  come  the  coal  and  ores 
and  timber  as  needed;  in  each  little  barn  could  be  stored 
the  crop  raised  on  the  adjacent  farm  and  it  could  be  kept 
there  safely  until  called  for.  The  output  of  the  factories 
was  consumed  as  fast  as  it  was  turned  out.  There  was, 
therefore,  little  or  no  need  for  new  vast  buildings  for 
holding  supplies.  When  soldiers  were  allowed  furlough, 
they  could  go  home  to  rest  or,  better  still,  to  work  on 
their  own  farms  —  as  was  usually  the  case.  "When  they 
were  convalescing  from  wounds  or  illness,  they  were  sent 
home  for  care.  In  either  case,  they  not  only  ceased  to 
be  a  burden  on  the  authorities,  but  frequently  became 
producers,  for  a  time  at  any  rate. 

France's  problem  can  be  called  a  national  rather  than 
an  engineers'  problem.  This  does  not  in  any  way  detract 
from  or  involve  a  lack  of  appreciation  of  what  France, 
the  French  nation,  and  the  French  General  Staff  accom- 
plished. Their  problem  was  a  mighty  one,  and  it  was 
solved  in  a  manner  that  will  win  increasing  admiration 
the  more  it  is  studied  as  future  ages  roll  by.  Only  it  was 
a  problem  different  from  that  presented  to  either  Great 
Britain  or  the  United  States. 

For  Great  Britain  the  war  was  not  one  at  home,  but 
abroad.  The  British  Government  had  to  arrange  to  send 
an  army  overseas  and  there  maintain  it.  For  this  army, 
England  was  the  base,  distant  only  30  to  120  miles 
from  the  French  coast,  according  to  ports.  It  is  true 
that  a  part  of  the  army  came  from  afar,  from  Canada, 
South  Africa,  India,  New  Zealand,  Australia,  her  colonies 
who  responded  so  nobly  to  the  call  for  imperial  defense, 
but  the  major  jDortion  came  from  the  little  islands  that  go 
to  make  Great  Britain  and  Ireland. 

To  Britain's  army,  aided  by  what  remained  of  Bel- 
gium's, was  assigned  in  general  that  portion  of  the  front 
extending  from  the  North  Sea  to  a  point  east  of  Amiens, 


22        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

but  varying  from  time  to  time  at  the  latter  end,  according 
as  the  line  of  division  between  the  British  right  and 
French  left  was  shifted.  To  provide  gateways  of  access 
to  this  territory,  the  French  turned  over  to  the  British 
and  for  their  exclusive  use,  all  ports  north  of  and  includ- 
ing Le  Havre;  that  is,  Le  Havre,  Dieppe,  Boulogne, 
Calais,  Dunkerque  and,  in  part,  Rouen.  A  glance  at  the 
map  of  France  shows  these  ports  to  be  in  a  line,  and 
roughly  speaking,  parallel  with  the  battle  front,  distant 
in  a  straight  line  only  fifty  miles  at  Calais  to  125 
miles  at  Havre.  The  important  arteries  of  railways 
as  well  as  some  3,500  miles  of  highways,  were  under 
British  control  for  maintenance  and  operation.  In  this 
area,  all  through  railway  traffic  was  suspended,  except 
coal  from  such  of  the  French  mines  north  of  Arras  as 
still  remained  out  of  German  hands.  Furthermore,  the 
civilian  population,  especially  toward  the  front,  had 
been  evacuated  to  a  great  extent,  thus  relieving  the  rail- 
ways of  a  large  part  of  pressing  local  commercial  traffic, 
and  permitting  them  to  be  devoted  almost  exclusively  to 
military  purposes.  This  minimum  of  civilian  interfer- 
ence and  the  shortness  of  the  haul,  rendered  the  problem 
of  military  transportation  in  the  north  as  simple  as  war 
conditions  permitted. 

Before  the  era  of  railways  there  was  constructed  in 
France  an  extensive  and  well  designed  system  of  canals 
covering  nearly  the  whole  country.  In  fact,  in  time  of 
peace  it  was  possible  to  go  by  boat  through  the  canals 
or  canalized  rivers  from  the  Rhine  in  Germany  to  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  or  Mediterranean  Sea.  These  canals  are 
of  two  classes  in  size.  On  the  first  class  boats  126  feet 
long  drawing  six  and  one-half  feet  and  with  a  burden 
of  300  tons  can  be  operated,  while  on  the  smaller  canals 
the  size  of  boat  is  reduced  to  one  of  seventy-five  tons. 
As  French  industrial  life  had,  to  a  great  extent,  adjusted 
itself  to  these  highly  useful  waterways,  in  fact,  the  only 


AMERICA'S  PROBLEM  23 

main  lines  of  transport  prior  to  the  introduction  of  steam 
railways,  the  whole  canal  system  had  been  maintained 
in  excellent  physical  and  operating  condition  up  to  the 
commencement  of  the  war.  In  the  British  sector,  the 
canals  which  reached  several  of  the  ports,  including 
Calais,  were  of  the  first  class,  and  proved  of  enormous 
benefit  to  the  British  army  by  reheving  the  railways  of 
a  burden  of  heavy  cumbersome  freight  for  which  fast 
transport  was  not  essential,  of  the  evacuation  of  some  of 
the  wounded  who  were  moved  more  comfortably  on  a 
slow  moving  canal  boat  than  on  a  noisy  jarring  train,  and 
of  much  materiel  that  could  be  sent  direct  from  English 
ports  in  barges  and  towed  through  the  canals  to  points 
of  consumption  without  breaking  bulk  or  rehandling. 
The  amount  of  materiel  thus  handled  monthly  exceeded 
300,000  tons. 

Great  Britain  could  not  rely  on  France  for  any  sup- 
plies except  some  lumber;  all  had  to  be  transported. 
Such  portion  of  the  supplies  as  came  from  overseas  was 
stored  in  England,  and  moved  from  there  as  needed, 
together  with  the  output  of  her  own  mines,  mills,  farms, 
and  factories.  For  the  British  army,  England  was,  there- 
fore, the  depot  and,  although  cut  off  by  water,  her  large 
and  efficient  na^y,  operating  from  its  own  bases,  was  able 
to  afford  reasonably  satisfactory  protection. 

Great  Britain's  men  who  were  wounded,  ill,  or  on 
leave,  could  be  and  were  taken  or  allowed  to  go  home 
almost  as  conveniently  as  were  the  French.  Although 
this  was  not  true  of  the  colonial  troops,  nevertheless  they 
could  go,  if  not  to  their  own  homes,  at  least  to  those  of 
their  own  people,  and  be  removed  from  a  foreign  even 
though  friendly  country  and  the  atmosphere  of  war. 

To  carry  men  and  materials  across  the  narrow  water- 
way between  England  and  France,  any  type  of  boat  could 
be  used,  in  fact,  the  moderately  small  vessel  was  the  most 
convenient.  They  were  easily  manoeuvered,  quickly  loaded 


24        AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

and  discharged,  less  subject  to  attack,  and  if  lost,  the  loss 
was  comparatively  small,  while  French  ports,  especially 
the  northern  ones,  were  by  original  construction,  adapted 
to  such  vessels.  These  smaller  cargo  carriers  provided  a 
steady,  continuous  inflow  of  men  and  freight,  and  when 
traffic  is  thus  delivered,  there  is  needed  but  the  minimum 
of  facilities  and  labor. 

On  account  of  the  nearness  of  the  base,  the  many  and 
short  lines  of  communication  in  France  by  rail,  canal 
and  water,  it  was  not  necessary  for  Great  Britain 
to  keep  on  hand  an  extraordinary  amount  of  supplies  in 
the  former  country.  In  fact,  enough  ammunition  and 
food  to  supply  the  army  for  two  or  at  most  three  weeks 
was  deemed  to  be  sufficiently  generous. 

The  difference  between  the  French  and  British  prob- 
lems lay  chiefly  in  the  separation  of  the  latter 's  base 
from  the  actual  theatre  of  operations  and  thereby  intro- 
ducing some  water  transjoort  for  men  and  all  materials. 

The  American  problem  resembled  the  British  in 
theory  in  that  the  base  lay  across  the"  water,  but  having 
stated  that,  further  resemblance  ceased.  The  details 
were  so  dissimilar,  the  distances  so  vastly  greater,  that 
the  American  problem  was  in  a  class  quite  by  itself. 

The  first  Commission,  as  explained  in  the  previous 
chapter,  reported  fully  to  Washington.  The  French  mili- 
tary authorities  were  very  frank  in  stating  that  the 
American  army  must  provide  itself  with  every  require- 
ment, that  to  France  it  could  look  for  nothing.  It  was 
the  same  as  if  an  army  were  planning  to  wage  war  in  a 
distant  and  desert  country  without  sufficient  ports,  with 
no  adequate  lines  of  communication  and  with  absolutely 
no  supplies  of  any  one  of  the  articles  needed  by  a  great 
army  in  a  modern  war. 

The  conditions  thus  laid  down  were  fixed  by  the  very 
necessities  of  the  situation  and  not  by  any  arbitrary  deci- 
sion of  the  French.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  before  the  war 


AMERICA'S  PROBLEM  25 

ended,  France  gave  the  world  a  number  of  surprising 
examples  of  her  latent  potentiality,  did  many  things  and 
furnished  many  sui:>plies,  including  such  articles  as  guns, 
ammunition,  tanks,  and  airplanes  which,  in  1917,  were 
deemed  to  be  absolutely  out  of  the  question. 

When  the  Commission  of  engineers  arrived  in  Europe, 
the  British  were  using,  to  their  full  capacity,  all  ports 
north  of  and  including  those  on  the  River  Seine.  Brest, 
the  French  insisted,  must  be  reserved  as  a  French  naval 
base.  Marseille  on  the  Mediterranean,  could  not  be  con- 
sidered available  on  account  of  exposure  of  approaching 
vessels  to  submarine  attack  in  the  straights  of  Gibraltar 
and  nearby  waters.  For  oicean-going  vessels,  this  left 
only  Nantes  and  St.  Nazaire  on  the  Loire,  Bordeaux  on 
the  Gironde  and  the  small  port  of  La  Rochelle  midway 
between  the  two.  Although  the  import  and  export  traf- 
fic of  France  had  been  curtailed  tremendously  by  the 
war,  the  portion  that  remained  was  concentrated  at  these 
places,  congesting  them  to  their  full  capacity,  and  if  there 
were  to  be  any  substantial  increment  in  ocean  traffic,  the 
facilities  for  berthing  and  discharging  the  ships  simj^ly 
did  not  exist. 

The  construction  of  wharves  and  piers  for  the  accom- 
modation of  vessels  is  not  the  simi^le  matter  along  the 
French  Atlantic  coast  that  it  is  for  the  ordinary  Ameri- 
can port,  where  some  piles,  heavy  timbers  for  floor  beams 
and  stout  planks  for  decking  suffice  and  can  be  put  in 
place  to  make  a  wharf.  Along  the  Atlantic  coast  of 
France  there  is  a  serious  daily  rise  and  fall  of  the  tide, 
which  greatly  hampered  rapid  work,  as  it  demanded 
special  details  of  construction  and  equipment.  This  vari- 
ation is  the  smallest  at  Pauillac,  near  the  mouth  of 
Gironde,  with  a  mean  of  13.7  feet  and  a  maximum  of 
18.1  on  spring  tides.  The  rise  increases  as  the  tidal 
wave  runs  along  the  coast,  reaching  the  great  figures  of 
21.7  feet  on  mean  and  28.3  feet  on  spring  tides  at  Treport. 


26        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Further  north  there  is  a  decrease,  the  variation  between 
liigh  and  low  water  at  Calais  being  16.2  feet  on  a  mean 
tide  and  21.0  feet  on  springs.  The  harbor  facilities  at 
St.  Nazaire  and  La  Rochelle  were,  therefore,  tidal  basins 
into  and  from  which  vessels  had  to  be  passed  through 
lock  gates  at  high  tide  only.  Such  basins  are  matters  of 
elaborate  construction  in  masonry,  are  permanent  in 
character,  and  offer  many  difficulties  for  alteration  or 
extension.  In  actuality,  radical  development  was  impos- 
sible because  surrounding  permanent  improvements  such 
as  streets,  buildings,  factories,  and  railways  prevented 
extension.  Bordeaux  and  its  subsidiary  port,  Bassens, 
across  the  river  and  some  five  miles  lower  down,  were 
about  seventy-five  miles  from  the  river  mouth,  with 
shoals  intervening  which  restricted  vessels  even  at  high 
water  to  a  maximum  draught  of  twenty-six  or  twenty- 
seven  feet.  All  these  places  were  really  no  more  than 
names.  For  American  purposes,  they  were  not  ports. 
The  French  promised  temporary  accommodations  for  a 
few  ships,  but  clearly  pointed  that  for  the  fleet  that  would 
eventually  arrive,  everything  must  be  constructed  and  all 
the  necessary  unloading  cranes  and  other  freight 
handling  machinery  must  be  purchased  in  America  and 
sent  out. 

The  British  authorities,  as  has  been  shown,  could  use 
the  existing  ports  which,  without  reconstruction,  were 
exactly  adapted  to  the  small  type  of  vessel  that  would 
naturally  be  used  in  cross-channel  traffic.  Further,  these 
vessels  could  be  expected  to  arrive  and  depart  at  a  sub- 
stantially constant  rate.  For  the  American  service,  the 
base  at  New  York  was  some  3,700  miles  away,  even  in 
a  direct  line,  and  long  miles  they  were  across  the  Atlantic 
waste  with  submarines  abounding.  To  cover  the  dis- 
tance, only  vessels  of  large  type  were  available,  and  after 
such  a  long  journey,  they  must  be  expected  to  arrive  at 
irregular  intervals.    As  a  matter  of  fact,  they  actually 


AMERICA'S  PROBLEM  27 

arrived  in  convoys  instead  of  singly,  making  the  prob- 
lem still  more  difficult,  because  the  coming  in  convoys 
involved  the  provision  of  accommodations  in  excess  of 
any  allowance  for  an  approximate  average  that  would 
ordinarily  be  assumed. 

The  conditions  surrounding  railway  transportation 
were  no  less  difficult.  "While  in  May,  1917,  no  definite 
statement  could  be  made  as  to  the  sector  to  be  assigned 
to  the  American  troops,  a  few  facts  stood  out  quite 
clearly.  The  British  sector  was  definitely  fixed.  The 
French  desired,  for  obvious  reasons,  where  if  sentiment 
played  a  part,  it  was  a  proper  and  very  forceful  part, 
that  only  French  trooj^s  should  cover  Paris.  For  similar 
reasons  of  sentiment  the  French  desired  to  retain  for 
their  own  occupation,  the  extreme  right  of  the  front  in 
Alsace  next  to  the  Swiss  frontier,  where  a  lodgment  had 
been  effected  in  1914  on  the  eastern  slope  of  the  Vosges 
in  Germany,  and  was  still  held.  The  American  sector 
had,  therefore,  to  find  a  place  between,  say,  Rheims  and 
the  department  of  the  Vosges.  It  is  now  interesting  to 
note  that  at  the  end  the  American  army  occupied  nearly 
the  whole  of  this  part  of  the  front. 

Talcing  Toul  as  the  center  of  gravity  of  a  probable 
American  sector,  the  distance  in  an  air  line  from  St. 
Nazaire  was  about  400  miles  and  slightly  more  than  that 
from  Bordeaux,  but  these  figures  would  be  very  greatly 
increased  by  following  any  selected  combination  of  pos- 
sible railway  routes.  This  was  a  very  different  matter 
from  the  corresponding  distance  between  the  British 
front  and  their  channel  ports  from  fifty  to  not  exceeding 
1l!5  miles.  The  difference  was  really  much  gi'cater  than 
the  numerical  ratio  of  eight  to  one  would  seem  to  indicate, 
liecause  the  routes  crossed  a  part  of  France  where  there 
remained  the  original  population  supplemented  by  the 
evacuated  ])eople  from  the  northern  departments.  All  the 
local  and  through  railway  traffic  had  to  be  uuiiutained, 


28        AMERICAN  ENGINP^ERS  IN  FRANCE 

because  on  this  part  of  the  country  France  depended  for 
the  greater  part  of  her  supplies  for  both  the  mihtary  and 
the  civilian  population. 

For  this  traffic  over  a  distance  as  great  as  from  Boston 
to  Washington,  there  was  no  rolling  stock  available,  not 
one  locomotive,  not  one  car!  The  French  railway  com- 
panies had  lost  much  equipment  through  captures  during 
the  first  two  months  of  the  war,  other  vehicles  had  been 
destroyed,  some  had  been  worn  out  in  the  ordinary  pro- 
cess of  use  and  had  been  discarded,  while  many  locomo- 
tives and  cars  were  so  completely  in  need  of  repair  as 
to  be  out  of  service  through  lack  of  men  to  attend  to  them. 
During  the  war  few  or  no  replacement  purchases  had 
been  made.  France  no  longer  had  enough  rolling  stock 
for  its  own  military  traffic  and,  therefore,  could  not  meet 
ours  even  in  part.  The  same  was  true  of  the  lines  them- 
selves. French  railways,  like  their  ports,  had  been 
adjusted  carefully,  very  carefully,  to  meet  commercial 
traffic  requirements  which  in  France  were  much  more 
constant  than  similar  requirements  in  America.  The 
lines,  if  they  had  rails,  could  carry  more  trains,  but  the 
real  measure  of  capacity  of  a  railway  is  how  many  cars 
can  be  passed  through  junction  points,  or  made  up  into 
trains  in  terminal  yards.  These  critical  points  were 
already  fully  congested.  But  not  all  the  rails  were  in 
place.  On  account  of  the  difficulty  and  expense  of  import- 
ing rails  from  America  and  in  order  to  meet  the  impera^- 
tive  calls  from  the  military  lines  at  the  front  which  must 
be  answered  at  all  costs,  the  French  authorities  had, 
during  the  two  years  preceding  our  entry  in  the  war, 
removed  the  rails  from  many  lines  of  secondary  impor- 
tance. Some  double-track  lines  had  been  reduced  to 
single  lines,  and  some  single  lines  had  temporarily  ceased 
to  exist  at  all.  Manj^  of  these  voids  must  be  refilled  to 
sustain  the  new  burdens. 

A  margin  of  supplies  in  France  that  might  be  gener- 


A^IERICA'S  PROBLEM  29 

ously  safe  for  British  demands  and  conditions  was  obvi- 
ously not  only  dangerously  narrow  for  American 
requirements,  but  quite  impossible  for  safety.  !\Yliat 
would  answer  for  a  waterway  thirty  miles  wide  would 
never  do  for  one  nearly  4,000  miles  wide.  But  it  was  not 
only  a  question  of  distance.  The  ocean-going  units  were 
necessarily  larger  as  we  have  seen.  The  loss  of  one 
would,  therefore,  be  exceedingly  serious  unless  there 
were  already  on  hand  in  France  surplus  supplies  similar 
to  the  lost  cargo.  Then,  even  at  best,  they  could  not  be 
counted  on  to  arrive  in  steady  flow,  as  the  small  vessels 
or  barges  at  Calais  and  Boulogne.  It  was  agreed  that 
nothing  less  than  a  supply  of  all  articles  to  carry  the 
American  army  for  sixty  days  without  replenishment 
could  suffice.  Later,  the  general  staff  increased  the  mini- 
mum to  ninety  days,  but  that  was  foimd  to  be  unneces- 
sarily liberal,  the  enemy  submarines  failing  to  be  as 
effective  as  was  feared  they  might  prove  to  be. 

By  the  word  ^'  supplies  ''  is  meant  not  only  the  food 
eaten,  uniforms  worn,  and  ammunition  expended,  but  a 
vast  category  of  articles  that  ordinarily  would  never  bo 
thought  of.  Hardware  and  tools  of  every  sort,  bakeries, 
cooking  outfits,  and  mechanical  laundries,  motors  big  and 
little,  carts  and  wagons,  railway  materiel,  plain  wire  for 
telegraph  and  telephone  lines  and  barbed  wire  for  entan- 
glements measured  by  thousands  of  miles,  harness  and 
saddlery,  medical  and  surgical  supplies  by  train  loads, 
pipes  large  and  small  with  pumps,  furniture,  and  house- 
keeping articles,  building  materials  of  almost  every 
nature,  coal,  oil  and  gasoline,  stationery  without  end.  Li 
the  Ordnance  Department  alone,  which  furnished  many 
articles  besides  arms  and  ammunition,  there  were  more 
than  100.000  separate  and  distinct  items  to  be  sent  to 
the  army  and  the  expenditure  of  this  one  department  to 
equip  an  amiy  of  5,000,000  men  was  estimated  to  be  more 
than  $12,000,000,000,  an  amount  equal  to  almost  half  the 


30        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

total  money  appropriated  by  all  the  congresses  of  tlie 
United  States,  from  the  first  continental  congress  down 
to  the  declaration  of  war.  Or,  to  pnt  it  in  another  way, 
the  rate  of  estimated  expenditure  by  this  department 
would  suffice  to  build  a  Panama  Canal  every  thirty  days. 
To  this  huge  mass  of  articles  were  to  be  added  the  manj^ 
things,  from  candies  and  playing  cards  to  books  and  spe- 
cial clothing  furnished  by  the  Red  Cross  and  other 
similar  organizations,  which,  if  not  an  integral  part  of 
the  army  supplies,  nevertheless  went  to  increase  in 
amount  and  variety  the  shij^ments  to  be  made  which, 
finally,  aggregated  the  enormous  total  of  7,500,000  tons. 

It  was  an  army  of  5,000,000  men  that  was  foreseen,  a 
number  equal  to  more  than  three-fourths  of  the  total 
population  of  the  City  of  New  York,  including  women  and 
children.  Let  it  be  recalled  that  without  outside  help 
and  in  spite  of  the  enormous  quantity  of  supplies  carried 
in  New  York's  stores  and  markets,  the  city  could  not  live 
for  more  than  two  weeks,  not  for  so  long  as  two  days  in 
some  items,  and  then,  perhaps,  a  mental  picture  can  be 
had  of  what  would  be  needed  to  maintain  such  a  fighting, 
working,  and  constructing  army  in  a  foreign  country  for 
three  months. 

For  these  supplies,  orderly  storage  space  must  be  pro- 
tvided  and  for  the  perishable  articles,  which  constituted 
a  very  large  part  of  the  whole,  there  must  be  water-tight 
buildings,  some  next  the  wharves  to  give  temporary  shel- 
ter when  the  cargoes  were  discharged  from  ships,  some  in 
great  main  supply  depots  inland,  some  in  more  advanced 
and  scattered  bases  near  the  battle  line  to  hold  the 
important  things  ready  for  immediate  use. 

Then  there  loomed  up  the  exceedingly  difficult  personal 
question.  France's  men  were  home.  Great  Britain's 
men  could  be  sent  home  from  time  to  time.  America's 
men  would  have  the  Atlantic  Ocean  between  them  and 
home.    Only  those  could  go  back  across  the  sea  who  were 


AMERICA'S  PROBLEM  31 

so  incapacitated  Ly  wounds  or  illness  as  to  Le  unfit  for 
further  service.  Provision  must  be  made  for  caring  not 
only  for  the  wounded,  but  for  those  convalescing  from 
slight  disability  who,  in  the  case  of  our  allies,  would  go 
to  their  homes  for  recuperation  and  the  best  form  of 
mental  as  well  as  physical  rest.  Then  there  would  be  the 
men  on  leave,  for  even  soldiers  must  have  a  little  relaxa- 
tion. They  could  not  be  turned  loose  in  France.  Rest 
areas  must  be  selected,  camps  laid  out  and  an  organiza- 
tion established  for  the  control  of  the  men. 

That  was  America's  problem  which,  in  bareadth  of  scope 
and  multitude  of  detail,  staggered  the  imagination.  In 
this  brief  sketch  of  the  picture  that  the  War  Department 
faced  in  the  spring  and  early  summer  of  1917,  no  refer- 
ence has  been  made  to  providing  for  the  necessities  of 
the  fighting  engineers,  the  men  who  were  to  be  engaged 
in  digging  trenches  and  holding  them,  in  reconstructing 
or  destroying  captured  fenemy  positions,  in  bridging 
streams,  or  in  doing  the  many  works  of  construction  inci- 
dent to  an  army  at  the  front.  All  such  work  was  com- 
mon to  the  armies  of  France,  Great  Britain,  and  the 
United  States,  dejDending  for  its  extent  on  the  length  of 
front  defended.  The  description  in  this  chapter  is  to 
show  where  and  in  what  respect  the  engineer  i^roblem  of 
the  three  allied  nations  differed  one  from  the  other. 

Of  course,  all  this  was  known  to  our  enemies.  It  is 
easy  to  imagine  how  the  Germans,  with  their  mental 
inclination  for  thorough  analysis,  worked  over  the  details 
of  the  problem.  [With  their  belief  in  their  own  invinci- 
bility and  their  unbounded  reliance  in  the  efficacy  of  the 
*'  U  "  boat,  they  easily  led  themselves  to  become  confi- 
dent beyond  any  doubt  that  the  problem  could  not  bei 
solved,  that  the  ships  to  carry  the  men  and  supplies  did 
not  exist,  and  even  if  built,  there  were  no  ports  to  accom- 
modate them  or  buildings  to  house  the  men  or  store  sup- 
plies, or  railways  to  move  them,  not  at  any  rate  for  some 


32        AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

years  and  long  "before  that  time  arrived,  tlie  Holienzollern 
standard  would  be  floating  over  the  ruins  of  Paris,  and 
their  own  brand  of  Kultur  and  barbarism  fettered  on  the 
world. 

Having  thus  determined  that  America  was  as  negligi- 
ble as  was  **  the  contemptible  little  army  of  England  "  in 
the  summer  of  1914,  the  campaign  of  ' '  Schrecklichkeit  ' ' 
became  a  perfectly  safe  policy  to  follow;  it  was  obviously 
wise  to  drown  helpless  women  and  children,  to  sink  hos- 
pital ships  and  disregard  all  rights  of  neutrals.  America 
was  powerless.  It  was  really  best  to  defy  her  so  as  to 
bring  her  into  the  dance  in  order  to  be  on  hand  to  pay 
the  fiddler's  bill  when  it  was  over. 


CHAPTEE  IV 

ENGINEER  ORGANIZATION 

An  army  at  war  is  employed  in  two  distinct  fields,  so 
distinct  that  tliey  naturally  lead  to  a  separation  of  imme- 
diate directive  control.  Tliere  is  that  part  of  the  army 
engaged  in  the  forward  area  in  actual  fighting,  which  for 
the  time  constitutes  the  combatant  force,  and  there  is 
the  remainder  of  the  army  occupied  in  undergoing  pre- 
liminary traiuiDg,  supervising  bases,  maintaining  lines 
of  commuication  or  resting  after  a  period  of  active  ser- 
vice. As  wars  have  become  more  complicated  with  a 
greater  and  more  varied  demand  for  all  sorts  of  supplies, 
these  latter  functions  have  developed  enormously  in 
importance,  calling  for  an  increased  proportion  of  the 
whole  force. 

The  normal  distribution  of  an  American  army, 
according  to  this  main  line  of  cleavage,  was  set 
forth  in  the  United  States  Field  Service  Eegula- 
tions,  the  little  book  that  was  supposed  to  be 
the  official  guide  for  the  army  during  a  war. 
But  its  teachings  failed  to  apply  in  France.  These 
regulations,  written  long  ago  with  additions  from  time  to 
time  to  conform  to  new  experience,  contemplated  only 
two  contingencies:  a  war  in  the  United  States,  where  the 
forces  would  be  at  home  acting  on  the  defensive,  or  a 
war  overseas  in  a  foreign  enemy  country,  where  they 
would  be  acting  on  the  offensive.  The  possibility  of  an 
American  army  operating  in  a  foreign  friendly  country, 
driving  an  invader  out  of  that  country,  and  for  practical 
purposes  being  on  the  defensive,  in  that  it  was  not  pos- 
sible to  take  advantage  of  captured  country  for  seizing 
supplies  or  converting  it  to  one's  own  use,  was  outside 

33 


34        AMEKICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

the  range  of  vision  of  this  otherwise  most  excellent 
work.  It  was  necessary  to  develop  a  new  organiza- 
tion to  meet  the  unforeseen  conditions  and  to  harmonize 
with  the  established  organizations  of  our  allies. 
The  Army  of  the  United  States,  of  course,  included  the 
whole  military  force,  no  matter  where  found,  whether  at 
home  or  abroad,  but  to  facilitate  operations  in  Europe, 
the  part  that  was  overseas  was  called  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force,  and  to  it  was  assigned  a  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. On  account  of  the  great  distance  sep- 
arating the  theatre  of  operations,  from  the  seat  of  the 
Government  in  ^Vashington,  and  because  the  A.  E.  F. 
was  cooperating  with  two  large  armies,  broader  powers 
were  necessarily  given  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  than 
the  Field  Service  Eegulations  contemplated  for  such  an 
officer.  The  part  of  the  army  that  remained  in  the  United 
States  (either  permanently  or  waiting  transportation 
overseas,  came  under  the  immediate  direction  of  the  War 
Department,  and  was  entirely  independent  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, American  Expeditionary  Force.  The 
officers  of  the  Department  controlled  all  matters  con- 
cerned with  the  organizing,  equipping,  and  training  of 
the  great  army,  the  erection  of  cantonments  to  hold  it, 
the  manufacture  or  purchase  of  the  stupendous  mass  of 
supplies  needed  by  an  active  army  in  the  field,  and  the 
building  or  acquisition  of  ships  to  carry  the  men  over- 
seas, their  equipment  and  supplies,  in  order  to  meet,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  requirements  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  American  Expeditionary  Force.  These  officers 
in  "Washington  were  not  limited  in  their  vision  to  the 
army  of  2,000,000  men  that  were  in  France,  but  had  in 
mind  and  demanding  their  attention  the  greater  army 
of  5,000,000  men  that  America  might  be  called  on  to  con- 
tribute if  the  war  should  continue  beyond  the  year  1918, 
which  then  seemed  likely.  Their  labors  were,  therefore, 
directed  towards  the  upbuilding  of  the  larger  unit. 


ENGINEER  ORGANIZATION  35 

The  Field  Service]  Regulations  divided  the  theatre  of 
war  into  two  zones,  the  Zone  of  the  Advance  and  the 
Zone  of  the  Rear,  the  latter  in  tlio  case  of  an  overseas 
war  to  include  the  home  service  and  water  transport. 
For  France  this  was  imi^ossible.  The  powers  and  respon- 
sibilities of  the  A.  E.  F.  began  only  with  the  coast  of 
France,  matters  of  ocean  transport  being  controlled  from 
>AYashington.  The  main  i:)rinci2)les  underlying  the  Field 
Service  Regulations  were  made  applicable  to  France  so 
far  as  was  possible,  and  the  territory  occupied  by  the 
A.  E.  F.  was  subdivided  into  the  Zone  of  the  Advance 
and  Service  of  the  Rear.  But  as  all  designations  and 
titles  were  abbreviated  into  their  initial  letters,  the  latter 
was  siDoken  of  as  the  S,  0.  R.  and  it  quickly  became  trans- 
formed into  the  ^'  Sore  "  Department.  ]\\''hether  or  not 
the  unfortunate  combination  of  letters  was  the  real  cause 
for  the  change  of  name,  the  men  in  the  field,  while  not 
knowing,  nevertheless  believed  it  to  be.  At  any  rate,  the 
Service  of  the  Rear  was  almost  immediately  changed  to 
the  Service  of  Supplies,  and  the  S.  0.  R.  became  the 
S.  0.  S. 

The  Zone  of  the  Advance  corresponded  to  the  similar 
zone  described  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations.  It  cov- 
ered the  area  in  which  all  active  operations  were  being 
carried  on  and  to  a  sufficient  depth  from  the  front  to 
include  the  troops  thus  assigned  whether  in  the  line  or 
in  reserve.  The  length  of  such  zone  was  the  length  of 
front  held,  the  width  varied  with  topography  and  local 
conditions,  but  roughly  speaking,  was  about  twenty 
niiles.  In  this  zone  the  authority  of  the  army  command- 
ers was  su]:>reme,  except  only  as  they  were  subordinate 
to  the  personal  direction  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

For  the  purpose  of  this  book,  it  is  not  necessary  to 
describe  at  length  the  complete  organization  of  the  Ser- 
vice of  Supphes,  which  cared  for  the  soldier  from  the 
moment  his  ship  came  in  sight  of  the  coast  of  France  imtil 


36        AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

his  departure  to  America.  Tlie  S.  0.  S.  clotlied,  housed, 
and  fed  him,  saT7  to  the  obtaining,  storing,  and  forward- 
ing of  his  arms  and  ammunition,  paid  and  insured  him, 
created  and  maintained  for  his  benefit  hospitals  and  rest 
camps,  kept  his  records;  ran  a  great  post  office  and  a 
telegraph  and  telephone  service;  established  enormous 
refrigerating  plants,  info  which  whole  cargoes  of  meats 
were  taken  with  ease,  bakeries,  shops  where  old  uni- 
forms, other  clothing  and  shoes  were  cleaned,  repaired, 
and  re-issued;  carried  into  effect  elaborate  construction 
of  ports  and  buildings,  and  operated  railways,  roads,  and 
canals ;  organized  a  police  system ;  in  short,  touched  every 
phase  of  a  soldier's  work,  life,  and  death,  and  extended 
its  delicate  machinery  over  all  of  France  and  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  harmonize  with  French  laws  and  estab- 
lished customs.  It  was  a  wonderful  organization,  but  for 
the  moment,  we  are  concerned  only  with  the  part  of  the 
Service  of  Supi^lies  that  controlled  engineers  and  their 
work. 

The  Service  of  Supplies,  being  something  new  to  an 
American  army,  naturally  passed  through  a  somewhat 
disturbed  period  of  evolution  before  it  finally  reached  a 
satisfactory  working  condition.  There  is  no  need  to  dis- 
cuss the  intermediate  stages,  except  to  say  that  as  the 
perfect  machine  was  being  erected,  there  were  many 
radical  changes.  Thus  the  transportation  department 
was  completely  transformed,  except  as  to  the  executive 
head,  finally  becoming  a  special  corps  and  reporting 
directly  to  the  Commanding  General,  S.  0.  S. 

The  huge  army  of  engineers  amounting,  as  was  shown 
above,  to  about  350,000  men,  demanded  a  complex  and 
very  carefully  adjusted  organization  that  on  one  hand 
maintained  rigid  military  authority  and  yet  pennitted 
freedom  of  thought  and  even  of  action  by  which  the  new 
problems  in  the  application  of  science  that  arose  almost 
daily   could  be    solved.     The   organization   had   to    be 


ENGINEER  ORGANIZATION  37 

devised  so  as  to  direct  th'e  great  force  scattered  all  over 
France,  to  create,  lay  out,  and  supervise  its  work,  to 
insure  coordination  and  cooperation,  to  avoid  friction 
and  especially  conflict  of  authority,  to  be  so  flexible  that 
whole  units  could  be  transferred  promptly  from  one 
department  to  another,  to  furnish  channels  of  communi- 
cation, and  for  the  exercise  of  command  that  should 
ramify  throughout  the  services  of  both  the  Zone  of 
the  Advance  and  of  Supplies.  Such  an  organization  had 
never  been  attempted  in  the  Corps  of  Engineers. 

It  was  quite  impossible  to  bring  all  these  engineers 
under  one  control,  except  that  nominally  exercised  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief.  As  with  the  army  as  a  whole,  the 
engineers  were  divided  first  into  two  main  classes,  those 
serving  in  the  Zone  of  the  Armies  and  those  in  the  Serv- 
ice of  Supiolies.  In  this  case  the  expression  **  Zone 
of  the  Armies  '^  is  intentionally  used  rather  than  **  Zone 
of  the  Advance,"  because  for  certain  administrative  pur- 
poses it  was  not  possible  to  have  all  lines  of  demarkation 
between  the  two  zones  exactly  coincident,  and  many 
troops  assigned  to  and  under  the  control  of  the  S.  0.  S. 
were  engaged  in  the  Zone  of  the  Advance. 

For  the  non-military  reader,  it  may  be  convenient  to 
recall  that  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  was 
divided  into  armies.  At  the  time  of  signing  the  armis- 
tice, there  were  two  such  armies  actually  in  the  field  with 
a  third  in  process  of  formation,  which  became  subse- 
quently the  Army  of  Occupation.  An  army  is  composed 
of  several  corps,  each  corps  of  divisions,  each  division 
of  brigades,  and  each  brigade  of  regiments,  with  certain 
attached  special  troops  in  each  case. 

To  every  army,  certain  engineer  regiments  were 
assigned,  reporting  to  and  rccci\nng  orders  from  th(§ 
Army  Chief  Engineer  who  was  on  the  staff  of  the  Army 
Commander.  These  regiments  were  engaged  with  all 
jnatters  of  heavi''  construction  that  were  the  concern  of 


38        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

the  army  as  a  whole.  The  chief  engineer  of  an  army 
was  charged  with  the  location  and  construction  of  new 
main  railways  and  the  repair  and  maintenance  of  old 
ones.  He  saw  to  the  building  of  roads,  of  light  rail- 
ways to  serve  troop  and  advanced  artillery  positions; 
the  locating  of  quarries  from  which  might  be  procured 
stone  for  road  metal  or  railway  ballast;  bridges;  the 
finding  of  a  satisfactory  service  of  water  supply  and  its 
distribution;  the  construction  of  secondary  lines  of 
trenches  and  defensive  works  of  a  permanent  character ; 
tunnelling  and  mining  operations;  the  surveying  and 
mapping  of  the  territory  occupied  by  his  army  or  likely 
to  be  occupied  by  it ;  the  care  of  electrical  and  other  spe- 
cial machinery  used  in  his  army  area ;  the  determination 
of  enemy  battery  positions  by  sound  and  flash  ranging; 
the  study  of  the  geological  conditions  in  the  army  area 
and  the  camouflage  protection  of  the  guns,  controlling 
positions,  or  important  buildings.  For  these  varied  and 
complicated  duties  he  was  given  special  troops  which,  on 
account  of  their  detail,  were  called  army  troops. 

Other  engineer  units  were  attached  to  a  corps  under  the 
general  command  of  the  corps  engineer  on  the  staff  of 
the  corps  commander.  The  functions  of  the  corps  engi- 
neers were  similar  to  those  of  army  engineers,  but 
geographically,  were  more  restricted,  being  confined  to 
the  operations  by  the  corps  taken  as  a  whole.  The  num- 
ber of  troops  thus  attached  to  army  or  corps  was  not 
fixed  by  any  regulation  or  general  order,  but  varied 
according  to  the  fluctuating  demand  of  the  movements 
under  consideration  or  in  hand. 

With  each  division  and  forming  an  integral  part  of  it, 
was  one  regiment  of  engineers,  whose  commanding  officer 
was  ex  officio  division  engineer  on  the  staff  of  the  divi- 
sion commander.  This  regiment  executed  all  construc- 
tion work  that  was  assigned  to  a  division  or  to  any  of 
its  component  brigades.    It  maintained  the  local  lines  of 


ENGINEER  ORGANIZATION  39- 

conunimication,  sited  and  dug  trenches,  laid  out  and  built 
forward  defense  works,  and  strung  the  barbed 
wire  entanglements,  erected  temporary  or  small 
bridges,  made  surveys,  drained  camps,  and  did  all 
the  things  of  a  structural  nature  required  by  the 
men  on  the  fighting  line.  In  the  case  of  an 
advance,  the  engineers  went  forward  with  the  divi- 
sion, bridging  streams,  repairing  roads,  consolidating 
the  captured  enemy  positions  by  reversing  their  face  and 
repairing  shell  damage,  and  erecting  n»w  wire  entangle- 
ments. If  the  advance  were  only  a  raid,  that  is,  an  attack 
followed  by  an  immediate  withdrawal  before  an  enemy 
counter  attack  could  be  launched,  the  engineers  destroyed 
enemy  guns,  dugouts,  trenches,  and  all  other  works  in 
the  time  available.  In  case  of  retreat,  they  formed  part 
of  the  rear  guard,  demolishing  roads  and  bridges  or 
erecting  obstacles  to  delay  the  enemy  pursuit.  For- 
tunately, in  the  war  just  ended,  American  engineers  were^ 
not  called  on  for  this  last  duty.  ?^Yhile  all  special  troops 
were  spared  as  much  as  possible,  the  army,  corps, 
or  division  engineers  were  always  regarded  as  available 
to  be  used  as  infantry  in  case  of  emergency,  and  were 
frequently  detailed  to  hold  and  defend  by  hard  fighting, 
the  trenches  that  they  had  built. 

It  is  not  without  interest  to  point  out  in  connection 
with  actual  fighting  that  the  ratio  of  death  casualties 
in  battle  among  officers  to  similar  casualties  among  men 
was  higher  with  the  engineers  than  with  the  infantry, 
artillery,  or  cavalry,  and  that  the  number  of  battle  deaths 
per  thousand  officers  and  men  of  each  arm  in  France 
was  greater  in  the  engineers  than  in  either  the  artillery 
or  cavalry,  being  exceeded  only  by  the  infantry. 

The  total  number  of  engineers,  including  attached 
auxiliniy  troops  acting  in  the  Zone  of  the  Advance  with 
armies,  corps,  or  divisions,  exceeded  100,000  men. 

Engineers  in  the  Service  of  Supplies  were  nominally 
under  the  control  of  the  Commanding  General,  S.  0.  S., 


'40        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

through  various  channels.  The  senior  officer,  from  whom 
they  received  orders,  was  the  Chief  Engineer,  A.  E.  F., 
an  officer  on  the  staff  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  This 
office  was  held  first  by  Brigadier-General  Harry  Taylor 
and  finally  by  Major-General  Wilham  C.  Langfitt  (orig- 
inally Colonel,  Thirteenth  Engineers),  both  members  of 
the  Corps  of  Engineers,  U.  S.  A. 

Although  nominally  an  officer  of  General  Headquar- 
ters, the  Chief  Engineer,  for  reasons  of  convenience, 
established  his  headquarters  not  at  G.H.Q.,  at  Chaumont, 
but  at  the  headquarters  of  the  S.  0.  S.  at  Tours.  As 
Chief  Engineer,  A.  E.  F.,  he  had  charge  of  all  engineering 
construction  and  work  in  France,  both  within  and  without 
the  Zone  of  the  Advance,  and  came,  therefore,  in  contact 
with  the  army  commanders  and  the  Commanding  Gen- 
eral, S.  0.  S. 

The  work  of  the  engineers  in  the  army  zone  has  already 
been  outlined.  The  channel  of  communication  between  the 
higher  engineer  command,  the  Chief  Engineer,  A.  E.  F., 
and  the  chief  engineers  of  the  armies  was  maintained 
first  through  the  Director  of  Military  Engineering  and 
Engineer  Supplies  (D.  M.  E.  and  E.  S.  for  short)  on  the 
staff  of  the  Chief  Engineer  at  Tours,  and  finally,  as  the 
extent  of  the  American  operations  increased,  through  an 
assistant  to  the  Chief  Engineer  at  G.  H.  Q. 

All  construction  work,  if  in  connection  with  ports  and 
harbors,  railways,  water  supply,  buildings,  hospitals,  etc., 
and  also  all  forestry  operations  were  imder  the  control 
of  the  Director  of  Construction  and  Forestry,  Brigadier- 
General  Edgar  Jadwin,  original  Colonel  of  the  Fifteenth 
Engineers,  the  first  engineer  regiment  to  reach  France, 
who  reported  to  the  Chief  Engineer.  During  the  early 
days  of  American  activity  in  France,  railway  construc- 
tion was  executed  by  engineers  attached  to  the  Trans- 
portation Department,  but  finally  all  such  forces  were 
transferred  to  the  Director  of  Construction  and  Forestry, 
who,  therefore,  had  charge  of  all  construction  of  what- 
ever nature  outside  of  the  zone  of  the  armies. 


ENGINEER  ORGANIZATION  41 

Coordinating  vdih.  the  D.  C.  and  F.  was  the 
Director  of  Light  Railways  and  Roads,  D.  L.  R. 
and  R.,  at  first  General  Langfitt,  but  at  the  last 
Brigadier- General  Charles  H.  McKinistry,  first 
Colonel  of  the  Eleventh  Engineers.  It  will  thus 
'be  seen  that  the  first  nine  engineer  Regiments  fur- 
nished four  general  officers  for  high  staff  command, 
the  above  three,  and  Brigadier-General  Herbert  Deak^Tie, 
first  Colonel  of  the  Nineteenth  Engineers,  who  was  made 
Chief  Engineer,  Second  Army,  on  its  constitution.  The 
Director  of  Light  Railways  and  Roads  had  charge  of  all 
light  railways,  including  the  principal  repair  shop  and 
roads  except  such  portions  of  both  light  railways  and 
roads  as  lay  within  the  Zone  of  the  Advance,  which  it  was 
deemed  best  to  place  under  the  control  of  the  army  com- 
manders.   The  Director  reported  to  the  Chief  Engineer. 

The  extended  and  complex  powers  of  the  Director  of 
Construction  and  Forestry  were  exercised  through  a 
series  of  section  engineers,  usually  officers  with  the  rank 
of  colonel,  among  whom  was  distributed  the  work  as  con- 
tained in  certain  arbitrarily  defined  areas.  Under  the 
general  command  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  acting  princi- 
pally through  the  Director  of  Construction  and  Forestry 
and  the  Director  of  Light  Railways  and  Roads,  there  was 
a  force,  as  has  been  shown,  of  more  than  100,000  officers 
and  men. 

The  next  largest  aggregation  of  engineers  was  found 
in  the  Department  of  Transportation,  a  department  that 
would  have  been  in  another  year,  one  of  the  largest,  if 
not  the  largest  department,  in  the  A.  E.  F.  The  Transpor- 
tation Corps  had  charge  of  the  operation  of  all  standard 
gauge  railway  lines  assigned  to  American  use ;  of  terminal 
and  storage  yards ;  of  trains  worked  by  American  train- 
men on  French  railways ;  of  a  largo  central  machine  sho]) 
with  smaller  subsidiary  shops  for  the  repairs  of  locomo- 
tives and  cars;  of  the  movement  of  traffic  on  canals  and 


42        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

tlie  j^reparation  of  plans  for  new  railway  construction 
to  be  carried  out  by  the  D.  C.  and  F.  This  department 
was  composed  of  about  G0,000  eugiueer  officers  and  men 
under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  W.  AV.  Atter- 
bury,  formerly  Vice-President  of  the  Pennsylvania  Rail- 
road, and  an  engineer  by  profession,  with  the  title  of 
Director-General  of  Transportation,  abbreviated  to 
D.  G.  T.  lie  was  independent  of  the  Cliief  Engineer, 
except  as  the  latter  constructed  the  lines,  yards  and 
structures  to  be  used  by  his  department  and  reported 
directly  to  the  Commanding  General,  S.  0.  S.  As 
the  duties  of  the  D.  G.  T.  increased,  a  new  and  sepa- 
rate corps,  known  as  the  Railway  Transportation  Corps 
(R.  T.  C),  was  created,  and  all  engineer  officers  con- 
nected with  transportation  were  recommissioned,  if  not 
originally  commissioned,  as  officers  of  that  corps. 

At  General  Headquarters  and  elsewhere,  there  were 
some  scattered  engineer  units,  which,  while  not  compara- 
tively large  in  numbers,  had  charge  of  work  of  the 
highest  importance.  These  were  the  engineers  engaged 
in  the  making  and  printing  of  army  maps,  in  the  study  of 
the  general  geology  of  France,  in  the  development  and 
working  of  apparatus  for  discovering  enemy  guns  or 
airplanes  at  night  by  sound  or  flash,  and  in  camouflage. 
They  came  imder  the  supervision  of  the  Chief  Engineer. 

Then  there  were  engineers  in  the  Motor  Transport 
Corps.  As  motors  varying  in  type  from  high  speed 
motor  cycles  to  huge  motor  trucks  and  tractors  began  to 
arrive  literally  by  tens  of  thousands,  it  soon  became  evi- 
dent that  another  new  field  of  army  work  had  been 
opened,  a  field  so  large  and  so  important  as  to  be  worthy 
of  an  independent  status.  These  motors  had  not  only  to 
be  sot  up  and  run,  but  maintained  and  repaired,  requiring 
for  the  last  a  special  shop.  The  Motor  Transport  Corps 
was  organized,  and  as  it  had  reference  to  troop  and  sup- 
ply movement,  it  was  made  a  department  of  the  Quarter- 
master Corps. 


CHAPTEE  Y 

PORTS 

In  the  chapter  on  America's  Problem,  it  was  there 
shown  that  one  of  the  great  difficulties,  perhaps  thei 
greatest,  in  1917,  was  to  find  and  prepare  gateways 
through  which  the  army;  that  the  i\Yar  Department  had 
begun  to  raise,  with  all  its  guns,  ammunition  and  other 
stores,  could  enter  France.  At  that  time  the  number  of 
500,000  men  was  spoken  of  as  the  American  contribution. 
To  receive  even  this  number  seemed  to  those  first  on  the 
ground  a  staggering  problem  when  they  saw  that  France 
never  had  possessed  port  facilities  much  in  excess  of  her 
own  requirements,  that  her  northern  ports  had  been 
assigned  to  British  use  and  that  natural  physical  fea- 
tures forbade  rapid  construction  of  additional  accommo- 
dations. How  much  more  staggering  it  would  have 
appeared  had  it  been  known  that  provision  must  be  made 
for  an  ultimate  army  of  4,000,000  men,  of  whom  more 
than  half  werg  actually  to  reach  France,  and  that  during 
each  of  three  consecutive^  months  300,000  men,  with  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  of  tons  of  freight,  would  be  landed  I 
Sometimes  ignorance,  plain  dense  ignorance,  is  an  ever 
present  help  in  time  of  trouble. 

,To  the  Engineer  Commission  there  appeared  to  be  only 
two  localities  susceptible  of  sufficient  development  to  fur- 
nish immediate  relief,  the  lower  reaches  of  the  Loire  and 
the  Giroude-Oaronne  Pivers. 

About  seventy  miles  from  the  bar  marking  the 
entrance  to  the  Gironde  is  Bordeairs:,  located  on  the 
Garonne,  which  river,  with  the  Dordogne,  makes  Ihe 
Gironde.  Vessels  drawing  twenty-eight  feet  can  ascend 
as  far  as  Bordeaux,  the  head  of  masted  vessel  naviga- 

'43 


44        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

tion,  but  a  tidal  rise  of  about  ten  feet  demands  that  the 
passage  be  made  at  high  water  in  order  to  be  able  to 
cross  certain  shoals. 

Six  miles  below  Bordeaux  and  on  the  opposite  or  right 
bank  of  the  Garonne  is  Bassens,  where  the  French  had 
constructed  wharves  to  furnish  facilities  for  some  war 
industries,  which  they  were  extending  in  the  spring  of 
1917  so  as  to  provide  accommodations  for  ten  steamships. 
Of  these  wharves,  seven  were  finished.  The  French  har- 
bor authorities  pointed  out  that  a  second  development  at 
least  as  large  as  the  one  in  hand  could  be  constructed 
immediately  adjacent  to  those  already  built,  and  until 
that  was  completed,  some  of  the  berths,  perhaps  seven, 
could  be  placed  temporarily  at  American  service.  On  the 
other  hand,  Nantes  and  St.  Nazaire,  neighboring  places 
on  the  Loire,  offered  many  immediate  advantages.  Four 
berths  at  the  former  and  five  at  the  latter  were  available 
at  once,  while  St.  Nazaire,  situated  at  the  river  mouth, 
had  twenty-nine  feet  of  water  on  the  lock  sills  (like  many 
French  ports,  it  consisted  of  a  tidal  basin)  and  was 
equipped  with  large  lift  cranes,  capable  of  handling  the 
heaviest  weights. 

By  July,  1917,  the  French  made  the  following  assign- 
ment of  existing  facilities  to  continue  until  such  time  as 
they  could  be  replaced  by  new  construction: 

St.  Nazaire 5  berths 

Nantes 4  berths 

Bassens 7  berths 

Pauillac  (on  the  Gironde) . .  2  berths 

La  Pallice 2  berths 


20  berths 


But  it  was  clearly  apparent  to  everyone  that  this  total 
of  shipping  accommodation  would  pc  quite  insufficient  for 
the  American  army  whose   size  people  were   already 


PORTS  45 

beginning  to  recognize  'vrould.  exceed  the  early  estimates. 
^Vhat  fonn  the  additional  facilities  should  tali:e  and 
where  they;  :were  to  be  located  was  the  subject  of  much 
discussion.  SV'ith  no  thought  that  they;  were  to  be  the 
sole  creations,  it  was  decided  to  build,  first  and  simul- 
taneously, at  La  Martiniere  on  the  Loire  and  at  Bassens 
continuous  wharves  capable  of  accommodating  ten  shipa 
each.  The  former  project  was,  however,  soon  abandoned 
on  account  of  unsatisfactory  foundation  questions,  leav- 
ing Bassens  as  the  only  scheme  authorized  during  1917. 

It  was  decided  that  probably  forty  per  cent  of  the 
A.  E.  F.  cargo  could  bo  brought  into  the  Girond^  River 
and  handled  iDrincipally  at  Bassens,  although  some  of 
it  could  be  taken  care  of  at  Pauillac,  where  the  French 
had  built  a  wharf  capable  of  accommodating  four  or  five 
vessels.  Being  located  near  the  mouth  of  the  river,  this 
port  was  somewhat  more  convenient  than  Bassens  higher 
up.  At  Bassens  the  French,  according  to  promise,  turned 
over  to  American  use,  seven  of  the  ten  berths  which  they 
had  built  there.  Subsequently,  as  they  did  on  many 
another  occasion,  they  exceeded  their  promises  of 
cooperation  and  finally  all  ten  berths  were  given  over  to 
permanent  American  occupation. 

After  a  trying  wait  during  several  months  for  mate- 
rials to  arrive,  work  was  started  in  November,  1917,  on 
a  ton-berth  American  wharf  immediately  below  the 
French  wharf,  which  was  ready  for  taking  vessels  in  the 
following  March.  This  wharf  had  a  length  of  4,100  feet 
and  a  width  of  eighty-two  feet.  In  order  to  get  it  in  use 
as  rapidly  as  possible,  it  was  designed  according  to  what 
might  be  known  as  j;\jmorican  ty]")ical  wharf  construction, 
using  wooden  piles  and  wooden  stringers,  covered  with 
heavy  planks.  As  finally  constructed  there  were  used  no 
less  than  11,000  piles  and  4,500,000  feet  board  measure  of 
timber,  nearly  the  whole  of  which  came  from  American 
forests. 

4  7  'i 


46        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

The  Paris-Orleans  Railwaj^  Companj^  Had  a  branch 
leading  to  the  French  wharfs.  The  American  engineers 
constructed,  in  connection  with  their  own  wharves,  ample 
switching  facilities,  including  both  classification  and 
departure  yards,  together  with  additional  tracks  connect- 
ing the  French  wharves  with  the  American  wharves,  so 
as  to  make  a  complete  and  unified  plant  to  accommodate 
twenty  ocean-going  vessels  simultaneously. 

The  American  wharves  were  equipped  with  forty  large 
American  gantry  cranes  for  the  rapid  unloading  of 
cargo.  A  continuous  line  of  warehouses  was  erected  in 
order  to  furnish  immediate  protection  to  perishable 
goods  pending  their  reshipment  to  warehouse  depots  in 
the  interior.  This  construction,  with  its  many  large  rail- 
way yards  and  trackage,  is  the  only  American  project 
completely  equipped  prior  to  the  armistice  and  it  stands 
as  evidence  of  what  the  A.  E.  F.  would  have  done  in  the 
line  of  wharf  and  other  construction  had  the  war  con- 
tinued. The  gantry  crane  equipment  used  on  this  ter- 
minal project  more  than  fulfilled  the  expectations  of 
those  who  were  responsible  for  its  installation,  and  Bas- 
sens  became  the  chief  port  of  entry  for  American  cargoes. 

[With  the  failure  to  develop  La  Martiniere  on  the  Loire, 
Montoir  was  selected  as  the  site  for  the  chief  Ameri- 
can port  on  that  river.  The  original  plan  called  for  a 
wharf  3,230  feet  long,  to  accommodate  eight  vessels 
simultaneously,  with  a  double-track  trestle  bridge  4,000 
feet  in  length.  Owing  to  the  lack  of  construction  mate- 
rials and  the  difficulty  in  finding  a  satisfactory  location 
for  this  project,  due  to  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  river 
bottom,  there  was  considerable  delay  in  commencing  the 
work.  In  fact,  it  was  not  started  until  July,  1918.  At 
the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  armistice,  the  work  was 
well  advanced  and  would  have  been  ready  for  complete 
operation  early  in  1919.  In  view  of  the  cessation  of  hos- 
tilities, it  was  decided  to  concentrate  work  of  construe- 


PORTS  47 

tion  on  tiie  completion  of  three  berths  and  these  were 
finished  in  January,  1919.  This  wharf,  Hke  the  one  at 
Bassens,  was  of  the  American  type,  but  it  is  interesting- 
to  note  that  material  for  it  came  from  France,  the  French 
reversing  their  first  decision  that  wharf  material  could 
not  be  obtained  in  Europe.  The  i^iles,  which  varied  in. 
length  from  eighty  to  one  hundred  feet,  came  from  trees 
cut  in  the  .Vosgcs  Mountains.  Tvhile  the  work  at  Mon- 
toir  was  being  carried  out,  the  American  transportation 
service  used  the  berths  at  Nantes  and  St.  Kazaire,  which 
had  been  turned  over  by  the  French.  Nantes  being 
higher  up  the  river,  could  accommodate  vessels  whose 
draft  did  not  exceed  twenty-three  feet.  Traffic  to  this 
point  was,  therefore,  restricted  to  light-draft,  cross- 
channel  vessels  or  for  larger  ocean-going  vessels,  part 
of  whose  cargo  had  been  taken  off  usually  by  lighters  at 
St.  Nazaire,  thus  reducing  their  draft  to  such  a  figure  as 
iwould  permit  them  to  ascend  the  river  to  Nantes. 

At  the  very  beginning,  Brest  had  been  set  aside  as  not 
available,  because  it  lacked  extensive  terminal  facilities. 
There  were  no  berths  available  where  vessels  drawing 
twenty-seven  feet  could  come"  alongside  and,  conse- 
quently, everything  had  to  be  handled  by  lighter.  Brest 
was  the  chief  French  naval  base  on  the  Atlantic  Ocean, 
therefore  the  Government  accommodations  were  entirely 
reserved  for  its  own  use,  while  the  most  valuable  portion 
of  the  commercial  port  was  congested  with  ships  bring- 
ing in  munitions  for  Eussia  and  Eoumania. 

Another  disadvantage  in  the  Brest  situation  was 
that  the  outward  railway  haul  was  over  hea-\y  gradients 
and  was  200  miles  longer  to  the  American  sector 
than  the  line  from  St.  Nazaire,  and  in  order  that 
freight  from  Brest  could  reach  the'  American  lines  of 
communication,  it  was  necessary  that  it  pass  over  a 
Bmgle-track  line  from  Le  Mans  to  Tours.  The  topog- 
raphy of  the  harbor  frontage  precluded  the  possibility 


48        AMEEIGAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

of  expansion  except  at  a  proliibitory  cost  botli  in  money 
and  in  time  for  development.  During  the  autunm  of  1917 
and  the  spring  of  1918,  the  only  nse  that  the  Americans 
made  of  Brest  was  one  lighterage  wharf.  Consequently 
all  troops  and  cargo  arriving  at  Brest  were  discharged 
at  this  wharf  after  having  been  unloaded  from  the  trans- 
port vessel  on  to  lighters. 

With  the  beginning  of  the  German  offensive  in  March, 
1918,  and  with  the  realization  by  all  the  military  high 
commands  that  the  war  would  probably  be  fought  to  a 
close  during  the  next  few  months  and  that,  owing  to  the 
intensity  of  the  coming  struggle,  it  was  desirable  that 
ithe  full  strength  of  American  man  power  should  be 
brought  into  play,  the  whole  question  of  troop  transport 
and  troop  discharge  was  again  brought  under  considera- 
tion. By  this  time,  the  naval  authorities  in  the  United 
States  had  taken  over  and  had  repaired  the  deliberately 
damaged  German  passenger  liners  that  had  been  kept  by 
their  owners  in  American  ports  since  the  beginning  of 
hostilities,  which  the  United  States  Government  had 
iseized  on  the  declaration  of  war  in  April,  1917. 

The  largest  of  these  vessels  and,  consequently,  the  most 
yaluable  ones  for  the  transport  of  troops,  drew  more 
iwater  than  could  be  found  at  any  French  Atlantic  port 
except  Brest.  The  British  and  French  Governments 
offered  to  cooperate  in  the  increased  delivery  of  troops 
through  a  sui:)ply  of  a  greater  ship  tonnage  by  the  former 
and  by  permission  of  the  latter  to  use  the  naval  facili- 
ties in  the  port  of  Brest. 

As  the  result  of  this  agreement  in  the  spring  of  1918, 
the  American  engineers  immediately  undertook  the  prep- 
aration of  extensive  plans  for  the  improvement  of  the 
port,  including  the  construction  of  several  berths  for 
deep  draft  vessels  and  the  utilization  of  the  existing 
jetties.  Actual  construction  of  the  work  was  begun  in 
July,   1918.     During  that  and  the   succeeding  months. 


POETS  49 

wHen  tlie  arrival  of  American  troops  in  France  reached 
the  maximum  figures,  Brest  became  the  port  of  entry  for 
all  large  vessels.  The  work  in  hand  was  finished  in  Sep- 
tember and  Brest  thereafter  was  the  chief  port  of 
troop  arrival  and  of  de^oarture  until  the  final  return  of 
the  army  in  1919. 

But  all  the  while  the  plans  of  the  A.  E.  F.  were  steadily 
growing.  After  the  failure  to  construct  a  satisfactory 
port  at  La  ]\lartiniere  and  while  the  Montoir  project  waa 
still  under  discussion,  engineers  charged  with  the  respon- 
sibility of  transport  began  looldng  about  to  obtain  other 
places  where  landing  facilities  could  be  secured  or,  if 
necessary,  be  constructed. 

In  June,  1917,  the  attention  of  Colonel  Taylor,  the  then 
Chief  Engineer,  A.  E.  F.,  and  Major  Parsons,  the  Chief 
of  the  Engineer  Commission,  had  been  drawn  to  the  po&- 
tsibilities  of  developing  an  entirely  new  port  at  Talmont, 
a  little  fishing  village  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Gironde 
Eiver  and  directly  at  its  mouth.  At  this  point  it  would 
be  possible  to  berth  vessels  of  the  maximum  draft  that 
could  pass  over  the  bar  and  there  would  be  saved  the 
journey  up  and  down  the  river  from  the  mouth  of  th0 
river  to  Bassens,  a  journey  which,  on  account  of  the  wait- 
ing for  high  tide,  would  average  at  least  twenty  hours  in 
both  directions  or  nearly  two  days  for  each  round  trip 
of  a  ship. 

The  objection  to  Talmont  was  its  open  exposure  to 
winds  from  the  southwest  which,  should  they  reach  gale 
proportions,  might  render  this  port  not  usable  during 
their  continuance.  For  this  and  on  account  of  some  local 
French  objections,  the  use  of  Talmont  was  temporarily 
set  aside,  but  with  the  impossibility  of  using  La  Mar- 
tini ere  and  with  the  steadily  growing  demand  for  more 
and  more  space  —  a  cry  that  ceased  only  with  hostili- 
ties—  Talmont  was  again  taken  under  consideration  in 
the  summer  of  1918.     After  full  study  of  the  physical 


50        AMEKICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FEANCE 

surroundings,  it  was  decided  that  the  objections  could  be 
BO  reduced  that  they  would  not  outweigh  the  natural 
advantages,  and  construction  was  undertaken.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  Talmont  was  one  of  the  few  places  where  a 
new  extensive  water  and  rail  terminal  could  be  created, 
a  combination  that  was  imperatively  necessary  should  the 
war  continue  for  another  year.  The  plans  adopted  and 
approved  called  for  the  creation  of  accommodations  for 
ten  vessels,  together  with  the  necessary  warehouses  and 
track  facilities.  Construction  materials  were  ordered 
from  the  United  States  and  work  had  been  already 
ienergetically  begiin  on  the  construction  when  the  armis- 
tice was  signed.  Then  the  project,  so  far  as  American 
use  was  concerned,  was  abandoned. 

During  1917  and  the  early  part  of  1918  no  considera- 
tion was  given  to  the  use  of  the  Mediterranean  ports  on 
account  of  the  exposure  in  the;  approach  to  these  places 
to  submarine  attack  on  vessels  coming  through  the  com- 
paratively narrow  straits  opposite  Gibraltar.  "With  the 
demands  for  greater  accommodations,  and  as  the  limit 
of  capacity  of  the  Atlantic  ports  of  France  had  been 
reached,  it  became  apparent  that  recourse  must  be  had 
to  the  Mediterranean  harbors.  By  the  summer  of  1918, 
the  Navy  Department  advised  that  sufficient  patrol  ves- 
sels were  available  to  provide  the  necessary  anti-subma- 
rine protection.  Arrangements  were  then  made  with  the 
French  for  the  use  of  the  ports  of  Marseille,  Toulon  and 
Cette.  During  June  the  port  of  Marseille  was  opened 
for  the  use'  of  the  A.  E.  F.,  and  chiefly  for  the  handling  of 
Bubsistence,  clothing,  forage,  motor  vehicles,  air  craft 
machinery,  rails,  gasoline,  oil  and  a  few  locomotives. 
The  French  turned  over  to  exclusive  American  use  nine 
berths.  Later  six  more,  without  track  facilities,  were 
ready  to  be  turned  over  when  the  armistice  was  signed, 
the  plans  for  equipping  them  with  the  track  and  unload- 
ing facilities  having  been  worked  out.     Unfortunately, 


PORTS  51 

the  existing'  Terminal  facilities  af  all  tlieso  berths  were 
not  adapted  to  the  use  of  American  cars.  Had  the  "^ar 
continued,  the  whole  track  layout  would  have  necessarily 
been  reconstructed.  As  it  was,  American  cargo  was 
handled  exclusively  by  French  equipment  and  French 
train  crews. 

In  the  autumn  of  1018  the  French  Minister  of  Marine 
gave  the  A.  E.  F.  the  use  of  two  piers  belonging  to  the 
Na\y  Department  at  Toulon.  Three  piers  at  Cette  were 
also  devoted  to  American  use  wbicb  had  been  previously 
given  to  the  British  and  a  few  cargoes  were  discharged 
by  the  latter.  Had  the  war  continued,  this  port  would 
have  been  reconstructed  and  largely  extended  for 
American  use. 

The  above  are  the  main  ports  that  our  army  occupied, 
though  American  traffic  went  in  small  consignments  to 
other  places,  the  French  cooperating  loyally  by  obtain- 
ing facilities  from  private  owners  or  granting  the  use  of 
Government  space  which,  at  the  outset,  they  considered 
would  not  be  possible  to  accom^plish. 

For  administration  purposes,  the  ports  operated,  or  to 
be  operated,  by  the  A.  E.  F.,  were  di^dded  into  groups 
as  follows: 

Channel  Group  :  Le  Havre,  Eouen,  Caen,  Cherbourg 
and  Honfleur. 

Upper  Coast  Group:  Brest,  St.  Malo,  Lorient  and 
Granville. 

Lower  Loire  Group  :    St.  Nazaire,  Montoir  and  Donges. 

Upper  Loire  Group:  Nantes  and  subsidiary  small 
ports  in  vicinity. 

Charente  Group  :  La  Pallice,  La  Rochelle,  Rochefort, 
Tonnay-Charente  and  Marennes. 

GiRoxDE  Rn^ER  Group:  Bassens,  Bordeaux,  Sursol, 
Blaye,  Frut,  Pauillac,  St.  Loubes,  St.  Pardon  «ind 
Talmont. 


52        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  PRANCE 

Mediteeeaxean  Geoup:    Marseilles,  Toulon  and  Cette 

Opeeated  Indepexdextly  :    Bayonne. 

Eventually  to  be  Opeeated  with  Gieonde  Geoup: 
Les  Sables  d'Olonne. 

Beittsh  Poets:  London,  Southampton  and  Liverpool 
in  England;  Glasgovi^,  Scotland;  Barry,  Cordic  and  Swan- 
sea in  Wales,  and  Belfast  in  Ireland. 

It  should  be  stated  that  the  ports  of  the  Channel 
group  which  had  been  assigned  by  the  French  to  the 
British  were  used  chiefly  for  the  discharge  of  men  and 
cargoes  reaching  France  via  England,  or  for  the  dis- 
charge of  supplies  purchased  in  England,  The  British, 
like  the  French,  realized  the  importance  of  American 
assistance  and  assigned  five  berths  at  Le  Havre  to 
American  use  in  the  autumn  of  1918,  with  the  understand- 
ing that  the  A.  E.  F.  would  provide  the  necessary  tracks 
and  warehouses.  These  berths  were  put  in  service  before 
the  signing  of  the  armistice. 

The  total  number  of  berths  actually  used  by  the 
A.  E.  F.  amounted  to  no  less  than  ninety-seven,  of  which 
twelve  had  been  constructed  by  Americans  and  eighty- 
five  had  been  furnished  by  the  French  and  British, 

When  it  is  recalled  that  the  French  stated  in  May, 
1917,  that  all  that  France  could  be  expected  to  do  would 
be  to  furnish,  perhaps,  fourteen  berths  at  Bassens,  St. 
Nazaire  and  Nantes  inclusive,  and  that  these  were  to  be 
loaned  temporarily  only,  it  will  be  seen  how  great  was 
French  cooperation  and  how  they  not  only  made  good 
their  original  promises,  but  exceeded  their  estimates,  the 
latter  being  such  a  rare  experience  in  the  usual  handling 
of  construction  work. 

The  labors  of  the  Transportation  engineers  were  not 
limited  to  negotiating  with  the  French  authorities  for  the 
assignment  of  berthing  facilities  and  the  planning  of  their 
construction  or  rehabilitation.     At  all  the  new  places, 


POETS  53 

such  as  Bassens,  complete  railroad  facilities  had  to  be  con- 
structed At  the  already  existing  ports  the  track  layouts 
conformed  entirely  to  the  French  standards.  This  stand- 
ard called  for  parallel  tracks  connected  only  by  hand- 
worked turntables  with  tracks  at  right  angles  to  the  main 
lines,  so  that  in  order  to  shift  a  car  from  one  line  to  the 
other,  it  had  to  be  run  to  one  of  these  small  turntables, 
placed  upon  the  right  angled  intersecting  track,  run  to 
the  track  on  which  it  was  desired  to  be  placed  finally  and 
again  revolved  on  a  hand  turntable.  This  obviously 
made  a  very  slow  and  cumbersome  oj^eration.  In  order 
to  get  the  maximum  rate  of  delivery,  these  tracks  had  to 
be  all  redesigned,  relaid,  and  connected  by  means  of 
cross-overs  and  switches,  so  that  locomotives  could  shift 
the  cars  cither  singly  or  in  train  lots  from  one  track  to 
another  But  it  is  to  be  recalled  that  at  many  of  these 
places  the  existing  tracks  leading  to  or  actually  on  the 
wharves  were  intersected  by  city  streets.  It  can  be 
imagined  how  difficult  was  any  rearrangement  when  it 
had  to  be  carried  out  maintaining  the  street  crossings, 
with  the  removal  of  large  buildings,  and  under  an  intense 
railway  traffic. 

As  an  illustration,  at  St.  Nazaire  such  changes  and 
reconstruction  to  the  American  standards  of  switching 
entailed  a  total  of  twenty-five  miles  of  new  track. 
At  the  same  place  a  double-track  railway  connection  was 
built  approximately  four  miles  in  length,  in  order  to  pro- 
vide the  necessary  additional  facilities  between  the  docks 
and  the  storage  and  classification  yards  so  that  the  sup- 
plies from  the  ship's  sides  could  be  removed  as  rapidly 
as  possible  and  thus  free  the  vessels  for  their  return 
journey.    This  line  was  built  through  the  city. 

The  control  of  the  port  work  was  in  tlie  hands  of  a 
bureau  called  the  Army  Trausjiort  Service  which,  prior 
to  the  entry  of  the  ITiiited  States  into  the  war,  was  oper- 
ated as  a  department  of  the  Quartermaster  Corjos  through 


54        AMEEICAN  ENGINEESS  IN  FEANCE 

the  Water  Transportation  Branch  of  the  office  of  the 
Chief  Quartermaster  General  in  "Washington.  All  mat- 
ters pertaining  to  procuring  and  allocating  tonnage  and 
managing  vessels,  including  the  operation  of  docks, 
wharves  and  terminals,  were  placed  under  a  civilian 
organization  known  as  the  Shipping  Control  Committee, 
formed  in  the  early  part  of  1918,  and  given  the  powers  of 
the  War  Department  and  of  the  Shipping  Board  relative 
to  vessel  procurement,  allocation  and  operation.  While 
no  definite  limit  was  placed  upon  the  authority  and  juris- 
diction of  the  Shipping  Control  Committee,  their  efforts 
were  confined  mainly  to  home  ports.  They  did  not 
attempt  to  exercise  jurisdiction  over  the  operations  of 
the  Transport  Service  in  Europe.  They  contented  them- 
selves with  the  appointment  of  a  permanent  representa- 
tive of  that  Committee  with  G.  1,  General  Staff,  S.  0.  S. 

The  Army  Transport  Service  of  the  A.  E.  F.  was  at 
first  operated  under  the  Quartermaster  Corps  by  an 
officer  who  had  accompanied  the  Commander-in-Chief  to 
Europe.  He  was  placed  in  direct  charge  of  the  work 
as  Director  of  Docks.  Under  the  provisions  of  G.  0.  78, 
G.  H.  Q.,  1917,  the  Army  Transport  Service  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  Chief  Quartermaster,  Lines  of  Commu- 
nication, to  the  Transportation  Corps,  and  this  same 
officer  was  appointed  Director,  A.  T.  S.,  reporting  to  the 
Director  General  of  Transportation. 

On  May  24,  1918,  the  Army  Transport  Service  was 
reconstituted  and  a  standard  organization  prescribed  for 
all  ports  with  corresponding  divisions  in  the  office  of  the 
Director,  thus  affording  the  necessary  control  and  super- 
vision and  a  comprehensive  development  of  the  terminal 
organizations.  Due  to  the  long  continued  lack  of  per- 
sonnel, the  complete  organization  was  not  effected  imtil 
a  short  time  prior  to  the  signing  of  the  armistice. 

On  the  Staff  of  the  Director,  A.  T.  S.,  were  the 
following : 


POETS  55 

Deputy  Director;  Executive  Officer;  General  Inspector; 
Supervisor  of  Operations  and  Chief  of  Troop  and  Cargo 
Divisions;  Supervisor  of  Terminal  Facilities;  Chief  of 
Inland  Water  Transport;  Chief  Marine  Engineer  and 
Property  Officer. 

The  organization  at  the  Base  Ports  comprised : 

a.  General  Superintendent  "^ith  an  assistant  in  charge 
of  each  group  of  ports. 

b.  Superintendent  in  direct  charge  of  each  port. 

c.  Camp  Commander  reporting  to  the  General  Super- 
intendent in  direct  charge  of  military  affairs. 

d.  Executive  officer  in  charge  of  Administration 
Division. 

e.  Supervisor  of  Operations  in  charge  of  all  Marine 
operation,  including  Marine  Superintendents,  etc. 

f.  Superintendent,  Troop  and  Cargo  Division,  in 
charge  of  all  matters  pertaining  to  troops  and  cargo 
from  ship's  hold  to  railroad  oi^erating  department. 

g.  Supervisor  of  Terminal  Facilities,  in  charge  of 
procurement,  inspection  and  maintenance  of  all  terminal 
facilities, 

h.  Property  Officer  in  charge  of  all  supplies  including 
stevedore  gear. 

Beginning  with  a  few  officers  and  491  civilian  steve- 
dores, the  personnel  of  the  Army  Transport  Service  was 
gradually  increased  until  at  the  time  of  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  it  consisted  of  approximately  800  officers, 
22,000  enlisted  men,  2,509  civilians  and  900  German 
prisoners,  a  total  of  over  26,000  men. 

This  rearrangement  of  the  Army  Transport  Service 
brought  the  management  and  operation  of  all  the  port 
facilities  under  the  authority  of  the  Director  General  of 
Transportation,  where  it  belonged.    The  fewer  the  num- 


56        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ber  of  conflicting  bureaus  with  the  consequent  division 
of  responsibility  and  j)ower,  the  greater  the  ultimate 
efficiency. 

The  British,  as  has  been  stated,  made  great  use  of  the 
very  excellent  existing  French  system  of  canals  which, 
fortunately  for  them,  led  directly  from  their  main  ports 
of  entry  to  the  distributing  points  along  the  front.  The 
American  sector  was  so  placed  that,  unfortunately,  it  was 
not  possible  for  the  A.  E.  F.  to  make  similar  use  of  the 
French  canals.  Consideration  was  given  to  the  utiliza- 
tion of  these  inland  waterways  as  a  means  of  relieving 
the  overtaxed  railroads  from  unnecessary  traffic. 

Cargo  that  arrived  at  Le  Havre  and  Rouen  could 
be  shipped  —  and  was,  to  a  great  extent,  so  handled  — 
by  barges  up  the  River  Seine,  thence  by  the  canals  reach- 
ing from  the  head  waters  of  the  Seine  to  various  interior 
points.  To  the  end  of  January,  1919,  the  Transport  Serv- 
ice handled  over  inland  waterways  in  France  a  total  of 
380,000  tons,  not  an  extraordinarily  large  amount,  though 
one  which  afforded  an  appreciable  and  very  welcome 
relief  to  the  railway  transportation. 

The  principal  part  of  the  construction  of  the  ports 
was  done  by  the  Seventeenth  Engineers  with  headquar- 
ters at  St.  Nazaire  and  by  the  Eighteenth  Engineers  at 
Bordeaux. 


CHAPTER  VI 

FRENOH  RAILWAYS 

The  entire  railway  system  of  all  France  is  composed  of 
two  classes  of  lines,  those  with  a  broad  gauge  and  those 
with  a  gauge  of  one  meter.  The  broad  gauge  has  a  width 
between  rails  of  1.44  meters  or,  expressed  in  English 
measure,  of  4  feet  8.7  inches,  differing  by  only  two- 
tenths  of  an  inch  from  the  standard  gauge  of  4  feet 
8^/2  inches  of  our  own  lines.  In  fact,  the  difference  is  so 
slight  as  to  be  negligible  and  American  as  well  as  Brit- 
ish car  trucks  were  shipped  to  France  without  altera- 
tions. The  railways  of  all  the  principal  countries  of 
Europe,  except  Spain  and  Russia,  have  the  same  gauge 
as  the  French.  The  broad  gauge  system  is  divided 
among  five  separate  corporations;  les  companies  des 
chemins  do  fer  du  Nord,  de  L'Est,  de  Paris  a  Lyon  et 
a  la  Mediterranee,  for  short  called  the  P-L-M;  de  Paris 
a  Orleans  (the  P-0),  and  de  I'Etat.  There  is  a  sixth 
company,  the  Midi,  but  it  belongs  to  and  its  lines 
form  a  part  of  the  Paris-Orleans  system,  although  the 
company  maintains  its  individual  corporate  identity. 
The  above  companies  are  all  stock  concerns  with  the 
exception  of  the  Etat,  formerly  known  as  the  Chemin  de 
Fer  de  I'Ouest,  which  was  taken  over  by  the  general  gov- 
ernment some  years  ago  and  is  operated  by  it  as  a  state 
railway.  The  other  concerns  enjoy  some  measure  of 
Government  assistance  in  the  way  of  advances  or  guar- 
antees, in  return  for  which  they  will  become"  Government 
property  in  the  course  of  time. 

The  main  offices  of  these  five  systems  are  located  in 
Paris,  from  which  point  the  lines  radiate  to  all  parts  of 
France,  very  much  as  the  spokes  of  a  wheel  lead  away 

57 


58        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

from  the  liiib.  Paris  is,  therefore,  the  nerve  center  of 
France  as  regards  government,  finance  and  control  of 
transiDortation. 

By  mutual  consent  and  a  definitely  adopted  arrange- 
ment, specific  sections  of  France  are  assigned  to  the  above 
companies.  There  is  scarcely  any  invasion  of  the  terri- 
tory served  through  one  system  by  the  lines  of  another, 
and  even  where  adjacent  divisions  join,  there  is  but  little 
overlapping.  Competition  for  traffic  between  the  com- 
panies, therefore,  does  not  exist.  These  arbitrary  terri- 
torial divisions  are  wedge-  or  fan-shaped,  with  their  small 
ends  meeting  at  Paris. 

The  Etat  covers  that  part  of  France  lying  west  of  a 
line  beginning  at  Dieppe  on  the  Channel  and  running 
through  Paris,  Orleans,  Tours,  Poitiers  to  Bordeaux. 
In  consequence  it  serves  the  ports  of  Dieppe,  Havre, 
Rouen,  Cherbourg,  Brest,  St.  Nazaire,  Nantes,  La 
Rochelle  and  Bordeaux. 

The  Paris-Orleans  system,  including  the  lines  of  the 
Chemin  de  Fer  du  Midi,  lies  east  of  a  line  commencing 
at  Paris  and  passing  via  Chateaudun,  Tears,  Poitiers, 
Angouleme  and  Bordeaux  to  Biaritz  and  the  Spanish 
frontier,  thence  north  of  the  Pyrenees  Mountains,  and 
west  of  a  line  running  from  the  Spanish  frontier  on  the 
Mediterranean  along  the  latter  and  through  Mont- 
pellier,  Nimes,  Clermoni>Ferrand,  Nevers  to  Paris,  with 
branches  on  the  west  side  from  Tours,  one  to  Le  Mans, 
the  other  to  Nantes,  St.  Nazaire  and  Brest.  This  latter 
branch  is  the  only  case  of  a  line  of  one  company  invading 
to  any  appreciable  extent  the  otherwise  exclusive  terri- 
tory of  another.  The  P-0  company  has  no  monopolistic 
control  over  any  harbor  except  the  small  one  of  Bayonne 
near  Biaritz,  though  it  provides  the  main  service  to  Bor- 
deaux and  carries  the  bulk  of  the  traffic  to  and  from  that 
great  port.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Etat  is  the  sole  rail- 
way running  into  Dieppe,  Havre,  Rouen,  Cherbourg,  and 


FEENCH  RAILWAYS  59 

La  Rochelle,  and  is  the  principal  line  to  Brest,  St. 
Nazaire  and  Nantes. 

The  territory  of  the  Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee  lies  east 
of  that  of  the  Paris-Orleans  and  is  bounded  on  the  west 
by  a  line  marked  by  Paris,  Nevers,  Clermont-Ferrand, 
Nimes,  Montpcllier,  on  the  south  by  the  shore  of  the 
Mediterranean,  and  on  the  east  by  the  frontiers  of  Italy 
and  Switzerland,  and  a  line  through  Belfort,  Is-sur-Tille, 
Dijon,  Paris.  "While  this  system  does  not  touch  the 
Atlantic  seaboard,  it  reaches  the  great  Mediterranean 
port  of  Marseille  and  the  naval  base  at  Toulon.  It  pro- 
vides the  main  lines  of  communication  to  Italy  and 
Switzerland  and  connects  the  three  largest  cities  of 
France,  Paris,  Lyon  and  Marseille. 

The  Chemin  de  Fer  de  I'Est  serves  eastern  France 
as  included  between  two  lines  running  from  Paris,  one 
to  the  German  frontier  as  it  existed  before  the  war  in 
Alsace,  the  other  to  the  eastern  part  of  the  Belgian 
frontier  and  Luxembourg.  The  first  or  southern  of  these 
lines,  is  marked  by  Paris,  Troyes,  Is-sur-Tille  and  Bel- 
fort,  the  northern  one  by  Paris,  Meaux,  Soissons,  Laon 
and  Hirson.  The  Est  is  the  only  French  railway  com- 
pany whose  rails  do  not  reach  salt  water.  It  furnished 
the  sole  lines  to  Germany  and  Luxembourg,  the  former 
via  Metz  and  Strasbourg.  It  enjoyed  a  valuable  traffic 
in  minerals,  especially  iron  ore  and  steel,  and  covered  the 
great  wine  districts  of  Champag:ne  and  Burgimdy. 

The  Nord  system  made  a  net  work  over  the  rich  and 
highly  important  part  of  France  lying  between  Paris,  the 
northern  channel  ports  and  Belgium,  an  area  bounded 
on  the  west  by  the  tracks  of  the  Chemin  de  Fer  de  I'Etat 
and  on  the  east  by  those  of  the  Est,  as  defined  by  the  two 
radiating  linos,  Paris-Beauvais  Treport  and  Paris-Laon- 
Ilirson.  Within  these  boundaries,  the  smallest  area 
belonging  to  anyone  of  the  French  railway  oom])anies, 
lay  France's  greatest  coal  fields,  stretching  from  Arras 


60        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

to  the  Belgian  frontier;  Lille,  the  fifth  city  of  France; 
Calais  and  Boulogne,  main  ports  for  Anglo-continental 
traffic  and  the  railways  connecting  Paris  with  Belgium 
and  through  Belgium  with  Holland  and  northwestern 
continental  Europe. 

From  the  above  description  of  the  routes  of  and  the 
territories  served  by  the  several  systems,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  Nord  and  Est  companies  were  the  only  ones 
whose  rails  reached  the  actual  theatre  of  war,  and 
of  these  the  Nord  was  the  one  chiefly  atfected. 
Considerably  more  than  one-half  of  the  lines  of  this  lat- 
ter company  were  in  enemy  hands  or  turned  over  abso- 
lutely to  the  French  or  British  military  authorities  for 
operation  by  them. 

The  second  class  of  French  railways  consisted  of  dis- 
connected lines  under  mutually  unrelated  ownership  and 
operation  with  a  gauge  of  one  meter  (3  feet  3  1/3  inches), 
their  construction  having  been  begun  at  a  time  when 
there  existed  a  very  mistaken  but  widespread  belief  in  the 
economy  of  narrow-gauge  railways.  At  the  same  period 
many  miles  were  constructed  in  accordance  with  the 
same  error  in  the  United  States,  especially  in  the  West, 
and  notably  in  Colorado.  These  second-class  railways 
iwere  purely  local  concerns,  in  fact,  they  were  officially 
described  as  "  Chemins  de  Fer  d'Interet  Local  "  and 
were  controlled  by  corporations  in  which  the  communes 
or  municipalities  adjacent  to  the  lines  were  interested, 
frequently  to  the  major  extent.  The  lines  of  each  sepa- 
rate company  were  usually  short,  rarely  exceeding 
seventy-five  miles  for  any  one  concern,  though  the  total 
length  for  the  whole  country  was  about  5,600  miles.  The 
traffic,  consisting  chiefly  of  passengers,  was  light,  and, 
consequently,  the  indirect  local  accommodation  usually 
exceeded  in  value  the  direct  financial  return  to  the 
owners,  that  is,  the  adjacent  communes. 


FKENCH  EAILWAYS  61 

The  variation  in  gauge  between  the  first-  and  second- 
class  railways  was  unfortunate  for  military  purposes  be- 
cause, except  in  a  very  few  instances,  the  metre  gauge  lines 
could  not  be  used  for  military  ends  on  account  of  their 
own  lack  of  sufficient  rolling  stock  and  the  undesirability 
of  acquiring  locomotives  and  cars  that  could  not  be  used 
universally.  These  lines  were,  therefore,  of  little  or  no 
use  at  all  when  they  lay  in  the  zone  of  the  armies,  unless 
they  could  be  reconstructed  into  standard  gauge  lines. 
This  was  a  matter  of  some  difficulty,  as  the  old  cross- 
ties  would  not  answer  and  the  rails  were  too  light  except 
for  very  restricted  traffic.  The  other  alternative  was 
to  convert  them  into  narrow-gauge  lines  of  the  light  rail- 
way or  military  gauge  of  60  cm.  Such  change  was 
readily  accomplished  by  simply  drawing  the  rails 
together  and  was  nearly  always  done  if  the  meter  gauge 
railway,  by  its  location,  lent  itself  to  being  made  a  part 
of  the  army  light  railway  system. 

Exclusive  of  the  meter  gauge  railways,  the  five  great 
corporations,  or  six,  if  the  Midi  is  regarded  as  a  separate 
concern,  comprised  approximately  25,000  miles  of  main 
line  with  10,800  miles  of  second  tracks  and,  therefore, 
was  in  extent  of  mileage,  the  third  largest  system  in 
Europe,  being  exceeded  only  by  the  railways  of  Germany 
(38,500  miles)  and  Russia  (45,000  miles).  In  regard  to 
volume  of  traffic  the  French  lines  again  ranked  third 
among  European  countries,  coming  next  after  the  com- 
bined railways  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  of  Germany 
in  the  order  named. 

The  French  lines  can  be  fairly  compared  with  the 
American  railways  composing  what  the  Interstate  Com- 
merce Commission  formerly  described  as  Group  II,  or 
those  approximately  of  the  States  of  New  York,  Pennsyl- 
vania, New  Jersey,  l\rarylnnd  and  Delaware.  This  area 
in  the  United  States  includes  the  important  lines  such 
as  the  New  York  Central,  between  New  York  and  Buffalo, 


62        AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

and  the  Pennsylvania,  Baltimore  and  OMo,  between  New 
York  and  Pittsburgh;  the  Jersey  Central  and  Reading, 
all  the  Lackawanna  lines,  Erie  and  Lehigh  Valley.  These 
American  railways  were  almost  exactly  of  the  same 
length  as  the  combined  French  railways,  and  serving,  as 
they  did,  the  most  densely  populated  and  most  highly 
productive  portion  of  the  United  States,  enjoyed  the 
most  intense  traffic  to  be  found  in  any  section  of  the 
country.  Although  they  constitute  but  about  one-tenth 
of  the  whole  railway  mileage  of  the  United  States,  they 
carry  more  than  one-third  of  all  the  passengers  and 
nearly  one-third  of  all  the  freight.  As  to  comparative 
traffic  between  the  French  railways  and  the  American 
railways  covered  in  Group  11,  the  former  carried  pas- 
sengers in  the  ratio  of  five  to  three,  but  freight  tons  in 
the  ratio  of  only  two  to  five.  As  French  freight  trains 
were  shorter  and  passenger  trains  more  frequent  than 
similar  American  trains,  the  traffic  units  on  French  rail- 
ways were  run  at  much  shorter  inter^'als  than  ours,  giv- 
ing a  more  congested  service  and,  consequently,  pre- 
sented serious  difficulties  to  the  introduction  of  a  great 
number  of  additional  trains,  such  as  the  entry  of 
America  into  the  war  entailed. 

Before  the  war  French  railways  were  in  fine  physical 
condition  with  heavy  rails,  stone  ballast,  complete  block 
signals  and  permanent  structures.  There  were  run,  espe- 
cially on  the  Nord  lines  between  Paris  and  Boulogne  and 
Calais,  some  of  the  fastest  trains  to  be  found  anywhere 
in  the  world.  Although,  through  lack  of  new  material 
and  equipment  and  the  great  shortage  of  labor,  it  had 
been  impossible  to  maintain  these  railways  during  the 
war  at  the  previous  standard  of  excellence,  nevertheless 
the  authorities  had  succeeded  in  keeping  them  in  sur- 
prisingly good  condition  when  all  the  attending  circum- 
slances  are  taken  into  account.  In  fact,  when  the  Railway 
Commission  travelled  on  the  main  line  of  the  Est  railway 


FKENCH  EAILWAYS  63 

in  'June,  1917,  a  speed  of  sixty  to  eighty  miles  an  hour 
was  made  over  a  considerable  distance. 

As  against  the  contingency  of  war,  the  French  general 
staft  had  planned  years  ago,  and  with  no  particular  war 
in  mind,  full  provision  for  the  most  efficient  method  of 
operating  the  railways  with  the  double  view  of  military 
exigencies  and  existing  commercial  requirements.  The 
employees  on  French  railways  were  all  subject  by  law; 
to  army  mobilization,  and  were  so  mobilized  in  the 
late  war.  This  mobilization,  pro\dding  for  holding 
skilled  men  at  their  posts  and  securing  a  permanent 
working  staff,  greatly  facilitated  control  of  the  railways 
by  the  military  authorities.  The  French  army  regulations 
ordered  that,  ?fvhile  the  general  officers  of  each  railway; 
corporation  should  continue  to  function  and  administer 
the  properties  in  the  event  of  war,  and  while  the 
employees  of  all  grades,  whether  mobilized  or  not,  should 
remain  at  their  posts  to  carry  on  their  regular  daily 
routine,  a  new  controlling  supervision,  to  last  only  dur- 
ing the  emergency,  should  be  established  in  which  th^ 
imperative  military  needs  and  the  civil  demands  could 
be  examined,  adjusted  and  both  be  satisfied. 

This  control  consisted  in  chief  of  two  commissioners 
or  **  Commissaires  "  to  use  the  official  title,  one,  the 
**  Commissaire  Militaire,"  being  named  by  the  "War 
Department,  the  other  by  the  company.  These  two  offi- 
cers worked  side  by  side  with  equal  authority,  but  with 
required  joint  action  to  be  effective.  They  passed  on 
and  determined  all  matters  of  general  principle,  acquisi- 
tion of  equipment  or  permanent  way  material,  decided 
on  the  necessity  for  and  ordered  the  construction  of  new 
or  additional  lines,  tracks,  yards,  storage  places  or  other 
major  facilities,  placed  maximum  and  minimum  limits  on 
trains  to  be  run,  made  arrangements  for  the  military  ser- 
vice, and  fixed  the  number  of  the  working  staff  and  their 
compensation.     In  short,  they  so  ordered  the  workings 


64        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

of  the  railway  system  as  to  permit  the  harmonizing  to  the 
fullest  extent  of  the  double  function  of  serving  the  needs 
of  the  army  and  of  the  civil  population. 

It  was  impossible  for  these  two  commissioners  to 
supervise  all  the  minor  details,  so  that  under-conunis- 
sioners  were  ap^Dointed  for  all  places  where  there  was 
any  likelihood  of  clash  between  military  and  civil  inter- 
ests. Such  places  were  terminal  yards  where  surplus 
rolling  stock  was  stored  and  trains  made  up,  or  regulat- 
ing stations  where  trains  were  received  with  military 
supplies  which,  in  some  instances,  were  to  be  put  in  stor- 
age, in  others  to  be  forwarded  to  other  stations  with  or 
without  breaking  bulk.  It  is  obvious  that  at  such  points, 
questions  would  frequently  arise  as  to  whether  it  was 
more  important  to  assign  cars  to  contain  a  shipment  of 
shells  for  the  army  or  to  carry  a  consignment  of  coal  to 
some  factory,  or  to  what  extent  priority  in  schedule  was 
to  be  given  to  troop  trains  over  those  with  ordinary  pas- 
sengers. Such  questions  were  dealt  with  by  the  under- 
commissioners  who,  like  their  chiefs,  worked  in  pairs, 
representatives  of  the  two  services,  with  equal  power  and 
equal  responsibility.  These  men  investigated  all  such 
questions  on  the  ground  and,  having  ascertained  the 
facts,  were  usually  able,  acting  under  general  instruc- 
tions handed  down  to  them  from  time  to  time,  to  reconcile 
apparently  conflicting  demands.  Should  they  be  unable  to 
agree  or  be  unwilling  to  assume  responsibility  for  a 
decision  fraught  with  such  importance  as  apparently,  per- 
haps, to  exceed  their  powers,  the  matter  would  be  referred 
to  higher  authority  for  decision,  the  reference  being 
accompanied  by  recommendations  from  the  two  duly 
charged  military  and  civil  representatives. 

To  an  American  accustomed  to  the  principle  of  a  sin- 
gle executive  or  unacquainted  with  European  practice, 
such  duality  of  control  might  seem  dangerously  compli- 
cated and  be  considered  as  apt  to  lead  to  frequent  atid 


FRENCH  RAILWAYS  65 

annoying  deadlocks.  But  the  European  manager  has 
been  trained  to  it  by  long  experience  through  a  system 
of  double  signatures  to  bank  cheques  and  letters,  double 
approval  for  all  orders,  etc.  He  practically  never  acts 
alone  as  an  American  general  manager  usually  does. 
Consequently  the  commissioners  and  under-commission- 
ors  had  had  previous  experience  in  working  alongside 
of  a  mate  with  joint  and  coequal  powers  and  found 
little  difficulty  in  j^roducing  results.  In  the  French 
situation,  both  of  each  pair  of  men  felt  that  they  were 
working  for  France  and,  undoubtedly,  faithfully  endeav- 
ored to  reach  the  best  solution.  There  was  no  antagonis- 
tic feeling  of  the  army  versus  the  civilian  nor  jealousy 
of  the  former  by  the  latter,  because,  although  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  latter  might  not  be  in  military  uniform, 
he  was  nevertheless  mobilized  and  was,  equally  with  his 
fellow,  a  soldier  of  France.  Both  realized  that,  while  the 
army  must  be  served  promptly  and  served  well,  the  civil 
industries  must  also  be  served,  because  on  them  the  army 
depended  for  its  supplies,  and  on  these  supplies  rested 
the  country's  safety.  They  saw  to  it  that  a  conflict 
between  the  two  opposing  demands  was  avoided,  and  that 
the  service,  whose  needs  were  paramount  at  the  time,  was 
given  priority. 

One  great  advantage  in  this  scheme  (and  so  carefully 
studied  and  worked  out  in  time  of  peace)  for  harmonizing 
the  double  functions  was  that  it  was  quickly  put  in  force 
without  any  disturbance  of  the  existing  operating 
machinery.  When  war  was  over,  the  working  staff  was 
demobilized,  the  chief  and  under-military  commissioners 
were  withdrawn  and  the  operating  staff  of  the  railway 
company  resumed  its  functions  as  a  complete  working 
unit  without  necessity  for  any  reorganization.  During 
the  war  nothing  had  been  changed,  nothing  had  been  dis- 
located. There  had  been  added,  temporarily,  certain 
special  officials  with  equal  but  not  superseding  authority, 


66        A^IERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

whose  duty  it  was  to  see  that  the  mihtary  requirements 
were  understood  and  cared  for  properly  but  not  to  the 

detriment  of  the  other  obligations  of  the  railway.  "When 
the  necessity  for  such  cooperation  was  iDassed,  the  officers 
were  withdrawn. 

France  having  been  invaded  and  a  considerable  por- 
tion of  the  country  and  many  miles  of  railway  being  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  there  was  a  limit  beyond  which 
civil  or  commercial  traffic  ceased  and  there  remained  only 
the  service  of  the  combatant  army.  This  line  was  the 
arbitrary  demarkation  between  the  Zone  des  Armees  and 
the  Zone  de  I'Interieur.  The  Zone  des  Armees  had  an 
irregular  width  averaging  about  twenty  miles.  [Within 
this  zone  the  civil  population  was  largely  evacuated,  but 
not  entirely  so.  In  particular  districts,  such  as  the  coal 
mining  country  in  the  north,  civilian  life  still  existed  well 
within  shelling  distance,  even  women  and  children  con- 
tinuing to  remain  at  work  in  the  mines.  But  once  beyond 
the  ling  of  the  Zone,  all  normal  civil  railway  traffic  ceased. 
There  were  no  tickets  to  be  had,  nor  time  tables  to  be 
consulted.  All  trains  were  handled  by  the  military 
authorities,  and  all  movements  were  subservient  to  army 
demands.  Such  civil  traffic  as  might  exist  within  the  for- 
ward zone  was  of  secondary  importance. 

The  general  control  of  all  railways  in  the  Zone  des 
Armees  was  under  the  charge  of  an  officer  stationed  at 
General  Headquarters.  In  the  event  of  an  advance  being 
made  that  could  be  considered  permanent,  the  limitations 
of  the  Zone  des  Armees  would  be  moved  forward.  At 
this  new  limit  the  exclusive  military  control  would  cease 
and  the  authority  of  the  railway  companies  through  the 
joint  commissioners  be  established. 

As  there  was  a  single  officer  at  the  French  General 
Headquarters  controlling  army  railway  operation,  so 
there  was  a  single  officer  in  the  !War  Department  in  the 
Boulevard   St.   Germain,  Paris,   acting   as  the  liaison 


FRENCH  RAILWAYS  67 

officer  or  connecting  cliannel  between  tlie  Commissalres 
Militaires  and  the  cliief  military  authority.  The  personal 
machine  was,  therefore,  complete.  Any  disputes  between 
those  high  in  authority  were  adjusted  by  a  responsibly 
officer  of  the  Government,  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  who 
also  in  the  name  of  the  Government  arranged  for  pur- 
chases of  railway  material  and  saw  to  it  that  the  available 
supply  of  material  and  labor  was  distributed  among  the 
five  companies  according  to  their  actual  and  most 
pressing  needs.  This  official  was  the  Sous  Secretaire  de3 
Transports,  ranking  as  a  cabinet  member  without  port- 
folio, but  under  the  Minister  of  Public  [Works.  At  the 
time  of  America's  entry  into  the  war,  this  post  was  ably 
filled  by  Monsieur  Albert  Claveille,  an  engineer  by  pro- 
fession, formerly  general  manager  of  the  Chemin  de  Fer 
de  I'Etat.  Subsequently,  M.  Claveille  became  Minister  of 
Public  Works  in  the  Ministry  of  Painleve.  He  retained 
this  portfolio  through  the  following  ministry  of  Clemen- 
c'eau  until  after  hostilities  had  ceased. 

A  picture  of  the  French  railway  system  and  its  war- 
time management  is  necessary  to  permit  an  understand- 
ing of  the  structure  that  was  to  be  so  essential  to  the 
successful  American  participation  and  on  which  the  spe- 
cial American  service  was  to  be  grafted. 

Of  the  five  railway  companies,  only  two,  as  was  said 
above,  reached  the  actual  battle  front.  The  British  oper- 
ations were  confined  wholly  to  certain  parts  of  the  Kord 
lines  except  for  the  men  and  supplies  that  Entered 
through  Dieppe,  Havre',  or  Rouen,  and  who  made  the 
initial  stage  of  their  journey  on  the  rails  of  the  Etat  com- 
pany. On  the  other  hand,  the  Est  lines  running  towards 
Soissons,  Chateau-Thierry,  Verdun,  the  Valley  of  the 
Meuse,  St.  ^Fihiol,  Toul  and  Nancy,  wer^  the  lines  of 
comnumication  serving  the  American  front.  The  Ameri- 
can troops,  with  their  su]")]"»lies,  were  landed  at  the  several 
porta  from  Brest  southward,  whence  they  were  transj- 


68        AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FEANCE 

ported  over  the  Etat  or  P-0  lines  and  across  tliose  of  the 
Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee  to  reach  the  Chemin  de  Fer  de 
i'Est.  American  railway  movements  came,  therefore,  in 
contact  with  four  of  the  five  main  systems,  and  as  the 
principal  traffic  currents  of  these  concerns  flowed 
towards  Paris,  the  American  routes  ran  transverse  to 
this  established  order,  which  introduced  additional  com- 
plications in  operation. 


CHAPTER  VII 

AATF.RTCAX  RAILWAY  OrERATlONS  IN"  FRANCE 

"WTien  the  staff  took  up  the  question  of  organizing  a 
transportation  system  for  the  American  Expeditionary 
Forces  in  France,  it  had  the  benefit  of  British  experience. 
The  latter  had  been  obhged  to  do  as  evidently  Americans 
would  be  forced  to  do,  to  modify  opinions  as  to  methods 
of  railway  operation  in  order  to  meet  French  views,  to 
adapt  themselves  to  existing  conditions  that  could  not  be 
changed,  and  to  learn,  how  to  manage  a  system  of  rail- 
ways burdened  with  military  demands  that  must  be  met 
promptly  and  at  the  same  time  with  a  local  civilian  traffic 
that  could  not  be  ignored.  But  they  had  found  a  sat- 
isfactory solution. 

During  the  first  year  of  the  war,  Great  Britain  handled 
its  traffic  over  French  railways  without  any  well-estab- 
lished organization  or  definite  plan  for  cooperation  with 
the  French.  But  as  the  army  grew  in  size,  as  the  amount 
of  supplies  increased  in  tonnage,  and  as  the  French 
became  more  and  more  in  need  of  assistance,  the  British 
realized  the  necessity  of  constructing  a  well-designed 
operating  machine  whereby  their  men  and  materials 
could  be  handled  with  the  maximum  of  certainty  and  the 
minimum  of  friction.  For  this  task,  Mr.  Eric  Geddes 
was  selected,  sent  to  France  and  given  the  rank  of  major- 
general  that  he  might  have  proper  authority. 

Mr.  Geddes,  or  the  Rt.  Hon.  Sir  Eric  Geddes,  K.  C.  B., 
as  he  afterwards  became,  was  one  of  the  human  features 
of  the  war.  Born  in  1876,  he  passed  some  years  in  the 
United  States  in  railway  service,  chiefly  on  the  Baltimorei 
and  Ohio  Railroad.  After  some  extended  experience  in 
India,  he  returned  to  England  and  became  General  Man- 

69 


70        AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ager  of  the  North  Eastern  Railway.  Early  in  1917, 
Major-General  Sir  Eric  Geddes  was  recalled  as  chief  of 
transportation  in  France,  placed  in  charge  of  hastening 
shiiD  construction  in  England  and  created  Vice-Adroiral. 
He,  therefore,  had  the  unique  distinction  of  a  civilian 
holding  at  the  same  time  temporary  rank  as  Major- 
General  and  Vice-Admiral  in  the  British  army  and  navy 
respectively.  Before  the  war  came  to  an  end,  Sir  Eric 
Geddes  was  appointed  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  an 
office  corresponding  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  the 
United  States.  He  was  succeeded  in  France  by  his  previ- 
ous deputy,  Major-General  Sir  P.  A.  M.  Nash,  who  before 
the  war  had  been  Locomotive  Engineer  of  the  Great 
Northern  Railway  of  England,  and  to  whom  the  A.  E.  F. 
owe  many  courtesies. 

Major-General  Geddes  was  given  command  of  all 
transportation  matters  in  France  with  the  title  of 
Director  General  of  Transportation,  or  D.  G.  T.,  as  it 
was  always  mentioned.  The  organization  that  he  built 
up  embraced  every  channel  for  transportation,  including 
standard  gauge  railways,  light  military  railways,  canals 
and  roads,  their  construction,  maintenance,  and  opera- 
tion, and  the  authority  of  the  Director  General  of  Trans- 
portation extended  unbroken  and  unchallenged,  except  as 
it  had  to  conform  to  military  exigencies,  over  the  whole 
of  France  wherever  British  operations  were  paramount. 
To  the  British  transportation  department  there  was  no 
line  separating  the  Zone  of  the  Advance  from  the  Zone 
of  the  Rear  as  there  was  in  the  French  and  later  in  the 
American  service,  nor  was  there  any  conflict  in  authority 
between  the  several  branches  of  transportation,  because 
they  all  reported  to  one  head.  The  only  exception  was 
the  control  of  the  transport  vehicles,  motor  and  horse, 
used  on  highways. 

The  organization  thus  created  consisted  in  chief  of  five 
directorates,  reporting  to  the  Director  General  of  Trans- 


[^MEEICAN  KAILWAY  OPERATIONS         71 

portation,  but  exercising  separate  authority  over  trans- 
portation, light  railways,  roads,  inland  water  transport 
and  docks.  There  were  three  technical  departments 
whose  chiefs,  with  the  titles  of  Chief  Eailway  Construc- 
tion Engineer,  Chief  Mechanical  Engineer  and  Cliief 
Engineer  of  Port  Construction,  while  reporting  direct  to 
the  Director  General  of  Transportation,  cooperated  with 
the  several  ''  Directors  "  and  carried  out  the  necessary 
railway  or  mechanical  construction  in  their  several 
departments.  In  addition  there  were  appropriate  sec- 
tions dealing  with  questions  of  organization,  statistics, 
stores  and  accounts,  while  the  Canadian  Railway  troops 
maintained  a  section  of  their  own,  more  fully  described 
in  Chapter  XXV. 

Liaison  with  army  commanders  was  maintained 
through  two  Deputy  Directors  General  of  Transporta- 
tion, between  whom  the  five  armies,  that  composed 
the  British  Expeditionary  Force,  were  divided  into  two 
groups  and  under  whom  were  Assistant  Directors  Gen- 
eral of  Transportation,  one  for  each  army.  It  was  the 
duty  of  the  latter,  having  ascertained  army  needs  and 
learned  of  proposed  movements,  to  report  on  the  same 
through  the  Deputy  Director  of  the  army  group  to  the 
Director  General  who  made  the  necessary  provision 
through  the  Directors  having  supervision.  In  the  event 
of  any  difference  of  opinion  between  the  Director  General 
and  an  army  commander  final  decision  was  rendered 
nominally  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  but  in  practise 
by  the  Quartermaster  General  acting  in  his  name. 

The  authority  of  the  Director  General  was  confined 
strictly  to  France.  Vessels  arriving  at  French  ports 
were  discharged  by  a  staff  working  under  officials  of  the 
admiralty,  but  once  the  cargo  was  placed  on  the  quay 
and  freed  from  the  ship's  tackle,  it  became  the  charge  of 
the  Transportation  Department  and  so  remained  in  its 
passage  through  the  storage  depots  until  finally  con- 
sumed by  men  or  guns. 


72        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

The  headquarters  of  the  Transportation  Departmenti 
were  established  in  the  Chateau  Monthuis,  quite  close  to 
Montreuil,  in  whose  charming  park  the  office  buildings 
and  quarters  for  the  headquarters  staff  were  erected. 
The  General  Headquarters  of  the  British  Army  were 
located  in  Montreuil,  the  delightfully  quaint  old  city 
with  its  medieval  walls  and  moat  perched  high  on  a  hill 
overlooking  the  valley  of  the  Nocq.  To  the  west  was  the 
sea,  at  Etaples  only  ten  miles  away,  while  not  much  fur- 
ther to  the  south  was  the  historic  field  of  Crecy.  The 
Director  General  was  thus  in  close  touch  with  the  center 
of  military  activity,  and  was  conveniently  located  to 
reach  quickly  any  point  on  the  British  front  and  the  ports 
of  Dunkerque,  Calais  and  Boulogne. 

Montreuil  was  never  referred  to  by  name,  but  always 
as  ''  G.  H.  Q."  There  was  the  fiction  that  somehow  the 
enemy  did  not  know  where  the  British  headquarters  were 
located,  and  they  would  never  know  if  only  everyone 
would  refrain  from  mentioning  the  name  of  the  place. 
Of  course,  they  did  know,  but  it  was  a  singular  fact  that 
Montreuil  was  never  bombed.  It  was  said,  but  probably 
with  as  much  truth  as  many  other  things,  that  the  Ger- 
mans avoided  bombing  Montreuil  through  the  personal 
orders  of  the  Kaiser,  who  hoped  that  in  return  the  Brit- 
ish would  avoid  bombing  his  own  headquarters  in  the 
field.  In  this  matter  of  mentioning  names,  Americans 
were  not  quite  so  particular,  for  although  Chaumont  was 
generally  spoken  of  as  *'  G.  H.  Q.,"  the  fact  that  there 
were  two  main  points,  Chaumont  and  Tours,  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Army  and  headquarters  of  the  Service 
of  Supplies,  led  unavoidably  to  the  speaking  of  both 
places  by  name. 

The  American  Transportation  Department  was  pat- 
terned on  the  British  experience  as  a  model,  and  in  the 
'early  planning,  practically  all  the  work  was  done  by 
Major  W.  J.  Wilgus,  the  sole  member  of  the  first  engi- 


AMERICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         73 

neer  commission  who  was  not  assigned  to  other  duties 
as  were  the  other  members.  It  was  no  light  task  that 
faced  the  Staff.  The  investigations  of  the  Commission 
showed  the  transcendent  importance  of  transportation. 
But  neither  the  system  nor  its  component  joarts  were 
in  existence  and  much  time  would  obviously  be  needed  to 
manufacture  and  ship  the  rails,  the  rolling  stock  and  the 
other  required  materiel.  Orders,  therefore,  must  be 
placed  at  once  if  the  equipment  were  to  be  on  hand  when 
needed.  The  nature  of  the  equipment  depended  in  large 
measure  upon  the  size  of  the  American  army,  its  compo- 
sition and  the  sector  it  was  to  occupy,  and  in  June,  1917, 
no  one  of  those  fundamental  details  had  been  determined. 
However,  in  spite  of  difficulties,  a  requisition  for  materiel 
was  drawn  up  and  cabled  to  "Washington  in  July. 

The  skeleton  plan  on  which  this  requisition  was  based 
contemplated,  as  suggested  by  the  Staff,  a  possible  initial 
American  sector  between  Epinal  and  Nancy,  which  could 
be  served  by  the  existing  double-track  railway  lines  from 
Bordeaux  and  St.  Nazaire,  meeting  at  Bourges.  From 
this  point  there  was  a  railway  capable  of  handling 
25,000  tons  of  supplies  daily,  with  supplementary  lines 
having  sufficient  capacity  over  local  requirements  of 
25,000  tons  more.  Beyond  a  daily  tonnage  of  50,000 
tons  it  was  not  possible  to  see. 

It  was  recognized  that  the  additional  burden  on  the 
French  railways  would  require,  on  the  part  of  the 
American  Army,  the  construction  of  new  yards,  water 
supplies,  engine  terminals  and  other  facilities  that 
responsibilities  of  this  kind  entail,  and  also  the  con- 
struction of  many  other  additions  such  as  extra  tracks, 
cut-offs,  and  regiilating  stations,  all  with  the  view  of 
removing  any  special  restrictions  that  might  hamper  the 
maximum  train  movements.  In  addition,  but  fortunately 
this  was  one  of  the  few  questions  whose  answer  could  be 
postponed,  was  the   collecting  of  ample   equipment   of 


74        AMEEICAN  ENGINEEKS  IN  FKANCE 

all  kinds  for  reconstructing  railways  in  the  enemy *s  ter- 
ritory when  the  movement  towards  Berlin  should  begin. 

The  requisition  covered  not  only  sufficient  rolling  stock 
and  track  materiel,  but  the  necessary  railway  operating 
personnel  for  the  above  traffic,  on  the  assumption  that 
the  A.  E.  F.  would  work  its  own  locomotives  and  cars  by 
American  train  crews  in  transporting  its  supplies  from 
the  ports  of  entry  to  the  front,  but  subject  to  the  oper- 
ating rules  in  force  on  the  French  railways.  The  hand- 
ling of  American  traffic  to  as  large  an  extent  as  possi- 
ble under  American  control  was  held  as  absolutely 
necessary,  as  otherwise  the  success  of  the  American 
armies  might  be  jeopardized  should  the  French  supply 
of  personnel  and  equipment  fall  short  of  needs  at  a  crit- 
ical moment. 

In  carrying  out  a  comprehensive  plan  of  this  kind,  one 
of  the  first  questions  arising  was  the  character  of  the 
rolling  stock  to  be  used  on  the  French  railways.  A  deci- 
sion was  reached  that  the  locomotives  should,  if  practica- 
ble, be  in  accord  with  the  American  practice  and  have  a 
traction  force  that  would  be  limited  only  by  the  struc- 
tural clearances  of  the  French  railways  and  the  support- 
ing strength  of  the  bridges.  It  was  decided  also  that  the 
cars  should  be  of  the  American  type  with  a  capacity 
consistent  with  the  same  limitations  as  for  locomotives 
and  equipped  with  air  brakes,  but  with  the  French  type 
of  couplers  and  buffers  instead  of  corresponding  Ameri- 
can devices.  The  outcome  of  these  decisions  on  equip- 
ment was  that  the  Transportation  Department  was 
furnished  with  consolidation  locomotives  with  a  tractive 
effort  of  36,000  pounds  and  cars  of  thirty  tons'  capacity. 
Thus  the  policy  adopted  in  the  early  days  of  the  Trans- 
portation Department,  then  a  function  of  the  Chief  Engi- 
neer, contemplated  and  finally  pennitted  the  A.  E.  F.  to 
run  its  own  trains  made  up  of  American  locomotives  and 
cars  and  manned  by  American  personnel  under  ''  track- 


AMEEICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         75 

age  rights  "  over  French  railways  from  the  sea  to  the 
front,  a  distance  of  about  600  miles,  by  the  several  routes. 

Immediately  after  sending  the  requisition  for  materiel, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  cabled  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
that  an  extensive  study  of  the  transportation  methods  of 
the  Allies  had  convinced  him  that  the  operation  of  the 
railways  must  be  under  a  man  with  large  experience  in 
managing  commercial  railways  in  the  United  States.  He 
asked  that  the  ablest  American  railway  man  available 
be  sent  to  him,  explaining  that,  after  the  unfortunate 
results  with  inexperienced  men,  the  British  had  selected 
the  best  executive  man  they  could  find  to  have  charge  of 
transportation,  and  that  the  c[uestion  was  mostly  one  of 
operation  and  management  in  intimate  relation  with  the 
French  who  would  retain  general  control  over  their  own 
commercial  transportation. 

Acting  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  the  Secretary  of  War  sent  over  Mr.  W.  W.  Atter- 
bury,  Vice-President  in  charge  of  operations  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad. 

On  September  14,  1017,  the  Transportation  Depart- 
ment was  established  by  General  Order  37,  G.  H.  Q.,  1917, 
and  thereby  became  one  of  the  technical  services  of  Gen- 
eral Headquarters.    This  G.  0.  ordained  that : 

1.  A  Transportation  Department  is  hereby  established 
as  one  of  the  technical  services  of  the  Headquarters, 
A.  E.  F.  This  department  will  be  charged  with  the 
operation,  maintenance  and  construction  of  all  railways 
and  canals  under  American  control  and  Avitli  the  con- 
struction and  maintenance  of  wharves  and  roads,  and  of 
shops  and  other  buildings  for  railway  purposes.  Until 
such  time  as  the  number  of  construction  troops  in  France 
warrants  a  division  of  engineer  troops  and  labor  between 
the  Lines  of  Communication  and  the  Transportation 
Department,  all  construction  work  will  be  done  under 
the  Conmianding  General  of  the  Lines  of  Communication. 


76        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

i 

The  Chief  of  the  Transportation  Department  will  be 

the  Director    General   of   Transportation   and  will  be 

assisted  by  the  following  staff: 

a.  Deputy  Director. 

b.  Engineer  of  Construction. 

c.  Manager  of  Light  Railways. 

d.  Manager  of  Roads. 

e.  Business  Manager. 

f.  General  Manager. 

g.  Deputy  Director  with  each  Army  Commander. 

The  Deputy  Director  (personal)  will  be  the  personal 
representative  of  the  D.  G.  T.  and  will  act  for  him  in 
his  absence.  The  Deputy  Director  in  each  of  the  army 
groups  will  be  the  representative  of  the  D.  G.  T.  with 
the  Army  Commander;  will  be  responsible  for  keeping 
the  D.  G.  T.  advised  of  transportation  requirements 
within  his  area;  and,  in  an  emergency,  shall  act  with  the 
authority  of  the  D.  G.  T. 

The  General  Manager  will  be  responsible  for  operation 
and  maintenance  of  all  broad  gauge  lines,  including 
equipment  and  terminals.    He  shall  be  assisted  by: 

a.  General  Superintendent. 

b.  General  Superintendent  of  Motive  Power. 

c.  Engineer  of  Maintenance  of  "Way. 

d.  Superintendent  of  Transportation. 

e.  Superintendent  of  Railway  Telegraphs. 

The  Business  Manager  will  be  responsible  for  pur- 
chases, supplies,  stores  (unless  on  line,  in  which  event 
they  are  under  the  Division  Superintendent),  accounts, 
statistics  and  disbursements.    He  shall  be  assisted  by: 

a.  Purchasing  Agent. 

b.  Chief  Accountant. 

c.  Chief  of  Bureau  of  Claims. 

d.  Statistician. 

e.  Treasurer. 


AMERICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         77 

The  Engineer  of  Construction  will  be  responsible  for 
construction  of  new  lines  (broad  gauge),  terminals, 
docks,  shops,  sheds,  buildings  and  other  structures  con- 
nected with  railways. 

The  Manager  of  Roads  will  be  responsible  for  main- 
tenance of  existing  highways,  reconstruction  and  con- 
struction of  new  highways  within  the  zone  of  the  armies 
occupied  by  our  forces. 

The  Manager  of  Light  Railways  will  be  responsible  for 
construction,  operation  and  maintenance  of  all  light  rail- 
ways for  use  of  our  forces. 

The  same  order  named  Mr.  Atterbury  as  Director  Gen- 
eral of  Transioortation,  Major  (subsequently  Colonel) 
Wilgus  as  Deputy  D.  G.  T.,  Brigadier-General  William  C. 
Langfitt  as  Manager  of  Light  Railways,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Charles  H.  McKinstry  as  Manager  of  Roads.  On 
October  8th  Mr.  Atterbury  was  made  a  Brigadier- 
General. 

The  early  days  in  the  history  of  the  Transportation 
Department  were  not  particularly  cheerful.  The  Director 
General  was  confronted  with  the  difficulty  of  arranging 
for  operating  trains  over  lines  not  then  adequate  to 
sustain  the  double  burden  of  French  commercial  and 
American  army  needs,  lines  that  had  been  developed  in 
accordance  with  principles  and  were  being  worked  by 
methods  diametrically  opposed  to  those  in  vogue  on  the 
railways  in  the  United  States,  whose  staff  spoke  a  dif- 
ferent language,  and  of  adjusting  the  principles  of 
American  railroad  operation  to  an  established  military 
system  whose  officers  had  been  educated  along  quite  dif- 
ferent lines. 

When  the  burden  of  work  of  the  Commander-in-Chief 
began  to  assume  huge  proportions,  it  was  deemed  advis- 
able to  relieve  him  of  all  unnecessary  details,  so  that  on 
February  IG,  1918,  there  was  issued  General  Order  31, 
creating  the  Service  of  Supplies,  wherein  the  Department 
of  Transportation  was  made  a  section  of  the  Service  of 


78        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Utilities,  the  latter  being  one  of  the  main  component 
parts  of  the  Service  of  Supplies. 

Transportation  was  found  to  be  too  important  to  be 
left  as  a  branch  of  a  department,  even  though  charge  of 
railway  construction  had  been  taken  from  the  Director 
General  and  given  to  the  Director  of  Construction  and 
Forestry  in  March,  1918.  Consequently  the  Service  of 
Utilities  was  abolished  by  G.  0.  114,  July  11,  1918,  and 
the  Department  of  Transportation  substituted  therefor, 
thus  permitting  the  D.  G.  T.  to  report  directly  to  the  Com- 
manding General,  Service  of  Supplies.  As  thus  consti- 
tuted, the  Transportation  Department  covered; 

Operation  and  maintenance  of  all  railways  and  canals, 
under  American  control. 

Operation  of  inland  water  transport  and  ocean  trans- 
port with  England  and  other  European  countries. 

Compilation  of  accounts  due  the  United  States  for 
material  furnished  the  French  railways. 

Compilation  of  statistics  showing  classified  tonnage 
received  at  ports;  that  moved  over  railways;  and  that 
delivered  at  rail  heads. 

Operation  of  terminals,  including  unloading  of  ships, 
and  transportation  of  goods  to  storehouses. 

Procurement  of  railway  supplies. 

Control  of  telephones  and  telegraphs  for  railway 
purposes. 

Railway  personnel. 

Control  and  maintenance  of  all  rolling  stock  and  motor 
cars. 

Disbursement  incident  to  performance  of  foregoing 
duties. 

Some  difficulties  were  found  in  adjusting  military 
organization  to  the  operating  organization  of  a  commer- 
cial railway  whose  functions  were  the  moving  of  men 
and  material  from  one  point  to  another.  In  the  latter 
organization,  the  ordinary  regimental  unit  did  not  fit. 


AMEKICAN  EAILWAY  OPERATIONS         79 

Finally  it  became  apparent  that  tlie  best  solution  was 
the  creation  of  a  transportation  corps  wherein  the  struc- 
ture of  an  infantry  regiment,  the  base  of  all  military 
units,  could  be  dropped  and  men  formed  in  such  cate- 
gories as  would  be  best  adapted  for  railway  operation. 
To  this  end  the  approval  of  the  War  Department  was 
secured  and  the  necessary  orders  were  issued  just  as 
hostilities  ceased.  The  organization  that  was  contem- 
plated consisted  of  6,000  officers  of  various  ranks  and 
200,000  enlisted  men,  although  on  November  11th  the 
actual  number  of  individuals  in  the  corps  was  1,677 
officers  and  61,894  enlisted  men,  the  largest  technical 
service  in  the  A.  E.  F. 

American  railway  operation  in  France  can  bo  divided 
into  three  phases. 

The  first  phase  covers  the  period  from  1917  to  the 
spring  of  1918  when  the  A.  E.  F.  was  in  the  position  of 
a  large  shipper,  all  its  troops  and  freight  being  moved 
by  French  equipment  with  French  train  crews  exclusively. 

During  the  second  phase  which  continued  from  the 
spring  of  1918  until  November  of  the  same  year,  when 
the  American  army  operated  its  own  terminals  with  its 
own  rolling  stock  and  men,  and  by  means  of  its  own 
engines,  cars  and  men  gave  to  the  French  substantial  aid 
in  a  steadily  increasing  degree  in  handling  traffic  on  the 
railways. 

At  the  conclusion  of  hostilities  the  third  phase  was  just 
beginning,  for  it  was  then  arranged  to  take  over  certain 
definite  sections  of  French  railways  and  work  them  with 
American  personnel  and  under  the  American  system  of 
train  operation. 

To  supervise  operation,  the  Director  General  of  Trans- 
portation appointed  a  General  Manager  under  whom 
were  a  Suporinlendent  of  Motive  Power  and  a  General 
Superintendent  of  Transportation. 

As  was  fully  explained  when  discussing  French  rail- 


80        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ways,  the  systems  with  wliicli  Americans  came  in  contact 
were  the  Etat,  the  Paris-Orleans  and  Midi,  the  Paris- 
Lyons-Mediterranee  and  the  Est.  The  first  two  of  which 
extended  easterly  from  the  several  ports  of  entry  between 
Brest  and  Bordeaux,  and  converged  to  i^laces  in  the  cen- 
ter of  France,  east  of  Tours  and  south  of  Orleans,  where 
there  were  established  the  principal  intermediate  supply 
depots  and  the  great  aviation  camps.  From  the  points 
of  convergence,  other  lines  radiated  to  the  regulating 
stations  of  Is-sur-Tille,  Liffol-le-Grand  and  St.  Dizier 
and  beyond  to  all  points  in  the  American  sector.  The 
total  length  of  French  railways  used  by  American  trafiic 
was  about  5,000  miles. 

These  lines,  or  such  portions  of  them  within  the  limits 
of  the  Service  of  Supplies  as  carried  American  ship- 
ments, were  divided  for  operating  purposes  into  six 
Grand  Divisions,  and  these  were  further  subdivided. 
Each  of  the  former  was  under  the  charge  of  a  General 
Superintendent  reporting  to  the  Superintendent  of 
Transportation,  and  each  division  under  a  Di\dsion 
Superintendent  who,  reporting  to  the  General  Superin- 
tendent of  the  Grand  Division,  exercised  supervision 
over  the  American  train  crews  cooperating  with  the 
French,  had  charge  of  repairs  to  American  equipment, 
and  did  what  he  could  to  expedite  American  shipments 
in  French  hands.    All  these  officials  had  military  rank. 

This  organization  was  established  only  in  the  territory 
behind  the  regulating  stations.  Matters  connected  with 
transportation  in  the  advanced  section  were,  at  first, 
largely  under  the  control  of  the  regulating  officers 
appointed  by  General  Headquarters,  although  an  Assist- 
ant General  Manager  for  the  Zone  of  Advance,  was 
appointed  and  attached  to  the  Assistant  Chief  of  Staff, 
G.  4  at  G.  H.  Q.,  to  assist  in  the  transportation  problems 
in  that  territory.  Later,  when  it  became  apparent  that 
the  transportation  problems  in  the  Zone  of  Advance  were 


AMERICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         81 

becoming  more  diflScult,  the  Director  General  was 
requested  to  place  a  Deputy  at  General  Headquarters. 
Subsequently,  a  similar  organization  to  that  which 
obtained  in  the  Service  of  Supplies  was  formed  and 
placed  in  effect  in  the  advanced  section. 

In  May  and  June,  1918,  five  battalions  of  railway  men 
were  assembled  in  France,  the  troops  being  selected  at 
the  classification  camps  at  St.  Aignan  and  Blois  from  the 
combatant  regiments.  They  composed  the  first  American 
operating  unit.  They  were  assembled  at  several  points 
and  for  thirty  days  were  instructed  in  French  train 
operation  by  representatives  of  the  French  railways. 
Miniature  signals  were  made  and  classes  held  at  the 
camps  in  order  to  familiarize  the  men  with  signal  opera- 
tions. A  resume  of  the  rules  of  the  several  lines  over 
which  the  Americans  were  to  operate  was  translated 
from  the  French  and  published  in  standard  book  form. 
The  book  contained  the  essential  rules  for  French  rail- 
way operation,  showing  the  signal  aspects  in  colors.  As 
soon  as  the  period  of  instruction  was  finished,  the  men 
were  turned  over  to  the  French  and  used  as  much  as  pos- 
sible to  drive  American  locomotives  which  had  begun  to 
arrive  and  which  were  being  used  by  the  French  to  haul 
American  freight. 

The  increasing  number  of  American  troops  had  put  a 
tremendous  burden  on  the  French  railways.  At  the  end 
of  May  the  amount  of  freight  unloaded  at  the  ports 
exceeded  25,000  tons  a  day.  To  relieve  still  further  the 
transport  situation,  a  request  was  made  by  Marshal  Foch 
that  railway  troops  from  the  United  States  be  given 
priority  and  that  24,500  railroad  men  be  sent  over  during 
June  and  July.  Although  this  program  was  not  fully 
realized,  about  15,000  operating  men  did  arrive  in  France 
before  the  end  of  July,  and  immediate  steps  were  taken 
to  instruct  them  and  put  thorn  into  service,  ^leanwhile, 
engine  houses  were  being  erected  as  fast  as  possible  and 


82        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

the  sufficiency  of  the  water  supply  was  being  investigated 
with  the  view  to  future  extended  operations.  Because  of 
the  need  of  thirty  days'  instruction  for  the  men,  il  was 
not  until  September  that  the  first  trains,  operated 
entirely  by  American  crews,  began  to  run  from  the  coast 
to  the  regulating  stations. 

It  was  agreed  that  Americans  should  operate  their  own 
trains  so  far  as  possible,  the  same  to  be  made  up  at  the 
ports  and  run  through  unbroken  to  the  American  inland 
terminal  points.  Wherever  it  was  possible,  no  American 
trains  were  handled  in  French  yards,  as  these  were 
already  congested  and  could  not  take  care  of  additional 
traffic. 

Freight  runs  were,  therefore,  made  on  the  main  line 
from  Montoir  to  Saumur,  from  Saumur  to  Gievres,  from 
Gievres  to  Marcy,  and  from  Marcy  to  Is-sur-Tille,  thereby 
obviating  the  use  of  the  French  yards  at  Angers,  St. 
Pierre  des  Corps  (Tours),  Vierzon,  Nevers  and  Dijon. 

Although  this  kept  French  yards  from  being  further 
congested,  some  difficulty  arose  by  reason  of  the  fact 
that  the  runs  of  the  French  pilots,  one  of  whom  was  on 
every  American  train  as  conductor,  did  not  coincide  with 
the  regular  French  train  runs.  The  lack  of  through  com- 
munications from  the  American  yards  to  French  yards, 
added  other  complications  and  it  was  frequently  difficult 
to  arrange  for  '^  marches  "  for  American  trains  after 
they  were  made  up  in  American  yards. 

The  chief  difference  between  the  American  and  French 
railway  operation  was  that  of  centralized  control  in  the 
case  of  Americans  and  local  control  in  the  case  of  the 
French. 

Before  an  international  system  of  train  working 
could  be  put  on  a  satisfactory  basis,  it  was  seen  that  a 
new  method  of  communication  would  have  to  be  estab- 
lished over  our  lines,  as  the  French  system  of  telegraph 
and  telephone,  running  only  from  station  to  station,  could 


A^IEEICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         83 

not  meet  the  needs  of  the  American  service.  A  selector 
telephone  system  was,  therefore,  installed  from  St. 
Nazaire  to  Is-sur-Tille,  from  Bourges  to  St.  Florentin 
and  Liffol-le-Grand,  and  from  Bordeaux  to  Bourges  and 
Vierzon.  The  line  was  cut  at  each  division  terminal  so 
that  operation  of  trains  over  any  given  division  was 
under  the  control  of  a  Chief  Train  Dispatcher  at  that 
point.  In  addition  to  the  selector  telephones,  tele- 
graphic communication  was  also  established  on  all  lines 
over  which  American  trains  were  operated.  This 
telephone-telegraph  service  proved  efficacious,  and,  in 
fact,  better  communication  was  afforded  on  the  lines  oper- 
ated  by  the  Transportation  Corj^s  in  France  than  on 
many  good  railways  in  the  United  States. 

The  French  Chef  do  Gare  or  Station  Master  has  abso- 
lute control  over  the  movement  of  all  trains  through  his 
station,  and  no  train  is  permitted  to  depart  without  his 
consent.  The  Chefs  de  Garo  are,  therefore,  a  series  of 
independent  train  control  authorities,  each  one  supreme 
in  his  own  territory  with  no  superior  authority 
corresponding  to  the  ximerican  train  dispatcher. 
The  trains  are  run  on  a  series  of  schedules  or 
''  marches,"  beginning  at  one  minute  after  midnight. 
The  '*  marches  "  of  trains  in  the  direction  of  Paris  are 
even  numbered,  those  in  the  opposite  direction  odd  num- 
bered, and  are  arbitrarily  spaced  twenty  minutes  apart 
throughout  the  entire  twenty-four  hours.  Therefore,  on 
a  double-track  railway  seventy-two  trains  per  day  in 
each  direction  is  the  limit  of  the  traffic  that  can  be 
handled.  As  a  matter  of  actual  practise,  this  limit  is 
never  reached  on  account  of  road  delays,  terminal  con- 
gestions, etc. 

On  French  railways  all  runs  for  trains  and  engine 
crews  are  turn-around  runs,  the  crew  starting  from  its 
home  terminal  and  returning  at  the  end  of  the  day.  The 
system  of  putting  crews  on  rest  at  an  outlying  point, 


84        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

common  in  American  practise,  is  entirely  unknown  in 
France.  Trains  are  blocked  from  station  to  station, 
all  signals  being  under  manual  control,  and  with  the 
exception  of  certain  distant  signals,  no  permissive  sig- 
nals exist. 

The  French  rolling  stock  is  very  light  and  air-brake 
equipment  on  freight  cars  was  almost  unknown  before 
the  advent  of  American-constructed  cars.  The  average 
French  car  has  a  capacity  of  about  ten  tons,  while  the 
American  cars  used  in  France  had  a  capacity  of  thirty 
tons. 

The  French  locomotives  are  of  good  design  and  con- 
struction, well  adapted  to  the  needs  of  that  country  under 
ordinary  conditions.  They  are  lighter  than  the  locomo- 
tives generally  used  in  the  United  States'.  In  France  a 
higher  average  speed  is  maintained  and  shorter  and 
lighter  trains  are  hauled  than  on  American  railways. 

On  account  of  the  ordinary  French  freight  cars  being 
entirely  without  air  brakes  and  that  a  great  many  of 
them  were  not  even  equipped  w^ith  hand  brakes,  it  was 
necessary  to  place  a  certain  number  of  brake  cars  in  each 
freight  train,  the  number  varying  on  the  different  rail- 
ways according  to  the  gradients  and  the  length  of  trains 
hauled. 

Owing  to  a  fairly  even  balance  of  traffic  in  pre-war 
days,  no  central  system  of  car  distribution  had  been 
found  to  be  necessary,  the  Chefs  de  Gare  generally  hav- 
ing enough  empty  cars  at  their  stations  to  take  care  of 
local  needs.  If  not  enough  cars  were  available,  request 
was  made  on  the  nearest  divisional  terminal  for  the 
required  number.  The  same  lack  of  central  coordination 
existed  in  respect  to  the  distribution  of  locomotives,  and 
no  definite  system  was  in  force  for  the  balancing  of 
motive  power  along  the  lines.  Such  matters  were  left  to 
the  station  masters. 

It    was    believed    that    American    trains    could    be 


AMERICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         85 

run  more  safely  and  more  Economically  if  oper- 
ated with  air  brakes,  but  this  was  forbidden  by 
French  operating  practise.  However,  as  a  result 
of  a  conference  with  the  French  railway  officials 
and  representatives  of  the  Fourth  Bureau  of  the  French 
War  Department,  it  was  agreed  that  a  test  train  should 
be  run.  Air  brakes  were  used  throughout  and  as  a  result 
the  French  operating  representatives  were  convinced 
that  the  plan  was  entirely  feasible.  A  second  lest  train 
was  run  on  another  part  of  the  railways  assigned  to 
American  use,  and  it  also  was  convincing  to  the  French 
officials.  In  compliance  with  their  recommendations,  the 
Minister  of  Public  Works  issued  an  order  authorizing 
the  operation  of  American  trains  with  air  brakes  over 
any  portion  of  the  American  lines  of  communication. 

In  case  that  the  American  trains  were  made  ujo  partly 
of  American  and  partly  of  French  equipment,  it  was 
agreed  that  where  such  combining  of  equipment  occurred, 
the  French  cars  were  to  be  placed  behind  the  American. 

Another  point  which  involved  extended  discussion  was 
that  of  tonnage  rating,  the  French  officials  claiming  that 
the  American  tonnage  ratings  were  much  too  high,  and 
that  we  would  not  be  able  to  accomplish  what  had  been 
planned.  A  thorough  survey  of  the  lines  was  made,  and 
it  was  found  that  the  French  in  computing  their  tonnage 
ratings  used  a  greater  margin  of  safety  than  is  common 
in  American  practise,  and  that  in  the  main  their  ratings 
more  nearly  approximated  the  facts  than  our  own. 
American  trains  were  limited  to  a  length  of  not  exceeding 
500  meters,  including  the  locomotive,  but  this  limitation 
was  not  due  to  the  type  of  motive  power  used,  but  to  the 
length  of  passing  sidings  on  the  French  railways. 

Many  of  these  questions  might  easily  have  led  to  seri- 
ous differences.  That  they  were  all  adjusted  was  due  to 
the  lact,  courtesy  and  accommodating  character  of  the 
French  officials. 


86        AMEKICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Until  some  time  after  the  signing  of  the  armistice  the 
actual  operations  of  troop  trains  were  conducted  almost 
entirely  by  the  French,  although  in  some  cases  American 
equipment  and  American  crews  were  used.  The  troop 
trains,  however,  were  run  between  French  terminals  and 
not  between  American  terminals,  as  was  the  case  with 
freight  trains. 

One  of  the  most  serious  problems  in  the  transportation 
of  troops  was  the  jDrevention  of  personal  injury.  The  acci- 
dent ratio  among  troops  travelling  over  American  lines  of 
communication  was  very  high.  During  the  warm  weather 
the  temptation  was  great  for  soldiers  to  get  out  of  the 
cars  in  which  they  were  crowded  and  to  ride  between 
them  or  on  top,  or  to  sit  in  the  doors  of  box  cars,  with 
their  heads  and  leg's  projecting.  The  clearance  between 
cars  and  bridges  and  tunnels  on  the  French  railways  is 
considerably  less  than  similar  clearances  in  the  United 
States.  To  attempt  to  lessen  the  consequent  frequent 
occurrence  of  accidents,  an  active  campaign  was  started 
by  the  Transportation  Service  in  the  shape  of  posters 
and  warning  notices  which  were  distributed  among  the 
troops  at  jDoints  of  entrainment.  But  the  average 
American  was  incorrigible,  apparently  it  is  only  death 
that  stops  him.  In  spite  of  all  warnings,  notices  and 
orders,  in  spite  even  of  the  many  fatal  accidents,  it  was 
impossible  to  prevent  the  practice.  The  men  would  take 
the  chance. 

For  the  transportation  of  sick  and  wounded,  the 
Transportation  Department  ordered  ambulance  trains 
to  be  built  in  England  after  the  standard  British  plans. 
Nineteen  such  trains  with  a  total  of  304  cars 
were  delivered,  and  twenty-nine  more  trains  were 
under  construction  or  ordered  when  the  war  ended. 
These  trains  were  composed  of  cars  with  two  tiers  of 
iron  beds  very  comfortably  aiTanged,  a  car  divided 
into  an  operating  room  and  dispensary,  kitchen  and  din- 


AMERICAN  RAILWAY  OPERATIONS         87 

ing  car,  and  cars  for  all  kinds  of  supplies  and  quarters 
for  doctors,  nurses  and  attendants.  "When  war  broke  out 
in  li)14,  there  were  no  such  trains  in  existence  and 
arrangements  had  to  be  improvised  out  of  any  cars  at 
hand.  The  British  trains  were  models  of  completeness, 
comfort  and  general  excellence  of  design. 

A  distinctive  feature  of  the  railway  organization  in 
France  was  the  establishment  of  the  Railway  Transport 
Officer  or  R.  T.  0.  Service.  This  system  was  patterned 
after  the  one  in  use  in  the  British  army  where  specially 
trained  officers,  "  R.  T.  O.'s  "  were  placed  at  the  more 
im))ortant  freight  and  passenger  stations  to  keep  watch 
on  fieight  movements  and  to  aid  other  officers  and  men 
when  travelling.  The  difference  in  language  made  it 
very  difficult  for  the  travelers  to  get  information  regard- 
ing train  schedules  and  the  handling  of  baggage  and 
freight.  The  Transport  Officers  were  installed  both, 
with  the  view  to  assist  them,  and  incidentally  to  relieve 
the  French  from  the  burden  of  dealing  with  a  great  num- 
ber of  passengers  unfamiliar  with  the  language  and 
customs  of  France. 

Effort  was  made  to  secure  for  this  purjoose  officers 
who  had  had  railway  experience  and  who,  whenever  pos- 
sible, possessed  some  knowledge  of  the  French  language. 
Such  officers  as  it  was  possible  to  select  were  sent  to  a 
school  where  they  were  instructed  in  French  railway 
methods  and  the  manner  in  which  shipment  of  troops  and 
freight  was  made.  There  was  a  total  of  about  220  of 
these  officers  stationed  at  the  more  important  stations 
and  terminals.  Tlie  Railway  Transport  Officers  were  not 
confined  to  the  main  lines  of  conmiunication,  but  were  to 
be  found  all  over  France  in  leave  areas  or  at  important 
junctions,  and  even  in  England  and  Italy.  If  an 
**  R.  T.  0."  was  eHicient  and  possessed  tact  with  patience, 
he  was  an  imjiortant  member  of  the  army  and  a  very 
helpful  friend  to  his  fellow-soldiers. 


CHAPTER  Vin 

STORAGE   YAUDS  AND   OTHER  RAILWAY   CONSTRUCTION 

Ports  were  needed  for  the  landing  of  men  and  supplies, 
and  railways  were  needed  for  their  transportation,  but 
all  the  ports  and  all  the  railways  would  have  been  worth- 
less if  provision  had  not  also  been  made  for  the  housing 
of  the  men  and  the  storage  of  materials.  The  men  were 
not  difficult  to  handle,  although  barracks  with  a  floor  area 
of  250  acres  had  to  be  erected.  Men  can  go  almost  any- 
where and  take  care  of  themselves.  They  soon  learned 
that  they  would  not  see  again,  until  their  return  to  the 
United  States,  anything  approaching  in  completeness  and 
comfort  the  camps  they  occupied  during  their  period  of 
training  at  home,  and  ceased  complaining  of  hardships. 
It  was  the  mass  of  inanimate  objects  of  all  sizes,  shapes, 
weight  and  composition  that  caused  official  concern. 
This  dead  freight  had  to  be  cared  for,  and  carefully,  from 
the  moment  of  discharge  from  ship  until  that  of  actual 
consumption. 

At  the  outset  the  Commander-in-Chief  laid  down  the 
rule  that  sufficient  supplies  of  all  kinds  to  maintain  the 
army  for  ninety  days  must  be  kept  on  hand.  He  sug- 
gested that  this  quantity  might  be  distributed  among 
three  points.  Following  this  suggestion  it  was  decided 
that  supplies  enough  for  forty-five  days  were  to  remain 
at  a  base  storage,  for  thirty  days  at  some  intermediate 
point,  and  for  fifteen  days  in  the  advanced  area. 

Storage  facilities  for  army  supplies  were  of  three 
classes.  The  first  was  open  storage,  where  imperishable 
articles  such  as  pipe,  pig  metal,  coal,  lumber,  etc.,  could 
be  kept,  which  required  but  the  necessarj^  area  of  land 
with  convenient  tracks  to  permit  cars  to  be  unloaded  and 

88 


STORAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTRUCTION         89 

again  loaded.  The  second  was  also  open,  but  tarpaulin 
covers  were  used  to  protect  such  articles  as  hay,  canned 
goods,  small  arms  in  boxes,  and  ammunition.  The  third 
was  covered  storage  as  afforded  by  buildings  for  the 
various  things  that  exposure  to  dampness  would  injure. 
It  is  the  last  which  caused  most  worry,  for  both  forms  of 
open  storage  were  easily  and  quickly  arranged. 

It  was  at  first  estimated  that  to  house  ninety  days* 
supply  per  man  there  would  be  required  an  average  of 
twenty-one  square  feet  of  covered  floor  area.  As  the 
storage  building  unit  was  fixed  at  a  width  of  fifty  feet, 
this  average  meant  that,  when  an  army  of  4,000,000  men 
were  in  France,  warehouses  would  be  needed  equivalent 
to  one  building  thirty-two  miles  long.  Fortunately,  this 
estimate  was  i^roved  to  be  unnecessarily  generous,  as  it 
was  found  that  more  and  more  goods  could  be  kept  quite 
safely  under  the  sole  and  simple  protection  of  a  tarpaulin. 
In  consequence,  the  lesser  standard  of  ten  square  feet  of 
covered  storage  area  per  man  was  adoj^ted.  But  the 
demand  for  men  was  so  great  following  the  Gennan 
offensives  of  the  spring  of  1918  that  all  available  vessel 
space  was  given  to  troops  at  the  expense  of  supplies,  so 
that  a  sufficiency  to  carry  the  army  for  ninety  days  was 
never  on  hand.  During  1918  the  minimum  was  enough 
for  twenty-three  days  during  January,  and  the  maximum 
for  seventy-two  days  during  June,  when  new  ships  of  the 
emergency  fleet  began  to  become  effective.  There  was  an 
average  of  fifty  days'  supply  from  January  to  November. 
In  the  meanwhile  the  requirement  to  hold  a  minimum  of 
ninety  days'  supply  had  been  reduced  to  forty-five  days. 

There  was  a  tremendous  number  of  storage  places 
located,  literally  speaking,  all  over  France.  There  were, 
first,  the  warehouses  and  open  storage  spaces  forming  a 
part  of  the  wharf  construction,  where  the  cargoes  were 
housed  or  placed  when  discharged  from  the  steamers 
and  while  waiting  transhipment  to  interior  points.  It  was 


90        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

too  slow  a  process  and  one  involving  too  much  delay  in 
freeing  vessels  to  transfer  directly  from  ship  to  car  as  a 
regular  proceeding. 

Next  in  order  came  the  base  depots,  huge  affairs  cov- 
ering, as  will  be  seen  presently,  areas  whose  boundaries 
could  be  stated  in  miles.  These  depots  were  located  as 
close  as  could  be  arranged  to  the  ports  that  they  served, 
and  to  them  were  taken  the  supplies  from  the  wharves 
and  wharf  warehouses  as  fast  as  they  could  be  handled. 
This  prevented  congestion  on  the  wharves.  At  the  base 
depots  the  supplies  were  sorted  systematically,  similar 
kinds  of  articles  being  put  by  themselves.  Ships'  cargoes 
were  often  badly  mixed  in  loading,  so  that  sorting  and 
segregation  were  necessary  after  discharge  in  France. 

The  base  depots  were  the  main  reservoirs.  They  were 
too  far  from  the  front  to  be  relied  on  for  quick  service 
in  case  of  emergency.  Intermediate  depots  were,  there- 
fore, constructed,  about  midway  between  the  coast  and 
the  front,  which  rivalled  in  size  some  of  the  base  depots 
and  where  enough  supplies  could  be  stored,  either  under 
or  without  roof,  to  carry  the  combatant  army  for,  per- 
haps, twenty  days.  Such  a  figure  is  stated  in  general 
terms.  Of  some  classes  of  articles  there  was  usually  a 
generous  surplus,  while  of  others  there  was  always  a 
shortage,  but  of  such  supplies  as  there  were  on  hand, 
a  successful  effort  was  made  to  keep  a  substantial  amount 
at  the  intermediate  depots. 

The  intermediate  depots  were  located  in  the  interior  of 
France,  away  from  the  coast  and  frontier,  beyond  the 
congested  districts  next  to  the  seaports,  where  serious 
train  delays  were  frequent,  delays  that  frequently  and 
seriously  interrupted  a  steady  forward  delivery.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  were  sufficiently  far  back  from  the  fight- 
ing front  so  as  not  to  be  exposed  to  easy  airplane 
attack  or  be  threatened  by  an  enemy  advance,  and  yet 
sufficiently  near  to  the  front  that  supplies  might  be  sent 


STOEAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTEUCTION    91 

to  the  army  zone  by  motor  truck  in  case  of  urgent  call, 
which  sometimes  happened. 

Next  to  the  intermediate  depots,  and  third  in  the  chain, 
came  the  regulating  stations,  where  shipments  were 
received  in  train  loads  from  either  the  base  or  the  inter- 
mediate depots.  The  regulating  stations,  while  extensive, 
were  simple  when  compared  with  the  other  depots. 
They  consisted  of  yard  tracks  where  cars  of  incoming 
trains  could  be  sorted  according  to  ultimate  destina- 
tion. Covered  and  ojoen  storage  facilities  were  provided 
where  supplies  could  be  held  if  the  forward  depots  or 
^'  dumj^s  "  were  full.  The  regulating  stations  were  in 
the  advanced  area  and,  though  perhaps  beyond  the 
reach  of  shells,  were  nevertheless  likely  to  be  bombed. 
It  was,  therefore,  not  desirable  to  hold  at  such  points 
more  supplies  than  necessary  to  furnish  a  small  balanc- 
ing reservoir. 

Beyond  the  regulating  stations  were  the  advanced 
or  army  dumps  at  the  rail-heads  where  the  minimum 
amount  of  supplies  was  stored.  There  were,  therefore, 
four  steps  in  the  jorogress  of  materials  from  the  coast  to 
the  front  trench.  It  was  not  necessary  that  every  article 
should  pass  through  each  doj)()t.  The  base  and  interme- 
diate depots  were  nothing  but  huge  reservoirs  holding 
the  surplus.  If  there  was  a  demand  at  the  front  for  cer- 
tain, articles,  shipments  could  be  made  direct  from  the 
wharves  to  the  nearest  regulating  stations,  cutting  out 
the  base  and  intermediate  depots  entirely,  or  a  draught 
miglit  be  made  on  either  one  of  the  last  two. 

Tlicre  are  neither  words  nor  statistics  that  will  enable 
one  to  see  in  his  mind's  eye  one  of  these  gi'cat  depots. 
When  the  units  of  measure  are  hundreds  of  miles  for  the 
railway  tracks,  acres  for  the  floor  area  of  buildings,  and 
square  miles  for  the  extend  of  land,  it  is  quite  impossible 
to  picture  the  scene,  with  the  puffing  locomotives,  long 
strings  of  loaded  freight  cars,  piles  of  every  imaginable 


92        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

kind  of  mercliandise  and  the  operating  force  in  uniform 
under  military  discipline.  There  is  no  single  railway 
terminal  in  the  United  States  that  equals  in  capacity 
for  the  handling  and  storage  of  goods,  any  one  of  several 
of  the  American  army  depots  in  France. 

The  interlocked  system  of  port,  base  and  intermediate 
depots,  with  the  regulating  stations,  forward  dumps  and 
their  various  component  parts,  was  not  a  single  creation. 
It  represented  the  joint  action  of  many  boards  of  engi- 
neers. In  fact,  not  only  had  the  end  not  been  reached 
but  plans  for  still  further  increases  were  being  consid- 
ered when  the  cessation  of  hostilities  in  November,  1918, 
put  an  end  to  all  development. 

The  first  step  in  the  matter  of  storage  yards  was  taken 
by  the  French  early  in  the  summer  of  1917,  prior  to  the 
organization  of  the  Transportation  Department,  by  fix- 
ing on  the  site  for  the  yard  of  a  regulating  station  at  the 
junction  of  the  Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee  and  the  Est 
Railways  near  Is-sur-Tille,  in  the  department  of  Cote 
d'Or,  about  sixteen  miles  north  of  Dijon.  They  made 
this  selection  as  giving  the  best  location  for  a  regulating 
station,  assuming  that  the  American  sector  would  be  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Toul,  which  it  finally  was. 

The  French  engineers  prepared  plans  for  the  depot 
and  submitted  them  to  the  American  Chief  Engineer  in 
AugTist,  1917.  The  French  plans  were  not  suitable  for 
American  methods  of  operation  and  had  to  be  completely 
revised  by  the  Transportation  Department.  The  Ameri- 
can plans,  work  on  which  was  begun  in  the  autumn  of 
1917,  contemplated  the  occupation  of  840  acres  with 
ninety-five  miles  of  tracks,  sixty  warehouses  providing 
1,847,000  square  feet  of  storage  area,  and  open  storage 
amounting  to  more  than  5,000,000  square  feet  or  125 
acres,  nearly  all  of  which  was  finished  and  put  in  use. 

In  August,  1917,  the  Fifteenth,  Seventeenth  and 
Eighteenth  Engineers  were  in  France.    They  provided  a 


/         /  J 


STORAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTRUCTION    93 

skilled  force  capable  of  investigating,  planning  and  exe- 
cuting on  a  large  scale.  Concurrently  with  making  deci- 
sions as  to  the  use  of  existing  ports  and  the  creating  of 
new  ones,  determination  as  to  the  location  of  certain 
main  depots  was  reached  and  their  construction  put  in 
hand.  While  that  work  was  in  progress,  studies  were 
continued  as  to  other  projects.  The  sites  selected  for 
immediate  occupation  were  St.  Sulpice  and  Montoir  as 
base  depots  for  the  several  landing  places  in  the  vicinity 
of  Bordeaux  and  St.  Nazaire  respectively,  and  Gievrea 
as  an  intermediate  depot. 

St.  Sulpice  is  located  about  nine  miles  east  of  Bassens. 
The  site  was  acquired  in  1917,  the  French  Government 
using  its  powers  of  expropriation  to  secure  the  land 
either  by  lease  or  purchase.  Such  cooperation  on  the 
part  of  the  French  Government  was,  of  course,  always 
forthcoming.  Plans  were  at  once  adopted  contemplating 
147  miles  of  track,  144  warehouses  with  a  covered  storage 
area  of  2,263,000  square  feet  and  open  storage  amounting 
to  nearly  7,000,000  square  feet.  This  layout  had  a  length 
of  about  two  and  one-half  miles,  covering  approximately 
850  acres.  By  November,  1918,  more  than  the  originally 
contemplated  covered  storage  area  facilities  had  been 
constructed,  with  ninety-one  miles  of  track  and  approxi- 
mately one-half  of  the  open  storage  area  put  in  use. 
St.  Sulpice  itself  was  reinforced  by  the  extensive  ware- 
houses along  the  wharves  of  Bassens,  where  much  mate- 
rial could  be  held  pending  its  shipment  to  the  main  base 
depot. 

After  extended  and  intensive  study  of  the  whole  ques- 
tion of  the  most  efficient  development  of  the  estuary  of 
the  Loire  River,  it  was  finally  decided  to  place  the  base 
storage  depot  at  IMontoir,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 
This  was  a  convenient  location  to  serve  both  St.  Nazaire 
and  also  the  new  wharves  which  it  was  proposed  to  build 
adjacent  to  ]\ron<oir.    The  plans  finally  developed  for  tlio 


94        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Montoir  depot  provided  for  236  miles  of  track,  180  ware- 
houses .with  4,125,000  square  feet  and  approximately 
10,000,000  square  feet  of  open  storage.  The  construction 
of  this  yard  was  continued  until  the  signing  of  the  armis- 
tice, when  considerably  more  than  one-half  of  the  original 
plan  had  been  completed.  The  ground  covered  by  the 
Montoir  development  was  about  two  and  one-half  miles 
long  and  had  an  area  of  1,200  acres. 

Ranking  in  importance  with  St.  Sulpice  and  Montoir 
were  the  two  intermediate  depots  at  Gievres  and  Montier- 
chaume.  The  first  site  selected  for  a  main  intermediate 
depot  was  Gievres  in  the  department  of  Loir  et  Cher,  a 
point  on  the  Paris-Orleans  Railway,  east  of  Tours  and 
south  of  Orleans.  The  reasons  for  the  selection  of 
Gievres  were :  Firstly,  it  was  located  in  a  broad  sandy 
plain  where  there  was  but  a  small  local  population  to 
inconvenience  and  the  maximum  of  topographical  facility 
for  extended  construction  was  afforded ;  secondly,  it  was 
reached  by  direct  rail  communication,  208  miles  long 
from  St.  Nazaire,  which  had  been  decided  upon  as  the 
first  point  of  arrival  for  American  freight.  No  less  than 
2,G00  acres  of  land  were  obtained  in  Augiist,  1917,  and 
a  plan  adopted  contemplating  264  miles  of  track,  195 
warehouses,  aggregating  4,410,000  square  feet  of  covered 
storage  and  10,370,000  square  feet  of  open  storage,  mak- 
ing it  the  largest  de^mt  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force  in  France.  By  the  autumn  of  1918  one-half  of  the 
track  mileage  had  been  completed  and  about  3,600,000 
square  feet  of  the  covered  storage,  and  6,000,000  square 
feet  of  the  open  storage  put  into  service.  This  work  at 
Gievres  was  begun  by  the  Fifteenth  Engineers,  the  first 
of  the  original  regiments  to  arrive  in  France,  who  made 
all  the  preliminary  surveys  and  plans. 

Gievres  was  conveniently  located,  with  direct  com- 
munication with  ilie  ports  on  the  Loire  River 
and    also    with    Brest.      It    was    necessary,    however. 


STORAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTRUCTION    95 

that  a  complementary  depot  should  be  constructed  with 
similar  direct-rail  communication  with  Bordeaux 
and  the  ports  south  of  St.  Nazaire.  For  this 
purpose  a  site  was  chosen  in  August,  1917,  at  Montier- 
chaume,  near  the  city  of  Chateauroux,  in  the  depart- 
ment of  Indre,  thirty-live  miles  south  of  Gievres  and 
227  miles  from  Bassens.  The  plans  for  Montierchaume 
were  drawn  on  a  scale  quite  similar  to  those  at  Gievres, 
as  it  was  contem]:)]ated  to  have  these  two  depots  of  the 
same  size.  At  these  depots  were  to  be  stored  all  supplies 
for  the  departments  of  engineers,  ,quarteniiaster,  sig- 
nals, etc.,  except  ammunition.  There  was  some  delay  in 
getting  the  work  at  Montierchaume  started.  In  fact,  it 
was  not  begun  until  March,  1918,  so  that  it  never  reached 
the  size  of  Gievres,  but  it  would  have  done  so  had  the 
war  continued.  Provision  for  the  ammunition  which  was 
not  handled  at  Gievres  and  ]\rontierchaume,  on  account  of 
the  danger  of  explosion  or  fire,  was  made  by  construct- 
ing two  yards  to  hold  nothing  but  ammunition  at  Mehun, 
a  few  miles  east  of  Gievres  and  on  the  same  line  of  rail- 
way, and  at  Issoudun,  similarly  located  with  respect  to 
Montierchaume. 

The  general  princi})le  on  which  the  storage  depots  were 
laid  out  was  to  have  the  large  base  depots  at  St.  Sulpice 
and  Montoir  serving  the  groups  of  ports  on  the  Gironde 
and  Loire  Rivers,  and  the  intermediate  depots  at  ^Nton- 
tiercliaume  and  Gievres  as  the  next  advanced  storage  for 
these  groups  of  ports  respectively.  But  as  other  ports 
were  turned  over  by  the  French  or  ]}ritisli  for  American 
use,  other  storage  depots  had  to  be  constructed  which, 
(hough  individually  small  as  com]iared  with  the  huge 
installations  already  described,  were  nevertheless  far 
from  being  insignificant.  Fspecially  was  this  the  case 
since  by  far  the  greater  part  of  this  extensive  and  expen- 
sive construction  was  for  temporary  use  only  and  had 
little  prospect  of  future  i^ernianent  value. 


96        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

A  small  base  depot  :was  erected  at  Aigrefeuille,  near 
La  Pallice  which,  however,  was  not  decided  on  until  May, 
1918,  with  an  initial  installment  of  twenty-three  miles  of 
track,  a  covered  storage  area  of  204,000  square  feet  and 
an  open  storage  of  430,000  square  feet,  the  whole  cover- 
ing about  300  acres.  Only  a  small  proportion  of  this 
work  was  comjDleted  when  the  orders  for  cancellation 
came  following  the  cessation  of  hostilities. 

[When  it  was  decided  that  Marseille  should  be  used  as 
a  port  of  embarkation,  it  became  necessary  to  locate  a 
storage  depot  at  that  point.  A  site  was  selected  at 
Mirimas,  at  the  junction  of  the  two  double-track  lines  of 
the  Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee  railway,  thirty-three  miles 
west  from  Marseille,  there  being  no  point  nearer  to  Mar- 
seille than  this  on  account  of  the  rugged  topography  of 
the  country.  The  plans  for  Mirimas  contemplated  108 
miles  of  track,  120  warehouses  with  a  total  of  2,500,000 
square  feet  of  covered  space  and  12,000,000  square  feet 
of  open  storage,  the  whole  yard  covering  more  than 
1,000  acres.  Had  the  war  continued  and  Mirimas  been 
completed,  it  would  obviously  have  ranked  in  size  with 
the  two  large  yards  at  Montoir  and  St.  Sulpice,  but  only 
a  small  portion  of  the  work  had  been  finished  when  the 
war  came  to  an  end. 

Similar  preparations  for  a  large  storage  yard  near 
Brest  had  been  located  at  Pleyber  Christ,  thirty-two 
miles  away,  nothing  nearer  being  available  for  the  same 
reasons  which  prevailed  at  Marseilles.  This  develop- 
ment, on  which  no  work  was  started,  contemplated  thirty- 
two  miles  of  track,  thirty-six  warehouses,  816,000  square 
feet  of  covered  storage  and  2,000,000  square  feet  of  oi:)cn 
storage  area.  A  small  storage  yard  had  also  been  built 
at  St.  Luce  near  Nantes. 

Large  and  capacious  as  was  the  forward  storage  area 
and  regulating  station  at  Is-sur-Tille,  the  engineers  of 
the  Transportation  Corps  recognized  that  it  would  not  be 
, ultimately  sufficient. 


STORAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTRUCTION    97 

A  second  site  was  chosen  at  Liffol-le-Grand,  located 
in  the  department  of  the  Vosges,  vith  similar  railway 
connections  as  at  Is-sur-Tille,  although  it  was  some  miles 
further  to  the  east.  Plans  for  Liffol-le-Grand  had  been 
prepared  by  the  French.  These  were  completely  revised 
by  the  American  engineers  who  drew  new  plans  provid- 
ing for  seventy-two  miles  of  track  with  400,000  square 
feet  of  covered  storage  and  1,200,000  square  feet  of  open 
storage,  ^^ork  at  Liffol-le-Grand  was  begun  in  April, 
1918,  and  practically  the  whole  of  both  the  covered  and 
open  storage  had  been  prepared  in  time  for  the  American 
offensives  of  St.  Mihiel  and  the  Argonne.  Both  the  yards 
at  Is-sur-Tille  and  Liffol-le-Grand  were  connected  with 
the  large  railway  yards  and  storehouses  at  St.  Dizier,  a 
French  regulating  station,  which  became  a  base  yard  for 
American  occupation  and  use  during  the  Argonne  attack. 
The  total  covered  storage  constructed  by  the  A.  E.  F.  in 
France  and  exclusive  of  more  than  1,000  acres  of  open 
storage  amounted  to  the  following: 

Depot  Storage : 

Gievres 3,839,000  sq.  ft. 

St.  Sulpice 2,027,000  sq.  ft. 

Montoir 3,447,000  sq.  ft. 

Montierchaume  .  .  .     1,214,000  sq.  ft. 

Is-sur-Tille 1,355,000  sq.  ft. 

Other  depots 3,047,000  sq.  ft.     15,529,000  sq.  ft. 

Dock  Storage 3,028,000  sq.  ft. 

Miscellaneous  Storage 3,958,000  sq.  ft. 

Total 22,415,000  sq.  ft. 

From  various  types  of  construction,  including  even 
buildings  with  steel  frames  manufactured  and  sent  from 
the  United  States,  the  type  that  was  finally  adopted  as  the 
standard,  after  some  experimenting,  which  was  quite  suf- 


98        AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ficent  for  practical  purposes,  provided  for  a  building  300 
feet  long,  fiftj  feet  wide.  The  frame  was  composed  of 
round  posts  four  to  a  bent,  the  bents  being  about  fifteen 
feet  apart.  The  roof  trusses  were  made  of  six  by  one 
inch  boards,  the  roof  and  ends  were  covered  with  corru- 
gated iron  and  the  sides  were  left  either  open  or  were 
covered  with  canvas.  These  buildings  were  erected  very 
quickly,  in  fact,  there  is  a  record  of  one  having  been 
put  up  complete  by  sixty-one  men  in  eight  and  one-half 
hours.  There  was  no  wooden  flooring  except  in  buildings 
where  supplies  were  kept  that  were  readily  vulnerable 
to  injury  by  moisture,  such  as  salt,  sugar,  and  flour. 

The  greatest  part  of  railway  construction  done  by 
American  forces  in  France  was  in  connection  with  the 
various  storage  depots.  As  a  general  thing,  the  main 
lines  of  the  French  railways  were  capable  of  handling 
all  the  tonnage  that  was  offered,  especially  after  the 
intensive  American  methods  of  operation  had  been  intro- 
duced. It  was,  however,  necessary,  in  addition  to  build- 
ing the  storage  yards,  to  increase  the  local  facilities  such 
as  constructing  additional  side  tracks  and  engine  termi- 
nals, and  to  relieve  points  of  congestion  by  new  main 
tracks.  Of  the  last,  the  most  important  was  near  Nevers. 
At  this  place  there  was  a  junction  of  east  and  west  and 
north  and  south  railways,  fixing  a  moderate  limit  to  the 
amount  of  freight  that  could  be  sent  through.  Inasmuch 
as  the  east  and  west  line  was  to  become  one  of  the  main 
lines  of  the  American  service,  it  was  decided  to  build  a 
new  short  double-track  railway  passing  to  the  south  of 
the  city  of  Nevers,  and  avoiding  the  junction  congestion. 
This  was  the  most  ambitious  piece  of  railway  construc- 
tion undertaken,  involving  as  it  did,  102,000  yards  of 
excavation,  428,000  yards  of  embankment,  a  large  bridge 
and  trestle  1,400  feet  in  length  crossing  the  Loire  River 
and  Canal,  and  an  overliead  bridge  crossing  the  Paris- 
Lyon-Mediterranee   Railway.     The   whole   project  was 


STORAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTRUCTION    99 

five  and  one-lialf  miles  in  length,  effecting  a  saving  of 
8.6  miles  in  operation  and  an  elimination  of  jnnction 
delays. 

There  wiis  considerable  talk  in  American  papers  that 
the  Amercan  engineers  were  constructing  a  four-track 
railway  across  France.  Fortunately,  because  the  engi- 
neers had  quite  enough  to  do  without  undertaking  unnec- 
essary work,  the  only  juslilication  for  this  rumor  was  the 
doubling  of  an  existing  double-track  line  over  a  distance 
of  about  four  miles  just  east  of  Bourges.  At  this  i)lace, 
there  was  a  convergence  of  the  tracks  from  Bordeaux 
and  St.  Nazaire.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to  carry 
the  tonnage  over  the  one  double-track  line  for  the  short 
distance  to  the  place  of  divergence.  This  work  of  adding 
two  more  tracks  to  the  existing  two  tracks  was  under- 
taken and  completed  by  November,  1918. 

Other  main  running  tracks  were  built  in  connection 
with  the  various  base  and  intermediate  storage  depots  in 
order  to  give  access  to  the  existing  French  lines.  Engine 
terminals  solely  for  the  use  of  American  operation  were 
built  at  Montoir,  Saumur,  Gievres,  Cercy-la-Tour,  Is-sur- 
Tille,  Liffol-le-Grand  and  on  the  main  line  running  out 
from  Bordeaux  at  Perigeux  and  Montierchaume.  All 
these  engine  terminals  were  finished  and  placed  in 
operation. 

The  Transportation  Department  also  undeiiook,  in 
case  the  war  should  continue,  a  study  of  how  the  carrying 
capacity  of  the  entire  French  railway  system  might  be 
still  further  increased  so  far  as  it  affected  American 
plans.  This  study  included  the  preparation  of  tonnage 
and  density  charts,  an  examination  of  possible  routings, 
of  desirable  locations  for  new  yards,  regulating  stations 
and  other  faciliiios.  Studies  wore  also  made  of  the 
routes  and  possibilities  of  further  developinent  of  the 
French  canal  system,  and  of  railroad  lines  to  be  used  and 
facilities  to   be   required  in   the  event   of  the  possible 


100      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

advance  of  the  American  army  to  tlie  Rhine.  The  total 
length  of  the  standard  gauge  lines  including  yard  tracks 
constructed  by  American  engineers  in  France  amounted 
to  about  1,000  miles. 

The  carrying  out  of  these  projects,  involving  as  they 
did,  modifications  of  the  French  railway  system  and  of 
certain  radical  changes  in  their  methods  of  operation, 
produced  at  times  long  and  tedious  negotiations. 

The  plans  of  each  project,  after  having  been  designed 
and  authorized  by  the  proper  authorities  of  the  American 
army,  were  submitted  to  the  French  government.  The 
French  railways  were  under  the  general  jurisdiction  of 
the  Minister  of  War,  who  acted  through  the  Minister  of 
Public  Works  and  gave  final  approval  on  all  such  mat- 
ters. The  latter  Minister  was  assisted  in  this  work  at 
first  by  a  bureau  designated  as  the  Fourth  Bureau  of  the 
Ministry  of  War,  later  by  a  board  called  the  Franco- 
American  Special  Service.  After  the  plans  reached  the 
hands  of  the  Minister  of  Public  Works  they  were  sub- 
mitted by  him  for  approval  to  the  French  railway  com- 
pany directly  concerned.  Because  of  the  wide  difference 
in  operating  methods  and  inherited  traditions,  the  plans 
were  seldom  accepted  as  designed  and  counter  proposi- 
tions were  usually  presented.  To  eliminate  red  tape  and 
minimize  delay,  the  Minister  of  Public  Works  finally 
directed  the  American  Director  General  of  Transporta- 
tion to  submit  designs  for  new  work  to  the  particular 
railway  company  interested  and,  after  having  secured 
the  approval  of  the  officers  of  that  company,  to  submit 
the  design  formally  to  the  French  government  and  the 
American  General  Staff.  The  approval  of  the  French 
government,  when  secured,  carried  with  it  the  right  of 
acquisition  of  the  necessary  land  and  conveyed  authority 
under  which  the  work  was  to  be  undertaken.  The 
approval  also  contained  a  clause  as  proposed  by  the 
American  Director  General  of  Transportation  that  ''  in 


STORAGE  YARDS  —  CONSTRUCTION   101 

the  event  of  any  or  all  of  tliese  facilities  being  retained 
by  the  French  government,  railway  or  service  after  it  has 
served  the  purpose  of  the  American  anny  credit  should 
be  given  the  American  army  for  the  work  performed  and 
materials  furnished." 

In  many  cases  the  French  railways  or  the  marine  serv- 
ice deemed  it  necessary  that  additions  to  existing  facili- 
ties or  entirely  new  facilities  should  be  constructed  on 
account  of  the  extra  burden  imposed  on  them  by  reason 
of  the  American  traffic.  In  such  cases,  where  the  plans 
were  prepared  by  the  French,  they  were  sent  through 
the  Minister  of  Public  Works  to  the  Director  General  of 
Transportation  for  acceptance. 

Naturally,  with  ideas  originating  from  so  many 
sources,  French  as  well  as  American,  government  officials 
and  railway  managers  who  had  been  trained  along  lines 
based  on  absolutely  opposed  hypotheses  there  developed 
what  at  first  seemed  to  be  irreconcilable  difficulties.  But, 
as  is  nearly  always  the  case  when  men  are  imbued  with  a 
determination  to  find  a  working  solution,  the  impossible 
was  gradually  resolved  into  the  possible,  differences 
were  adjusted,  difficulties  were  minimized,  and  official 
machinery  made  to  run  smoothly.  Credit  for  this  is 
largely  due  to  the  broad-minded  force  of  Albert  Claveille, 
Minister  of  Public  Works.  When  hostilities  ceased  plans 
covering  no  fewer  than  316  different  projects  had  been 
approved.  The  total  extent  of  French  railway  wholly  or 
partly  used  by  the  American  army  exceeded  5,000  miles. 


CHAPTER  IX 

AMERICAN  LOCOMOTIVES  AND  CARS 

Although  many  American  methods  of  railway  opera- 
tion were  introduced  in  France,  it  is  very  doubtful 
whether  any  one  of  them  has  secured  a  permanent  rest- 
ing place  so  as  to  be  recognizable  hereafter.  There  may 
be  here  and  there  a  slight  modification  of  French  methods 
but  it  is  hardly  likely  that  there  will  remain  any  visible 
effect  of  American  influence.  French  methods  are  well 
adapted  to  local  conditions  and  to  the  national  tempera- 
ment, and  probably  will  not  undergo  much  change  as  a 
result  of  the  war.  French  railway  rolling  stock  on  the 
other  hand  is  much  more  likely  to  show  hereafter  modi- 
fications in  its  design.  So  many  locomotives  and  freight 
cars  of  the  standard  American  type  and  manufacture 
were  sent  to  France,  and  have  been  left  there  for  French 
use,  that  it  seems  impossible  that  the  French  design  of 
their  own  similar  rolling  stock  should  escape  from  being 
considerably  influenced.  It  is  hardly  conceivable  that 
French  railway  officials,  who  are  exceedingly  intelligent 
and  i^rogressive,  will  return  to  the  exclusive  use  of  their 
old  models  when  they  have  become  acquainted  with  loco- 
motives whose  mechanical  details  are  simpler  than  theirs, 
with  larger  freight  cars,  with  cars  on  bogie  trucks 
equipped  with  air  brakes,  and  with  the  economical  advan- 
tages presented  thereby. 

Of  the  nine  original  regiments,  there  was  but  one,  the 
Nineteentli  Engineers,  that  was  recruited  entirely  from 
the  mechanical  crafts  and  intended  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  repairing  locomotives  and  cars.  Although  tills  regi- 
ment was  formed,  as  the  others  were,  on  the  basis  of  two 

102 


AMERICAN  LOCOMOTIVES  AND  CAES     103 

battalions  of  three  companies  each,  it  was  later  exi:)anded 
to  a  regiment  of  fourteen  companies,  distributed  among 
five  battalions,  and  comprised  about  3,600  men.  On  its 
arrival  in  France  it  was  confronted  with  the  situation  as 
previously  described,  namely,  a  shortage  of  equii)raent 
and  the  existing  ec^uiioment,  such  as  it  was,  in  bad  repair. 

It  was  intended  that  the  new  large  shojos  of  the 
P-L-M  Railway  at  Nevers  in  course  of  construction  when 
the  war  broke  out  in  August,  1914,  and  never  comjoleted, 
should  be  used  as  the  main  place  where  American  rolling 
stock  should  be  repaired.  But  the  great  buildings  were 
not  entirely  under  roof,  and  the  special  heavy  machine 
tools  necessary  for  work  on  locomotives  were  not  in 
existence  in  France.  Consequently  the  six  companies  of 
the  regiment  were  distributed  between  as  many  different 
and  widely  scattered  places,  while  work  on  furnishing  the 
structure  of  the  Nevers  shops  and  equipping  them  was 
ordered  to  be  rushed. 

The"  company  of  the  Nineteenth  Engineers  located  at 
St.  Nazaire  was  engaged  in  erecting  American  locomo- 
tives as  they  were  discharged  from  ship.  The  remainder 
of  the  regiment  was  assigned  to  overhauling  French  roll- 
ing stock,  and  the  whole  of  the  Thirty-fifth  l^ngineera 
was  detailed  to  the  erection  of  cars  as  fast  as  they  were 
unloaded  from  the  ships.  Practically  all  such  car  erect- 
ing was  done  by  this  latter  regiment. 

The  companies  assigned  to  work  in  the  French  railway 
sliops  were  imder  the  control  of  the  French  military 
authorities.  As  might  have  been  exi)ccted,  these  men 
were  greatly  embarrassed  at  first  by  their  lack  of  knowl- 
edge of  the  French  language.  The  men  were  strangers 
to  French  equipment  and  tools,  and  espei-ially  to  I'rcncli 
UK^lhods  of  working,  which  to  the  average  American 
mechanic  were  often  incomprehensible.  All  this  naturally 
engendered  a  lack  of  confidence  in  the  Americans  on  the 


104      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

part  of  tHe  FrencH,  who  for  some  time  would  not  trust 
the  Americans  to  proceed  with  their  work  without  having 
a  Frenchman  constantly  at  their  side  to  supervise  their 
most  simple  tasks.  This  lack  of  confidence  was  not 
shared  in  the  least  by  the  higher  officials  of  the  railways 
who,  without  exception,  were  appreciative  of  and  grate- 
ful for  the  assistance  rendered.  As  time  went  on,  the 
obvious  benefit  of  allowing  the  Americans  to  work  by 
themselves  and  follow  their  own  methods  became  appar- 
ent to  the  French,  who  directed  that  thereafter  the 
Americans  should  be  organized  into  separate  gangs  in 
the  various  departments  under  their  own  leaders,  a  step 
that  was  followed  immediately  by  a  marked  increase  in 
efficiency. 

During  the  latter  part  of  1917,  it  was  clearly  evident 
to  all  concerned  that  the  French  equipment  had  deteri- 
orated to  such  an  extent  that  unless  large  forces  of  men 
were  assigned  to  repairing  their  locomotives  and  cars 
without  delay,  serious  difficulty  would  be  encountered 
in  handling  the  railway  traffic,  with  a  resultant  bad 
effect  on  the  general  situation.  A  hurry  call,  at  the 
request  of  the  French,  for  locomotive  and  car  repair  men 
was  cabled  to  the  United  States.  The  answer  was  a  total 
of  2,645  men  who  were  distributed  among  fifteen  different 
railway  repair  shops  under  French  charge  in  all  parts 
of  France. 

By  the  spring  of  1918  the  main  shops  at  Nevers  were 
nearly  completed  and  the  Nineteenth  Engineers  were  so 
expanded  in  size  as  to  man  them  and  the  other  shops  as 
well.  On  June  21st  the  first  locomotive  was  taken  in  for 
repairs  and  by  August  the  shops  were  in  full  operation. 
By  this  time  ^ven  the  'enlarged  regiment  was  insufficient 
to  do  all  the  work,  and  other  units,  chiefly  the  Forty- 
ninth  and  Fiftieth  Engineers,  were  placed  under  the 
orders  of  the  General  Superintendent  of  Motive  Power. 


AMERICAN  LOCOMOTIVES  AND  CARS     105 

The  locomotive  shops  at  Nevers  comprised  the  follow- 
ing buildings : 

Erecting,  machine  and  boiler  shops 350  ft.  x  350  ft. 

Smith  shop  330ft.x  70ft. 

Wheel  shop 300  ft.  x  80  ft. 

Paint  shop 130  ft.  x  75  ft. 

Foundry  (temporary  construction) 50  ft.  x  30  ft. 

Storehouse 175  ft.  x  30  ft. 

Offices  (three  stories) 90ft.x  35ft. 

In  addition  to  the  above,  there  were :  a  refectory,  ninety 
feet  by  thirty-five  feet  (intended  for  use  of  French  work- 
men but  used  by  the  American  troops  as  a  Y.  M.  C.  A. 
hut  and  later  as  an  Officers'  Club);  a  hospital  or  first 
aid  room,  fifty  feet  by  thirty-five  feet  (used  by  representa- 
tives of  the  French  railways) ;  one  single  and  two  double 
houses  (used  as  Officers'  quarters) ;  apprentice  school 
(used  as  a  power  i)lant) ;  an  electrical  shop  and  several 
minor  buildings. 

The  main  building  contained :  two  erecting  bays,  eacH 
'equipped  with  two  sixty-five-ton  cranes  and  two  ten-ton 
cranes;  three  machine  shop  bays,  the  center  one  being 
equipped  with  a  fifteen-ton  crane ;  and  three  boiler  shop 
bays,  the  center  one  being  equipped  with  two  thirty-five- 
ton  cranes. 

The  locomotive  shops'  enclosure  covered  approxi- 
mately forty-five  acres. 

The  main  building  had  been  designed  originally  as  a 
steel-frame  structure,  but  the  shortage  of  steel  during 
the  war  compelled  the  French  to  redesign  it  to  be  made 
of  reinforced  concrete.  As  such  they  completed  it,  and 
produced  a  magnificent  building.  The  French  furnished 
a  special  water  service  from  the  Loire  River,  whence 
water  was  pumped  into  a  concrete  tank  holding  100,000 
gallons.  A  complete  and  adequate  sewer  system  was  also 
installed. 


'106      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

According  to  tlie  first  French  plans,  power  for  operat- 
ing the  niaclilne  tools  and  cranes  was  to  come  from  an 
electrical  installation  to  be  established  at  Garehizy,  fonr 
and  a  half  miles  distant.  The  snbstation  at  the  shops, 
where  the  current  at  15,000  volts  would  be  received,  was 
to  be  equipped  completely,  including  wiring,  switchboards, 
distributing  panels,  etc.,  by  the  Americans.  Unfortunately 
the  Garehizy  j^lant  was  not  completed  so  that  current 
could  be  furnished  until  1919.  The  American  engineers 
immediately  on  their  arrival  ordered  boilers  and  gener- 
ators to  be  sent  from  the  United  States,  for  a  temporary 
steam  plant.  To  furnish  some  power  until  the  new 
apparatus  should  reach  Nevers,  they  installed  three 
100  kw.  direct  connected  generator  sets  and  three  100 
E.  p.  vertical  boilers  that  were  available  in  France. 

The  necessity  for  providing  a  shop  for  the  general 
repairs  of  American  freight  car  equipment  was  apparent 
from  the  start.  The  advantage  of  locating  such  a  shop 
at  Nevers  was  manifest,  not  only  on  account  of  having 
it  supported  by  a  thoroughly  equipped  machine  shop  and 
a  general  storehouse,  but  because  Nevers  was  the  most 
central  point  on  the  lines  of  communication  for  the 
A.  E.  F.  Property  for  this  purpose  was  available  just 
opposite  the  locomotive  shops,  and  while  it  did  not  lend 
itself  to  the  most  desirable  layout,  it  answered  the  pur- 
pose sufficiently  well. 

As  designed,  this  plant  held  240  French  or  140  Ameri- 
can cars  under  repairs  at  one  time.  Storage  room  was 
also  provided  for  259  American  or  500  French  cars.  These 
storage  tracks  were  spaced  so  as  to  permit  their  being 
utilized,  if  necessary,  in  whole  or  in  part,  for  tracks  on 
which  cars  might  stand  while  undergoing  repairs. 

A  planing  mill  of  sufficient  capacity  to  handle  the  work 
of  both  the  car  and  locomotive  departments  was  installed 
at  this  plant,  as  was  also  a  storehouse,  a  small  machine 


AMERICAN  LOCOMOTIVES  AND  CARS     107 

and  smitli  shop,  and  four  work  buildings.  The  car  shop 
enclosure  covered  approximately  twenty  acres. 

This  plant  was  finished  September  6,  1918,  and 
continued  in  operation  until  June  7,  1919,  at  which  time 
it  was  turned  over  to  the  French. 

It  is  exceedingly  interesting  to  record  that  5,764 
French  and  American  cars  were  repaired  at  the  Nevers 
shops  by  American  mechanics  and  returned  to  service. 

The  American  standard  gauge  locomotives  were  almost 
wholly  of  one  type.  In  all  1,610  were  erected  in  France 
by  American  mechanics,  of  which  1,333  were  erected  for 
American  service  and  277  for  French.  Of  these,  thirty 
were  small  saddle-tank  engines  for  work  in  yards,  with 
6,225  pounds  tractive  power;  ten  were  150  h.  p.  gasoline 
engines ;  and  the  balance,  1,570,  were  of  the  one  pattern 
adopted  as  standard. 

The  last,  which  were  used  as  road  or  train  engines  had 
a  wheel  arrangement  described  technically  as  2-8-0,  that 
is,  one  leading  and  four  driving  axles.  Their  main  char- 
acteristics were: 

Cylinders  —  simple 21  in.  x  28  in. 

Driving  wheels  —  dianioler 56  in. 

AVeight,  working  ordor 166,400  1I)S. 

Weight  on  leading  truck 1(5,400  11)S. 

Weight  on  driving  wheels 150,000  lbs. 

Ti'active  power 35,600  lbs. 

Boiler  pressure 190  lbs. 

Wheel  base,  total 23  ft.  8  in. 

AVheel  ])ase,  di'iving  wluols 15  ft.  6  in. 

Tender  cai)acity: 

Water ' 5,400  gallons 

Fuel 9  tons 

The  locomotives  were  equijjped  with  superheaters,  air 
brakes  and  the  regular  French  couplers. 

Aniericau-made  cars  Avere  used  exchisively  for  freight 
purposes.    19,975  were  received  in  France  up  to  March 


108      'AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

28, 1919,  of  wHcH  18,441  of  tHe  following  types  Ha'd  "Been 
erected: 

Box  cars 8,003 

Flat  cars 1,700 

Gondola  cars,  high  sides 2,858 

Gondola  cars,  low  sides 3,893 

Tank  cars 625 

Eefrigerator  cars 950 

Ballast  cars  400 

Dump  cars 12 

18,441 


Of  the  above,  17,866  were  erected  hy  the  Thirty-fifth 
Engineers,  principally  at  La  Eochelle,  the  port  of  entry 
for  such  consignments,  and  the  balance  by  the  British 
at  their  shops  at  Audruicq  (Pas  de  Calais). 

These  cars  were  designed  in  accordance  with  standard 
American  practice  except  that  they  had  the  French  ty^DO 
of  couplers  and  buffers.  The  carrying  capacity  was 
60,000  pounds.  The  box  cars  weighed  when  empty  32,640 
pounds  and  the  flat  cars  26,500.  The  principal  dimen- 
sions were :  , 

Truck  wheel  base 5  ft.  6  in. 

Center  to  center  of  trucks 26  ft.  2-')4  in. 

Length  over  end  sills 36  ft.  2%  in. 

Length  overall 39  ft.  10  in. 

Width  over  side  sills  (boxes) 8  ft.  3 Vig  iii- 

Width  over  side  sills  (flats) 8  ft.  514  in. 

Width  overall  (boxes) 9  ft.  6 Vie  in. 

Width  overall  (flats) 9  it  3%  in. 

The  extreme  height  from  rail  to  the  top  of  the  French" 
brakeman's  hood  on  box  cars  was  13  feet  10%  inches. 
All  members  of  the  underframes,  and  side  frames  of  box 


AMERICAN  LOCOMOTIVES  AND  CARS     109 

cars,  were  of  steel,  the  flooring  of  all  cars  and  the  siding 
of  the  box  cars  were  of  yellow  pine. 

The  work  accomplished  by  American  mechanics  in  the 
various  repair  shops  was  very  great,  amounting  to : 

American  locomotives  set  up 1,333 

French  locomotives  set  up 277 

American  cars  set  up 17,866 

American    and    French    locomotives    repaired 

(Nevers  shop) 366 

American  and  French   cars  repaired    (Nevers 

shop) 5,76-i 

French  locomotives  repaired  (French  shops) . . .  1,474: 

French  cars  repaired  (French  shops) 52,850 


The  above  figures  cover  erection  and  heavy  repairs 
only  and  do  not  include  light  repairs  to  rolling  stock  exe- 
cuted in  the  small  machine  shops  at  Montoir,  Gievres, 
Cercy-la-Tour,  Is-sur-Tille,  Bassens,  Perigeux,  Chateau- 
roux  and  Liffol-le-Grand  staffed  by  American  engineers. 
The  figures  do  not  include  the  labor  expended  in  erecting 
the  machine  tools  and  equipping  the  power  plant  for  the 
Nevers  shoi:)s,  the  setting  up  of  sixty-seven  steam  shovels, 
pile  drivers  and  locomotive  cranes,  the  putting  into  com- 
mission of  nineteen  hospital  trains  received  from  the 
makers  in  England,  and  the  shipping  of  more  than  2,200 
car  loads  of  material  jDrcpared  for  other  departments. 
They  are  also  exclusive  of  the  work  of  erecting  and 
repairing  the  rolling  stock  for  the  light  railway  system 
which  was  done  in  the  shops  of  that  department  with  its 
own  independent  force  of  engineers,  as  will  be  later 
explained  in  Chapter  XXI. 

The  supervising  and  controlling  authority  for  all  thig 
work  was  vested  in  the  General  Superintendent  of  Motive 
Power,  an  officer  under  the  General  Manager,  the  latter 
being  on  the  staff  of  the  Director  General  of  Transporta- 


110      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

tion.  The  position  was  filled  during  the  whole  time  by 
Colonel  11.  11.  Maxfield,  who  went  to  France  as  second 
in  command  of  the  Nineteenth  Engineers.  In  pre-war 
days,  Colonel  Maxfield  held  the  position  of  Superintend- 
ent of  Motive  Power  of  the  New  Jersey  Division  of  the 
Pennsylvania  Railroad.  In  January,  1918,  he  succeeded 
to  the  command  of  the  regiment  and  exercised  the  double 
function  of  regimental  commander  and  General  Super- 
intendent of  Motive  Power.  Under  the  latter  authority 
he  had  jurisdiction  over  the  work  of  three  other  regi- 
ments, the  Thirty-fifth,  Forty-ninth  and  Fifj;ieth,  and 
some  attached  units.  On  the  railway  lines,  the  authority 
of  the  General  Suj^erintendent  was  transmitted  through 
Superintendents  of  Motive  Power,  one  of  which  was 
assigned  to  each  of  the  nine  Railway  Grand  Divisions. 


CmVPTEB  X 

THE  CAiIBIL\I  OFFEXSR^E 

The  military  situation  when  America  entered  the  war 
was  far  from  satisfactory. 

On  the  western  front  the  British  and  the  French  had, 
in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1916,  conducted  the  cam- 
paign which  is  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Somme,  during 
which  the  Germans  had  been  driven  back  to  a  line  run- 
ning north  and  south  through  Peronne.  There  had  been 
an  Allied  advance  to  an  irregular  depth  varying  up  to 
seven  or  eight  miles  on  a  front  of  about  twenty  miles,  a 
fine  victory,  but  one  purchased  at  terrific  cost.  In  the  lat- 
ter part  of  the  winter  of  1916-1917  the  enemy  voluntarily 
made  an  exceedingly  brilliant  retreat  in  this  whole  sec- 
tor between  the  river  Scarpe,  east  of  Arras,  to  the  river 
Oise  near  La  Fere,  a  distance  of  about  fifty  miles,  to  the 
carefully  prepared  position  known  as  the  Hindenburg 
line. 

It  was  a  clever  move.  The  Germans  gave  up  territory 
that  was  of  no  use  to  them,  territory  which  as  a  matter 
of  fact  they  retook,  in  a  few  days,  in  the  great  offensive 
beginning  the  21st  of  jMarch,  1918.  In  falling  back  they 
laid  the  country  absolutely  waste,  every  house  was  lev- 
eled, every  railway  and  highway  was  destroyed.  One  of 
France's  gardens  had  been  changed  into  a  desert  wilder- 
ness. The  Allies  were  thus  forced  to  change  their  plans 
and  to  reconstruct  from  a  military  point  of  view  the 
abandoned  country  before  the  advance  could  be  resumed. 
In  the  meanwhile  the  Germans  had  securely  entrenched 
themselves  on  ground  of  their  own  selection.  On  the 
eastern  front  Russia  had  collapsed,  the  Gallipoli  cam- 
paign had  been  abandoned  and  the  outlook  in  the  Levant 
was  dark. 

Ill 


112      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

lu  April,  1917,  the  French  made  an  attack  in  force  in 
the  Chamj)agne  country,  against  the  advice,  it  is  said,  of 
the  mihtary  chiefs,  an  attack  that  gave  but  Httle  result 
except  losses  whose  totals  have  never  been  made  public. 
Discontent  was  growing.  There  were  socialist  strikes 
in  Paris  with  the  red  badge  of  anarchy  openly 
displayed.  The  garrison  forces  of  the  capital 
were  strengthened.  In  the  north  a  series  of 
isolated  affairs  was  undertaken  by  the  British 
whose  chief  value  lay  in  strengthening  the  morale  of  the 
fighting  forces  and  the  gradual  wasting  of  the  enemy  by 
attrition.  Vimy  Ridge  was  carried  by  Canadian  troops 
and  a  satisfactory  advance  made  by  the  British  forces 
east  and  northeast  of  Arras.  In  June  Messines  Ridge  was 
taken,  leading  to  the  third  battle  of  Ypres.  In  July  a 
wide  attack  was  begun  in  Flanders  but,  as  had  happened 
with  nearly  every  allied  effort  in  that  year,  it  was  accom- 
panied by  heavy  rains  continuing  for  days  which,  in  the 
level  clay  plains  of  the  north,  sufficed  to  bring  that  offen- 
sive or  any  other  possible  one  to  a  standstill.  Men  and 
guns  could  not  be  moved  in  that  sea  of  deep  thick  mud. 
During  August  and  September  the  attack  was  resumed, 
resulting  in  the  capture  of  the  Passchendaele  Ridge  and 
much  territory  east  of  Ypres.  But  still  no  vital  point  had 
been  reached,  no  serious  break  in  the  German  lines  was 
threatened. 

By  this  time  the  first  contingent  of  American  Engi- 
neers was  in  France.  The  Eleventh,  Twelfth,  Thirteenth 
and  Fourteenth  Regiments  had  reached  Aldershot  in 
England,  the  first  named  arriving  at  the  end  of  July. 
The  Fifteenth  and  Sixteenth  were  on  linos  of  communi- 
cation in  central  France,  the  Seventeenth  and  Eighteenth 
had  commenced  the  all  important  wharf  construction  at 
St.  Nazaire  and  Bordeaux,  while  the  Nineteenth  was 
establishing  itself  to  repair  locomotives  and  cars. 

The   Eleventh   Engineers   were   ordered   during   the 


THE  CAMBEAI  OFFENSIVE  113 

early  days  of  August  to  join  the  British  forces  in 
Flanders  to  construct,  they  were  told,  some  main  lines  of 
communication  which  were  necessary  to  facilitate  an 
advance  in  prospect.  But  after  being  held  for  a  week 
near  the  Belgian  frontier,  countermanding  orders  were 
received  and  the  regiment  entrained  for  the  Somme  coun- 
try, where  it  was  soon  joined  by  the  Twelfth  and  Four- 
teenth regiments.  The  latter  two  were  assigned  to  the 
very  useful  "  light  "  railways  which  were  the  means  of 
distributing  ammunition  and  supplies  beyond  the  points 
where  standard  gauge  railways  could  not  be  maintained. 

It  was  not  long  before  it  became  evident  that  some  great 
new  movement  was  in  contemplation.  After  a  few  minor 
engagements  following  the  German  retirement  to  the 
Hindenburg  line  in  February,  the  Somme  front,  the  scene 
of  such  bloody  warfare  during  the  preceding  autumn, 
had  become  a  '' quiet  (?)"  sector,  with  only  an  occa- 
sional raid — ''shows"  the  British  Tommies  called 
them  —  or  an  exchange  of  artillery  compliments.  The 
main  activity  was  farther  north. 

Southeast  of  Arras,  northeast  of  Peronne,  and  distant 
about  eight  miles  from  the  British  lines  was  Cambrai,  a 
city  of  nearly  30,000  population  in  pre-war  days  and  a 
highly  important  railway  and  road  center.  It  had  been 
uninterruptedly  in  German  hands  since  its  first  capture 
by  them  in  September,  1914.  Its  recapture  in  connection 
with  the  gains  further  north  in  Flanders  would  seriously 
complicate  the  German  position  and  might  easily  involve, 
as  the  Somme  battle  had,  a  further  retirement  during  the 
coTuing  winter  to  a  new  ITindenburg  line. 

The  battle  which  followed.  General  Pershing  in  his 
final  report  described  as  of  '*  special  interest,  since  it 
was  here  that  American  troops  (Eleventh  Engineers) 
first  i")articipated  in  active  fighting." 

To  the  American  engineers  was  assigned  the  task  of 
preparing  the  lines  of  railway  communication  to  receive 


114      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

the  increased  traffic  that  was  soon  to  be  thrown  upon 
them,  of  constructing  new  lines  of  communication  so  as 
to  be  able  to  satisfy  the  voracious  hunger  of  the  new  bat- 
teries about  to  be  installed,  of  repairing  abandoned  main 
lines  so  that  they  might  be  reconstituted  if  an  advance 
were  secured,  and  what  was  a  new  experience,  unloading 
and  putting  in  position  great  fleets  of  tanks. 

Much  of  this  work  lay  in  advance  of  the  British  guns, 
between  them  and  the  British  trenches  and  at  times  in 
plain  sight  from  the  German  lines.  Under  such  condi- 
tions men  worked  only  in  small  scattered  parties  to  avoid 
notice,  or  in  large  forces  at  night  and  during  foggy 
weather,  times  of  ''  low  visibility."  New  excavation 
was  immediately  covered  with  boughs  or  with  camouflage 
so  that  it  should  not  show  in  airjDlane  photographs.  Men 
thus  engaged  were  under  a  cross-fire  of  shells  both 
going  out  and  coming  in,  and  the  Eleventh  Engineers  had 
the  distinction  of  reporting  the  first  American  battle 
casualties  as  early  as  the  5th  of  September,  1917. 

The  tank  was  really  the  only  entirely  new  creation  of 
the  war,  all  the  other  novelties  in  warfare  having  had 
a  previous  application  or  at  least  consideration. 

The  idea  of  the  tank  originated  with  a  Frenchman,  but 
was  taken  up  and  developed  by  the  British  Navy  and  put 
into  use  by  the  British  Army.  The  Germans  at  first 
decried  it,  but  after  facing  tanks  for  more  than  a  year 
and  a  half,  an  experience  that  filled  them  with  wholesome 
respect  for  this  new  development  in  warfare,  they 
decided  to  use  the  innovation  and  actually  jDut  some  on 
the  field,  though  not  in  sufficient  numbers  nor  in  time  to 
produce  any  material  effect. 

The  British  used  them  first  in  the  Somme  battle  as 
auxiliary  weapons  with  great  effect.  The  original  tank 
weighed  about  thirty  tons,  was  armored  heavily  enough 
to  deflect  rifle  bullets  or  shell  splinters,  and  was  armed 
with  small  guns.  They  were  moved  by  caterpillar  tractor 


THE  CAMBRAI  OFFENSIVE  115 

belts,  one  on  eacli  side,  operated  by  a  single  engine 
and  steered  by  a  wheel  rudder.  Later  they  were  given 
two  independent  engines  of  increased  power,  one  driving 
each  belt  so  that  the  tank  could  be  steered  without  a 
separate  rudder.  One  type  of  tank  was  armed  with 
cannon  posted  in  sponsons  and  called  a  ''  male,"  while 
the  "  female  "had  only  a  battery  of  Lewis  machine  guns. 
During  the  latter  part  of  1917  and  the  early  part  of  1918 
the  tank  was  subjected  to  close  study  by  the  three  armies, 
French,  British  and  American,  with  the  result  of  bring- 
ing forth  three  designs.  The  first  was  a  large  machine 
similar  to  the  early  British  tanks  weighing  thirty-five 
tons,  armed  as  above  and  carrying  a  crew  of  twelve  men. 
This  machine  had  the  advantage  of  weight  and  great  bat- 
tering force;  it  could  cross  trenches  six  feet  wide  with 
ease,  demolish  buildings  and  concrete  "  pill  boxes  "  con- 
taining machine  guns,  and,  with  its  heavy  armament  and 
large  crew,  possessed  great  offensive  value.  It  had  the 
disadvantage,  inherent  to  its  size,  of  being  unwieldy  and 
slow,  its  speed  not  exceeding  two  and  a  half  or  three 
miles  per  hour.  The  second  type  was  a  French  model, 
a  small  machine  weighing  15,000  pounds,  carrying  two 
men,  armed  with  a  37  mm.  {V/j  in.)  cannon  or  a 
machine  gun  and  had  a  speed  of  five  or  six  miles  an 
hour.  These  little  tanks,  called  *'  whippets,"  were 
largely  used  by  the  American  army,  especially  in  the 
Argonne  operations.  They  were  exceedingly  efficacious 
against  machine-gun  nests,  being  in  themselves  proof 
against  anything  but  artillery  fire.  The  third  type  of 
tanks  was  one  still  smaller  than  the  "whippets,"  weighing 
not  over  three  tons,  carrying  like  them  two  men,  mount- 
ing but  one  machine  gun,  and  having  a  speed  of  eight' 
miles  an  hour. 

In  planning  the  battle  of  Carabrai,  General  Sir  Julian 
Byng,  commanding  the  Third  Army,  B.  E.  F.,  decided 
to  use  tanks  on  a  much  larger  scale  than  they  had  ever 


116      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

been  emj^loyed  before  and  in  a  new  role.  An  attack  in 
force  had  always  been  preceded  by  artillery  preparation 
continuing  for  some  time,  perhaps  for  hours.  The  great- 
est number  of  guns  that  could  be  collected  would  be 
massed  and,  at  a  given  moment,  begin  to  scatter  shells  on 
the  enemy  front  trenches  and  the  wire  entanglement  in 
front  of  them,  beating  down  the  latter  and  making  the 
former  untenable.  ^Yhen  this  had  been  accomplished  the 
range  would  be  increased  and  the  fire  concentrated  on  the 
support  or  second  line  of  trenches.  Under  the  protection 
of  this  curtain  of  falling  shells  the  infantry  would 
advance  and  occupy  the  first  enemy  trench  if  all  went 
well.  Such  artillery  preparation  was  usually  effective  but 
it  gave  the  enemy  notice  that  an  attack  was  coming  and 
allowed  him  to  take  some  provision  for  artillery  reply, 
for  resistance  or  for  counter  attack. 

General  Byng  proposed  to  effect  if  possible  a  complete 
surprise,  to  use  a  very  brief  but  intense  artillery  prepa- 
ration and  then  to  launch  a  great  fleet  of  tanks  which 
would  trample  flat  the  wire  entanglements,  drive  the 
defenders  from  the  front  trenches  and  so  permit  an 
immediate  infantry  advance,  the  guns  in  the  meanwhile 
gi\ing  tanks  and  men  a  forward  protecting  barrage, 
silencing  the  enemy's  guns  and  preventing  a  counter 
attack. 

Both  the  allied  and  enemy  lines  in  this  sector  were 
lightly  held,  the  greater  part  of  both  forces  having  been 
withdrawn  to  strengthen  the  offensive  and  stiffen  the 
defensive  operations  in  Flanders.  It  became  necessary, 
therefore,  for  the  British  to  return  the  old  or  concentrate 
new  units  on  the  Somme  front,  to  move  in  the  guns  and  to 
accumulate  vast  stores  of  ammunition.  Extensive  prepa- 
•rations  were  in  progress  during  October  and  became 
intensified  with  the  coming  of  November.  As  the  success 
of  the  attack  depended  on  its  being  a  surprise,  all  move- 
ments had  to  be  made  under  cover  of  darkness.    For  two 


ITHE  CAMBRAI  OFFENSIVE  117 

weeks  prior  to  the  battle  tHe  procession  began  to  move 
as  soon  as  it  became  dark.  Railway  trains  showing  no 
lights  brought  in  their  loads  of  men  or  artillery,  who 
were  at  once  detrained  and  moved  to  position. 

The  camp  of  the  Eleventh  Engineers  was  next  to  the 
main  highway  leading  east  from  Peronne.  All  through 
each  night  during  the  period  of  preparation  there  could 
be  heard  the  tramping  of  men,  the  grinding  of  wheels, 
the  rumbling  of  guns  and  tractors  and  motor  lorries,  the 
last  heavy  with  shells,  as  the  column  crawled  eastward 
like  a  great  serpent.  We  knew  that  there  were  other 
khaki-clad  similar  columns  on  other  roads.  But  the 
movements  of  all  were  so  nicely  adjusted,  that  before 
each  da}^  broke  a  predetermined  stage  had  been  reached 
and  visible  activity  stopped  for  twelve  hours.  Men 
were  concealed  during  the  day  in  ruined  villages 
and  the  guns  and  wagons  were  parked  off  the  road, 
leaving  the  latter  quite  bare  and  free.  The  enemy  avia- 
tors could  then  come  and  inspect  all  they  pleased  if  they 
were  willing  to  risk  air  duels.  They  could  take  photo- 
graphs to  any  extent  but  these  would  reveal  no  apparent 
change  in  the  situation  behind  the  lines.  Perhaps  there 
might  be  shown  some  shadows  that  suggested  a  concen- 
tration, but  suspicion  would  be  laid  at  rest  by  the  photo- 
graph on  a  following  day  showing  the  same  shadows. 
"What  the  photographs  did  not  toll  was,  that  the  shadows 
which  appeared  to  be  the  same,  were  shadows  of  other 
guns  and  of  other  men. 

After  all  the  disappointments  of  the  year  the  weather 
now  and  for  the  first  time  favored  the  Allies.  For  two 
weeks  there  was  a  dense  fog  every  night  completely 
blanketing  the  ground  and  making  night  flying  absolutely 
impossible,  so  the  Germans  did  not  have  even  the  chance 
that  a  night  machine  flying  low  might  permit  the  observer 
to  note  the  dark  procession  on  tlie  white  roads. 

At  last  wo  knew  whon  tlie  ])attlo  was  to  beorin.     An 


118      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

attack  was  always  laid  out  on  a  detailed  schedule  some- 
what resembling  a  railway  time  table.  The  commence- 
ment of  the  affair,  usually  the  artillery  opening,  was 
fixed  at  **  zero  ''  hour,  and  then  each  subsequent  step, 
such  as  the  change  of  range,  the  establishment  of  the 
barrage,  the  infantry  going  over  the  top,  at  so  many 
hours  or  minutes  reckoned  from  zero  time.  This  sched- 
ule would  be  given  to  each  unit  commander,  and  then  all 
that  remained  was  to  notify  the  several  commanders  at 
the  latest  moment  what  the  equivalent  of  the  zero  hour 
would  be  expressed  in  local  time.  Each  commander 
would  then  correct  his  watch  with  the  standard  time  at 
headquarters  and  carry  out  his  orders,  beginning  at  the 
exact  minute.  On  November  18th  we  were  notified  that 
zero  hour  was  6 :30  A.  M.,  substantially  the  beginning  of 
day  light,  on  November  20th. 

The  Twelfth  Engineers  had  charge  of  certain  light 
railway  lines  which  they  had  put  in  order.  The  Eleventh 
Engineers  had  been  ordered  to  be  ready,  as  soon  as  a 
sufficient  advance  was  effected,  to  relay  the  track  on  the 
main  line  of  the  Nord  railway  running  north  into  Cam- 
brai.  The  Grermans  had  taken  up  this  track  at  the  time 
of  their  retirement  in  February,  1917,  had  carried  away 
the  rails,  fastenings  and  crossties,  and  had  blown  up  the 
bridges.  The  American  engineers  had  in  the  previous 
weeks  removed  the  debris  of  demolished  bridges  and 
filled  shell  craters  so  that  the  roadbed  might  be  ready  to 
receive  the  new  track.  That  the  Eleventh  Engineers 
might  be  in  readiness  to  act  promptly,  a  part  of  the  regi- 
ment was  ordered  to  assemble  immediately  behind  the 
attacking  line.  The  commanding  officer  directed  the 
author,  at  that  'time  second  in  command,  to  remain  the 
night  of  the  19th-20th  at  regimental  headquarters  should 
any  change  of  programme  requiring  executive  action 
arise  at  the  last  moment,  but  otherwise  to  join  him  in 
the  early  morning  at  the  advanced  post. 


THE  CAMBRAI  OFFENSIVE  119 

The  mornmg  came  and  with  its  coming  there  vanished 
the  fog  that  for  so  many  nights  had  been  such  a  com- 
forting cover.  AVith  the  regimental  surgeon  and  a  bat- 
talion commander  I  left  camp  at  dawn.  The  air  was 
sweet  and  crisp  as  might  be  expected  in  late  November. 
To  one  who  was  not  a  professional  soldier  but  who  had 
always  taken  a  keen  interest  in  military  affairs,  had  read 
of  battles,  had  as  a  small  boy  seen  France  once  before 
under  the  heel  of  the  German  oppressor,  but  who  had 
now  reached  a  point  in  life  when  there  was  no  reason 
even  to  dream  of  taking  part  in  war,  the  sensation  was 
peculiar.  In  spite  of  all  seeming  impossibility  I  was 
to  see  and  even  take  a  part  in  a  great  battle,  to  witness 
a  blow  struck  and,  to  the  extent  of  the  power  of  one  indi- 
vidual, to  aid  the  force  of  that  blow  against  the  long-time 
enemy  of  France,  and  now  the  enemy  of  my  own  country. 

From  stories  and  accounts  of  other  battles  that  I  had 
read  I  had  a  mental  picture  of  disorder  along  the  high- 
ways leading  to  the  field,  of  stragglers,  of  belated  con- 
voys, of  wrecked  vehicles  lying  by  the  roadside  where 
they  had  been  overturned  to  clear  the  way,  of  staff  offi- 
cers and  orderlies  galloping  along  to  restore  order  out 
of  disorder  and  to  hasten  onward  some  detail  of  men  or 
consignment  of  material  specially  needed. 

As  we  motored  to  the  front  there  was  no  confusion 
along  the  road,  in  fact  the  latter  was  quite  empty  of  any 
traffic  except  for  three  little  one-horse  carts,  that  had  no 
connection  with  the  day's  work,  and  a  large  covey  of 
line  partridges  flushed  by  the  noise  of  our  motorcycles. 
There  were  no  stragglers,  no  wrecks  and  no  dashing 
horsemen.  The  processions  of  men  and  supi)lies  that  we 
had  heard  passing  frontward  for  a  fortnight  had  all 
reached  their  destinations.  Every  man,  every  gun,  every 
shell  was  in  its  appointed  place,  a  magnificent  and  per- 
fect piece  of  staff  work.  Then  precisely  when  the  zero 
hour  arrived,  all  along  the  British  front  for  some  twenty 


120      AMERICAN  KNGINEBKS  IN  FRANCE 

miles  or  more  there  arose  a  simultaneous  roar  from  every 
gun,  a  roar  that  was  to  continue  unbroken,  night  and 
day,  for  five  days.  The  battle  was  on !  Then  to  the  ear 
there  came  another  sound,  another  roar,  slightly  more 
muffled  with  not  quite  the  same  sharp  crack,  the  din  of 
bursting  shells  as  the  German  guns  began  their  reply. 
But  the  great  difference  in  volume  between  the  two  was 
clear  evidence  that  there  was  a  wide'  discrepancy  in  the 
number  of  guns  employed  on  the  two  sides.  The  Ger- 
man guns  were  evidently  outnumbered,  the  surprise  was 
undoubtedly  a  success. 

The  Eleventh  Engineers  had  been  ordered  to  remain 
under  cover  in  reserve  until  such  time  as  it  was  certain 
that  the  enemy  had  fallen  back  and  that  no  immediate 
counter  attack  was  imminent.  While  waiting  I  went  into 
Havrincourt  "Wood  which  was  the  center  of  the  attack. 
There  the  British  eighteen-pounder  field  pieces  were 
standing  almost  wheel  to  wheel,  with  only  enough  space 
between  them  to  permit  the  crews  to  serve  the  guns. 
Every  gun  was  in  action  as  fast  as  the  gunners  could 
shove  home  a  shell  and  close  the  breech.  Some  infantry 
battalions  were  there,  whose  time  for  taking  part  had  not 
yet  come.  They  were  passing  the  moments  of  waiting 
with  foot  races  and  other  sports.  There  were  no  last 
letters  being  written,  no  farewell  messages  being  sent. 
Beyond  in  some  fields  across  from  the  ruins  of  what  was 
once  a  fine  sugar  mill  was  a  whole  division  of  Bengal 
Lancers,  some  12,000  or  15,000  splendid  figures  with 
khaki  turbans  surmounting  their  black-bearded  swarthy 
faces,  hoping  that  all  the  lines  of  trenches  would  be  car- 
ried so  that  they  could  at  last  have  the  chance  of  gallop- 
ing far  afield  among  fleeing  infantry. 

There  was  little  news.  There  was  a  rumor  that  the 
village  of  Havrincourt  in  our  immediate  front  was  quite 
cleared  of  the  enemy.  That  was  all.  It  suggested  the 
account  by  Henry  M.  Stanley  of  his  experiences  as  a  Con- 


THE  CAMBRAI  OFFENSIVE  121 

federate  private  at  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  how  as  he  lay 
wounded  on  the  field  he  had  not  the  slightest  knowledge 
of  how  fared  the  day.  The  nearer  one  gets  to  the  front, 
the  less  one  knows.  He  can  see  only  those  things  that  are 
in  his  immediate  neighborhood.  He  has  no  breadth  of 
.vision,  no  perspective. 

Then  there  came  down  the  road,  marching  westward, 
a  little  procession  of  perhaps  fifty  figures  in  field-gray 
uniforms,  the  first  prisoners,  mute  but  satisfactory  evi- 
dence that  the  enemy  lines  had  been  reached.  Their 
faces,  the  first  freshly  captured  prisoners  I  had  seen, 
made  a  curious  study.  There  was  a  mixture  of  all  sorts 
of  men,  from  quite  young  boys  to  men  of  thirty-five. 
Some  were  sullen,  some  just  stupid  looking,  others  rather 
interested  in  their  new  surroundings,  while  some  were 
unmistakably  nervous  as  to  what  might  be  in  store,  in 
striking  contradiction  to  those  who  were  evidently  not 
displeased  to  realize  that  the  war,  at  least  in  active  fight- 
ing, was  for  them  at  an  end. 

Then  came  another  procession  —  unfortunately  not  the 
last  —  evidence  that,  if  the  enemy  lines  had  been  reached, 
it  had  not  been  done  without  cost.  Men  with  heads  and 
arms  simply  bandaged  by  the  field  surgeons,  the  walk- 
ing wounded  as  they  were  called,  going  back  for  better 
treatment,  and  the  little  motor  ambulances  with  two 
tiers  of  badly  wounded,  their  feet  only  showing  at  the 
open  end  of  the  car. 

An  infantry  column  came  up  at  a  brisk  swing.  They 
have  been  ordered  in.  The  commanding  officer  fell  out 
and  running  up  to  two  British  officers  standing  by  the 
road  asked, ''  How's  the  news?  "  ''  Quite  good,"  was  the 
reply.  **  Thanks,"  he  said  as  he  turned  to  rejoin  his 
men.  How  delightfully  British,  and  how  thoroughly 
un- American !  Three  sentences,  six  words  on  a  matter  of 
life  and  death  in  a  great  battle.  The  answer  couve^nng 
al)solutely  no  information  but  leaving  eveiyone  satisfied! 


122      :A.MERICAN  engineers  in  FRANCE 

At  noon  we  were  informed  that  all  the  Britisli  guns 
had  been  moved  forward,  confirming  our  belief  that  the 
roar  from  the  Havrincourt  "Wood  was  less  distinct,  that 
the  infantry  had  occupied  all  the  first  objectives  and  that 
we  could  commence  our  work.  The  commanding  officer 
directed  me  to  go  forward  to  ascertain  the  posi- 
tion. By  2  P.  M.  I  had  crossed  the  famous  Hindenburg 
line,  where  the  British  soldiers  were  eating  with  much 
relish  the  breakfast  the  Germans  had  left,  for  after  see- 
ing the  tanks  coming,  the  latter  had  fled  precipitately.  A 
mile  beyond  and  on  the  far  side  of  LaVacquerie  farm, 
no  longer  a  farm  but  only  a  name  on  the  map,  were  the 
British  guns  standing  in  rows  in  the  open  without  tar- 
gets, as  contact  with  the  enemy  at  that  point  had  been 
temporarily  lost.  Just  there  the  roar  of  battle  had  almost 
ceased,  only  the  sharp  crack !  crack !  of  machine  guns  on 
the  right,  and  in  front  of  Gonnelieu,  being  heard  as  some 
scattered  German  outposts  still  held  on  and  gave  a  little 
trouble.  Before  us  were  the  spires  of  Cambrai  cathedral 
only  two  miles  away,  and  there  was  a  rumor,  unfortu- 
nately not  true,  that  the  cavalry  were  already  beyond  the 
city. 

Among  the  guns  were  the  victorious  tanks,  great  awk- 
ward ungainly  affairs,  looking  for  all  the  world  like  some 
old  dinosauria  or  other  fossil  pachyderms  which,  after 
many  ages,  had  suddenly  come  to  life.  There  were  no 
visible  signs  of  guidance  and  yet  there  they  were  slowly 
moving  about  with  a  raucous,  grinding,  grating  noise, 
climbing  in  and  out  of  shell  craters,  or  flopping  over  gap- 
ing trenches  with  a  motion  similar  to  the  rolling  and 
pitching  of  a  bluff  bowed  vessel  making  heavy  weather 
in  a  tumbling  sea.  Some  400  of  these  monsters,  that  is 
the  number  we  were  told,  had  taken  part  in  the  fight  and 
great  service  they  rendered.  They  had  taken  the  enemy 
quite  unawares  and  gave  him  no  time  for  preparation. 
They  leveled  the  wire  defenses  so  flat  as  to  make  them 
look  almost  as  if  they  had  never  existed,  so  that  the 


.THE  CAMBRAI  OFFENSIVE  123 

infantry  had  gone  on  unchecked.  It  was  a  great  plan 
that  General  Byng  conceived  and  it  succeeded  admirably. 
It  is  said  that  the  tank  commander  when  he  went  into 
action  flew  from  his  flag  tank  a  set  of  signals  reading, 
*'  England  expects  every  tank  to  do  its  damndest." 

Stretcher  bearers  were  moving  here  and  there,  picking 
up  those  who  could  not  walk  and  carrying  them  to 
waiting  ambulances  to  be  hurried  to  some  field  dressing 
station,  and  thence  to  a  hospital  for  full  treatment.  To 
these  bearers  the  color  of  the  uniform,  whether  khaki  or 
field-gray,  made  no  difference.  Some  figures  which  were 
lying  quite  still  the  stretcher  bearers  passed  by.  In  a  few 
hours  a  kind  chaplain  will  read  for  them  the  sweet  words 
of  the  simple  service  of  the  Church  of  England  and  there 
will  be  a  few  more  white  crosses  scattered  among  that 
forest  of  crosses  that  stretches  in  an  irregular  wide  belt 
across  northern  France. 

In  my  pocket  I  had  put  that  morning  a  flask  filled  with 
whiskey.  During  the  afternoon  the  contents  went  in 
small  portions  to  badly  wounded.  Finally  but  one  little 
drink  remained.  But  it  did  not  have  to  wait  long,  I  soon 
met  a  poor  fellow  sitting  against  the  broken  stump  of  a 
tree  waiting  for  an  ambulance.  Part  of  his  face  was 
gone,  and  his  wound  must  have  been  as  painful  as  it  was 
ghastly. 

*'  Would  you  like  a  little  drink,  my  man?  " 

The  remaining  half  of  his  face  seemed  to  smile  as  hS 
replied  quietly,  ''  Yes,  sir,  I  would,  thank  you." 

He  took  the  cup  with  great  care,  drank  but  a  portion, 
and  handing  it  to  a  man  beside  him,  who  I  noticed  for  the 
first  time  had  but  a  trilling  wound  in  the  foot,  said, 
^^  Here,  matey,  I  will  go  halves  with  you." 

This  incident  was  not  the  onh'  exhibition  of  the  fine 
spirit  displayed.  Somehow  all  the  horrors  and  sufferings 
of  battle  seem  to  awaken  in  men  not  a  thirst  for  more 
blood,  for  more  slaying,  but  the  kindlier,  gentler  traits 
of  human  nature.    War  is  not  all  bad! 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  CAMBRAI  DEFENSIVE 

After  five  days  of  hard  figliting  the  battle  of  Cambrai 
died  down.  Cambrai  itself  had  not  been  taken,  the  Ger- 
mans having  rushed  in  heavy  reinforcements,  whose  pres- 
sure compelled  the  advanced  British  line  to  be  contracted 
slightly  through  the  villages  of  Fontaine-Notre-Dame 
and  Bourlon,  while  possession  of  the  wood  of  the  latter 
name  was  retained  by  the  British,  though  for  a  few  days 
only.  An  apparently  safely  secured  advance  of  some  five 
or  six  miles  in  depth  had  been  made,  heavy  casualties 
inflicted  and  a  goodly  toll  of  prisoners  counted. 

As  soldiers  in  the  field  we  knew  nothing  of  the  plans 
of  the  higher  command.  We  looked  down  on  the  towers 
and  roofs  of  Cambrai,  we  formed  ideas  of  our  own  as 
to  its  importance  to  the  enemy,  we  longed  for  a  change 
of  scene,  and  to  have  the  novelty  and  excitement  of  enter- 
ing a  large  city  that  had  been  so  long  in  German  hands. 
Especially  because  the  city  was  still  fairly  well  intact 
as,  naturally,  it  had  been  spared  by  both  British  and 
French  artillery.  We  hoped,  therefore,  that  the  fine 
advance  that  had  been  made,  with  the  comparatively  easy 
breaking  of  the  Hindenburg  line  would  furnish  a  good 
jumping  off  place,  as  we  called  it,  for  a  new  attack,  a 
further  advance,  and  another  victory. 

While  the  infantry  were  settling  themselves  in  their 
new  trenches  and  the  artillery  maintaining  a  continuous 
duel  with  the  German  guns,  the  American  engineers  had 
plenty  to  do. 

The  Twelfth  Regiment  were  extending  the  narrow- 
gauge  railway  lines  across  what  had  been  No  Man's  Land 
to  reach  the  new  battery  positions,  and  converting  the 

124 


THE  CAMBKAI  DEFENSIVE  125 

liglitly  built  previous  front  lines  of  railways  into  sub- 
stantially constructed  back  lines  as  they  now  became. 

To  the  Eleventh  Engineers  was  assigned  the  task  of 
strengthening  and  improving  the  standard  gauge  rail- 
ways in  that  section,  and  particularly  the  task  of  putting 
in  good  condition  the  main  line  of  the  Nord  railway,  that 
prior  to  the  Cambrai  offensive  they  had  cleared  of  ob- 
structions. Before  November  20th  this  railway  had  been 
in  front  of  the  British  guns,  but  now  on  account  of  the 
advance,  it  lay  behind  them,  and  was  so  situated  as  to  b(^ 
a  line  of  great  importance  should  there  be  a  further 
advance,  or  even  if  only  the  gain  in  ground  already  made 
were  securely  held.  On  the  afternoon  of  November  20tli 
they  began,  in  cooperation  with  the  Fourth  Battalion 
Canadian  railway  troops,  to  relay  the  permanent  way  on 
the  old  embankment  of  this  line  that  they  had  repaired 
with  painstaking  care.  The  general  direction  of  the  rail- 
way was  north  and  south  and  it,  therefore,  crossed  the 
opposing  fronts  diagonally  as  their  general  bearing  was 
here  northwest  to  southeast.  There  was  no  track  left  on 
this  line  for  about  five  miles  behind  the  British  trenches. 
The  enemy  had  removed  the  rails  and  ties,  and  had  blown 
up  the  bridges  when  they  retired  to  the  Hindenburg  line 
earlier  in  the  year.  For  the  above  distance  the  British 
had  not  restored  the  track  because  the  line  lay  so  close  to 
the  front  as  not  to  be  available  for  use,  it  being  in  plain 
sight  from  the  enemy  trenches  for  nearly  the  whole  way. 

After  passing  the  German  front  line  the  railway  route 
turned  to  the  east  towards  Camlirai  and  thence  away 
from  obserA^ation,  so  that  the  Germans  had  been  able  to 
retain  the  old  track  in  use  almost  to  their  front  trenches. 
It  was  the  relaying  of  this  track  that  the  American  and 
Canadian  engineers  undertook,  the  advance  made  on 
November  20th  having  left  the  railway,  if  rebuilt,  in  a 
reasonably  safe  location  for  o])eration. 

The  Germans  in  their  retreat  that  day  made  no  attempt 


126      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

or  did  not  have  time  to  destroy;  the  part  of  the  railway, 
that  had  been  in  their  hands.  In  fact,  they  had  not  even 
blown  up  the  bridge  crossing  the  Canal  de  PEscaut  at 
Marcoing.  Holes  were  found  excavated  in  the  masonry 
and  filled  with  explosives  needing  but  a  detonating  spark 
to  create  a  serious  and  annoying  breach.  All  important 
bridges  in  advanced  positions  which  might  be  seized  by 
a  surprise  attack  were  usually  thus  mined  by  engineers 
and  kept  ready  for  instant  demolition.  But  no  spark 
reached  the  charges  that  day  to  explode  them  and  one 
cannot  help  asking,  ^'  Why?"  Did  the  officer  or  man 
who  was  assigned  to  this  duty  join  in  such  haste  the 
retrograde  movement  that  he  had  no  desire  to  tarry  in 
order  that  his  orders  to  demolish  the  bridge  might  be 
carried  out,  or  did  he  simply  forget,  or  did,  perhaps, 
some  chance  shell  win  for  him  a  little  cross  with  the 
inscription,  ''  One  unknown  German  soldier  "?  In  any 
event  the  bridge  was  found  intact,  and  presently  the 
engineers  laid  new  rails  across  it  and  connected  them 
with  the  abandoned  German  rail-head.  Thus,  for  a  few 
days,  direct-rail  communication  between  Paris  and  Ber- 
lin, which  had  been  interrupted  on  every  line  since  Sep- 
tember, 1914,  was  actually  restored.  It  is  obviously  not 
to  be  understood  that  trains  were  or  could  be  run,  but 
that  a  continuous  track  existed  from  the  British  lines 
across  the  new  No  Man's  Land  to  the  German  lines  and 
beyond. 

This  reconstruction  involved  the  laying  of  eight  miles 
of  track,  requiring  eight  days  of  very  strenuous  labor,  as 
the  line  was  being  repeatedly  shelled.  November  29th  in 
that  year  was  the  American  Thanksgiving  day,  and  as 
the  through  track  connection  had  been  made  on  the  day 
previous,  after  a  final  twenty-two  hours  of  continuous 
work,  the  national  holiday  was  observed  as  a  much 
needed  day  of  rest.  This  was  permissible  because  the 
artillery  duel  had  slowly  softened  and  by  November  29th 


THE  CAMBRAI  DEFENSIVE  127 

we  began  to  understand  that  no  further  advance  was  con- 
templated for  the  moment,  and  that  we  were  not  to  have 
the  excitement  of  entering  Cambrai.  The  daily  routine 
was  resumed  as  it  existed  before  the  battle  began.  Once 
more  the  situation  answered  the  description  by  the 
stereotyped  phrase  in  the  official  communique — "Nothing 
to  report ' '.  Our  belief  that  quietness  was  really  restored 
was  confirmed  by  a  letter  from  the  army  conunander  him- 
self to  the  British  officer  in  charge  of  railways  in  the 
army  area,  containing  the  following  extract,  which  he 
conveyed  to  the  troops  concerned: 

**  Now  that  the  Third  Army  offensive  has  reached  its 
limit,  and  the  normal  trench  warfare  has  been  resumed, 
I  would  like  to  take  the  opportunity  of  giving  you  a  short 
appreciation  of  the  services  that  you  and  other  transpor- 
tation officers  have  rendered." 

At  that  time  and  as  a  result  of  the  attack  on  Cambrai, 
the  new  British  lines  constituted  an  almost  rectangular 
salient  projecting  into  the  enemy's  line,  facing  north- 
east towards  Cambrai,  about  nine  miles  long  and  six 
miles  deep  with  two  sharply  defined  re-entrant  angles, 
one  at  Gouzeaucourt  on  the  southeast  and  the  other  north 
of  Boursies  on  the  northwest. 

On  Friday  morning,  November  30th,  after  the  day  of 
rest,  the  Eleventh  Engineers  proceeded  to  Gouzeaucourt 
with  orders  to  begin  the  reestablishnaent  of  the  railway 
yard  at  that  point,  as  the  transportation  department  had 
decided  to  place  there  a  transfer  rail-head.  The  existing 
layout  of  highroads  made  this  location  highly  convenient. 
It  was  known  that  no  British  offensive  movement  was 
intended  and  it  was  believed  that  nothing  was  imminent 
that  would  call  for  defense.  As  the  officers  desired  the 
men  to  be  free  from  any  unnecessary  encumbrance,  only 
tools  were  carried,  orders  having  been  given  that  all 
arms  should  be  left  in  camp.  As  the  train  carrying  the 
men  ran  over  the  newly  made  track,  some  hea\'y  shelling 


128      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

was  heard  to  the  eastward.  A  few  shells  were  seen  to 
burst  on  the  top  of  the  ridge  running  parallel  with  the 
track  where  the  British  batteries  were  posted,  but  this 
excited  no  special  comment.  Suddenly  at  8  o'clock  the 
firing  increased  in  intensity  and  became  concentrated 
into  a  barrage.  As  such  it  advanced  over  the  ridge,  down 
the  slope  and  finally  rested  across  the  track  close  to 
where  the  men  were  working.  Then  some  British  troops 
were  seen  falling  back  through  the  open  fields,  and  the 
engineers  recognized  that  an  attack  in  force  was  being 
pressed  by  the  enemy. 

The  Germans  had  succeeded  in  repeating  exactly 
what  the  British  had  accomplished  ten  days  earlier, 
the  effecting  of  a  complete  surprise.  They  had, 
unknown  to  the  British,  massed  troops  opposite 
Gouzeaucourt  and  Boursies,  and  after  a  very  short 
but  heavy  artillery  preparation  had  launched  simul- 
taneously two  heavy  infantry  attacks  on  the  reen- 
trant angles  of  the  newly  formed  salient  with  the 
intent,  if  a  sufficient  advance  could  be  made,  either 
to  force  a  general  retiremeilt  from  the  salient  or,  per- 
haps, to  cut  off  a  large  body  of  troops  holding  it.  The 
attack  directed  on  Boursies  made  but  little  impression 
and  was  useful  only  in  drawing  men  away  from  other 
parts  of  the  line.  At  Gouzeaucourt  it  was  more  success- 
ful. The  Germans  quickly  recaptured  their  own  posi- 
tions that  they  had  lost  ten  days  before,  forcing  the 
British  first  back  to  and  then  out  of  the  lines  they  them- 
selves had  occupied  before  their  own  attack.  Then  press- 
ing on  they  swept  over  the  British  lines  and  went  beyond 
them. 

To  the  'engineers,  the  situation  as  it  affected  them  was 
painfully  clear.  They  were  unarmed  and,  therefore, 
unprepared  for  any  offense.  The  senior  officer  present 
recognizing  that  his  men  were  being  uselessly  sacrificed, 
very  properly  ordered  a  withdrawal.  This  was  attempted 


THE  CAMBRAI  DEFENSIVE  129 

at  first  by  train,  but  the  barrage  was  so  intense  that  the 
train  had  to  be  abandoned,  the  locomotive  only  being 
saved.  The  men  consequently  became  somewhat  scat- 
tered, though  not  disorganized.  Some  succeeded  in  mak- 
ing their  way  under  the  command  of  their  officers  through 
Gouzeaucourt,  some  sought  refuge  in  dugouts  from  the 
downpour  of  high  explosive  and  gas  shells,  while  some 
were  rallied  with  British  and  Canadian  soldiers  sepa- 
rated from  their  commands  into  an  improvised  unit  and 
offered  resistance.  They  seized  any  weapons  at  hand, 
although  some  fought  effectively  with  their  picks  and 
shovels  until  overcome.  It  is  related  that  one  fellow  was 
seen  to  lay  low  five  of  the  enemy  with  only  a  shovel 
before  he  fell.  This  irregular  body  undoubtedly  delayed 
the  advance  along  the  main  Cambrai-Gouzeaucourt  road 
imtil  the  troops  in  reserve  could  be  posted  to  make  an 
organized  stand.  Casualties  were  occurring  fast,  while 
of  the  men  who  were  in  the  dugouts  many  were  captured, 
although  one  party  remained  in  safety  in  a  shelter  for 
forty  hours,  succeeding  in  returning  to  their  camp  during 
the  darkness  on  the  second  night,  by  which  time  a  British 
counter  attack  had  forced  back  the  attacking  line  beyond 
the  village  of  Gouzeaucourt.  During  the  first  day  of  their 
voluntary  imj^risonment  a  German  soldier  appeared  at 
the  entrance  and  calling  into  the  darkness,  asked  who 
was  there.  One  of  the  men  replied  in  German  that  they 
were  wounded  Germans,  an  answer  that  apparently  satis- 
fied the  enquirer,  because  he  went  away  and  did  not 
return. 

"While  the  attack  was  in  progress  German  airplanes 
flew  low,  sweeping  the  ground  with  machine-gun  bullets. 
They  did  not  spare  even  ambulances  loaded  with 
wounded,  whose  character  was  plainly  indicated  by  large 
red  crosses  painted  on  the  sides  and  roofs,  several  Ameri- 
cans already  wounded  being  hit  again  while  being  trans- 
ported.   The  barrage  composed  of  both  high  explosives 


130      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

and  gas  shells  was  very  severe,  so  mucli  so  in  fact,  that 
an  investigation  made  a  few  days  later  when  the  railway 
line  had  been  recaptured,  showed  that  a  direct  hit  on  the 
track  had  been  scored  every  thirty-three  feet  on  the 
average. 

Such  was  the  first  participation  of  American  troops 
in  Europe  in  a  major  engagement.  The  picturesqueness 
of  men  fighting  successfully,  hand  to  hand,  armed  only 
with  their  tools  against  rifles  and  bayonets,  undoubtedly 
enhanced  the  effect  and  went  a  longer  way  than  perhaps 
the  incident  justified,  towards  establishing  American 
prestige.  For  up  to  that  time  the  fighting  quality  of 
Americans  was  quite  unknown  to  the  other  armies.  OflS- 
cial  recognition  of  what  was  done  on  this  occasion  is 
shown  by  the  award  of  two  Military  Crosses  and  one 
Military  Medal  by  the  British,  followed  by  three  Distin- 
guished Service  Crosses  by  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
A.  E.  F. 

The  battle  of  Gouzeaucourt,  or  the  Cambrai  Defensive 
as  it  was  officially  named,  followed  the  same  general 
course  as  the  Cambrai  Offensive  that  began  on  November 
20th.  At  the  end  of  the  first  day  the  British  brought  up 
reinforcements  and  counter  attacked,  regaining  some  of 
the  lost  ground.  Then  followed  an  intense  artillery  duel, 
during  which  both  sides  used  gas  in  large  quantities.  By 
December  4th  the  intensity  began  to  subside  and  the 
British,  realizing  that  the  salient  they  had  previously 
established  was  in  a  vulnerable  location,  gradually  with- 
drew from  some  of  the  advanced  positions  to  give  them 
a  line  that  could  be  held  more  easily.  The  net  result  of 
the  two  battles,  the  offensive  and  defensive,  left  an 
extent  of  territory  in  the  hands  of  the  British  of  about 
one-half  of  what  they  had  captured  between  November 
20th-25th,  and  probably  a  credit  balance  in  the  matter 
of  prisoners  taken  and  casualties  suffered. 

"With  the  cessation  of  activity  of  the  Cambrai  Defen-^ 


THE  CAMBRAI  DEFENSIVE  131 

sive  the  campaign  of  1917  came  to  an  end.  The  year  had 
begun  with  the  German  retirement  from  Noyon,  Nesle, 
Peronne,  Bapaume  and  the  country  lying  east  of  the  field 
of  what  is  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Somme,  and  later 
was  filled  with  a  series  of  attacks  and  counter  attacks 
which,  on  the  whole,  had  netted  a  gain  for  the  allied 
cause.  There  had  been  periods  of  great  anxiety  which 
were  now  relieved  by  the  entrance  of  America  into  the 
struggle.  But  still  the  end  was  not  in  sight  and,  perhaps, 
the  double  battle  of  Cambrai  well  illustrated  the  futility 
of  attacking  imtil  a  great  preponderance  of  force  had 
been  secured.  Ten  days  after  the  counter  attack  had  sub- 
sided and  both  armies  were  once  more  dug  in,  hard 
freezing  weather  came  on,  and  there  was  nothing  to  do 
but  to  wait  until  winter  was  over.  The  general  feeling 
among  the  troops  was  that  the  next  offensive  would  be 
undertaken  by  the  Germans. 

The  Cambrai  Defensive  had  been  a  severe  disappoint- 
ment but,  though  the  allied  troops  had  suffered  much, 
they  were  not  discouraged,  knowing  that  help  on  a  larger 
scale  was  not  far  distant  and  that  if  they  could  hold  on 
for  a  little  longer  final  victory  was  assured.  As  a  small 
illustration  of  their  spirit  it  is  recalled  that  while  the 
German  counter  attack  was  still  raging  with  the  result 
in  the  balance,  there  was  heard  the  sound  of  bagpipes  one 
evening  at  the  hour  when  darkness  was  just  coming  on. 
Then  down  the  road  a  battalion  of  Scotch  Highlanders 
was  seen  returning  to  reserve,  having  been  relieved 
after  defending  an  important  position  for  several  days 
against  repeated  attacks  and  great  odds.  They  were 
marching  in  regular  formation  in  "  column  of  fours,'* 
or  of  **  squads  "  as  the  American  manual  describes 
it,  with  their  band  at  the  head.  There  was  but  a  handful 
of  them,  the  others  were  in  hospitals  or  lying  in  silence 
where  the  guns  were  banging  away.  They  were  painfully 
tired  looking,  but  they  marched  in  cadence  and  in  forma- 


132      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

i 
tion.  Tlie  Americans  gave  tliem  a  liandclap  but  not  a 
cheer  as  they  passed,  because  no  man  in  the  crowd  dared 
to  trust  his  voice  to  cheer,  but  the  Scots  paid  no  atten- 
tion to  it,  their  jaws  were  set  tight  and  every  face  spoke 
quite  clearly  of  their  determination,  of  their  reali- 
zation that,  although  cut  to  pieces,  they  had  held  their 
post  until  relieved,  and  of  their  pride  that  the  honor  of 
Scotland  had  been  kept.  All  the  while  the  bagpipes  were 
screeching  out  a  wild  weird  Highland  paean  of  victory 
and  defiance.  Perhaps,  that  extraordinary  instrument 
is  the  only  one  that  could  have  done  justice  to  the  moment 
and  occasion.  The  unit  might  have  been  decimated  but 
it  had  not  been  beaten. 


CHAPTER  Xn 

THE  MIERIOAN  "  R.  E.'S  " 

In  the  British  service  it  is  the  custom  to  abbreviate 
all  names  to  their  initial  letters,  and  what  corresponds 
in  the  British  Army  to  the  Corps  of  Engineers  in  the 
American  Army,  namely,  the  ''  Royal  Engineers,"  is 
always  referred  to  as  the  ''  R.  E.'s"  in  the  same  way  as 
the  artillery  arm  is  shortened  to  R.  A. 

Several  of  the  original  engineer  regiments  were  as- 
signed to  the  British  forces  for  long  periods,  varying  from 
nine  to  twelve  months,  so  becoming  in  actuality  for  the 
time  being  an  integral  part  of  the  British  engineer  force. 
Among  their  associates  and  from  the  standpoint  of  serv- 
ice, the}'  were  *'  R.  E.'s,"  but  to  distinguish  them  from 
British  engineers,  they  were  spoken  of  as  the  "American 
R.  E.'s,"  the  amusing  contradiction  in  terms  between  the 
American  and  the  R.  standing  for  Royalty  never  being 
noticed.  But  on  the  other  hand  the  appellation,  *'  Ameri- 
can R.  E.'s,"  did  convey  a  real  sense  of  the  friendly 
relations  that  existed  between  the  engineer  units  of  the 
two  armies.    They  were  one  and  the  same. 

It  was  interesting  to  watch  the  association  of  two 
bodies  of  men,  with  their  opposite  points  of  view,  their 
different  customs,  their  little  peculiarities  and  personal 
idiosyncrasies,  with  a  feeling  at  first  on  the  one  side 
that  the  others  had  been  a  little  slow  in  enter- 
ing the  war  and  had  left  the  common  burden 
to  be  carried  too  long  by  others,  while  on  the 
opposite  side  there  outcropped  that  perfectly  ridicu- 
lous   superstition    engendered    by    silly    school    books 

133 


134      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

that  England  was  still  the  foe  of  what  had  been  once  her 
colonies.  But  gradually  as  both  sets  of  men  came  to 
know  each  other  better,  they  began  to  understand  that  if 
there  was  any  surface  antagonism  it  was  nothing  more 
than  the  ordinary  antagonism  of  two  members  of  the 
same  family,  ready  to  argue  with  each  other  but  at  heart 
united.  And  so  it  was!  After  the  first  few  days  of 
strangeness  there  developed  between  the  American  and 
British  soldiers  a  close,  warm  friendship  with  the  high- 
est mutual  respect,  esteem  and  admiration.  The  mere 
being  thrown  together  for  a  few  days,  the  going  of  an 
American  unit  to  a  camp  in  England  on  its  way  to 
France,  or  the  chance  association  in  a  rest  area  during 
the  short  term  of  a  leave  would  not  and  did  not  suffice  to 
break  down  the  barrier  of  reserve  on  the  one  part  or  the 
little  feeling  of  suspicion  on  the  other.  What  was  needed 
was  actual  service  side  by  side,  bri,nging  the  American, 
and  the  Britisher  together  under  a  united  command  and 
for  a  long  enough  time  to  permit  the  men  of  both  peoples 
to  get  through  and  beyond  the  screen  of  nationalism. 

The  effect  of  time  and  joint  service  in  producing  this 
mutual  good  will  and  understanding  is  shown  in  the 
experience  of  one  American  regiment,  an  experience 
that  was  fairly  typical  of  all.  When  this  particular  regi- 
ment learned  on  its  arrival  in  England  that  it  had  been 
assigned  to  the  British  forces,  to  be  in  fact  British  sol- 
diers and  under  British  orders,  the  disappointment  was 
openly  expressed  through  all  ranks  from  the  commanding 
officer  down.  Officers  and  men,  with  scarcely  an  excep- 
tion, would  have  preferred  any  assignment  to  that.  Six 
months  later  when  this  same  regiment  was  detached  from 
the  British  Expeditionary  Force  and  ordered  to  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force  the  regret  at  the  change 
was  as  widespread  and  as  sincere  as  the  disappointment 
over  the  first  assignment  had  been.  After  a  short 
interval  the  fortune  of  war  suddenly  and  unexpectedly 


THE  AMERICAN  ''  R.  E.'S  "  135 

I 
brought  the  regiment  back  again  into  service  with  the 
British,  a  return  that  was  hailed  with  wild  enthusiasm. 
Although  the  regiment  was  again  withdrawn  there  was 
always  a  hope  among  both  officers  and  men  that,  perhaps, 
the  fates  would  once  more  be  so  kind  as  to  send  them 
back  again  to  Flanders  Fields.  In  this  particular  case 
there  was  nothing  in  the  composition  of  the  unit  to  give 
the  men  a  pro-British  bias,  in  fact  just  the  contrary, 
because  more  than  fifty-five  per  cent  of  'the  men  were 
Roman  Catholics  and  at  least  one-half  of  them  either 
Irish  or  of  Irish  descent. 

On  its  way  home  a  part  of  the  regiment  was  placed 
on  a  passenger  steamer  on  which  were  others  not  in  the 
service.  One  day  the  commanding  officer  was  seated  on 
deck  talking  with  an  eminent  bishop  of  the  Church,  who 
inquired  as  to  the  relationship  existing  between  the  men 
and  the  British.  On  being  told  how  cordial  it  had  been, 
he  expressed  his  pleasure,  mixed,  however,  with  a  little 
surprise,  because  he  said  that  contrary  stories  in  other 
instances  had  come  to  his  ears.  On  being  pressed  he 
admitted  that  he  had  never  heard  the  opposite  view 
expressed  by  anyone  who  had  actually  served  with  the 
British.  To  give  corroborative  testimony  the  colonel 
stopped  the  first  two  officers  who  happened  to  pass  and 
asked  them  to  state  their  opinions  and  then  directed  that 
the  very  first  enlisted  man  met  should  be  sent  to  him.  In 
a  few  minutes  a  man  came  up,  saluted  and  said,  "  Ser- 
geant Mc reports,  sir,"  giving  a  good  old  Irish 

name.  The  bishop  did  his  own  questioning  and  finally 
said,  "  Now,  Sergeant,  I  am  going  to  ask  you  two  ques- 
tions. First,  when  you  speak  of  '  Tommy,'  I  presume 
you  are  referring  to  the  Canadians  or,  perhaps,  the 
Australians  that  you  have  met?  "  To  which  came  the 
answer,  *'  I  suppose  I  include  the  Canadians  and  the 
Australians,  sir,  but  it  was  not  exactly  them  I  had  in 
mind.    It  was  the  Englishman." 


13G      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

''  And  now,  my  second  question,"  said  the  bishop. 
**  Why  was  it  that  the  men  would  have  been  glad  to  have 
gone  back  to  the  British,  at  any  time  up  to  the  close  of 
hostilities?  "  **  I  do  not  know  exactly  the  reason, 
Bishop,"  replied  the  sergeant,  ''  but,  perhaps,  one  thing 
was  that  while  we  believed  that  in  a  close  spot  our  own 
men  would  stand  fast,  we  knew  that '  Tommy  '  would." 

In  giving  this  answer  the  sergeant  had  not  the  slight- 
est intention  of  making  any  adverse  criticism  or  reflec- 
tion on  his  fellow-American  soldiers.  He  had  served 
more  months  in  the  British,  advanced  zone  than  anywhere 
else,  he  had  become  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  Brit- 
ish soldier,  had  learned  to  know  and  understand  him,  to 
appreciate  his  steadfastness  and  other  good  qualities, 
and  was  expressing  an  opinion  of  him  in  his  straight- 
forward way,  an  opinion  that  was  not  intended  to  be 
comparative. 

The  British  soldier,  or  ''  Tommy,"  a  contraction  of 
**  Thomas  Atkins,"  as  he  was  always  called,  was  a 
remarkable  person.  Brave,  of  course,  but  then  most,  if 
not  all,  men  are  brave  when  properly  led,  his  striking 
individual  characteristics  were,  first,  an  indomitable 
doggedness,  impressing  everyone  with  the  fact,  as  Ser- 
geant Mc put  it,  that  he  ^'  would  stand  fast,"  a 

cheerfulness  that  never  failed  him,  never  deserted  him 
in  the  most  trying  hour  of  defeat  or  when  sore  pressed, 
a  simplicity  that  never  lost  its  charm  or  balance  even 
when  flushed  in  the  most  glowing  moment  of  victory,  an 
ability  to  accept  conditions  when  he  knew  they  could  not 
be  bettered  and,  therefore,  to  refrain  from  complaining, 
and  a  constitutional  appreciation  of  the  value  of  disci- 
pline. If  he  had  a  fault  it  was  his  inability  to  recognize 
when  he  was  beaten.  In  spite  of  all  that  the  Germans 
could  do,  that  was  one  lesson  they  could  never  teach  the 
*'  Tommies."  So  much  did  all  this  affect  the  Americans 
that  on  one  occasion  when  there  was  being  given  a  joint 


THE  AMERICAN  ''  R.  E.'S  "  137 

Anglo-American  vaudeville  performance,  that  an  Ameri- 
can quartette  asked  to  be  excused  from  acceding  to  a 
request  from  the  British  officers  to  sing,  **  Over  There," 
on  the  ground  that  the  words  were  boasting.  The  song 
was,  however,  sung  and  received  with  loud  applause  by 
the  British,  but  the  men  never  allowed  their  regimental 
band  to  play  it  afterward  without  protest,  so  much  so 
that  it  was  soon  dropped  from  consideration. 

Then  for  a  while  the  British  officer  was  not  understood, 
due  probably  largely  to  the  fact  that  his  mode  of  living 
was  quite  unlike  the  accustomed  mode  of  the  majority 
of  Americans.  To  begin  with,  his  hours  were  so  differ- 
ent, for,  unless  he  was  compelled  to  do  otherwise,  he 
breakfasted  when  the  American  officer  had  already  been 
at  work  for  some  time,  he  stopped  for  "  tea,"  a  seem- 
ingly awful  waste  of  precious  moments,  and  he  dined  at 
the  outrageously  late  hour  of  eight  or  eight-thirty.  For 
the  latter  function  he  dressed,  that  is,  he  saw  to  it  that 
his  uniform  was  clean  or  at  least  freshly  brushed,  and 
put  on  "  slacks  "  or  long  trousers  instead  of  wearing 
his  riding  breeches  and  heavy  boots.  At  dinner  all  mili- 
tary talk  or  ''  shop  "  was  absolutely  taboo.  Instead,  the 
conversation  was  what  one  would  hear  in  a  London  club, 
on  travel,  books,  art,  good  stories,  but  never  about  war. 
All  this  struck  the  average  American  at  first  as  flippant 
and  superficial,  an  impression  accentuated  and  not 
removed  by  the  Englishman's  habitual  reserve  until 
acquaintance  begins  to  ripen  into  friendship.  "^Miat  the 
American  did  not  know  in  the  early  days  was  that  long 
after  he  had  gone  to  l)od,  his  British  host  with  whom  he 
had  dined  so  excellently  and  agreeably  had  returned  to 
his  office  quarters  on  his  guest's  departure,  to  work  until 
the  morning  hours  on  his  military  problems  when  all 
light  conversation  was  as  muclf  forbidden  as  the  contraiy 
had  ])een  at  dinner.  It  did  not  take  the  American  long 
to  appreciate  the  good  features  of  the  British  habits  of 


138      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

life  and  to  value  the  great  importance  of  the  ability  to 
lay  aside  cares  and  worries  and  to  give  the  mind  a  much 
needed  rest  through  thoughts  on  lighter  things,  even  if 
only  for  an  hour.  Tea  at  five  o'clock  soon  became  an 
institution  at  more  than  one  American  mess. 

Both  British  officers  and  men  insisted  on  having  their 
pleasures  and  physical  comforts  to  the  very  maximum 
possible,  even  at  times  and  under  conditions  that  were 
really  serious,  though  never  to  the  point  of  interference 
with  military  duties.  The  officers  saw  to  it  that  every 
opportunity  was  afforded  to  the  men  for  their  recreation, 
in  which  they  themselves  frequently  took  part.  In  this 
way  they  succeeded  in  maintaining  a  spirit  of  cheerful- 
ness and  high  morale. 

To  what  extent  the  British  could  do  this  right  up  to 
the  very  line  of  the  guns  greatly  impressed  the  American 
officers  in  the  early  days  of  B.  E.  P.  service.  On  one 
occasion  a  British  officer  whose  battalion  was  doing  a 
tour  of  duty  in  the  trenches  notified  an  American  friend 
that  a  '^  show  "  well  worth  seeing  was  being  arranged, 
and  that  he  would  send  the  latter  a  friendly  hint  in  time. 
In  trench  vernacular,  *'  show  "  meant  an  affair  short  of 
a  major  engagement,  anything  from  a  raid  to  an  attack 
in  force  on  a  limited  front.  A  few  days  later  there  came 
an  invitation  to  tea  on  a  fixed  afternoon.  On  the  Ameri- 
can officer's  arrival  at  the  British  post  he  was  told  that 
the  zero  hour  had  been  fixed  for  7 :30,  as  it  was  desired 
to  attack  after  dark,  and  that  dinner  had  been  set  for 
8:30.  All  this  was  said  quite  as  a  matter  of  course,  as 
no  one  at  the  front  ever  contemplated,  let  alone  went  so 
far  as  to  suggest  that  such  a  thing  as  a  chance  shell  might 
seriously  interfere  with  any  personal  engagement. 

Meanwhile,  tea  was  served  in  one  of  the  headquarters' 
dugouts,  a  battalion  headquarters  precisely  similar  in 
general  layout  to  many  other  headquarters  along  the 
front.     Advantage  had  been  taken  of  a  high  railway 


THE  AMERICAN  "  E.  E.'S  "  139 

embankment,  into  which  and  of  course  on  the  side  away 
from  the  enemy  a  series  of  chambers  had  been  excavated, 
the  earth  being  held  up  by  ordinary  mine  timbering  or  by 
semicircular  sections  of  very  heavy  corrugated  iron 
plates.  The  dugouts  were  about  ten  feet  in  width  and 
perhaps  as  long.  One  was  used  for  the  headquarters 
office  and  officers'  moss,  another  was  the  kitchen,  a  third 
was  the  signals  office  whence  led  the  telephone  wires  to 
brigade  headquarters,  while  others  were  used  for  sleep- 
ing quarters  with  superimposed  bunks  as  in  a  sleeping 
car. 

Through  the  open  door  of  the  dugout  there  lay  what 
had  once  been  one  of  the  gardens  of  France  which  now, 
since  the  wave  of  the  Somme  battle  had  rolled  over  it 
during  the  previous  year,  had  been  transformed  into  an 
absolute  desert,  empty  of  all  life  but  the  soldier  occu- 
pants. There  in  the  distance  to  the  left  was  Epehy,  once 
a  prosperous  place,  now  with  not  a  single  house  standing. 
There  to  the  right  the  tumbled  broken  wreckage  of  the 
sugar  mill  of  Heudicourt.  In  the  foreground  two  bat- 
talions between  whom  existed  a  strong  athletic  rivalry 
were  settling  some  old  scores  or  creating  new  ones  in  an 
exciting  game  of  football. 

Was  all  this  really  war?  "Well  might  doubt  arise  to 
question  it,  and  still  more  to  question  the  fact  that  in  a 
few  minutes  a  serious  attack  was  to  be  made  in  which 
lives  wore  to  be  sacrificed.  The  ruined  houses,  the 
broken  trees,  spoke  war,  but  one  was  so  accustomed  to 
that  sight !  The  fields  were  green  with  a  tangled  crop  of 
woods  and  wild  grass,  which,  interspersed  with  bright 
scarlet  poppies  or  blue  corn  flowers,  looked  gay  enough 
to  make  one  forget  that  they  ought  rather  to  be  covered 
now  with  ripening  sugar  beets  or  dotted  with  fat  grazing 
cattle,  r.ut  there  are  two  details  that  suggested  the 
ini  mi  nonce  of  danger.  If  the  players  in  the  game  wore 
wearing  white  brooches  and  club  jerseys  as  might  be 


140      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

seen  on  any  English  common  on  a  holiday,  the  spectators 
dressed  in  khaki  carried  each  a  gas  mask,  ready  for 
;emergency,  and  just  beyond  was  a  row  of  six-inch  guns 
that  had  only  the  night  before  been  moved  into  place. 
As  darkness  descended,  and  the  distant  scene  slowly 
faded,  the  game  was  ended,  and  the  artillerymen  began 
to  strip  their  guns  and  the  great  piles  of  vicious-looking 
shells  of  the  covering  camouflage  that  during  the  day- 
light had  hidden  them  from  airplane  observation. 

At  7:25  the  artillery  fire  which  had  been  during  the 
afternoon  customarily  irregular  and  lazily  desultory, 
ceased  entirely,  a  silence  so  deep  as  to  be  almost  audible 
and  oppressive  because  all  knew  what  it  portended.  The 
football  game  was  forgotten  now  as  watch  in  hand  one 
listened  to  the  seconds  slowly  ticking  away.  At  pre- 
cisely the  half  hour  there  was  a  single  warning  shot,  and 
then  with  one  mighty  voice  all  the  artillery  on  a  three- 
mile  front,  those  guns  regularly  on  station  and  all  those 
others  moved  in  to  reinforce  them  for  the  occasion, 
leaped  into  action.  That  night  they  hurled  not  the  ordi- 
nary shells,  but  some  filled  with  thermite,  another  cheer- 
ful contribution  of  the  chemical  engineer,  a  finely  divided 
metallic  combination  which  oxydizes  so  rapidly  on  expo- 
sure to  the  air  as  to  become  molten  metal. 

The  shells  were  so  timed  as  to  burst  on  high  and 
direcfly  over  the  enemy  trenches  on  which  there  fell  the 
rain  of  white-hot  particles  of  the  burning  compound,  set- 
ting fire  at  once  to  anything  inflammable.  It  was  like  a 
wonderful  display  of  fireworks  on  a  gigantic  but  terrible 
scale,  with  the  great  flashes  of  the  exploding  shells  and 
the  steady  continuous  shower  of  falling  sparks,  with  gun 
upon  gun,  battery  on  battery  maintaining  the  supply  of 
bursts  and  fire  as  fast  as  active  men  could  serve  them. 
It  was  not  many  minutes  before  the  timbers  holding  up 
the  earth  banks  of  the  trenches,  the  board  walks  at  the 
bottom,  the  doors  of  dugouts  and  anything  else  that  could 


THE  AMERICAN  ''  R.  E.'S  "  141 

catch  fire  was  in  flames.  The  rows  of  German  trenches 
on  the  hillside  opposite  were  clearly  marked  in  the  dark- 
ness by  livid  bands  of  fire. 

But  even  such  a  scene  must  yield  to  the  pressing 
demand  of  dinner,  and  after  an  hour's  watching  a  return 
was  made  to  the  dugout,  where  an  excellent  six-course 
meal  was  served. 

The  mess  dugout  was  of  the  semicircular,  iron-lined 
variety.  Down  the  center  was  a  narrow  table  seating  ten. 
The  tables  and  benches  were  of  home-made  design  and 
army  manufacture.  But  there  was  a  white  table-cloth, 
the  glazed-surface  kind  that  could  be  wiped  clean,  a  dinner 
service  of  china,  candles  stuck  in  empty  bottles  for  lights, 
and  above  all  a  genuine  whole-souled  soldier's  welcome. 
There  was  a  victrola  in  the  corner  playing  a  medley  of 
ragtime  airs  and  grand  concert  selections,  and  as  the 
shells  from  the  battery  of  six-inch  guns  in  the  neighbor- 
ing meadow  went  screaming  overhead,  there  was  a 
steady  flow  of  good  stories.  The  guns,  however,  were 
X^ointcd  directly  towards  the  open  dugout  door  so  the 
full  force  of  the  concussion  of  each  shot  was  felt  most 
strongly  in  the  confined  space,  which  after  a  while  so 
tired  the  patience  of  the  host  that  he,  turning  to  one  of 
his  junior  officers,  said,  "  I  say,  Jones,  please  go  down 
and  ask  those  artillerymen  to  hold  up  their  bally  noise 
for  a  while.  Tell  them  some  gentlemen  are  trying  to 
have  a  quiet  dinner!  " 

On  the  way  back  to  camp  it  was  difficult  to  separate  the 
confused  impressions  of  a  football  game,  an  extraordi- 
nary artillery  display,  a  delightful  dinner  and  a  sharp 
attack  all  at  once.  But  the  experience  was  not  unique, 
it  was  the  kind  of  thing  that  had  taken  place  and  would 
be  many  times  repeated  along  the  British  front.  It  was 
their  way  of  keo]iing  up  their  spirits  and  remaining 
cheerful. 

Sports  were  not  only  encouraged  by  the  officers,  but 


142      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

they  themselves  frequently  took  part  with  their  men.  At 
one  time  ''  Tommy  "  and  his  commander  might  be  giv- 
ing and  receiving  hard  knocks  on  the  ball-field  without 
regard  to  rank,  but  immediately  the  game  was  ended  the 
one  insisted  on  and  the  other  never  failed  to  give,  and 
to  give  cheerfully,  the  snappy  military  salute.  The 
Americans  soon  realized  that  in  playing  together  there 
was  no  attempt  at  patronizing  on  the  one  hand  nor  the 
slightest  feeling  of  servility  on  the  other  in  the  subse- 
quent salute.  They  saw  that  the  British  officer,  in  spite 
of  an  assumed  indifference,  cared  for  his  men  as  the 
officers  of  no  other  army  did ;  they  saw  in  him  one  brave 
to  recklessness,  as  he  was  accustomed  to  lead  his  men 
over  the  top  armed  with  only  a  walking-stick  until 
expressly  forbidden  to  do  so;  they  knew  that  he  never 
ordered  his  men  to  do  what  he  would  not  do  himself. 
Those  qualities  naturally  won  the  full  respect  and 
implicit  confidence  of  the  men,  and  established  between 
officers  and  men  a  mutual  respect  that  won  the  admira- 
tion of  the  observer.  It  was  the  soldierly  qualities,  the 
close  cooperation  of  officers  and  men,  their  cheerfulness, 

their  manliness  that  Sergeant  Mc saw,  and  that 

made  him  want  to  go  back  to  ''  Tommy  ". 

It  is  a  pity  that  more  American  units  could  not  have 
served  with  the  British  forces,  but  it  is  hoped  that 
enough  did  so  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  fuller  under- 
standing and  a  better  feeling  among  all  branches  of  the 
English-speaking  race.  In  such  understanding  and  feeP 
ing  there  lies  the  best  hope  for  a  world  peace. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

RELATIONS  WITH  THE  FRENCH 

To  develop  and  cement  a  close  personal  friendship, 
to  enter  into  and  become  an  integral  part  of  the  life  of 
other  men,  to  reach  beyond  differences  in  national  char- 
acter and  national  customs,  there  must  be  completely 
unfettered  freedom  of  speech.  If  there  be  in  this  respect 
any  barrier  no  matter  how  small,  the  real  spirits  of  men 
never  meet.  On  account  of  the  difference  in  language, 
therefore,  there  was  not  and  there  could  not  have  been 
the  same  close  intimacy  between  American  and  French 
Boldiers  as  between  the  former  and  the  British.  Then, 
perhaps,  the  fact  that  the  first  and  last  were  both 
strangers  in  a  foreign  land  made  another  bond  between 
them. 

But  there  were  two  traits  of  French  character  that 
impressed  the  American,  filling  him  with  surprise  and 
admiration;  first,  the  calm  self-control  not  only  of  the 
French  soldier  but  of  the  nation  as  a  whole,  and  second, 
the  conduct  of  the  French  women.  The  comic  papers 
have  always  indicated  the  three  nations  by  certain  tj^pical 
characteristics.  The  Frenchman  was  represented  as  a 
very  excitable  and  excited  person,  gesticulating  wildly 
and  getting  much  wrought  up  over  nothing,  while  the 
Britisher  was  shown  as  a  rotund  complacent  John  Bull, 
and  the  American  as  a  lanky  passive  Uncle  Sam,  the  last 
two  both  models  of  imperturbable  calmness,  each  in  his 
own  peculiar  manner.  The  comparison  is  neither  just  nor 
accurate.  No  matter  where  the  French  were  met,  nor 
under  how  great  a  crisis,  they  were  always  calm,  never 

143 


144      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

excited,  a  control  and  calmness  that  the  people  of  neither 
of  the  other  nations  could  surpass. 

When  in  the  South  African  war  the  news  of  the  victory 
at  Mafeking  was  received  in  England  the  people  went 
wild.  Great  boisterous,  jostling  crowds  surged  through 
the  streets  of  London  and  the  English  language  became 
enriched  by  the  word  ''  mafeking,"  signifying  a  noisy 
and  somewhat  unruly  celebration.  Compare  that  occur- 
rence with  what  took  place  in  Paris  on  the  famous  Novem- 
ber 11th.  While  everyone  had  for  some  days  previously 
believed  that  the  end  was  near,  nevertheless  on  Novem- 
ber 10th  it  was  reported  in  Paris  that  the  actual  conclu- 
sion of  the  armistice  might  be  delayed  for  one  or  even 
two  days.  When  an  American  officer  learned  at  the 
American  headquarters  at  9:30  A.  M.  on  the  11th  that 
the  armistice  had  actually  been  signed  that  morning  at 
five,  and  was  to  go  into  effect  at  eleven,  he  hastened  to 
the  street  expecting  to  find  Paris  already  en  fete  cele- 
brating the  consummation  of  her  victory  over  her  heridi- 
tary  foe.  But  the  great  Boulevards  were  as  quiet  and 
orderly  as  on  other  days.  There  was  no  shouting,  no 
excitement,  no  newspaper  extras,  no  demonstration,  and 
yet  in  ninety  minutes  the  greatest  war  of  all  history  that 
had  held  France  on  the  rack  for  more  than  four  years 
would  be  at  an  end.  Meeting  a  French  naval  officer  he 
imparted  the  news.  *'  I  had  not  heard  it,"  the  French- 
man said,  **  but  hope  it  is  true.  I  will  inquire  at  the 
Ministry  of  Marino  whither  I  am  going."  It  was  not 
until  10:45  that  the  Bourse  confirmed  the  news  to  the 
Paris  banks. 

Then,  but  not  till  then,  did  Paris  begin  to  celebrate. 
Shops  were  closed,  flags  were  displayed,  and  without  any 
ordinance  or  concerted  action  a  general  holiday  was  pro- 
claimed or  rather  went  into  effect.  But  the  crowds  that 
filled  the  streets  were  orderly  and  exceedingly  quiet. 
Only  the  Americans  wore  making  a  noise. 


RELATIONS  WITH  THE  FRENCH  145 

During  July  and  August,  1918,  a  part  of  one  of  the 
original  engineer  regiments  was  occupied  in  constructing 
for  the  First  Army,  A.  E.  F.,  an  ammunition  dump  south- 
westerly from  Chateau-Thierry.  In  the  early  morning  of 
July  15th,  heavy  firing  was  heard,  but  the  nature  of  it 
could  not  be  learned.  That  day  the  officer  commanding 
the  regiment  lunched  with  some  French  officers  at  a 
neighboring  aviation  camp,  and  during  the  meal  one  of 
the  latter  very  casually  remarked,  and  in  much  the  same 
tone  as  if  it  were  of  no  great  imjoortance,  that  the  enemy 
had  crossed  the  Marne  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning. 
Commencing  with  their  first  great  offensive  that  began 
on  March  21st,  the  Germans  had  launched  a  series  of 
major  attacks  towards  Amiens,  Montdidier,  the  Aisne, 
and  the  Marne,  each  of  which  had  netted  large  gains,  but 
certainly  in  the  popular  and  to  a  large  extent  in  the  mili- 
tary mind,  the  IMarne,  the  scene  of  the  first  victory,  stood 
as  the  great  barrier  beyond  which  they  could  not  pass. 
Now  they  had  actually  crossed  it! 

"Were  the  French  officers  excited?  Not  in  the  least! 
They  had  received  no  details,  but  were  quite  confident 
that  Foch  had  the  situation  well  in  hand.  Just  then  two 
American  officers  who  were  passing,  stopped,  in  the  hope 
of  getting  something  to  eat.  The  contrast  between  them 
and  the  French  was  interesting.  They  were  full  of  both 
news  and  excitement.  An  attack  in  force  had  been  made 
and  a  crossing  of  the  river  on  a  wide  front  effected  with 
the  advance  still  continuing.  They  also  said  the  high- 
way to  LaFerte,  the  American  headquarters,  had  been 
shelled  and  cut.  Immediately  after  luncheon  the  com- 
manding engineer  officer  started  in  a  motor  for  Army 
Headquarters.  He  found  the  road  intact  as  the  French 
officers  said  that  he  probably  would,  but  he  soon  ran  into 
the  flotsam  of  battle.  There  were  ambulances  and  all 
sorts  of  vehicles,  both  motor  and  horse  drawn,  hurriedly 
impressed   into   service,   moving   southward   with    their 


146      AMERICiVN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

loads  of  wounded  whicH  were  being  distributed  among 
extemporized  hospitals  in  all  the  villages,  and  the 
upward  flow  of  guns  and  ammunition  lorries,  of  trucks 
and  busses  filled  with  reserves,  all  being  hurried  north- 
ward. 

As  he  sped  on  through  Coulommiers,  Aulonoy,  Jouarre 
and  other  smaller  places,  the  people  were  standing  in 
scattered  groups  talking  very  quietly,  and  though  their 
earnest  faces  showed  unmistakably  that  they  fully  real- 
ized the  alarming  situation  of  the  moment,  they  were  not 
excited.  They  had  seen  the  advanced  line  of  foam  of 
the  first  great  German  wave  of  August,  1914,  trickle 
through  these  same  streets,  they  knew  of  those  other 
great  waves  of  the  immediately  preceding  months  that, 
rolling  over  villages  and  cities  by  the  score,  had  washed 
them  away,  and  now  this  very  day  there  was  a  new  wave 
just  set  in  motion,  with  its  oncoming  roaring  crest  less 
than  fifteen  miles  distant.  Were  their  homes,  which  had 
seen  one  tide  actually  lap  their  very  door  steps  and 
recede,  now  to  be  swept  away?  For  them  it  was  a  terri- 
bly anxious  moment,  their  all  was  at  stake  but  there  was 
absolutely  no  excitement,  no  running  hither  and  there,  no 
noise.  As  each  new  ambulance  came  up,  they  stopped 
their  talking  and  gave  a  hand  to  help  carry  the  wounded, 
for  temporary  rest,  into  their  houses  until  other  accom- 
modations farther  to  the  rear  could  be  provided,  houses 
that  might  be  in  ruins  before  another  day's  sun  should 
go  down.  Would  an  American  crowd  have  been  so  calm, 
so  completely  self-possessed?  Perhaps,  but  they  could 
not  have  shown  a  finer  spirit,  they  could  not  have  sur- 
passed the  conduct  of  those  French  people  as  shown 
under  the  trying  conditions  of  that  July  15th.  We  know 
now,  what  they  did  not  know  then,  that  on  that  morning 
the  line  of  furthest  advance  had  been  reached,  and  that 
in  three  days  the  great  counter  offensive  would  begin,  the 
first  since  Cambrai,  and  that  this  offensive  was  to  con- 


RELATIONS  WITH  THE  FRENCH  147 

tinne  along  the  whole  front  until  final  victory  was  gained. 

France  has  suffered  in  the  war  as  no  country,  no 
people  has  ever  been  called  on  to  suffer.  In  her  defense 
the  women  have  given  more  than  1,300,000  sons,  hus- 
bands, fathers  who  will  never  return.  They  lie  buried  on 
that  continuous  field  that  stretches  all  the  way  from  the 
Vosges  Mountains  to  the  North  Sea.  The  women  have 
submitted  to  that  sacrifice  without  complaint,  and  bravely 
doing  what  they  themselves  could  do,  in  maintaining  the 
home,  in  working  in  the  fields,  factories  and  mines,  look- 
ing to  and  hoping  for  that  day  when  it  would  all  end. 
This  they  did  with  unsurpassed  bravery  for  more  than 
four  terrible  years,  and  now  it  is  their  lot  to  live  on  with- 
out those  who  were  or  later  would  have  been  their  main- 
stays in  life.    To  the  women  of  France  all  honor ! 

The  physical  damage  that  has  been  done  to  the  coun- 
try cannot  be  imagined.  To  realize  the  full  awfulness  of 
it,  the  destruction  must  have  been  seen  when  it  was 
still  fresh,  because  the  gentle  hand  of  time  has  already 
begun  to  sear  the  open  wounds  and  to  smooth  the  scars. 
Although  the  actual  destruction  will  not  grow  smaller, 
its  fearfulness  is  already  beginning  to  be  less  garish,  and 
in  a  few  years  will  have  lost  much  of  its  terrible  aspect. 
So  soon  are  we  led  to  forget ! 

But  take  a  map  of  France  and  draw  on  it  a  line  begin- 
ning at  the  Belgian  frontier  and  running  through  St. 
Omer,  St.  Pol,  Amiens,  Compiegne,  Chateau-Thierry, 
Rheims,  Suippes,  Pierrefitte,  Commercy,  Toul  and  Nancy 
to  the  German  Alsatian  frontier,  and  you  will  have 
roughly  delineated  this  western  or  southern  line  of  battle 
destruction.  "West  of  the  line  there  are  places  that  have 
been  damaged  by  air  raids,  and  some  seriously  so,  such 
as  Abbeville,  Paris,  Chalons,  and  Bar-le-Duc,  but  they  are 
isolated  cases.  Between  the  above-described  line  and  the 
northern  boundary  of  France,  an  area  more  than  280 
miles  long  and  with  a  mean  width  of  about  fifty  miles, 


148      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

there  is  not  a  city  or  a  village  but  that  has  been  almost 
completely  destroyed.  Places  along  the  outer  limits  may 
have  been  damaged  in  part  only,  but  all  towns  and  cities 
in  the  interior  of  the  war  belt  have,  without  exception, 
been  rendered  uninhabitable.  In  many,  many  instances 
not  only  has  every  house  been  knocked  down,  but  so  com- 
pletely demolished  that  not  even  the  lines  of  the  founda- 
tions or  the  location  of  the  streets  can  be  distinguished. 

This  territory  was  one  of  the  fairest  and  richest  of  all 
France.  Now  it  is  laid  absolutely  waste.  The  houses 
where  the  people  lived  and  the  mills  where  they  worked 
no  longer  exist,  the  rich  top  soil  that  produced  year  upon 
year  its  abundant  crop  has  been  blown  away  over  exten- 
sive areas  by  the  exploding  shells,  trees  have  been  cut 
down,  and  the  fields  furrowed  deep  by  trenches  or  cov- 
ered with  acres  of  wire  entanglements. 

Elsewhere  than  along  the  western  fringe  of  the  devas- 
tated district  the  civil  population  had  been  almost 
entirely  evacuated,  except  in  the  coal  districts  in  the 
north,  where  such  as  could  work  were  allowed  to  stay. 
There  women  and  children  remained,  doing  their  share 
by  helping  the  miners  or  tilling  the  fields  and  thus  releas- 
where  there  was  not  a  house  that  did  not  show  some 
damage,  where  not  a  pane  of  window  glass  remained, 
and  living  to  all  outward  appearances  entirely  oblivious 
of  war  and  death.  It  was  really  most  extraordi- 
nary how  they  managed  to  continue  the  accustomed 
details  of  their  normal  life.  As  an  illustration  there 
comes  to  mind  a  picture  of  a  sweet  morning  of  a  Sunday 
in  early  June  in  a  little  village  among  the  coal  mining 
districts  near  Bethune,  whence  the  German  trenches  were 
not  more  than  two  or  three  miles  distant.  Down  the 
main  street  constituting  as  is  usual  in  France  the  sole 
street  of  the  village  and  along  which  were  ranged  the 
miners'  houses,  every  one  with  its  battle  scars,  there 


RELATIONS  TTITII  THE  FEENCH  149 

passed  a  procession  of  yoimg  girls  dressed  in  white 
going  to  tlieir  first  communion,  a  procession  exactly  like 
those  other  processions  in  which  their  mothers  and  grand- 
mothers for  ever  so  many  generations  had  taken  their 
part.  It  mattered  not  to  them  that  an  occasional  enemy 
shell  shrieked  overhead.  Poor  little  things,  their  mem- 
ories could  not  in  some  instances  recall  the  days  when 
there  were  not  such  sounds  and,  therefore,  they  took 
them  quite  casually  and  as  a  matter  of  course  now.  The 
young  brothers  of  these  girls,  too  young  as  yet  to  be 
accepted  in  the  army,  and  their  mothers  were  filling  the 
places  of  their  older  brothers  and  fathers  in  the  mines 
that  France  might  have  coal  for  her  factories  to  turn  out 
guns  and  shells.  The  little  old  parish  church  to  which 
the  procession  went,  may  have  an  ugly  gaping  wound  in 
its  roof,  its  windows  may  be  quite  destitute  of  any  glass, 
and  only  a  shattered  stump  of  its  belfry  may  remain,  but 
the  old  white-haired  cure,  too  infirm  to  render  service 
in  the  trenches,  still  ministers  to  his  flock,  and  under  what 
remains  of  the  shadow  of  the  cross  the  women  and  chil- 
dren cling  to  home  and  work  for  France.  Those  little 
ones  in  white  seemed  to  personify  the  splendid  spirit  of 
France  that  enabled  her  to  face  losses,  damage  and  suf- 
fering such  as  no  nation  had  ever  been  called  on  to 
endure. 

But  these  were  the  workers.  They  were  young  and 
theirs  was  the  hope  of  victory  and  peace  and  with  that 
consummation  the  reunited  family  and  the  restored  home. 
In  contrast  thcfe  comes  another  picture,  one  that  has 
been  many  times  repeated,  perhaps  the  saddest  type  of 
picture  of  the  whole  war.  It  was  in  a  little  village  in  the 
Somme  country  where  everything  was  absolutely 
destroyed.  An  aged  couple  had  somehow  obtained  one 
of  those  much-coveted  i)asses  to  visit  their  old  village 
located  in  the  fighting  zone.    They  were  looking  for  what 


150      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

had  been  their  home,  something  dear  to  ns  all,  but  per- 
haps dearest  to  a  Frenchman  who  is  not  accustomed  to 
travel  and  is  particularly  strongly  inclined  to  live  in  the 
place  where  his  forefathers  lived.  The  old  people  had 
found  the  site  they  were  seeking,  but  their  house  was  like 
every  other  house  for  miles,  just  a  pile  of  blackened 
stones.  The  poor  old  woman  was  seated  on  the  broken 
mass  eating  a  piece  of  dark  war  bread.  There  were  no 
tears,  tears  could  not  flow  under  such  circumstances,  but 
the  expression  of  mute  agony  on  that  poor  old  soul's 
face,  as  her  eyes  looked  in  silence  on  her  life's  wreck,  told 
in  unmistakable  terms  the  story  of  her  grief,  of  the  full 
realization  of  her  all  having  been  swept  away,  and  the 
recognition  that  the  years  remaining  to  her  were  too  few 
to  give  her  any  hope  for  a  resurrection.  She,  too,  had 
bled  for  France! 

This  tenacity  of  the  French  to  their  homes,  even  when 
the  homes  had  ceased  to  exist  as  habitable  houses  and 
when  they  were  actually  under  the  fire  of  their  own 
French  guns,  caused  annoyance  to  the  Germans,  as  Mr. 
Brand  Whitlock,  the  American  Minister,  now  Ambassa- 
dor, to  Belgium,  recounts  in  his  admirable  book, 
*'  Belgium.''  The  French  peasants  behind  the  German 
lines  in  northern  France,  ^'  in  their  stubborn  and  pathetic 
attachment  to  the  land,  continued  to  till  their  soil,"  as 
Mr.  Whitlock  says,  and  when  the  Germans  were 
criticized  for  not  evacuating  these  people,  they  answered : 
^'  But  they  do  not  wish  to  be  evacuated.  Try  yourself 
to  make  them  leave." 

In  pursuance  to  this  suggestion,  and  with  the  view  of 
saving  the  French  inhabitants  from  destruction  by  their 
own  or  British  fire,  some  of  the  delegates  of  the  Ameri- 
can Commission  on  Belgian  Relief  in  the  north  of  France 
were  detailed  to  question  the  peasants.  ^'  They  offered 
them  the  chance  of  leaving,  but  they  would  not  go ;  they 
preferred  to  stay  in  their  homes  as  long  as  their  positions 


BELATIONS  AYITII  THE  FRENCH  151 

were  at  all  tenable,  and  to  face  the  unknown  dangers 
there  rather  than  to  confront  the  unknown  dangers  of 
the  mysterious  world  outside.  Peasants  ploughed  while 
an  occasional  shell  fell  in  the  fields  about  them,  and  old 
peasant  women,  driven  from  their  homes  by  bombard- 
ment, crawled  back  at  night  to  seek  some  shelter  in  the 
ruins  that  still  had  some  air  of  familiarity." 

The  French  soldiers  undoubtedly  entertained  toward 
their  American  brothers-in-arms  a  sincere  feeling  of  true 
comradeship,  to  which  they  gave  expression  on  every; 
occasion.  The  following  treatment  of  one  of  the  engi- 
neer regiments  is  an  illustration  of  French  sentiment, 
with  its  roots  striking  through  mere  superficial  politeness 
down  into  that  earnest  good  will  that  the  French  troops 
and  French  nation  offered  to  their  transatlantic  allies. 

The  regiment  in  question  found  itself  in  central 
France  engaged  on  some  construction  work  during  the 
early  days  of  July,  1918.  The  officer  commanding  the 
local  French  troops  called  on  the  American  colonel  and 
requested  his  cooperation  in  a  militarj^  review  on  the 
forthcoming  great  French  national  holiday,  July  14th. 
When  they  came  to  arrange  the  details  it  was  found  that 
the  American  oflicer  was  the  senior  in  point  of  rank.  The 
French  officer  not  only  at  once  conceded  priority,  but 
insisted  that  the  American  troops  should  occux">y  the  right 
of  the  line,  the  position  of  honor  accorded  to  rank,  and 
that  for  precisely  the  same  reason,  the  American  officer 
should  take  the  salute  on  the  march  past.  On  such  an 
occasion  the  French  ceremonial  requires  that  after  the 
troops  have  been  inspected  and  reviewed,  they  shall 
be  again  formed  in  line  and  that  a  salutes  be  rendered  to 
the  flag,  posted  with  the  appropriate  color  guard  in 
advance  of  the  formation  in  line.  Now  it  happened  that 
the  French  unit  had  no  colors,  colors  during  the  war  not 
being  much  used,  and  the  French  officer  proposed  that 
the  American  flag  be  saluted  instead.     The  American 


152      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

officer  protested  that  it  was  a  French  holiday,  that,  in 
according  the  posts  of  honor  to  his  regiment  and  himself 
America  had  already  received  more  than  her  share 
of  attention  on  such  an  occasion,  but  the  Frenchman 
would  listen  to  no  objection.  ''II  n'y  a  q'une  armee, 
q'un  drapeau,"  he  exclaimed. 

Then  on  July  14th  in  the  quaint  medieval  square  of  the 
old  city,  in  the  presence  of  the  people  massed  on  the  side- 
walks or  crowding  every  window,  and  of  the  city  officials 
with  their  tricolored  scarfs  grouped  on  the  courthouse 
steps,  the  command,  *' Honneur  au  drapeau!"  was 
given  and  the  men  of  the  two  nations  brought  their  rifles 
to  the  position  of  salute,  there  floated  upward  toward  the 
old  round  tower,  wliich  legend  says  was  once  the  resi- 
dence of  Richard  Coeur  de  Lion  of  England,  the  strains 
of  the  stirring,  moving  ''  Marseillaise  "  and  of  the  well 
beloved  "  Star-Spangled  Banner." 

The  French  recognized  that  there  were  different 
nations  but  only  one  aim.  They  were  always  very  polite 
in  acknowledging  their  gratitude,  as  they  expressed  it, 
for  America's  assistance  to  France,  but  they  knew  quite 
well  that  America  was  fighting  its  own  and  not  France's 
battle  and  they  much  preferred  to  be  answered  that 
America  was  struggling  with  and  not  for  France.  It  was 
the  community  of  purpose,  the  identity  of  ideal  that  they 
saw  and  desired  to  have  expressed,  or  as  the  French 
officer  put  it,  ''  One  army,  one  flag!  " 


CHAPTER  XIV 

FORESTRY 

A  British  officer  defined  lumber  as  a  munition  of  war. 
On  account  of  its  many  applications  and  uses,  the  enor- 
mous quantity  needed,  and  the  fact  that  no  substitute 
for  it  could  be  found  or  manufactured,  it  seemed  to  be 
entitled  to  the  dignity  of  the  higher  classification  rather 
than  be  treated  as  merely  one  of  tens  of  thousands  of 
articles  grouped  under  the  head  of  supplies. 

France,  thanks  to  the  wonderful  system  of  reforestra- 
tion  which  she  had  been  enforcing  for  many  years,  had 
been  and  during  the  war  was  able  to  supply  in  great 
measure  her  own  local  needs.  This  was  not  true  for 
Great  Britain,  who  had  depended  largely  on  fcreigii 
countries,  America,  Australia  and  the  Baltic  districts. 
Lack  of  ocean  tonnage  that  could  be  spared  for  timber 
shipments  during  the  war  greatly  reduced  the  available 
supply  from  all  these  sources,  and  Great  Britain  turned 
to  France  for  assistance.  France  on  other  occasions  had 
responded  to  other  calls  and  she  did  not  fail  her  ally  in 
this  one. 

French  forests  are  much  more  extensive  and  contain 
more  large  sized  trees  than  an  American  would  expect 
to  find  in  an  old,  densely  populated  country  whore  the  for- 
ests have  been  exploited  for  centuries,  accustomed  as  ho 
is  to  the  spendthrift  squandering  and  sickening  waste  of 
his  own  once  magnificent  timber  wealth.  In  France  forests 
are  the  property  of  either  the  state  itself,  of  the  various 
communes,  of  certain  public  institutions  such  as  hospitals 
or  universities,  or  of  individuals.  In  times  of  peace  all 
forest  lands,  however  owned,  came  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  Service  des  Eaux  et  Forets,   a  bureau  of   the 

153 


154      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Department  of  Agriculture,  which  administered  the  state 
properties  and  controlled  to  some  extent  the  others. 
Indiscriminate  and  wasteful  cutting  of  trees  was  forbid- 
den. No  section  of  forest  land  could  be  laid  waste. 
Instead  only  a  certain  joroportion  of  trees  might  be 
removed  at  one  time,  leaving  enough  to  protect  the  half- 
grown  trees  and  the  young  growth,  ^lien  trees  were 
cut,  others  were  set  out  to  take  their  places.  Thus  by 
cutting  over  a  part  of  any  forest  area  each  year  and  by 
working  in  slow  rotation  over  the  whole  area,  it  has  been 
possible  to  get  a  regular  annual  crop  and  still  leave  the 
forest  intact.  In  short,  a  French  lumberman  draws  from 
his  investment  its  regular  product  of  interest  and  never 
touches  the  principal. 

The  French  official  and  the  French  lumberman  are  also 
keenly  on  the  alert  against  fire,  an  enemy  to  be  feared 
quite  as  much  as  waste.  By  a  proper  staff  of  watchmen, 
by  the  removal  of  all  fallen  limbs  and  dead  pieces,  by 
systematically  laid  out  clearings  to  prevent  the  rapid 
spread  of  fire  should  one  start,  and  above  all,  through  a 
wholesome  respect  for  and  realization  on  the  part  of  the 
entire  population  of  the  enormous  value  of  the  forests 
to  the  nation,  France  has  been  spared  those  frightful  and 
so  unnecessary  holocausts  that  have  so  often  swept 
American  forests.  In  this  matter  we  as  a  people  have 
much  to  learn. 

The  consequence  was  that,  when  after  it  was  recognized 
that  the  war  was  to  be  a  long  protracted  affair  and  that 
an  overseas  supply  of  timber  could  not  be  obtained, 
France  could  and  did  undertake  to  care  for  her  allies 
as  well  as  for  herself.  The  peace-time  forestry  organiza- 
tion continued  to  function  during  the  war,  but  to  adapt 
it  to  the  new  conditions,  to  provide  for  allied  needs  and 
to  correlate  private  with  goveiTiment  interests,  so  that 
all  might  work  for  the  common  cause  under  intelligent 
direction,    there   was    established    the    Comite    Franco- 


FORESTEY  155 

Brittanique  de  Bois  de  Guerre,  under  the  direction  of  tHe 
Inspecteur  General  des  Services  de  Bois.  This  Commit- 
tee furnished  the  necessary  machinery  for  the  procuring 
of  timber  from  government  or  state  lands  and  arranged 
that  there  should  be  no  conflict  in  demands,  no  unneces- 
sary competition  with  inflation  of  prices  and  that  waste 
should  be  reduced  to  the  minimum. 

This  committee  saw  only  to  the  matter  of  supply  of 
and  payment  for  standing  timber,  each  army  attending 
to  the  felling  and  sawing  of  the  trees  allotted  to  it.  The 
British  government  organized  a  special  forestry  service 
from  among  the  Canadian  troops,  but  this  force,  like  so 
many  of  the  special  forces,  was  inadequate  to  the  huge 
task.  Therefore,  when  the  Balfour  Commission  was  dis- 
cussing, in  May,  1917,  with  the  American  government  the 
details  of  American  cooperation,  Lieutentant-General 
Bridges,  the  military  attache  to  the  commission, 
requested  that  a  special  regiment  of  woodmen  be  raised 
to  be  loaned  to  the  British  army  to  assist  in  getting  out 
various  lumber  products. 

Wlien  the  American  Engineer  Commission  arrived  in 
France,  the  French  government  made  it  very  clear  that 
enonnous  quantities  of  lumber  of  all  sizes  for  all  pur- 
poses would  be  needed  and  that,  while  they  preferred 
that  such  material  should  come  from  our  own  forests, 
they  recognized  the  practical  impossibility  of  transport- 
ing such  a  bullvy  commodity  when  all  available  ship  ton- 
nage would  be  needed  to  bring  the  men  and  those  sup- 
plies that  must  come  from  America,  such  as  could  come 
from  nowhere  else.  They  further  stated  that  French 
forests  would  be  at  America's  service  to  a  limited  extent. 
But  the  government  also  made  clear  the  point  that  all 
the  forestry  force  and  all  the  cutting  and  sawing 
machinery  with  means  of  transportation  from  the  forests 
to  the  main  railways  must  be  furnished  by  the  United 
States. 


156      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Witli  the  American  entry  into  tlie  European  timber 
field  it  was  evident  that  the  demand  for  timber  was  to  be 
greatly  increased  and  that  the  arrangements  which  had 
heretofore  contemplated  only  the  demands  by  the  French 
and  British  armies  must  be  reorganized.  The  first  step 
was  to  enlarge  the  Franco-British  Committee  into  an 
Inter- Allied  Committee  along  the  same  general  lines  but 
with  increased  membership,  wider  scope  and  greater 
power.  The  details  of  the  careful  and  highly  organized 
methods  for  the  control  of  timber  lands  and  timber  prod- 
ucts, so  far  as  they  affected  the  army,  are  admirably 
described  in  the  historical  report  of  the  Chief  Engineer, 
A.  E.  F, : 

"  When  the  advance  guard  of  American  Foresters 
arrived  in  Paris  in  June,  1917,  they  found  the  French 
Government  and  Army  highly  organized  for  supplying 
the  French  and  British  forces  with  timber.  Each  of  the 
French  Army  Groups  carried  on  its  staff  a  Forestry 
Ser\dce  attached  to  the  *  Direction  des  Etapes.'  Under 
the  Forestry  Service  of  the  Army  Groups  were  Chefs 
d'Arrondissement  and  under  them  in  turn  Chefs  de  Sec- 
teur.  This  elaborate  organization,  maintained  by  the 
French  Genie  (i.  e.,  Corps  of  Engineers),  requisitioned 
existing  stocks  of  lumber  or  wood,  bought  or  requisi- 
tioned forests  or  obtained  cessions  of  timber  from  the 
State  Forests  of  the  region,  operated  saw-mills  with  Ger- 
man prisoners  or  French  Genie  troops,  largely  handled 
its  own  motor  and  railroad  transportation  and  func- 
tioned as  a  whole  as  a  very  intensely  organized  and  spe- 
cialized section  of  the  French  Army  supply  service.  In 
the  Zone  of  the  Rear,  a  large  organization  had  been 
developed  under  the  Ministre  de  1 'Armament  et  des 
Fabrications  de  Guerre  for  obtaining  the  stocks  of  rail- 
road ties,  aviation  lumber,  artillery  and  vehicle  lumber, 
and  all  other  forest  products  needed  to  carry  on  the  war. 
This  organization  centered  in  the  Inspecteur  General  des 


FORESTRY  157 

Services  de  Bois  in  Paris,  wlio  directed  tlie  activities 
of  some  twenty  Centres  des  Bois,  the  latter  embracing 
all  parts  of  France  outside  of  the  Army  Zone.  Each 
Centre  de  Bois  consisted  of  a  group  of  French  engineers 
or  forestry  officers,  headed  by  a  Directeur  de  Centre,  who 
represented  the  French  Government  in  obtaining  mili- 
tary supplies  of  forest  products  in  a  given  region.  The 
Centres  de  Bois  had  authority  by  presidential  decree  to 
requisition  up  to  seventy-five  per  cent  of  the  output  of 
any  saw-mill  at  a  standard  scale  of  prices  fixed  by  th§ 
Inspecteur  General  at  Paris.  They  also  purchased  spe- 
cial products  like  railroad  ties,  piling  and  so  forth,  at 
prices  fixed  by  the  individual  Centre.  They  purchased 
or  requisitioned  forests,  installed  mills  which  were  oper- 
ated largely  by  German  prisoners,  but  to  some  extent 
by  French  Genie  troops ;  and  formed,  in  a  word,  an  exten- 
sion of  the  .Wood  Supply  Service  of  the  French  Army 
Groups  over  the  entire  territory  of  France,  although 
under  the  control  of  the  French  Ministry  of  Munitions. 
The  line  between  the  Army  Zone  and  the  Zone  of  the 
Rear  was  very  sharply  drawn,  and  the  organizations  on 
either  side  of  it  were  totally  distinct.  Within  the  Army 
Zone,  the  French  Army  Groups  obtained  their  timber 
supplies  directly  by  their  own  services  and  had  prac- 
tically absolute  control  of  all  forest  resources  within  the 
Zone.  In  the  Zone  of  the  Rear,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
organization  was  a  civilian  one,  although  made  up  largely 
of  militarized  personnel,  functioning  through  the  French 
Ministry  and  disposing  of  its  products  in  accordance 
with  such  budgets  or  allocations  as  might  be  determined 
upon  by  the  Minister  of  Munitions  and  the  Minister  of 
War/* 

In  accordance  with  the  habitual  French  respect  for 
trained  advisoiy  bodies,  there  was  organized  La  Commis- 
sion Forestiere  d 'Expertises,  independent  of  the  Inter- 
Allied  Committee,  but  necessarily  associated  with  it, 


158      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

iwhose  duty  it  was  to  determine  the  amount  of  timber  on 
any  private  tract  allocated  to  military  service,  to 
appraise  the  value  and  negotiate  the  purchase.  The 
Comite  permanent  de  Bois  de  Guerre,  consisting  of  the 
Inspector  General,  representatives  of  the  Department  of 
Agriculture,  prominent  French  lumber  manufacturers 
and  members  of  the  French  Parliament,  laid  down  the 
lines  of  a  general  policy  to  be  pursued  by  the  govern- 
ment in  regard  to  military  demands  of  the  allies, 
including,  of  course,  the  French,  for  lumber.  The  Inter- 
Allied  Commission  for  the  purchase  of  lumber,  with 
headquarters  in  London  and  Paris,  correlated  all  pur- 
chases of  the  allied  armies  from  neutral  countries,  par- 
ticularly Scandinavia,  Switzerland,  Spain  and  Portugal. 
Then  there  were  the  permanent  government  organiza- 
tions such  as  the  Ecole  de  Chemins  de  Fer,  controlling 
the  existing  stocks  of  railway  ties  in  France,  and  the  Ser- 
vice de  Ponts  et  Chaussees,  with  jurisdiction  over  the 
use  and  repair  of  roads,  the  disposition  of  timber  along 
public  highways,  and  the  use  of  streams  for  driving  logs. 

All  this  may  have  seemed  too  complicated  and  unneces- 
sarily cumbersome  to  the  average  American,  unaccus- 
tomed to  referring  affairs  to  trained  specialists.  In  fact, 
sometimes  younger  officers,  not  understanding  European 
procedure,  criticized  the  application  of  the  principle,  but 
it  was  the  French  method  of  reaching  a  result,  and  any 
other  method  would  have  ended  in  chaos. 

As  to  the  details  of  procedure  of  acquiring  forests  and 
how  successful  the  French  plan  was,  it  is  again  con- 
venient to  quote  from  the  report  of  the  Chief  Engineer : 

**  The  group  of  foresters  and  lumbermen  who  came  to 
France  in  August  and  October,  1917,  were  employed  very 
largely  on  reconnaissance  to  locate  suitable  tracts  of  tim- 
iber,'*  *  *  *  ^jjj  i]^Q  a  reconnaissance  for  timber  was 
iextended  over  practically  all  France  south  of  the  occu- 
pied departments  and  the  departments  forming  a  base 


FORESTRY  159 

for  the  Britisli  Army.  Officers  attached  to  the  Central 
Headquarters  of  the  Section,  and  the  personnel  in  the 
Office  of  the  American  Delegate  on  the  Inter-AlHed  Com- 
mittee scouted  continuously  for  timber  in  new  regions, 
including  the  Central  Plateau,  the  French  Alps  and  the 
Pyrenees.'* 

As  each  forest  was  examined,  a  report  upon  it  with 
recommendations  for  or  against  acquisition  was  sub- 
mitted to  the  Chief  of  the  Forestry  Section,  through  the 
District  Commander  in  all  regions  covered  by  operating 
districts. 

If  the  forest  was  deemed  to  be  desirable  for  A.  E.  F. 
operations,  the  representative  of  the  Section  at  Chaumont 
was  instructed  to  acquire  it  if  possible,  if  the  forest  was 
situated  in  the  War  Zone  area,  while  the  American 
Delegate  on  the  Inter-Allied  "Wood  Committee  at 
Paris  acquired  it  if  it  lay  in  the  rear  of  the 
Army  Zone.  In  the  War  Zone,  the  acquisition 
of  the  forest  was  requested  from  the  Direction  des 
Etapes  of  the  proper  French  army  group,  through  the 
French  Mission  at  American  General  Headquarters. 
The  French  forestry  officers  on  the  Direction  des  Etapes 
decided  if  the  forest  could  be  allotted  to  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force,  and  if  so,  proceeded  to  acquire  it 
through  their  own  field  organization  wliich  negotiated 
directly  with  the  French  Forostfy  Service  in  the  case  of 
state  or  communal  timber,  and  with  private  owners  in 
the  case  of  private  timber.  The  Direction  des  Etapes 
possessed  ample  powers  for  the  requisition  of  forests, 
which  were  exercised  more  freely  than  in  the  Zone  of 
the  Rear.  Acquisitions  in  the  War  Zone,  in  the  main,  pro- 
ceeded rapidly,  all  details  being  arranged  between  the 
local  officers  of  the  Forestiy  Section  and  the  Chefs  du 
Secteur  of  the  Direction  des  Etapes. 

In  tlie  case  of  forests  in  the  Zone  of  the  Rear,  the 
American  Delegate  had  first  to  obtain  the  approval  of 


160      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

tlie  cession  or  purchase  in  belialf  of  the  A.  E.  F.  from 
the  Inter- Allied  Wood  Committee.  In  the  case  of  state 
or  communal  timber  the  consent  of  the  French  Forestry- 
Service  had  also  to  be  obtained.  The  allocation  of  the  for- 
est to  the  A.  E.  F.  might  then  be  made  or  refused,  after 
considering  our  needs  for  it  in  relation  to  those  of  the 
French  and  British  Armies.  The  Canadian  Forestry 
Corps  had  established  operations  in  four  of  the  regions 
logically  tributary  to  the  A.  E.  F.,  namely :  The  Vosges 
Mountains,  the  Jura  Mountains,  the  northern  part  of  the 
Loire  River  Valley,  and  the  pineries  south  of  Bordeaux. 
Competition  between  the  A.  E.  F.  and  the  British 
Directorate  of  Forestry  for  desirable  tracts  was  often 
keen  and  the  allocation  of  the  forest  to  one  army  or  the 
other,  if  indeed  the  French  did  not  reserve  it  for  them- 
selves, had  to  be  thrashed  out  in  the  Inter-Allied  Wood 
Committee.  Once  a  forest  was  allotted  to  the  A.  E.  F., 
all  further  details  were  settled  directly  with  the  French 
Forestry  Service  in  the  case  of  state  or  communal  hold- 
ings. In  the  case  of  private  holdings,  the  Commission 
d 'Expertises  was  requested  to  estimate  and  appraise  the 
timber  and,  if  possible,  to  effect  its  purchase.  This  pro- 
cedure was  extremely  slow,  largely  on  account  of  the 
limited  personnel  available  to  the  Expert  Commission,  a 
situation  which  was  met  as  far  as  possible  by  loaning  to 
the  Commission  a  considerable  number  of  trained  Ameri- 
can foresters  to  assist  in  the  field  estimates.  If  the 
Expert  Commission  succeeded  in  effecting  a  purchase, 
and  in  view  of  the  difficulties  encountered,  its  work  in  the 
main  was  surj^risingly  successful  due  to  the  energy  and 
ability  of  its  chief,  a  contract  with  the  owner  was  made 
by  the  Centre  de  Bois  concerned.  If  the  Expert  Com- 
mission was  unable  to  obtain  the  forest  by  friendly  pur- 
chase it  was  necessary  to  request  the  Comite  Permanent 
to  approve  its  requisition. 

But  the  careful,  thrifty  French  would  not  permit  their 


FORESTRY  161 

forests  to  be  despoiled.  Timber  might  be  cut,  but  not 
wasted.  To  obtain  the  supply  for  the  current  year  it  was 
shown  that  it  was  not  necessary  to  kill  the  growing  sup- 
plies of  future  years.  To  this  end  the  following  require- 
ments were  enforced,  as  set  forth  in  the  report  of  the 
Chief  Engineer : 

**  The  methods  of  cutting  state  and  communal  forests 
(were  fixed  by  the  terms  of  the  cessions  as  drafted  by  the 
Conservateur  of  the  district  concerned.  In  the  case  of 
private  forests,  cutting  regulations  were  outlined  in  the 
*  Proccs  Verbaux  '  prepared  by  the  Expert  Commission 
in  the  course  of  its  appraisal  of  the  timber.  These  were 
later  embodied  and  sometimes  changed  in  the  formal 
contracts  made  with  private  owners  by  the  Centres  de 
Bois.  The  contracts  were  uniformly  delayed  until  long 
after  cutting  had  begun.  In  each  district,  however,  a. 
special  liaison  officer  representing  the  Inspecteur  Gen- 
eral directed  the  methods  to  be  followed  in  cutting  pri* 
ivate  forests  and  settled  complaints  from  owners.  In  the 
Army  Zone,  these  duties  were  discharged  by  the  Chefs 
du  Secteur.  In  the  state  and  communal  forests,  methods 
of  cutting  were  closely  controlled  by  the  field  officers  of 
the  French  Forestry  Service." 

**  The  requirements  of  the  French  bureau  of  forestry 
were  enforced  in  state  and  communal  cessions.  They 
were  departed  from  in  the  case  of  many  private  forests 
which  had  been  requisitioned  or  whoso  owners  were  fa- 
vorable to  a  heavier  cut  than  forestry  rules  would  nor- 
mally permit.  In  the  southern  pineries,  following  the 
forestry  system  of  the  region,  the  timber  was  cut  clean 
and  the  requirements  were  comparatively  simple.  In  a 
[few  instances  the  terms  of  the  cession  required  the 
removal  of  the  undergrowth  of  briars.  In  the  hardwood 
forests  and  the  softwood  forests  of  the  eastern  moun- 
tains only  ti-oes  selected  and  marked  by  the  FrencK 
iorestors  could  be  cut,  and  these  usually  consisted  of 


162      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

from  fifteen  to  forty  per  cent  of  tlie  total  volume  of  mer- 
chantable material.  In  a  few  large  hardwood  areas,  spe- 
cial concessions  permitted  the  removal  of  as  much  as 
eighty  per  cent  of  the  timber  in  the  coupes  cut  over.  The 
piling  of  brush  was  required  in  the  pine  and  fir  forest* 
of  central  and  eastern  France,  but  not  as  a  rule  in  the' 
hardwood  forests  where  the  close  utilization  of  fuel  wood 
left  nothing  but  small  twigs.  In  a  few  instances,  the  pull- 
ing of  stumps  after  cutting  was  enforced. ' ' 

''  The  most  serious  restriction  from  the  standpoint  of 
effective  logging  operations  was  the  limitation  of  the 
total  quantity  of  timber  which  could  be  removed  from 
many  forests.  In  the  state  and  communal  forests  of 
eastern  France,  containing  many  magnificent  areas  of 
fir  and  spruce  timber,  cutting  was  restricted  to  a  limited 
number  of  *  coupes  '  which  were  ready  for  fellings 
under  the  exact  methods  of  management  applied  by  the 
French  Forestry  Service.  Certain  coupes  of  mature  tim- 
ber would  be  withheld,  for  example,  because  the  regener- 
ation of  young  trees  was  not  sufficiently  advanced.  Tli^ 
markings  in  these  forests,  as  a  result  of  continued  pres- 
sure by  the  American  representatives  who  dealt  with  the 
French  Forestry  Service,  were  extended  to  include  in 
some  cases  from  five  to  ten  *  annual  possibilities,'  that  is, 
from  five  to  ten  times  the  quantity  permitted  to  be  cut 
in  one  year  under  the  working  plan  prescribed  for  the 
management  of  the  forest  in  question,  all  timber  marked, 
however,  being  restricted  to  such  as  could  safely  be 
removed  from  the  standpoint  of  maturity  and  the  regen- 
eration of  the  new  crops.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  French 
forestry  practice  in  this  region  is  so  conservative  that 
several  of  these  forests  carried  an  excessive  amount  of 
old  timber,  and  cuttings  of  this  character  and  extent  were 
not  injurious  from  a  purely  technical  standpoint.  The 
most  extreme  illustrations  of  the  application  of  French 
forestry  requirements  occurred  in  a  few  cases  of  large, 


FOEESTEY  163 

rich  forests  where  the  cutting  of  only  a  small  fraction  of 
the  merchantable  timber  was  allowed,  this  being 
restricted  to  wind-falls  or  thinnings." 

It  is  hoped  that  the  above  lessons  how  to  care  for  for- 
ests and  to  conduct  operations  have  been  learned  and  will 
be  appreciated  by  our  own  lumberman. 

The  first  unit  of  the  American  forestry  force  was  the 
10th  Eegiment  of  Engineers  organized  among  the  lum- 
ber districts  of  the  west.  It  arrived  in  France  on  Octo- 
ber 2,  1917,  and  was  followed  in  quick  succession  by  the 
20th,  41st,  42d,  and  43d  Engineers,  and  the  503d,  507th, 
517th,  519th,  523d,  531st  and  633d  Service  Battalions. 
On  October  18th,  a  forestry  service  was  organized  by 
combining  the  above  regiments  into  one  regiment  known 
as  the  20th  Engineers,  and  the  service  battalions  into 
attached  Forestry  Service  Companies. 

The  regiment  finally  consisted  of  fourteen  battalions 
of  forty-nine  companies  and  at  the  close  of  hostilities 
contained  about  20,000  officers  and  men,  the  largest  regi- 
ment in  the  American  Army.  Plans  were  under  contem- 
plation to  increase  the  personnel  to  50,000  men,  which 
would  have  made  it  the  largest  regiment  in  any  army 
of  the  world,  larger  even  than  the  Fifth  Engineers  of  the 
French  Army,  the  famous  unit  of  railway  troops.  It 
was  commanded  by  Colonel  J.  A.  Woodruff,  who,  with 
four  lieutenant-colonels  through  headquarters  at  Tours, 
administered  not  a  regiment,  except  in  name,  but  a  great 
manufacturing  establishment.  As  indicating  how  actual 
figures  exceeded  the  estimated  requirements,  the  maxi- 
mum forestry  force  likely  to  be  needed  was  computed 
at  the  beginning  of  operations  to  consist  of  ten  battailous 
of  forestry  troops,  formed  by  three  battalions  of  engi- 
neers and  seven  service  battalions,  a  total  maximum 
force  of  15,000  men. 

Much  of  the  timber  that  was  cut  oamo  from  extensive 
forests  without  interior  means  of  transportation.    Nar- 


1G4      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 


row-gauge  railways  were  constructed  in  those  places 
wliere  haul  by  motor,  by  tractor  or  by  team  was  too 
great  for  reasonable  economy.  The  main  items  of  plant 
used  by  the  Twentieth  Engineers  included : 


282  sawmills, 
1,850  logging  wagons, 
12,500  horses, 

128  power  tractors, 
2,300  motor   trucks    and 
trailers. 


400  miles  of  railway  track 

of   60    c.   m.,   3   ft. 

meter  and  standard 

gauge, 

2,070  railway  logging  cars, 

85  locomotives. 


The  chief  areas  from  which  timber  was  cut  were  the 
Landes  district  south  of  Bordeaux,  producing  pine  of  a 
rather  inferior  grade,  the  Vosges  and  Jura  Mountains, 
where  firs  were  found  giving  splendid  piles  as  long  as 
100  feet,  and  many  scattered  isolated  forests  through 
central  France  furnishing  oak,  beech  and  other  hard- 
woods. The  following  table  shows  the  total  production 
by  the  American  Forestry  Section : 


TOTAL  CUT  OF  FORESTRY  SECTION,  DEC.  1,  1917  TO 
APRIL  1,  1919 


By  Units 
Working 

FOR 

American 
Army 

Ey  Units 
Working 

FOR 

French 

Army 

By  Units 
Working 

FOR 

British 
Army 

Lumber  ft.  B.  M 

212,528,000 
5,065,000 
4,853,000 

3,011,795 
210,124 
228,130 

953,874 

Standard  gauge  R.  R.  tie^,  pieces 

Light  railway  ties,  pieces 

219,366 
64,025 

Total 

222,446,050 

3,450,049 

1,237,265 

Miscellaneous  round  products,  pieces. . 
Piling  pieces 

1,883,504 

127,598 

14,1C2 

39,095 

1,194,817 
64,049 

Fuelwood  stores 

12,295 

Total 

2,025,204 

39,095 

1,271,161 

FORESTEY  165 

The  lumber  was  used  for  all  sorts  of  purposes,  but  the 
greater  part  for  wharves,  buildings,  bridges  and  timber 
roads,  although  items  such  as  packing  boxes  consumed 
much.  The  ''  Miscellaneous  Eound  Pieces  "  include 
poles  for  telegraph  and  telephone  lines,  props  for  mines, 
dugouts  and  trench  supports,  and  something  like 
1,000,000  stakes  from  two  to  five  feet  long,  for  wire 
entanglements.  The  maximum  cut  in  one  month  (Octo- 
ber, 1918)  was  53,000,000  feet  B.  M. 

At  first  the  French  authorities,  in  order  to  permit 
American  engineers  to  commence  work  on  the  erection 
of  the  w^harves  and  storehouses,  undertook  to  supply  the 
necessary  timber  by  their  own  forces,  with  the  under- 
standing that  American  foresters  would  later  cut  for 
them  at  least  an  equivalent  amount. 

The  prospect  of  supplying  three  large  armies  with  con- 
struction timber  over  and  above  French  commercial 
needs,  all  of  which  was  to  be  cut  from  their  own  care- 
fully preserved  forests,  naturally  filled  the  French 
authorities  with  alarm  lest  the  standing  supply  should 
be  depleted  seriously.  Had  the  wa'r  continued  this  fear 
would  have  had  reasonable  justification,  but  even  the 
great  cut  made  by  the  American  engineers  did  not 
amount  to  more  than  fifteen  per  cent  of  the  normal  annual 
cut  in  France  prior  to  the  war. 

Although  the  men  of  tlie  Twentieth  Engineers  were 
intended  primarily  to  operate  far  removed  from  the  bat- 
tle line,  and  were  given  only  a  small  amount  of  military 
drill  and  armed  only  so  far  as  to  furnish  guards,  never- 
theless some  of  the  work  was  carried  out  under  fire,  and 
more  than  one  gold  star  stands  to  their  credit. 

One  of  the  battalions  went  overseas  on  the  Tuscania 
early  in  1918.  On  the  afternoon  of  February  5th  the 
voyage  was  rightly  considered  over.  The  north  coast 
of  Ireland  was  in  plain  sight,  only  ten  miles  away  on  the 
starboard  beam,  when  suddenly  the  ship  was  lifted  by 


166      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

tlie  explosion  of  a  torpedo.  The  few  vessels  that  were 
near  took  off  as  many  men  as  they  could,  but  as  some  of 
the  Tuscania's  boats  could  not  be  lowered,  owing  to  the 
listing  of  the  ship,  and  others  had  been  smashed,  about 
700  men  were  left  on  board  with  no  help  in  sight.  As  the 
ship  slowly  settled  they  cheerfully  sang: 

"Where  do  we  go  from  here,  boys, 
"Where  do  we  go  from  here  ?  " 

Then  a  destroyer  came  up  and  continued  the  rescue, 
but  as  it  was,  ninety-two  found  a  resting  place  in  Irish 
soil  or  with  those  many  other  men,  women  and  chil- 
dren, who  were  victims  of  the  silly,  cruel  policy  that 
availed  Germany  so  little  and  contributed  so  much  to  her 
eventual  downfall. 


CHAPTER  XV; 

:WATER  SUPPLY 

That  an  army  cannot  exist  [without  water  is  axiomatic, 
but  that  in  no  previous  war  did  an  army  need  so  much 
water  as  in  this  one  is  also  true.  The  armies  were 
larger,  and  besides  the  men  and  animals  to  be  supplied 
with  drink  there  were  also  locomotives  and  motors.  In 
addition  to  quantity  of  water,  quality  was  now  con- 
sidered for  the  first  time,  because  general  staffs  realized 
that  there  was  a  difference  in  waters,  and  that,  if  th'e^ 
health  of  armies  were  to  be  conserved,  only  water  of 
certain  purity,  or  chemically  brought  to  that  standard, 
must  be  supjolied. 

To  furnish  the  requisite  amount  of  pure  water  for  a 
city  of  say  50,000  population  is  no  small  task,  but  what 
of  the  task  of  furnishing  enough  water  for  that  number 
of  men  who  have  been  moved  into  an  uninhabited  area 
on  a  few  days^  notice?  That  was  usually  the  problem 
given  to  the  engineer.  To  solve  it  properly  he  must  be 
something  of  a  hydraulic  expert,  a  chemist,  and  a 
bacteriologist. 

The  American  army  on  arrival  found  water  supply 
services  established  in  both  the  French  and  British 
armies,  and  as  the  American  forces  were  to  occupy  at 
first  a  small  part  of  the  existing  front  and  gradually,  as 
more  troops  arrived,  a  greater  and  still  greater  part,  it 
was  only  immediately  necessary  to  take  over  the  installa- 
tions already  made. 

.Usually  an  army  depended  for  its  supply  of  water  on 
a  series  of  water  stations,  wells,  streams,  or  reservoirs 
located  substantially  parallel  with  the  front  line  and  dis- 
tant from  it  three  to  six  miles,  depending  on  the  topog- 

167 


168      AMEKICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FEANCE 

rapliy  of  the  ground  and  available  source  of  sui^ply. 
M^ater  stations  make  excellent  targets.  From  the  water 
carts  that  are  always  standing  by  taking  load  the  sta- 
tions are  easily  recognized  in  aerial  photographs,  and  on 
account  of  their  importance  soon  receive  attention  from 
the  enemy  guns.  They  must,  therefore,  be  kept  out  of 
range  of  the  field  artillery.  These  advance  stations  were 
very  simple  installations  consisting  of  a  gasoline  operated 
pump,  as  a  steam  pump  with  its  smoke  would  never  do, 
a  tank  with  a  pipe  line  from  the  pump,  stand  pipe  or 
hose  from  the  tank  to  fill  the  carts,  water-troughs  and 
perhaps  one  or  more  pipe  lines  for  distribution. 

The  difference  in  extensiveness  between  the  French 
and  British  installations  was  quite  marked.  The  theory 
of  the  former  was  that  immobility  of  an  army  could  not 
be,  or  at  least  should  not  be,  believed  to  be  of  long  con- 
tinuance, and  that,  therefore,  extensive  water  develop- 
ments were  but  a  waste  of  time  and  effort.  Even  though 
the  front  might  be  stabilized  for  long  periods  of  time,  as 
was  the  case,  nevertheless  the  extent  of  the  forces  hold- 
ing any  given  sector  fluctuated  between  perhaps  wide 
limits,  approaching  a  condition  of  mobility.  They  argued 
that  it  was  better  to  use  local  resources  or,  if  they 
were  insufficient,  to  set  up  other  water  points  in  gi-eat 
numbers,  of  small  individual  capacity  and  of  the  simplest 
character. 

The  British  practice  was  rather  the  converse.  They 
were  inclined  to  dig  or  bore  large  wells  giving  a  gener- 
ous capacity  of  flow,  which  lead  to  a  smaller  number  of 
water  points  for  a  given  output.  But  the  British  instal- 
lations being  larger  than  the  more  numerous  French 
ones,  had  a  more  complex  equipment. 

Good  arguments  can  be  advanced  for  either  point  of 
view.  On  the  one  hand  that  it  is  better  to  avoid  concentra- 
tion, when  the  failure  of  a  single  unit  might  have  serious 
consequences  j  on  the  other,  that  the  more  permanent  and 


WATER  SUPPLY  169 

larger  i^Iant  was  less  likely  to  go  wrong  througli  failure  of 
mechanism,  while  the  danger  of  concentration  was  more 
than  offset  by  the  safety  arising  from  the  inspection  and 
control  naturally  attendant  to  a  large  installation.  But 
the  real  reason  for  the  difference  anose  from  the  oppos- 
ing traits  of  national  character.  The  same  was  visible 
in  trench  construction,  in  railways,  in  buildings,  in  fact 
in  almost  every  detail  of  organization  and  execution. 
One  nation  by  nature  leans  to  lightness,  delicacy  and 
mobility,  the  other  to  strength,  solidity  and  permanence. 
It  made  an  exceedingly  interesting  study  in  psychology 
to  observe  the  constant  exhibition  of  the  contradictory 
national  tendencies.  It  is  impossible  to  say  which  was 
the  better  system.  Probably  each  army  was  right, 
because  by  following  what  was  for  it,  the  seemingly 
proper  path  the  best  results  were  obtained. 

Some  skill  was  frequently  displayed  in  hiding  water 
points,  using  ruined  buildings  for  sites  for  tanks  or 
putting  pumps  under  an  earth  cover. 

Pipe  lines  to  the  front  were  usually  impossible  on 
account  of  being  exposed  to  breakage  by  shell  fire, 
against  which  burying  in  trenches  provided  no  shelter,  as 
shells  were  effective  far  beyond  any  limit  of  practical 
depth  of  pipe  trench.  If  pipe  lines  leading  to  the  front 
in  advanced  areas  were  used,  experience  showed  that  it 
was  safer  to  run  them  across  country  rather  than  along 
roads,  as  the  latter  were  so  frequently  used  as  targets 
by  the  enemy  when  troops  were  known  to  be  passing  or 
in  the  hope  of  catching  them  by  chance.  As  an  uninter- 
rupted supply  of  water  was  necessary,  the  lines  had  to 
be  immediately  repaired,  if  they  were  cut.  To  this  end 
special  gangs  lived  in  nearby  dugouts  where  they 
kept  in  stock  a  full  assortment  of  tools  and  an  extra 
suj^ply  of  pipes  and  connections.  The  usual  method  of 
transportation  and  distribution  to  troops  in  advance  of 
water  points  was  by  water-tank  cars  on  the  light  rail- 


170      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ways,  by  automobile  water  trucks  and  horse  drawn  tank 
wagons.  For  storage  in  the  trenches,  nothing  better  was 
found  than  the  ordinary  gasoline  cans  or  "  petrol  tins  " 
as  the  British  called  them.  They  were  light,  non-break- 
able, of  convenient  size,  easy  to  handle  and  good  for  no 
other  purpose.  For  a  while  the  water  might  have  a  dis- 
tinct flavor,  but  under  trench  conditions,  men  soon 
learned  not  to  be  too  particular  in  such  little  matters. 

Such  were  the  normal  conditions  of  supplying  water 
to  an  army  that  was  stationary.  So  long  as  it  remained 
so,  the  only  concerns  were  maintenance,  assurance  that 
there  was  a  proper  standard  of  purity  and  the  details  of 
traffic  control  at  points  where  perhaps  sixty  water  carts 
an  hour  would  report  for  fillilig.  These  are  all  matters 
of  routine  organization.  It  is  when  an  army  starts  for- 
ward in  a  successful  offensive  with  attending  rapid 
advance,  or  worse  still,  a  succession  of  advances,  that 
real  troubles  begin. 

The  first  thing  to  be  done  after  it  was  seen  that  an 
attack  was  successful  or  that  a  foothold  had  been  gained 
in  the  enemy's  trenches,  was  to  get  without  a  moment's 
delay  a  supply  of  water  to  the  newly  captured  position. 
It  was  there  that  the  petrol  tins  rendered  their  maximum 
service.  Across  a  shell-torn,  wire-encumbered  no  man's 
land  there  were  no  roads,  not  even  a  horse  cart  could 
make  progress,  but  eight  two-gallon  cans  in  two  crates 
could  be  strapped  to  a  pack  animal  and  delivered  to  the 
men  in  their  new  position,  where  the  small  units,  weigh- 
ing about  twenty-five  pounds  each,  were  readily  dis- 
tributed by  hand.  By  such  means,  water  actually 
reached  men  in  their  new  objectives  within  half  an  hour 
after  they  had  taken  them,  and  there  is  one  case  reported 
where  carrying  parties  delivered  water  to  a  new  position 
in  four  minutes  after  its  occupation.  Water  must  be 
brought  forward  at  once  during  the  fighting,  there  should 
be  no  waiting.    Having  attended  to  the  immediate  press-t 


.WATER  SUPPLY  171 

ing  demand  that  will  brook  no  delay,  the  next  step  was 
to  organize  a  new  source  of  supply,  unless  the  advance 
was  so  small  or  so  unimportant  in  extent  as  to  permit 
water  for  the  new  position  to  he  drawn  from  the  previ- 
ous points.  First,  the  existing  wells  were  found  and,  as 
little  reliance  could  be  placed  on  either  streams  or  wells 
that  were  uncovered  by  an  advance  as  not  being  polluted 
either  by  natural  causes  or  by  the  deliberate  action  of  the 
enemy,  it  was  better  to  keep  them  posted  as  unfit  for 
drinking  until  after  they  had  been  examined.  This  was 
the  French  rule  and  it  was  a  very  wise  one. 

The  sources  of  supply  which,  after  examination,  were 
accepted  were  equipped  with  mechanical  apparatus. 
Afterward  additional  sources,  if  needed,  were  dug  or 
driven,  the  latter  being  preferred  as  giving  quicker 
results  and  usually  Fetter  water,  as  such  wells  furnished 
a  supply  free  from  surface  contamination.  Then  pipe 
lines  were  laid,  routes  for  water  carts  marked  out  and 
a  new  system  established  on  a  line  more  advanced  than 
the  old.  As  an  illustration  of  what  can  be  accomplished, 
the  record  made  by  the  British  engineers  in  carrying 
water  forward  after  the  battle  of  Messines  Eidge,  which 
began  on  June  7,  1917,  is  worthy  of  notice.  On  that  date 
the  troops  at  the  front  were  supplied  with  water  that 
came  from  lakes  and  ca'tch  pits  well  in  the  rear.  By 
June  15th  the  pipe  lines  had  been  laid  across  the  cap- 
tured and  completely  devastated  country  and  were  deliv- 
ering water  into  what  had  been  German  positions  at  a 
rate  of  600,000  gallons  daily.  Under  the  conditions 
existing  during  the  progress  of  a  hard-fought  battle,  it 
was  found  possible  to  lay  a  mile  of  four-inch  main  in 
twenty-four  Tiours. 

So  transccndently  great  is  this  matter  of  water  sup- 
ply that  in  the  forward  area  it  was  found  desirable  in 
both  the  French  and  British  experience,  to  have  tho 
establishment  and  control  of  water  points  and  regula- 


172      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

tions  for  distribution  fixed  by  and  under  the  control  of 
tlie  chief  engineer  of  each  army  through  a  special  water 
supply  officer.  In  this  way  the  questions  of  sufficiency, 
purity  and  distribution  of  water  were  coordinated  for 
each  army  as  an  operating  unit  and  not  left  to  diverse 
and  perhaps  conflicting  efforts  on  the  part  of  subsidiary 
units  such  as  divisions  or  even  corps. 

The  French,  in  order  to  coordinate  the  service  of  their 
armies  and  to  see  that  no  one  army  received  an  unneces- 
sarily larger  part  of  the  meagre  supplies  at  the  expense 
of  the  others,  stationed  an  officer  with  the  title  of  Chief 
of  Water  Supply  at  General  Headquarters.  He  had 
broad  authority  over  all  water-supply  work  throughout 
all  the  French  armies.  For  each  individual  army  there 
was  a  water-supply  officer  reporting  to  the  Chief  Engi- 
neer of  the  Army.  While  carrying  out  the  plans  as 
laid  down  by  the  latter,  he  was  assisted  by  the  advice  of 
the  Chief  of  Water  Supply  and  made  requisitions  on 
the  last  for  any  special  equipment  or  additional  amount 
of  ordinary  equipment  that  might  be  needed.  Junior  to 
the  Army  Water  Supply  Officer  was  a  staff  of  assistant 
water-supply  officers,  each  with  an  area  under  his  juris- 
diction which,  while  it  might  conform  —  as  it  usually 
did  —  with  that  of  a  corps  or  possibly  of  a  division,  this 
coincidence  did  not  diminish  the  responsibilty  of  the 
assistant  to  his  chief  nor  carry  authority  to  the  com- 
manding officer  of  the  smaller  unit.  W^ater  supply  was 
w^holly  an  army  function.  Each  assistant  water-supply 
officer  had  a  small  force  of  skilled  mechanics  reenforced 
from  time  to  time  as  occasion  demanded  by  drafts  from 
infantry  or  service  battalions,  the  regular  water-supply 
troops  providing  the  necessary  technical  skill. 

The  British  system  was  not  so  scientifically  balanced. 
There  was  no  general  chief  of  water  supply,  feach  Chief 
Engineer  of  Army  having  absolute  and  final  authority 
within  territorial  limits  of  his  army.      The  component 


WATER  SUPPLY  173 

corps  commanders  acting  through  the  corps  engineers 
had  control  of  water  problems  that  were  peculiar  to  their 
own  corps,  and  in  this  respect  there  was  lacking  the  unity 
that  existed  in  the  French  system.  With  the  British 
there  were  no  w^ater-supply  troops.  Whatever  work  was 
to  be  done  was  executed  by  army  or  corps  engineer 
troops  except  when  mechanical  details  were  concerned. 
These  were  taken  care  of  by  the  Electrical  and 
Mechanical  Company,  a  unit  quite  similar  to  the  Ameri- 
can regiment  of  the  same  designation  described 
in  Chapter  XVII. 

The  American  Expeditionary  Force,  as  it  was  being 
built  up,  made  a  study  of  both  the  French  and  British 
systems  of  organization  and  the  details  of  their  execu- 
tion in  the  field.  As  in  other  matters,  although  the 
experience  of  the  two  Allies  was  most  valuable  and  both 
countries  extended  every  help  and  gave  freely  of  advice, 
the  American  situation  was  not  exactly  like  that  of  either 
of  the  other  two  and,  therefore,  for  the  A.  E.  F.  some- 
what different  standards  had  to  be  adopted.  The  British 
front  was  not  far  removed  from  its  base  so  that  army 
influence  predominated,  using  the  word  army  in  its 
technical  sense  of  a  certain  definite  combatant  unit, 
French  army  needs  for  water  supply  were  the  only  ones 
with  which  the  French  military  authorities  needed  to  con- 
cern themselves,  because  behind  the  Zone  of  the  Advance 
the  separate  cities,  villages  or  communes  provided  for 
their  own  wants  or  such  additional  demands  that  the  war 
threw  upon  them. 

But  the  A.  E.  F.  had  not  only  to  supply  the  needs  of 
its  combatant  force  but  also  those  of  the  groat  ports, 
storage  depots,  hospitals,  somi-pormanont  replacement 
camps  and  intermediate  headquarters  that  either  did  not 
exist  with  the  French  and  British  or,  if  they  did,  existed 
on  a  much  smaller  scale.  An  American  water-supply 
organization,  therefore,   covered   two   distinct   services, 


174      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

first  that  of  tlie  Service  of  Supplies  and  second  tliat  of 
the  Armies  in  the  field. 

Since  the  first  detachment  of  combatant  troops  moved 
into  certain  portions  of  established  positions  in  connec- 
tion with  the  French  where  the  water  points  were  already 
in  operation,  it  was  not  necessary  to  take  any  steps  in 
regard  to  the  second  of  the  above  services  until  there 
was  a  sufficient  concentration  of  American  troops  at  the 
front,  which  did  not  begin  until  late  in  the  spring  of 
1918,  beyond  making  plans  and  provision  in  advance. 
For  the  wharves  at  Bordeaux  and  St.  Nazaire,  for  the 
operation  and  fire  protection  of  the  warehouses,  for  the 
camps  being  erected  to  hold  the  troops  that  were  to  come 
and  for  other  similar  water-consuming  installations  it 
was  necessary  to  act  at  once  to  furnish  water  from  either 
previously  existing  French  sources  of  supply,  such  as 
neighboring  municipal  plants  or  from  other  sources 
newly  developed.  The  Twenty-sixth  Engineers,  after- 
wards designated  as  the  Water  Supply  Regiment,  began 
to  arrive  in  France  in  November,  1917,  and  undertook 
this  work. 

On  August  7  and  8,  1918,  there  were  issued 
from  General  Headquarters,  A.  E.  F.,  a  General 
Order  and  a  Bulletin,  Nos.  131  and  55  respec- 
tively, defining  the  organization  of  the  Water  Sup- 
ply Service  and  giving  official  recognition  to  a 
system  that  had  been  in  operation  for  some  weeks. 
The  G.  0.  and  the  Bulletin  stated  that  the  Water  Supply 
Service  was  a  branch  of  the  Engineer  Department,  but 
that  in  the  Zone  of  the  Armies  it  would  be  administered 
through  special  troops  assigned  to  the  Army,  the  com- 
manding officer  of  whom  would  be  Water  Supply  Officer 
of  the  Army.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  Water  Supply 
Officer  *^  to  anticipate  and  make  suitable  provision  to 
meet  the  water  supply  needs  of  the  army  and  exercise 
such  technical  supervision  and  control  over  water-supply 


WATER  SUPPLY  175 

:^vork  in  the  entire  area  occupied  by  the  army  as  may  be 
necessary  to  coordinate  water-supply  developments  and 
economize  time,  labor  and  material."  He  was  also 
charged  with  the  making  of  laboratory  and  sanitary 
inspection  necessary  to  determine  potability  and  to  pre- 
vent contamination.  The  laboratory  facilities  were  pro- 
vided generally  as  sections  of  the  Medical  Department. 

Water  supply  for  the  Service  of  Supplies  was  an 
adjunct  of  the  Director  of  Construction  and  Forestry, 
and  was,  therefore,  distinct  from  water  supply  in  the 
advanced  area.  Although  there  was  lacking  the  unity  of 
control  as  presented  by  the  French  organization,  this 
was  overcome  by  the'  various  officers  working  harmoni- 
ously together  in  the  matter  of  available  supplies.  Had 
the  war  continued  it  is  likely  that  some  system  analogous 
to  the  French  would  have  been  adopted,  the  advantages 
of  which  were  apparent,  and  the  department  concen- 
trated under  a  single  engineer  officer  at  General 
Headquarters. 

The  great  achievement  in  the  matter  of  water  supply, 
and  it  was  a  real  achievement,  was  in  the  quality  of 
water  delivered.  In  all  previous  wars,  typhoid  fever  has 
been  accepted  as  a  necessarily  existing  evil.  "With  the 
beginning  of  the  present  war  the  French  and  British 
authorities  undertook  to  eliminate  it  by  the  inoculation 
of  the  soldiers  and  the  i3urification  of  the  water. 

Water  can  be  purified  in  several  ways,  either  by  remov- 
ing or  killing  the  disease  germs.  The  first  could  b^ 
accomplished  by  passing  the  water  through  sand,  char- 
coal or  some  form  of  porcelain  filter,  and  the  second  by 
boiling  the  water  or  introducing  into  it  some  chemical 
compound  possessing  germ  toxic  properties.  Sand 
and  similar  filters  are  efficient  only  for  fixed  installations 
on  account  of  their  bulk;  porcelain  filters  arc  portable 
but  are  too  frail  to  withstand  battle  conditions,  while 
boiling  was  out  of  the  question  on  account  of  the  time 


176      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

involved,  plant  required  and  scarcity  of  fuel.  The  Water 
Supply  Engineers  were,  therefore,  reduced  to  use  some 
form  of  chemical  treatment  that  would  kill  the  germs 
but  leave  the  water  not  too  disagreeable  to  the  taste. 

There  were  many  chemicals  that  were  efficacious 
against  disease  germs,  but  few  that  met  the  obviously 
necessary  requirements  of  being  certain  in  result,  rea- 
sonably rapid  in  action,  harmless  in  general  character, 
that  did  not  discolor  the  water,  and  that  were  easy  of 
application  even  in  the  field.  To  show  the  necessity  for 
the  last,  there  is  a  British  story  that  during  some  prac- 
tical trials  one  soldier  was  heard  to  ask  as  he  held  in  his 
hand  three  tablets  that  were  to  be  introduced  in  a  cer- 
tain order,  ''  Now  then.  Bill,  which  of  these  'ere  pills 
goes  in  first?  "  *'  Lord  knows,  shove  the  whole  bloom- 
ing lot  in  together  and  'ave  done  with  it!  " 

Permanganate  of  potash  was  tried,  which  had  a  salu- 
tatory action  through  the  release  of  free  oxygen.  It  was 
very  efficacious  against  cholera  germs  but  not  so  much 
against  those  other  bacteria  that  convey  enteric  diseases. 
It  had  the  disadvantage  of  being  slow  in  action.  Calcium 
permanganate  was  experimented  with,  but  though  good 
in  laboratory  experiments,  was  too  complicated  for  field 
application  and  called  for  filter  caps  on  water  bottles. 
Bromine,  iodine  and  liquid  chlorine  were  all  tried.  They 
possessed  some  advantages  but  were  rejected  as  failing 
to  meet  the  requirement  of  ease  in  application.  Finally 
there  were  left  two  compounds,  ordinary  bleaching 
powder  and  sodium  bi sulphate. 

Bleaching  i:>owdcr  had  the  great  initial  advantages  of 
low  cost,  permanence  in  character  and  of  being  an  article 
of  regular  commercial  production  on  a  large  scale.  Like 
similar  substances  it  is  composed  of  several  chemical 
compounds,  some  of  which  exist  as  technical  impurities, 
but  its  principal  ingredient  is  known  as  calcium-chloro- 
bypochlorite,  whose  chemical  formula  is  CaClO,  CI.    It 


WATER  SUPPLY  177 

was  known  that  clilorine  was  a  powerful  and  quick-acting 
agent  against  bacteria,  one  part  of  chlorine  per  million 
destroying  germs  in  thirty  minutes.  Bleeching  powder 
when  dissolved  undergoes  the  following  transformation; 

2  CaClO,  Cl=:CaClo+Ca  (ClO)o  (hypochlorite). 

Hypochlorite  has  strong  oxidizing  properties,  being 
converted  in  calcium  chloride  and  free  oxygen  thus : 

Ca  (C10).=  CaCl2+Ooo. 

The  sterilizing  action  is  due  in  part  to  oxidation  and 
in  part  to  the  toxic  properties  of  hypochlorite  on  germs. 

Two  grammes  of  bleaching  powder  of  ordinary  com- 
position will  give  1 1/3  part  of  chlorine  per  1,000,000 
parts  of  water,  which  is  in  excess  of  the  required  amount 
of  one  per  million,  but  it  is  well  to  have  such  an  excess 
to  allow  for  deterioration  in  the  powder  or  possible 
excess  of  impurities  diminishing  the  amount  of  chlorine 
present. 

It  was  customary  to  chlorinate  water  in  the  water 
carts  when  filled  or  in  the  water  receptacles  in  which 
drinking  water  was  stored.  The  dose  varied  from  the 
above  minimum  to  six  times  the  amount,  depending  on 
the  condition  of  the  water,  as  water  would  absorb  chlorine 
in  proportion  to  its  own  contained  impurities.  There 
was  a  very  simple  field  testing  apparatus  that  quickly 
gave  the  amount  required.  In  a  large  receptacle,  such 
as  a  water  cart,  it  was  well  to  refrain  from  using  the 
water  for  some  hours  after  being  treated  in  order  to 
allow  the  chemical  action  to  penetrate  all  parts.  In  a 
small  container  holding  a  few  gallons,  reaction  was  com- 
plete in  half  an  hour.  Water  so  treated,  especially  if  the 
dose  were  strong,  had  a  slight  and  not  particularly  attrac- 
tive taste,  but  men  did  not  mind  it  because  the  disagree- 


178      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

able  taste  assured  tHem  tliat  they  were  drinking  water 
that  had  been  rendered  sterile  for  their  benefit. 

Sodium  bisulphate  was  another  chemical  that  met  the 
requirements  of  a  satisfactory  sterilizing  agent,  the  chief 
objection  being  that  long  continued  use  might  form  sul- 
phate of  lime,  which  is  insoluble  in  the  alimentary  canal. 
It  also  attacked  iron,  copper  and  nearly  all  alloys.  Of 
metals  that  might  be  used  for  water  containers  aluminum 
was  the  only  one  not  injuriously  affected,  but  as  nearly 
all  water  bottles  or  canteens  were  made  of  aluminum, 
sodium  bisulphate,  which  could  be  put  up  in  tablet  form, 
made  a  very  convenient  and  valuable  means  for  individ- 
ual use  when  the  regular  sterilizing  apparatus  was  not 
at  hand.  Men  who  might  be  thus  separated  from  their 
main  supply  were  provided  with  these  tablets,  one  tablet 
of  two  grammes  sufficing  to  kill  the  germs  in  an  ordinary 
canteen  in  thirty  minutes.  The  chemical  reaction  is 
shown  by  the  formula: 

2  NaHSO,=  Nao  S0;+  H2  SO,. 

It  is  the  sulphuric  acid  set  free  that  has  the  toxic  effect. 

The  disagreeable  taste  of  the  acid  can  be  counteracted 
by  making  up  the  tablets  with  oil  of  lemon  and  saccharine. 

When  the  men  came  to  understand  that  they  could 
drink  treated  water  with  impunity  whereas  plain  water, 
no  matter  how  clear  and  limpid  in  appearance,  might  and 
probably  did  carry  deadly  disease  germs,  they  were  very 
careful  to  insist  on  the  former. 

It  was  difficult  to  ascertain  and  consequently  adopt  a 
standard  for  the  minimum  amount  of  water  required  for 
troops  as  the  consumption  varied  between  such  wide 
limits,  according  to  local  conditions  or  composition  of 
units.  The  British  made  a  careful  study  of  these  ques- 
tions because  it  was  necessary  for  them  to  have  some 
basis  on  which  to  design  their  larger  concentrated  water 


WATER  SUPPLY  179 

points.  They  finally  decided  that  on  the  average  the  fol- 
lowing figures  per  man  per  day  gave  a  fair  basis  for 
comi^utation: 

Troops  living  in  huts 5  gals. 

Troops  in  camps  where  clothing 

was  washed 5  gals. 

Troops  in  camps  where  clothing 

was  not  washed 3  gals. 

Troops  in  bivouacs 1  gal. 

Troops  on  the  march  drinking 

water  only,  minimum 'V3  gal. 

Hospitals 10  gals. 

Horses  per  head 10  gals. 

Mules  per  head   6  gals. 

The  above  are  rated  in  British  imperial  gallons,  which 
should  be  increased  by  one-fifth  to  give  figures  in  U.  S. 
gallons. 

The  above  consumption  of  water  was  probably  greater 
than  that  used  by  the  French.  On  the  other  hand  it  was 
undoubtedly  much  less  than  that  demanded  by  the 
Americans,  who  invariably  consumed  more  than  either 
of  the  other  allied  armies.  The  American  national  pro- 
pensity for  waste  was  everywhere  apparent  and  it  used 
to  be  said  jokingly  that  an  American  unit  would  waste 
or  unnecessarily  consume  enough  supplies  of  all  kinds  to 
maintain  satisfactorily  a  French  unit  of  corresponding 
size.  That  this  remark  had  some  justification,  in  fact, 
was  shown  by  the  comparative  expenditures  of  the  two 
nations. 

As  it  was  not  until  August,  1918,  that  the  Water 
Department  became  thoroughly  and  oflicially  established, 
it  was  only  in  the  two  great  offensives  of  St.  Mihiel  and 
the  Argonne-Meusc  that  it  really  functioned  in  the  field. 
The  work  done  by  the  "Water  Supply  Eegiment  in  thosei 


180      AMEKICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

offensives  will  be  referred  to  in  the  cHapter  describing 
the  results  accomplished  by  the  engineers. 

The  largest  single  feat  of  the  Water  Supply  Depart- 
ment was  in  the  Service  of  Supplies  in  connection  with 
the  large  hospital  at  Mars-Sur-Allier,  where  a  system 
including  a  pipe  line  ten  inches  in  diameter,  five  miles 
long,  with  a  pumping  plant  working  against  a  head  of 
200  feet  and  delivering  sufficient  quantity  to  supply 
hospitals  with  40,000  beds,  was  installed  in  thirty  days. 

The  health  statistics  of  the  American  army,  con- 
firmed by  the  similar  statistics  in  all  the  other  armies, 
present  eloquent  testimony  as  to  the  beneficent  results  of 
the  enforced  application  of  science.  Typhoid  fever,  the 
great  silent  enemy  of  armies,  boasting  always  of  more 
victims  than  shells  or  bullets  ever  did,  was  banished 
from  the  field. 

In  the  Mexican  war  for  every  100  men  killed  in  battle 
or  who  died  of  wounds,  726  died  from  disease.  In  the 
Civil  war  on  the  Federal  side  the  ratio  for  death 
by  disease  to  death  from  battle  was  200  to  100, 
while  in  the  war  with  Spain,  the  ratio  again  rose,  due 
largely  to  the  fearful  ravages  of  typhoid  even  in  home 
camps,  and  accounted  for  85  per  cent  of  the  total 
number  of  deaths,  the  actual  proportion  being  as  520 
to  100.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  recent  war,  the  propor- 
tion was  only  36  to  100.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  epidemic 
of  influenza-pneumonia  which  swept  over  not  only  the 
army  in  France,  but  the  whole  world,  the  last-named 
ratio  would  have  been  much  less,  perhaps  not  over  25 
to  100.  In  the  whole  American  army  and  up  to  May, 
1919,  including,  therefore,  a  period  of  six  months  after 
the  cessation  of  hostilities  and  battle  casualties,  there 
were  only  2,328  cases  of  typhoid  fever  reported  with  the 
comparatively  insignificant  total,  when  dealing  with  men 
by  millions,  of  227  deaths.  Of  all  causes  of  death  from 
disease,  pneumonia,  with  which  water  supply  had  no  con- 


WATER  SUPPLY  181 

nection,  was  the  greatest,  contributing  83.6  per  cent.  To 
typhoid,  the  previous  scourge,  there  fell  but  one-half  of 
one  per  cent,  when  exjiressed  as  a  fraction  of  the  whole, 
while  the  actual  number  of  men  who  died  of  typhoid  was 
the  same  as  those  who  died  from  either  peritonitis  or 
Bright 's  disease,  causes  that  are  ever  present  and  never 
occasion  alarm. 

The  ximerican  war  with  Spain  made  clear  beyond 
doubt  the  cause  of  yellow  fever  and  showed  that  that  dis- 
ease and  malaria  as  well  could  be  eradicated,  so  likewise 
the  recent  war  has  proved  that  typhoid  fever  need  not 
and  should  never  again  be  present  to  a  large  extent  in 
gatherings  of  people  even  under  the  trying  conditions 
of  active  war  in  the  field.  When  the  history  of  the  war 
is  compiled,  this  fact  will  stand  out  in  high  relief  as  one 
of  the  greatest  strides  ever  made  in  the  record  of  medico- 
chemical  science. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS 

Althougli  poisonous  gases  were  used  for  the  first  time 
during  the  war,  their  employment  had  been  considered 
on  many  occasions,  but  the  proposal  was  rejected  each 
time  and  by  every  nation. 

During  the  past  century  chemists,  inventors  and  even 
military  people  had  urged  their  adoption,  but  no  bel- 
ligerent had  been  found  bold  enough  to  defy  world  opin- 
ion by  having  recourse  to  an  innovation  from  which  the 
mind  recoiled  with  horror. 

At  the  meeting  of  the  first  Hague  Peace  Conference 
in  1899,  the  matter  of  lethal  or  asphyxiating  gas  was 
referred  to  a  special  committee.  "When  the  matter  was 
put  to  a  vote  the  representatives  of  the  following  coun- 
tries on  the  committee  voted  in  favor  of  prohibiting  its 
use:  France,  Austria-Hungary,  Norway  and  Sweden, 
Japan,  Holland,  Denmark,  Turkey,  Italy  and  Germany. 
The  American  delegate,  in  accordance  with  his  instruc- 
tions, answered  ''No  "  and  placed  upon  the  records  the 
following  explanation  of  his  vote : 

*'  1.  That  no  slieli  emitting  such  gases  is  as  yet  in 
practical  use  or  has  undergone  adequate  experiment; 
consequently,  a  vote  taken  now  would  be  taken  in  ignor- 
ance of  the  facts  as  to  Avhether  the  result  w^ould  be  of  a 
decisive  character,  or  whether  injury  in  excess  of  that 
necessary  to  attain  the  end  of  warfare,  of  immediately 
disabling  the  enemy,  would  be  inflicted. 

*'  2.  That  the  reproach  of  cruelty  and  perfidy  made 
against  these  supposed  shells  was  equally  uttered 
formerly  against  firearms  and  torpedoes,  although  both 
are  now  used  without  scruple.  Until  we  know  the  effect 
of  such  asphyxiating  shells,  there  was  no  saying  whether 

182 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  183 

ttey  would  be  more  or  less  merciful  than  missiles  now 
permitted. 

"  3.  That  it  was  illogical  and  not  demonstrahly; 
humane,  to  be  tender  about  asphyxiating  men  with  gas, 
when  all  were  prepared  to  admit  that  it  was  allowable 
to  blow  the  bottom  out  of  an  ironclad  at  midnight, 
throwing  four  or  five  hundred  men  into  the  sea  to  be 
choked  by  water,  with  scarcely  the  remotest  chance  of 
escape.  If,  and  when,  a  shell  emitting  asphyxiating 
gases  has  been  successfully  produced,  then,  and  not 
before,  Avill  men  be  able  to  vote  intelligently  on  the 
subject." 

The  British  delegate  stated  that  there  was  little  proba- 
bility of  such  an  invention  but,  if  there  were  a  prohibi- 
tion, it  should  relate  only  to  projectors  whose  express 
object  was  to  diffuse  asphyxiating  gases. 

At  a  second  meeting  of  the  Committee  on  a  vote  to 
adopt  the  proposition  for  a  reference  to  the  conference, 
fourteen  votes  were  cast  in  favor  of  prohibition,  only 
the  American  delegate  voting  "  No."  The  subject  finally 
came  up  before  the  Peace  Conference,  whereupon  a  vote 
"  prohibiting  the  use  of  projectiles  whose  sole  object  is 
to  diffuse  asphyxiating  or  deleterious  gases  "  was  carried 
imanimously  with  one  exception :  the  one  dissenting  vote 
being  that  of  the  United  States,  although  Great  Britain's 
vote  in  the  affirmative  was  cast  on  the  condition  of 
unanimity. 

Eelying  on  the  declaration  of  the  Hague  Conference, 
the  allies  gave  no  consideration  to  the  employment  of 
toxic  gases,  assuming  that  the  enemy  would  observe 
iuternationally  established  and  generally  recognized 
humane  methods  of  conducting  war.  The  allies  had 
made  no  preparations  for  defense  against  such  an  attack. 
When,  therefore,  on  the  22nd  of  April,  1915,  a  yellow 
cloud  was  seen  rolling  slowly  across  No  Man's  Land, 
blown  by  the  gentle  easterly  wind  against  the  allied 


184      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

trenches,  it  raised  at  first  nothing  more  than  curiosity 
among  the  watching  British  soldiers  as  to  what  it  meant, 
and  then  caused  horror  and  consternation  as  the  irritat- 
ing, choking,  killing  mist  swept  over  them  and  they;  fully- 
recognized  the  awful  significance.  There  was  no  escape, 
men  must  breathe  steadily  or  die,  and  now  the  men  at 
Ypres  had  to  breathe  and  die.  "What  the  losses  were  has 
not  been  published. 

The  aUies  understood  at  once  that  Germany  intended 
to  place  no  limits  on  the  weapons  or  means  to  be 
employed  and  that,  therefore,  it  was  necessary  for  them 
to  devise  immediately  some  sort  of  defense  and  to  turn 
against  the  enemy  their  own  fiendish  device.  In  both  of 
these  efforts  they  were  highly  successful.  It  seems 
probable  that  if  a  balance  of  the  account  could  be  struck 
it  would  be  found  that  the  Germans  were,  on  the  whole, 
heavy  losers  by  the  use  of  gas,  especially  as  the  blockade 
seriously  interfered  with  the  importation  by  the  central 
powers  of  certain  highly  necessary  raw  materials  used 
in  the  manufacture  of  both  gases  and  protective  masks. 
Sometimes  one  wonders  whether  the  Germans,  having 
decided  to  employ  gas,  could  not  have  manufactured  and 
had  on  hand  such  a  supply  that  they  could  have  made 
attack  closely  following  attack,  and  so  actually  have 
forced  their  way  to  Paris  before  the  allies  were  able  to 
improvise  masks  for  defense  or  make  the  gas  itself  with 
which  to  return  blow  for  blow.  Was  this  another  oppor- 
tunity to  reach  Paris  that  was  presented  to  the  enemy 
that  he  neglected  to  use  1  At  the  moment  it  appears  so, 
but  perhaps  some  day  when  all  the  facts  are  available, 
another  generation  will  learn  definitely. 

The  gas  used  in  the  Ypres  attack  was  chlorine,  one  of 
the  two  constituents  of  common  salt,  out  of  which  it  is 
manufactured  by  electrolytic  process.  It  has  a  greenish- 
yellow  color  with  a  very  irritating  and  suffocating 
quality.     The  effect  on  a  person  breathing  it  is  violent 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  185 

choking  and,  if  taken  in  sufficient  concentration,  seri- 
ous inflammation  of  the  respiratory  organs  by  its  irritat- 
ing property,  causing  an  outpouring  of  mucous  in  the 
lungs  which  frequently  results  in  death  as  from  drown- 
ing, or  (else  so  irritates  them  that  severe  and  long  con- 
tinued bronchitis  or  pneumonia  results.  [While  chlorine 
gas  was  easily  manufactured,  it  was  not  very  satisfac- 
tory as  a  weapon  of  offense  on  account  of  its  volatile 
nature  and  quick  dispersion.  Studies  were,  therefore, 
made  to  produce  gases  that  were  both  heavier  and  more 
deadly. 

Of  gases  of  this  type,  the  two  chief  examples  were 
clilorpicrin  and  phosgene.  The  former  was  the  next  gas 
made  following  chlorine.  It  is  a  combination  of  chlorine 
and  picric  acid  and  is  a  strong  poison,  attacking  both 
eyes  and  lungs.  The  fact  that  it  injured  the  eyes,  ren- 
dered useless  the  first  respirators,  which  were  simply; 
mouthpads  soaked  in  a  solution  of  hjqDochlorite  of  soda. 
Phosgene,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  chemical  combination 
of  chlorine  and  carbon  monoxide  (CO  +  Cl2=  COCL) 
and  is  the  most  deadly  of  all  the  gases  that  were  used. 
On  account  of  its  slight  odor,  its  presence  was  scarcely 
recognizable  and  the  effect  on  men  breathing  it  was  most 
insidious,  for  although  its  main  attack  was  on  the  lungs, 
it  also  affected  the  heart,  so  that  men  who  had  had  small 
doses  might  suddenly  drop  dead  without  knowing  that 
they  had  been  subjected  to  phosgene.  It  was,  therefore, 
ordered  that,  whenever  men  Imew  that  they  had  been 
exposed  to  phosgene,  they  should  lie  quite  still  until 
removed  on  a  stretcher  or  in  an  ambulance.  These  gases 
when  under  pressure  or  at  a  temperature  of  about  32°  F. 
became  liquid  and  as  such  were  loaded  into  shells  and 
cylinders.  When  allowed  To  escape  at  atmospheric  pres- 
sure they  became  gases  which  wore  heavier  than  the  air. 

Although  chlorine  was  sometimes  used,  chlor})icrin 
and  phosgene  were  relied  on  when  deadly  effects  were 


186      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

desired.  So  terrible  was  phosgene  tliat  one  full  deep 
inhalation  was  sufficient  to  cause  death.  But,  even  if 
death  did  not  result  from  an  exposure  to  chlorpicrin  and 
phosgene,  a  man's  whole  respiratory  apparatus  was  seri- 
ously injured.  If  the  injury  were  not  actually  permanent 
it  sufficed  in  many  cases,  depending  on  the  amount  of 
poison  inhaled,  to  disable  the  sufferer  from  active  duty 
for  months,  rendering  him  susceptible  to  pneumonia  or 
other  pulmonary  diseases,  and  leaving  him  for  a  while 
as  one  afflicted  with  tuberculosis.  A  soldier  in  such  con- 
dition was,  so  far  as  the  enemy  was  concerned,  better 
than  one  dead,  as  he  not  only  ceased  to  be  a  belligerent 
but  actually  became  a  burden. 

The  treatment  of  serious  cases  of  chlorpicrin  or 
phosgene  poisoning  consisted  in  general  of  insisting  on 
absolute  avoidance  of  muscular  effort,  followed  by  bleed- 
ing of  the  patient  and  with  an  injection  of  a  salt  solution. 
The  amount  of  blood  withdrawn  might  be  considerable, 
being  in  extreme  cases  as  high  as  one  and  a  half  per  cent 
of  the  body  weight.  Oxygen  was  administered  and  also 
stimulants  like  brandy,  the  patient  being  kept  warm  and. 
so  far  as  possible,  in  a  well  ventilated  place. 

In  addition  to  the  lethal  gases,  others  were  developed 
which  when  used  alone  produced  only  discomfort.  Of 
these  the  first  to  be  employed  were  the  lachrymator  or 
tear  gases  which  irritated  the  eyes  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  cause  almost  immediately  a  great  discharge  of  fluid, 
involving  much  pain  and  temporary  blindness.  They 
were  more  cheaply  produced  than  phosgene  and  although 
not  fatal,  were  exceedingly  useful  when  projected 
against  the  first-line  fighting  force  and  especially  the 
artillery,  because  even  a  trace  of  tear  gas  rendered  a 
man  blind  and,  therefore,  quite  useless  for  a  short  while. 
These  tear  gases  had  a  bromine  base,  the  co-mmonest 
form  being  brom-benzyl-cyanide. 

Later  the  Germans  produced  a  new  gas  that  attacked 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  187 

externally  as  well  as  internally,  the  famous  mustard  gas, 
BO  called  not  because  it  was  produced  from  mustard  or 
had  any  connection  with  it,  but  because  it  had  a  somewhat 
similar  odor  and  produced  precisely  similar  burns. 
Chemically  speaking,  it  was  di-chlor-ethyl-sulphide, 
manufactured  by  blowing  gaseous  ethylene  into 
sulphur  monochloride.  The  Germans  made  a  great 
blunder  in  using  this  excellent  means  of  causing 
human  suffering,  because  the  Allies  promptly  began 
to  use  it,  too,  and  in  sj^ite  of  boasted  German 
excellence  in  all  matters  chemical,  the  Allies  were 
able  to  manufacture  it  in  a  far  larger  quantity  than 
the  Germans  could.  In  fact,  the  War  Department  report 
on  American  Munitions  states  that  on  the  conclusion  of 
the  war  the  whole  German  capacity  for  turning  out  mus- 
tard gas  was  only  six  tons  a  day  as  against  an  American 
capacity  alone  of  ten  times  that  amount,  with  a  large 
British  and  French  output  in  addition.  Mustard  gas 
presented  many  advantages  over  phosgene  even  if  it  were 
not  so  deadly,  although  it  was  fairly  satisfactory  in  that 
respect.  It  was  a  liquid,  stable  at  ordinary  low  tempera- 
tures and  volatile  at  higher  temperatures,  with  an  odor 
in  the  open  so  slight  as  to  be  recognizable  only  with  dif- 
ficulty. Ground  saturated  with  mustard  gas  would  con- 
tinue to  give  off  vapor  for  many  hours  after  its  receipt, 
perhaps  for  several  days  if  the  weather  were  cool  and 
the  ground  sheltered  from  sun  or  wind.  Troops  might 
be  moved  into  an  area  which,  quite  unknown  to  them,  had 
boon  "  gassed  "  with  mustard  sometime  previously  and 
actually  sit  down  in  an  atmosphere  that  would  presently 
cause  casualties,  and  not  be  aware  of  it  until  the  casu- 
alties began  to  appear,  especially  as  this  gas  did  not 
give  a  clioking  or  other  warning  as  did  the  chlorine  com- 
pounds. Although  it  attacked  the  bronchial  tubes  and 
respiratory  organs  and  caused  many  deaths  by  pulmo- 
nary disease,  when  it  was  a  novelty  and  proper  treatment 


188      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

was  unknown,  its  most  usual  effect  was  exceeding  painful 
surface  burns,  which  occurred  most  acutely  on  those 
parts  of  the  body  where  there  was  the  maximum  of 
perspiration.  Such  burns  would  completely  disable  a  man 
to  the  extent  of  keeping  him  in  the  hospital  for  weeks. 
The  internal  effects  of  mustard  gas  or  the  external  burns 
were  frequently  severe  enough  to  cause  death  even  after 
the  nature  of  the  attack  was  understood,  but  it  was  noted 
that  while  there  was  no  difference  between  the  injury 
produced  internally  on  whites  and  negroes,  it  was  found 
that  the  latter  were  markedly  less  sensitive  to  skin  burns. 
When  the  first  wave  of  gas  was  projected  against  the 
allied  trenches,  our  friends  were  without  any  protection. 
One  quick-minded  and  ingenious  quartermaster  of  a  Brit- 
ish division  took  the  first  step  in  defense  by  supplying 
his  troops,  within  twenty-four  hours  after  the  first  attack, 
with  a  pad  of  several  thicknesses  of  cotton  cloth  soaked 
in  hyposulphite  of  soda  which  gave  them  fairly  good 
protection  for  a  short  time.  For  this  he  was  rewarded 
with  the  coveted  Distinguished  Service  Order.  But  the 
matter  was  so  obviously  threatening  that  it  was  immedi- 
ately taken  up  for  serious  study  by  both  the  British  and 
the  French.  Until  perfected  apparatus  could  be  devised, 
the  men  were  provided  with  simple  respirators  capable 
of  absorbing  the  deleterious  properties  of  chlorine  gas, 
the  only  one  used  at  first.  But  as  the  enemy  began  to 
vary  the  gases  and  especially  to  use  gases  that  attacked 
the  eyes,  the  allies  were  obliged  to  discover  more  effi- 
cient and  more  complete  means  of  protection  not  only 
against  the  chemical  action  of  the  different  gases,  but 
also  as  a  covering  for  the  whole  face.  The  investigations 
and  experiments  werg  conducted  with  the  view  of  devis- 
ing a  headgear  that  would  protect  the  eyes,  cover  the 
very  sensitive  parts  of  the  face  and  permit  the  wearer 
to  breathe  a  steady  supply  of  purified  air.  Such  a  head- 
gear was  unavoidably  awkward  and  uncomfortable,  but 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  189 

nevertheless  a  form  had  to  be  found  that  would  cause  the 
least  inconvenience,  and  one  that  men  could  wear  and 
even  work  in  while  wearing  it  for  hours  at  a  time  in  a 
gas-laden  atmosphere  where  but  a  few  inhalations  meant 
death.  The  designing  of  the  apparatus  was  quite  as  com- 
plicated a  problem  as  finding  the  most  satisfactory 
chemicals  to  absorb  or  nullify  any  gas  likely  to  be  used 
before  the  air  carrying  it  could  reach  the  men's  lungs. 
Even  the  fabric  out  of  which  the  headgear  should  best  be 
made  required  special  study  because  so  many  substances 
were  subject  to  decomposition  by  the  action  of  the 
gases.  All  this  makes  a  fascinating  story  in  itself.  The 
investigations  called  for  the  most  intense  study  on  the 
part  of  the  master  chemical  engineers  of  Great  Britain 
and  France,  and  later  of  those  of  the  United  States. 

As  the  result  of  the  first  experiments  in  the  laboratory 
and  practical  tests  in  the  field,  troops  were  furnished 
with  two  types  of  anti-gas  protectors,  a  helmet  consist- 
ing first  of  one  and  later  of  two  thicknesses  of  flannel 
soaked  in  a  solution  of  sodiumphenate,  caustic  soda  and 
glycerine,  which  could  be  drawn  quickly  over  the  head 
and  gave  some  protection  against  weak  gas  for  a  short 
while,  and  an  air-tight  mask  fitting  the  face  closely  and 
preventing  any  external  air  from  reaching  the  lungs 
except  through  the  protected  mouthpiece. 

The  helmet  was  used  by  both  the  French  and  British 
armies  and  for  a  while  by  our  own  as  a  secondary  means 
of  defense,  but  in  the  year  1918  it  was  discarded  as  not 
being  satisfactory.  It  was  nothing  but  a  loose  bag  with 
the  open  lower  end  tucked  in  under  the  wearer's  coat, 
air  being  drawn  in  through  the  porous  material.  There 
was  an  unavoidable  leak  and  the  efficacy  of  the  chemicals 
began  to  fail  after  short  exposure,  against  which  the 
advantage  of  its  lightness  and  ease  in  adjustment 
weighed  but  little,  especially  as  every  soldier  was 
obliged  to  carry  also  the  more  perfect  equipment.     It 


190      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

was  soon  discovered  tliat  with  the  helmet  respirators, 
artillery  was  practically  out  of  action  where  gas  was 
present.  This  necessitated  the  development  of  some 
other  protection  and  the  result  was  the  box  respirator. 
The  first  form  was  quite  cumbersome  and  too  heavy  for 
infantry  to  carry  but  as  its  protection  was  nevertheless 
excellent  a  smaller  and  lighter  model  soon  appeared. 

The  mask  or  small-box  respirator,  as  it  was  sometimes 
called,  consisted  of  a  rubberized  fabric  covering  the 
whole  face  and  held  in  place  by  elastic  bands  passing 
behind  and  over  the  head.  Air  for  breathing  was  drawn 
into  the  mouth  through  a  mouthpiece  held  between  the 
teeth,  whence  there  led  a  flexible  pipe  to  a  canister  con- 
taining gas-absorbing  chemicals.  The  breath  was 
exhausted  through  the  mouthpiece,  whence  it  escaped 
through  an  automatic  valve.  Breathing  through  the  nose 
was  mechanically  prevented  by  a  clip  attached  to  the 
inside  of  the  mask  which  closed  the  nostrils  by  compres- 
sion. Any  gas  that  might  find  its  way  behind  the  mask 
could  not,  therefore,  reach  the  lungs.  There  were  two 
large  eyepieces  of  a  non-breakable  glass.  The  whole 
apparatus  was  carried  in  a  square  canvas  bag  slung  over 
the  neck  but  hanging  on  the  chest  when  in  the  position 
of  **  alert,"  or  ready  for  immediate  use,  and  held  against 
swinging  by  a  cord  tied  around  the  body.  Men  were 
trained  so  that  the  mask  could  be  withdrawn  from  the 
bag,  put  in  place,  nose  clip  adjusted  and  mouthpiece 
inserted  in  less  than  ten  seconds.  That  was  the  maxi- 
mum time  allowed,  and  no  man  was  passed  through  liis 
gas-training  course  until  he  could  accomplish  the  opera- 
tion in  that  time.  When  thei  men  became  expert,  all  the 
steps  could  be  completed  in  five  or  six  seconds.  The 
chemical  containers  remained  in  the  bag.  The  dimen- 
sions of  the  latter  were  about  ten  inches  square  and  three 
inches  thick  and  the  whole  apparatus  weighed  a  little 
more  than  three  pounds. 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  191 

The  training  in  the  adjustment  of  the  respirators  was 
carried  out  in  the  presence  of  lethal  gases,  the  men  being 
taken  into  closed  buildings  filled  with  gas.  Besides  learn- 
ing how  to  put  on  their  respirators  quickly  and  receiving 
an  explanation  of  the  dangers  due  to  gas,  they  were  con- 
yinced  by  practical  tests  that  absolute  safety  was 
afforded  by  their  respirators.  This  added  greatly  to 
their  morale  when  exposed  to  the  same  fiendish  forms  of 
barbarity  in  the  field. 

It  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  these  contraptions 
iwere  exceedingly  disagreeable,  but  men  could  work  and 
actually  sleep  in  them.  The  discomfort  was  offset  by  the 
knowledge  that,  thanks  to  the  skill  of  the  chemical  engi- 
neer at  home,  the  wearer  could  live  in  an  atmosphere 
that  would  cause  death  in  a  few  minutes  without  them. 
So  great  was  the  advance  and  perfection  in  manufacture 
that,  while  the  earlier  types  of  mask  became  inoperative 
in  a  few  hours  through  the  exhaustion  of  the  absorbing 
chemicals,  those  that  were  being  produced  at  the  close 
of  hostilities  had  a  working  life  several  fold  greater. 

The  active  part  of  the  mask  respirator  was  the  absorb- 
ing chemicals  which  removed  the  toxic  gases  as  the 
poisoned  air  was  drawn  through  the  container  by  the  act 
of  inhalation.  Carbon  was  known  to  be  an  excellent 
absorbing  agent.  The  difficulty  was  to  secure  a  form 
of  charcoal  having  a  great  density,  as  that  gave  the  maxi- 
mum of  absorptive  power  for  the  minimum  of  weight, 
with  hardness  to  resist  breaking  into  dust  that  might 
clog  the  interstices  of  the  mixture  in  the  canister  and  so 
reduce  its  air-passing  capacity.  All  kinds  of  material 
were  tested,  hundreds  of  varieties  in  number  and  from 
all  parts  of  the  world.  But  after  experimenting,  by  the 
aid  of  a  largo  staff  of  chemists,  with  almost  every  con- 
ceivable vegetable  substance,  the  unsuspected  cocoauut 
skcll  stood  out  as  nearest  to  the  ideal. 

When  the  United  States  took  up  the  making  of  masks 


192      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

and  decided  to  use  cocoanuts  as  the  basis  for  the 
supply  of  carbon,  it  was  estimated  that  an  amount  of 
forty  or  perhaps  fifty  tons  a  day  would  suffice.  As  the 
demand  increased,  this  figure  was  constantly  raised  until 
finally  it  reached  400  tons  of  shells  or  the  equivalent. 
Now  the  total  supply  of  cocoanuts  from  the  West  Indies, 
Central  America  and  the  northern  coast  of  South 
America  amounted  to  only  seventy-five  tons  a  day.  The 
above  countries  were  necessarily  the  main  source  of 
supply,  because  lack  of  ocean  tonnage  prevented  exten- 
sive importations  from  the  far  East.  Then  it  was  found 
that  the  shortage  in  home  sugar  supply  reduced  candy 
and  sweets  manufacture,  and  consequently  curtailed 
cocoanut  consumption.  This  unexpected  turn  forced  the 
government,  firstly  to  start  the  famous  "  Eat  more 
cocoanuts  "  campaign  to  stimulate  the  production  of 
shells  and,  secondly,  to  find  the  most  satisfactory  substi- 
tutes. Among  the  latter,  various  nuts  and  fruit  pits, 
including  those  of  the  peach,  apricot,  cherry  and  plum, 
were  discovered  to  be  reasonably  satisfactory.  These 
were  obtained  from  the  canning  establishments  and 
through  collection  receptacles  placed  in  the  streets. 

Mixed  with  the  charcoal  were  particles  of  a  special 
lime  cement  to  neutralize  the  acid  quality  of  certain 
gases,  sodium  hydroxide  to  give  increasing  alkaline 
effect  and  sodium  permanganate  for  its  oxidizing  prop- 
erty. When  this  mixture  had  absorbed  its  quota  of 
poison,  the  canister  was  removed  and  a  new  one  substi- 
tuted. This  change  of  canisters  was  regulated  by  having 
every  man  record  on  a  slip  attached  to  his  mask  the 
hooirs  of  exposure  and,  when  a  fixed  limit  of  forty-eight 
hours  was  reached,  to  have  the  canister  exchanged. 

Horses  also  had  masks,  but  here,  fortunately,  the  prob- 
lem was  much  simpler  than  with  their  human  riders  or 
drivers.  It  was  found  that  horses'  eyes  were  not  affected 
,,b7  tear  gases,  and  that  to  toxic  gases  they  were  much 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  193 

less  sensitive  than  men.  As  the  horse  always  breathes 
through  his  nostrils  and  not  through  his  mouth,  all  that 
was  necessary  was  to  provide  a  loose  porous  bag  of 
heavy  soft  material  soaked  in  neutralizing  chemicals  that 
could  be  drawn  over  his  nose,  leaving  his  mouth  free  for 
the  bit. 

Gas  waves  as  first  projected  at  Ypres  were  discharged 
from  steel  cylinders,  the  gas  being  allowed  to  escape 
from  nozzles  and  be  carried  down  wind  towards  the 
allied  trenches.  This  was  the  only  method  employed  for 
some  time  by  both  the  Germans  and  the  Allies.  Such  a 
method  was  open  to  many  serious  objections.  The  large 
cylinders  were  cumbersome,  taking  some  time  to  put 
in  position,  and  as  the  wind  was  the  only  propelling 
force,  this  position  had  to  be  as  advanced  as  possible. 
As  a  matter  of  fact  it  had  to  be  in  the  very  front  trench, 
because  obviously  the  gas  wave  could  not  be  allowed  to 
pass  over  one's  own  men. 

As  action  depended  entirely  on  the  wind,  and  that 
must  be  exactly  right  —  not  only  as  to  direction  but  also, 
as  to  force,  gentle  rather  than  strong  —  the  actual  loos- 
ing of  the  gas  might  have  to  wait  for  days  for  favorable 
weather  conditions  after  the  cylinders  had  been  set  in 
place.  During  this  period  the  cylinders  not  only  filled 
the  trenches  to  the  inconvenience  of  the  defenders,  but 
there  was  danger  that  they  might  be  discovered  and  so 
give  warning  that  a  gas  attack  was  imminent,  or  some 
might  be  damaged  by  shell  fire,  freeing  the  contents 
among  the  very  men  tending  tliem.  In  the  event  of  the 
discovery,  an  inmiediate  bombardment  by  hostile  artil- 
lery would  certainly  result. 

A  further  objection  to  cylinders  was  that  the  ele- 
ment of  surprise  so  essential  to  success  was  absent 
or  nearly  eliminated.  When  gas  and  the  methods 
of  its  liberation  were  understood,  the  commencement  of 
a  wave  attack  was  easily  recognized  even  at  night,  when 


194      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

nothing  could  be  seen,  by  the  sound  of  the  escaping  gas. 
As  the  best  wind  was  a  gentle  one  with  a  velocity  of 
about  five  or  certainly  not  exceeding  ten  miles  an  hour, 
60  as  to  avoid  disturbing  and  scattering  the  cloud,  an 
interval  of  time  of  about  fifty  seconds  would  elapse 
before  the  wave  travelling  at  the  higher  velocity  reached 
the  opposing  trench,  even  if  it  were  only  250  yards  away. 
This  time,  short  as  it  was,  sufficed  to  permit  an  alarm  to 
be  spread,  and  for  men  even  in  the  front  trench,  oppor- 
tunity to  adjust  their  masks.  Men  farther  back  had  still 
more  liberal  warning.  Furthermore,  the  strength  of  the 
gas  was  entirely  dissipated  three  miles  from  the  point  of 
origin.  Then  finally  there  was  the  danger  that,  after  a 
cloud  had  been  started,  a  sudden  change  in  wind  might 
occur  and  the  whole  nasty  mess  come  rolling  back,  an 
accident  that  was  of  actual  and  not  infrequent  occurrence. 

These  objections  started  both  sides  to  devise  means  of 
firing  gas  from  guns.  Although  gas  clouds  liberated 
from  cylinders  were  up  to  the  end  of  the  war  sent  out 
occasionally  under  very  favorable  conditions,  main  reli- 
ance was  placed  on  gas-laden  shells  which  both  sides 
soon  learned  to  manufacture  and  fire  with  great  success. 

Gas  shells  were  made  with  thinner  walls  than  ordinary 
shells  so  as  to  provide  the  maximum  gas-holding 
capacity.  They  were  given  a  bursting  charge  of  some 
high  explosive  just  sufficient  to  break  the  case  and  free 
the  gas  contents.  By  means  of  shells  a  gas  attack  could 
be  made  at  any  time  regardless  of  weather  and  could  b0 
directed  on  any  part  of  the  enemy's  territory  —  either 
the  front-line  trenches  or  among  the  reserves  as  far  back 
as  the  guns  could  reach.  Such  an  attack  could  be  made 
suddenly  without  warning.  Under  these  conditions  no 
one  within  four  or  five  miles  of  the  front  was  safe  against 
gas  attack  at  any  moment.  Within  that  distance  it  was 
ordered  that  gas  masks  should  always  be  carried. 

Gas  shells,  on  account  of  the  smaller  bursting  charge, 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  195 

made  a  much  lower  toned  report  than  that  of  ordinary 
high  explosive  shells  and,  therefore,  were  easily  recog- 
nized. To  disguise  the  use  of  gas  shells,  it  was  custom- 
ary to  send  over  gas  and  high  explosive  shells  at  the 
same  time  and  so  drown  in  the  mingled  roar  any  differ- 
ence in  sound  between  individual  bursts.  Or  the  ratio  of 
the  bursting  charge  to  the  gas  content  might  be  increased 
so  as  to  make  the  bursting  sound  more  nearly  like  that 
of  an  ordinary  shell.  While  the  latter  course  would 
diminish  the  amount  of  gas  liberated,  the  smaller  amount 
would  be  highly  efficacious  if  the  enemy  could  be  caught 
unaware  of  any  gas  being  used. 

Gas  projected  in  shells  had  a  much  longer  range  than 
when  discharged  from  cylinders.  It  could  be  thrown  into 
back  areas  or  in  scattered  and  unsuspected  attacks. 
Therein  lay  an  additional  advantage  in  the  use  of 
chlorpicrin  and  phosgene  over  chlorine,  as  their  more 
stable  character  delayed  the  dissipation  of  the  gas. 
Tear,  sneezing  or  vomiting  gases  were  usually  projected 
just  prior  to  the  discharge  of  chlorpicrin  with  the  hope 
that  some  might  be  caught  by  the  former  and  either 
could  not  get  their  masks  on  or,  in  desperation  tear  them 
off,  when  the  sufferers  would  receive  the  full  effect  of  the 
lethal  gas.  The  tear  gases  were  particularly  effective  in 
this,  as  a  very  minute  amount,  too  small  to  be  otherwise 
noticed,  would  injure  the  sight  for  several  hours. 

The  gases  in  liquid  form  had  another  damaging  char- 
acter in  that  drops  might  be  spattered  over  wounded 
men's  clothing  and  would  continue  to  vaporize  for  some 
hours.  Many  casualties  have  thus  resulted  from  soiled 
clothing  being  carried  into  confined  sleeping  quarters  or 
to  other  men  tending  wounded,  and  even  among  doctors 
and  nurses  in  hospitals  working  over  men  that  had  been 
gassed  as  well  as  shot,  whose  clothes  were,  perhaps  quite 
unknown  to  them,  gas  polluted.  The  heavier  gases  would 
flow  down  into  shell  holes  or  dugouts  and  lie  there  for 


196      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

hours  before  becoming  dissipated.  Curtains  made  from 
blankets  soaked  in  or  sprayed  with  a  solution  of  sodium 
thiosulphate  {V/2  lbs.)  and  sodium  carbonate  (3  lbs.)  to 
three  gallons  of  water,  hung  in  front  of  dugout  entrances 
furnished  some  protection. 

Besides  discharging  gas  in  shells  from  long-range 
guns,  it  was  also  thrown  in  hand  grenades  and  in  various 
forms  of  shells  fired  from  trench  mortars.  Of  the  latter, 
the  most  efPective  was  the  Livens  projector,  something 
like  an  old-fashioned,  smooth-bore  mortar,  except  that 
it  was  longer  and  lighter  in  the  barrel.  From  it  were 
fired  cylinders  twenty-four  inches  long  by  eight  inches 
in  diameter,  with  an  effective  range  of  about  one  mile. 
As  the  tubes  and  cylinders  were  easily  and  cheaply  made, 
large  installations  could  be  collected  and  a  great  volume 
of  gas  liberated  in  a  few  minutes.  The  hand  grenades 
contained  poison  gases  and  also  phosphorus  gas,  produc- 
ing smoke  clouds  and  fires. 

When  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  chlorine  gas 
was  the  only  gas  of  the  toxic  variety  that  was  produced 
on  a  commercial  scale  in  this  country,  and  even  the  whole 
product  was  quite  insufficient  to  meet  the  suddenly 
increased  demand  for  war  purposes.  The  government 
was  obliged  to  create  a  plant  with  a  daily  capacity  of  100 
tons  of  liquid  chlorine.  Although  chlorine  alone  was  lit- 
tle used,  it  formed  an  important  part  of  the  composi- 
tion of  other  gases,  notably  chlorpicrin,  phosgene  and 
mustard. 

The  American  gas  output  began  in  January,  1918,  with 
ten  tons,  while  in  the  month  of  October  more  than  2,700 
tons  were  accepted,  with  a  total  of  nearly  11,000  tons 
before  the  11th  of  November.  To  transport  this  huge 
amount  there  would  have  been  needed  nine  trains  of  tank 
cars,  each  train  being  one-half  of  a  mile  in  length. 

Between  twenty  and  thirty  per  cent  of  all  American 


CHEMICAL  ENGINEERS  197 

casualties  were  due  to  gas,  the  greater  part  fortunately 
being  light. 

So  great  was  the  importance  of  gas  work  that  a  sepa- 
rate corps  was  csta))lished  called  the  Chemical  Warfare 
Service,  to  which  the  Thirtieth  Engineers  were  trans- 
ferred as  the  first  Gas  Engineers. 

Arms  and  all  equipment  made  of  steel  were  subject  to 
the  evil  effects  of  gas  quite  as  much  as  men  and  beasts. 
To  prevent  corrosion,  rifles  had  to  be  kept  oiled,  but  as 
that  was  not  always  possible  it  was  ordered  that,  when  a 
gas  attack  was  in  progress,  rifles  and  machine  guns  should 
be  fired  occasionally  to  insure  their  not  jamming.  When 
the  attack  had  passed  they  were  to  be  taken  down,  thor- 
oughly cleaned  and  oiled.  Even  ammunition  and  the 
working  parts  of  hand  grenades  were  effected  and  had 
to  be  protected.  In  short,  very  little  escaped  the  injuri- 
ous action  of  this  terrible,  insidious,  searching  fiendish 
agent. 


CHAPTEE  XVII 

CAMOUFLAGE  AND   OTHER   FEELDS   OF    ENGINEERING 

In  addition  to  the  large  fields  of  activity,  such  as  trans- 
portation, general  constrnction  and  the  more  delicate 
work  in  electricity,  chemistry  and  physics,  where  engi- 
neers had  the  opportunity  to  apply  their  science  on  a 
broad  scale,  there  were  other  fields  where,  if  the  men 
employed  were  not  numbered  by  the  tens  of  thousands, 
if  their  accomplishments  were  not  so  spectacular,  they, 
too,  formed  an  important  linl^  in  the  work  of  the  success- 
ful conduct  of  a  modern  army. 

The  first  of  these  was  the  telegraph  and  telephone  sys- 
tem. When  a  battle  front  is  continuous  for  400  miles 
and  an  engagement  under  the  direction  of  one  man  cov- 
ers perhaps  fifty  miles,  it  is  obvious  that  no  longer  is  it 
possible  to  rely  even  in  part  on  the  old  methods  of 
sending  orders  by  orderly,  courier  or  some  form  of  hand 
signals.  Consequently  in  the  war  just  ended,  the  tele- 
graph and  telephone  became  of  transcendent  importance 
and  were  used  more  extensively  'than  ever  before,  prac- 
tically superseding  all  other  methods  of  sending  commu- 
nications except  the  slow  one  of  courier  post  for  bulky 
letters  or  for  those  not  urgent.  Telephone  wires  placed 
every  camp,  every  headquarters-dugout,  even  posts  in 
the  front  trenches,  as  well  as  the  important  points  in  the 
rear,  in  instant  communication  with  each  other. 

This  work,  although  of  an  engineering  nature,  was 
taken  care  of  by  the  Signal  Corps  and  not  by  the  Corps 
of  Engineers.  But  the  subject  cannot  be  left  without 
comment,  even  if  the  work  was  not  performed  or  the  serv- 
ice maintained  by  the  Engineers,  without  at  least  record- 
ing that  the  American  telegraph  and  telephone  system, 

198 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        199 

of  American  material  with  wires  strung  by  American 
troops,  made  a  network  over  a  large  part  of  France.  It 
included  within  its  meshes  the  base  ports  of  entry,  the 
many  supply  depots,  concentration  camps,  the  main  head- 
quarters at  Chaumont,  Paris  and  Tours,  and  the  head- 
quarters of  the  various  armies,  corps,  and  divisions,  as 
tliey  were  found  in  the  field.  Then  as  the  final  advance 
progressed,  the  lines  were  extended  to  keep  in  touch  with 
the  ever-changing  front.  To  construct  and  maintain  these 
lines  an  appalling  amount  of  material  had  to  be  shipped 
to  France,  of  which  the  one  item  of  line  wire  and  cables 
amounted  to  no  less  than  nearly  150,000  miles,  or  suffi- 
cient wire  to  stretch  six  times  around  the  earth. 

The  English  language  always  stands  ready  to  absorb 
any  improving  modification.  As  the  result  of  the  war 
it  has  taken  many  additions  to  its  vocabulary  of 
which  undoubtedly  a  large  proportion  will  be  permanent. 
In  this  process  of  change  even  the  alphabet  did  not 
escape.  We  are  all  aware  that  several  of  the  letters  have 
a  similar  sound,  leading  both  to  confusion  and  error, 
when  spoken  over  the  telephone.  Some  British  genius, 
whose  name  ought  to  be  recorded,  removed  the  difficulty 
by  giving  new  names  to  those  letters  that  might  be  mis- 
taken. Thus  ACK  stood  for  A,  Beer  for  B,  Don  for  D, 
Emma  for  M,  Pip  for  P,  Esse  for  S,  Toe  for  T,  Vic 
for  V,  while  the  last  letter  of  the  alphabet  was  always 
called  by  its  regular  English  name  Zed.  The  other  let- 
ters retained  their  accustomed  sounds.  So  thoroughly 
practical  was  this  innovation  that  it  was  adopted  by  the 
American  telephone  operators  in  large  part,  and  would 
have  become  universal  had  the  war  lasted  longer  and 
more  men  had  become  familiar  with  it. 

The  British  always,  and  the  Americans  usually,  abbre- 
viated all  names  to  the  initial  letters.  Some  of  these 
combinations  were  easily  recognizable,  like  G.  11.  Q.  for 
General  Headquarters,  or  O.  C.  for  Officer  Commanding, 


200      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

but  some,  like  D.  A.  D.  0.  S.,  were  not  quite  so  readily 
legible.  This  last  combination  was  not  to  be  confused 
with  the  dodo,  the  extinct  form  of  bird,  but  described 
a  simple-minded  sort  of  person  perfonning  the  duties 
of  a  Deputy  Assistant  Director  of  Ordnance  Supplies. 
So  firmly  was  this  metliod  of  abbreviation  rooted  that 
even  in  ordinary  conversation  there  would  be  used  the 
initial  letters  and  not  the  words  themselves  describing 
an  officer,  place  or  some  article  in  common  use,  and  fre- 
quently the  letters  would  be  given  their  new  names. 
Thus  an  observation  point,  Avliich  Avas  always  spoken  of 
as  an  0.  P.,  was  called  on  *'  o-pip,'^  while  a  trench 
mortar,  shortened  to  T.  M.,  became  a  "  Toc-emma.'' 

But  if  the  main  telegraph  and  telephone  lines  were  in 
the  hands  of  the  Signal  Corps,  some  electric  wires  were 
installed  and  maintained  by  the  engineers.  In  addition 
to  their  work  in  range  finding  the  Seventy-fourth  Engi- 
neers took  care  of  the  **  listening-in  "  sets  by  which 
enemy  telephonic  conversations  were  overheard.  The 
front-line  telephone  system  was  at  first  a  single-wire 
line,  the  earth  being  used  for  the  return  circuit.  But  a 
French  engineer  devised  an  instrument  called  a  geo- 
phone,  which  was  afterwards  so  improved  and  developed 
as  to  have  a  greatly  extended  field  of  usefulness.  In 
principle  the  device  consisted  of  a  drum  in  which  the 
enclosed  air  space  received  the  sound  waves,  magnified 
them  and  by  electro-mechanical  apparatus  transmitted 
them  to  any  conveniently  located  listening  station.  As 
finally  perfected  these  instruments  were  sufficiently  deli- 
cate not  only  to  catch  sounds  transmitted  through  the 
air,  but  to  give  notice  of  raiding  parties  operating  at 
night  between  the  trenches,  and  even  picking  np  low- 
toned  conversations  between  the  enemy  lines.  With  sev- 
eral such  mechanical  ears  open,  it  was  possible  to  locate 
enemy  movements  in  the  dark  by  simply  noting  the  rela- 
tive intensity  of  noise  on  the  several  geophones. 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        201 

These  instruments,  of  course,  even  in  their  first  com- 
paratively crude  form,  could  easily  catch  the  return 
current  from  a  single-wire  telephone  or  telegraph  sys- 
tem. This  forced  the  installation  of  double-insulated 
wire  lines  on  which  the  return  current  could  not  be 
tapped  as  the  ground  return  could  be.  But  the 
man  of  science  was  not  to  be  beaten.  By  mak- 
ing his  geophones  more  delicate  he  was  able  to  over- 
hear the  actual  conversation  behind  the  enemy  lines  as 
spoken  into  a  telephone  receiver,  provided  only  he  could 
place  one  of  his  little  mechanical  ears,  which,  with  its 
connecting  wires,  was  a  most  inconspicuous  object,  close 
to  the  enemy  trenches. 

The  setting  of  these  boxes  at  night  in  No  Man's  Land 
was  a  nerve-testing  task.  On  one  occasion  as  an  engi- 
neer was  returning  to  his  own  lines  after  attending  to 
his  instrument,  he  was  suddenly  stopped  by  a  challenge 
from  a  negro  sentry  in  the  firing  trench  whom  he  had 
aroused  by  the  noise  he  made  as  he  stumbled  over  the 
body  of  a  dead  Gorman. 

"  Fo  *  the  land 's  sake ;  what  yo '  all  doin '  out  yonder  ?  ' ' 
asked  the  negro,  but  all  the  while  keeping  him  covered 
with  his  rifle. 

When  the  member  of  the  Seventy-fourth  Engineers 
explained  who  he  was  and  what  he  was  doing,  the  darky 
lowered  his  gun,  told  him  to  advance,  saying: 

"  The  Lawd  be  praised,  but  I  certainly  is  pleased  I 
don*t  belong  with  the  engineers. '* 

In  one  American  division  there  were  some  Cherokee 
Indians  who,  in  order  to  overcome  the  danger  of  having 
telephone  messages  overheard  and  understood  by  the 
enemy,  were  employed  as  telephone  operators  in  the 
front  trench.  When  the  message  was  received  at  head- 
quarters it  was  there  translated  back  into  English.  "What 
pains  the  Germans  must  have  taken,  with  their  accus- 
tomed thoroughness,  to  discover  the  key  to  this  extraor- 
dinary code ! 


202      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

These  geophones  had  another  application.  Both  sides 
carried  on  extensive  underground  operations  in  driving 
tunnels  beneath  the  other's  positions,  filling  the  leading 
chamber  with  high  explosives  and  then  blowing  up  a 
great  section  of  ti'ench  or  a  strong  point  at  the  critical 
moment  of  an  attack.  The  geophones  would  give  warn- 
ing by  noting  the  sound  of  pick  or  drill  underground 
even  at  a  distance  of  seventy-five  yards.  By  employing 
two  geophones  on  the  binaural  principle  and  changing 
their  position  until  the  intensity  of  sound  was  the  same 
in  each  ear,  the  direction  whence  sound  came  was  deter- 
mined. The  intersection  of  two  such  lines  of  direction 
gave  the  exact  spot  where  work  was  being  executed. 
Then  the  tunnelling  engineers  would  be  called  on.  A 
counter  galleiy  or  tunnel  would  be  driven  and  the  enemy 
attempt  frustrated. 

As  facility  and  extent  of  observation  by  airplane  were 
increased  and  the  accuracy  of  indirect  fire  developed,  it 
became  necessary  to  hide  or  screen  guns,  ammunition  and 
troops.  When  the  war  began  the  French  army  wore  the 
old  and  well-known  scarlet  breeches,  which  made  a  won- 
derful display  to  airplane  observers  and  were  the  caus^ 
of  many  casualties.  From  such  experiences  both  sides 
soon  realized  that  observation  from  above  had  begun  a 
new  era,  and  that  men  must  do  as  the  wild  animals  did 
and  render  themselves  inconspicuous.  Sombre  uniforms 
that  lacked  distinguishing  contrast  were  adopted,  glisten- 
ing gun  barrels  disappeared  under  paint,  even  the  bright 
parts  of  men's  accoutrements  were  covered.  But  this 
was  not  enough.  Masses  as  well  as  details  had  to  be 
obscured,  and  a  special  corps  headed  by  experts  was 
organized  to  create  what  was  more  than  an  art,  almost 
a  science,  to  which  was  applied  the  French  name  of 
**  Camouflage." 

This  word,  which  has  become  firmly  rooted  not  only 
in  French,  but  in  English  and  probably  other  languages, 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        203 

is,  like  tanks  and  very  long-range  guns,  a  product  of  the 
war.  Dictionaries  of  a  date  earlier  than  1914  do  not  con- 
tain it,  and  there  is  considerable  doubt  whence  it  came 
or  how  it  was  introduced.  The  nearest  approach  to  it 
was  "  camoufiet,"  which  had  quite  a  different  meaning, 
a  puff  of  smoke  blown  in  the  face,  or  in  a  military  sense,  a 
small  mine.  Apparently  camouflage  comes  from  old 
Franco-Provengal  stock  and  was  drafted  into  the  slang 
of  thieves  in  Paris  under  the  form  of  '*  comoufle," 
meaning  disguise,  whence  it  was  taken  up  by  the 
artist  community  and  popularized  by  them  in  the  form 
now  known. 

The  basic  idea  of  camouflage  was  to  hide  men  or 
objects  from  observation,  either  by  giving  them  a  mix- 
ture of  colors  so  that  they  would  blend  with  surrounding 
objects,  or  by  so  destroying  their  apparent  outlines  or 
confusing  the  outlines  with  the  shadows  that  they  cast, 
as  to  prevent  or  interfere  with  recognition  when  viewed 
from  a  distance  and  especially  at  a  distance  from  above. 

To  obtain  concealment  by  actual  hiding  was  usually 
impossible,  especially  for  the  most  important  objects  — 
men,  guns,  piles  of  ammunition,  or  special  buildings. 
Any  covering  sufficiently  large  to  hide  such  objects  would 
in  itself  be  visible.  It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  have 
resort  to  the  more  subtle  phases  of  the  art.  In  the  dis- 
covering, studying  and  applying  the  colors  or  imitations 
that  would  deceive  or  mislead  rather  than  hide,  there  was 
ample  room  for  unlimited  exercise  of  human  ingenuity. 

The  dun  color  of  the  regulation  olive  drab  uniform 
rendered  men  quite  inconspicuous  provided  they  did  not 
look  up  when  an  enemy  plane  was  passing.  If  they  did, 
their  white  faces  showed  in  the  photographs  but  more 
particularly  to  direct  observation.  j\ron  were,  therefore, 
ordered  to  restrain  their  curiosity  when  "  Fritz  "  was 
overhead  and  to  refrain  from  looking  up.  ]\ren  lying 
down  were  practically  invisible,  so  well  did  the  color  of 


204       AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

their  uniforms  lose  itself  in  the  color  of  the  ground.  Men, 
if  standing,  cast  shadows  which  were  visible,  especially 
to  the  eye  of  an  aerial  observer  if  the  men  were  moving. 
He  could  more  easily  recognize  what  a  moving  shadow 
meant  than  a  stationary  one.  "Bright  mess  kits,  naked 
bayonets,  or  tools  polished  by  work  reflected  light  and 
called  attention  to  the  probable  presence  of  men  even 
when  the  latter  were  not  visible.  Suspected  presence  of 
men  was  almost  certain  to  draw  artillery  fire  which,  as 
will  be  explained  later,  could  be  directed  with  extraordi- 
nary accuracy  on  a  target  invisible  from  the  guns. 
Although  strict  orders  were  issued  as  to  conduct  by 
troops  in  all  such  matters,  they  were  always  difficult  to 
enforce,  especially  such  simple  ones  as  that  faces  should 
not  be  raised  or  that  shovels  be  carried  in  the  hand  blade 
down  and  not  over  the  shoulder. 

For  misleading  concealment  chief  recourse  was  had  to 
color,  the  object  to  be  hidden  being  painted  with  great 
irregular  patches  of  contrasting  colors,  whites,  blues, 
yellows,  blacks,  in  such  a  way  as  to  destroy  the  outlines, 
to  accentuate  depressions,  to  tone  down  parts  that  would 
ordinarily  show  high,  and  to  confound  all  objects  with 
their  shadows.  This  offered  great  scope  in  the  practical 
application  of  color,  not  only  as  the  colors  gave  a  false 
expression  to  the  human  eye,  but  as  they  would  be 
recorded  on  a  photographic  plate.  This  naturally  cre- 
ated a  branch  of  warfare  in  which  artists  and  color  stu- 
dents excelled. 

Everything  was  painted,  buildings,  tents,  guns,  wagons 
and  especially  covered  wagons,  railroad  cars  that  loaded 
with  ammunition  serving  railway  artillery  might  be 
standing  for  days  at  a  time  on  some  siding,  and  some- 
times even  the  steel  helmets  of  the  men  were  decorated, 
although  the  last  was  a  needless  refinement. 

The  author  recalls  some  of  his  tents  that  would  have 
taken  prizes  in  any  exhibition  of  cubist  art.    Speaking 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        205 

of  tents  it  was  hard  at  first  for  American  officers  to  free 
their  minds  from  preconceived  ideas  as  to  what  a  mili- 
tary camp  should  be  and  to  cease  placing  tents  in  straight 
and  regular  rows.  Such  an  arrangement  no  camouflage 
could  conceal. 

If  covering  as  a  whole  was  impossible,  and  undesirable 
had  it  been  possible,  covering  in  part  was  freely  resorted 
to.  The  material  most  used  for  such  j^urpose  was  tree 
boughs,  which  thrown  over  freshly  turned  earth  from 
trench  excavations  that  it  was  desired  to  conceal,  over 
guns,  or  piles  of  ammunition,  so  broke  the  outlines,  hid 
the  natural  color  or  confused  the  shadows  as  to  render 
detection  impossible  or  extremely  difficult.  But  boughs 
were  not  always  available.  To  take  their  place  wire  net- 
ting was  used  or  nets  were  made  of  cord,  in  the  interstices 
of  which  were  woven  pieces  of  painted  cotton  cloth  resem- 
bling leaves  or  clods  of  earth.  Such  screens,  hung  on 
poles  over  guns,  gave  excellent  protection  but  still  per- 
mitted the  gun  to  be  served.  The  fact  that  the  horizontal 
screens  might  be  transparent  in  spots  heightened  their 
efficacy,  as  they  failed  to  throw  a  definite  shadow  or  show 
a  marked  outline.  Similar  screens  were  hung  vertically 
along  the  side  of  roads  exposed  to  obser\'ation  from 
enemy  balloons,  cutting  off  the  view  of  troops  so  that 
they  could  pass  behind  the  shelter  of  the  screens  without 
much  danger. 

The  making  of  all  these  articles  became  an  important 
industry;  and  for  their  production  the  A.  E.  F.  estab- 
lished a  well-equipped  shop  at  Dijon,  where  much  valu- 
able assistance  was  given  by  the  British  and  French 
camoufleurs.  This  shop  was  managed  by  the  Fortieth 
Engineers,  who  employed  a  large  staff  of  women  to  assist 
them.  Here  there  were  manufactured  wire  netting, 
fish  nets,  garlands,  hangar  covers,  sniper  suits  for  men 
to  wear  on  sniping  out-post  duty,  painted  burlaps  and 
coco  mattings. 


206      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

The  amount  of  such  material  produced  was  very  exten- 
sive, aggregating,  in  eight  months  during  1918,  3,000,000 
square  yards,  or  nearly  one  square  mile  in  area.  In  addi- 
tion there  were  made  and  sent  to  the  front  observation 
posts,  imitation  shell  holes,  dummy  heads,  and  other 
articles  intended  to  produce  a  visible  effect  of  something 
that  did  not  exist  instead  of  concealing  what  did  exist. 
Sometimes  the  best  concealment  is  obtained  by  drawing 
attention  to  an  illusion. 

So  important  was  camouflage  that  recommendation 
was  made  that  specially  trained  camouflage  troops  be 
attached  to  each  battery  whose  duty  it  should  be  to  mark 
out  paths  and  roads,  to  fix  the  location  and  to  hide  the 
piles  of  ammunition,  and  by  painting  or  otherwise  to  dis- 
guise the  guns,  latrines  and  kitchens;  in  short,  to  study 
the  best  means  of  concealing  each  gun  and  to  see  that  an 
intelligent  plan  was  carried  out. 

In  the  St.  Miliiel  offensive  guns  and  ammunition 
moved,  into  position  just  prior  to  the  attack,  were 
camouflaged  with  boughs  or  fish  nets.  After  the  attack 
began  and  until  the  offensive  subsided,  the  troops  were 
compelled  to  maintain  the  camouflage.  The  Germans 
had  accurate  maps  of  the  whole  country,  especially  of 
that  part  that  they  had  only  recently  occupied  but  had 
been  forced  to  evacuate,  and  they  were  thus  able  to  con- 
centrate an  accurate  fire  on  any  point  where  their  air- 
planes or  balloons  reported  the  presence  of  artillery.  In 
the  Argonne-Meuse  offensive  the  movement  into  position 
was  made  only  just  before  the  attack  began.  After  the 
battle  commenced  the  concentration  of  artillery  was  so 
great,  not  only  locally  but  on  the  whole  front,  and  the 
fire  so  continuous  both  night  and  day  that  little  attempt 
was  made  cither  to  conceal  or  to  deceive.  Guns  were 
stood  in  the  open  and  there  served. 

To  install  electric  light  and  power  plants,  to  care  for 
and  operate  engines  and  pumps  for  water  supply  and  to 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        207 

do  many  things  of  a  mechanical  nature  for  armies  and 
corps,  an  electro-mechanical  section  was  established  and 
the  Thirty-seventh  Engineers  assigned  as  the  Electro- 
^[echanical  Regiment.  Subsequently  this  regiment  was 
attached  to  the  First  Army,  A.  E.  F. 

Prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  American,  offensives,  the 
Electro-Mechanical  Section  set  up  a  number  of  electric 
light  and  power  plants  in  the  Service  of  Supplies,  chiefly 
for  lighting  hospitals,  storage  yards,  warehouses,  docks, 
bakeries,  refrigerators  and  other  similar  institutions, 
and  the  furnishing  of  power  to  small  machines.  In  some 
cases  the  Electro-Mechanical  Regiment  obtained  current 
from  French  sources,  in  others  they  erected  their  own 
generating  plants.  This  work  did  not  differ  from  electro- 
mechanical installations  under  ordinary  commercial  con- 
ditions. In  the  distribution  of  the  current  about  125 
miles  of  transmission  lines  were  strung. 

With  the  First  Army  the  greater  part  of  the  service 
rendered  by  the  regiment  was  in  arranging  during  the 
Argonne-Meuse  offensive  for  the  mechanical  parts  of 
water  supply  systems,  such  as  large  pumping  installa- 
tions, and  in  providing  lights  for  various  headquarters 
through  small  mobile  installations,  the  plants  ranging 
from  one  to  200  kilowatts  each,  average  about  twenty  kw. 
It  was  found  that  the  units  ranged  in  capacity  as  follows: 

Army  headquarters 10  kw. 

Evacuation  hospitals 10 

Corps  headquarters 5 

Division  headquarters 3 

Brigade  headquarters 1 

Hospitals 5  to  25  kw. 

Experience  showed  that  a  whole  regiment  was  an 
unnecessarily  largo  body  to  be  attached  to  an  army  for 


208      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

electro-meclianical  jourposes,  and  the  men  were  detailed 
for  other  work.  A  smaller  body  of  experienced 
mechanics,  if  assisted  by  ordinary  engineer  troops, 
wonld  have  been  more  economical.  Another  reference  to 
this  point  will  be  made  in  a  subsequent  chapter  devoted 
to  the  discussion  of  the  best  organization  of  engineer 
troops. 

Electro-mechanical  troops  were  used  by  the  French 
with  great  success  in  keeping  certain  wires  in  the  entan- 
glements in  front  of  the  trenches  charged  with  deadly 
high-tension  currents.  Sometimes  barbed-wire  fences 
were  electrified  but  the  most  satisfactory  device  was  an 
independent  plain  wire.  This  was  stretched  irregularly 
in  plan  from  tree  to  tree  and  from  it  were  dangling  wires 
at  about  fifty-cm.  (20  ins.)  intervals  and  reaching 
to  within  perhaps  twelve  inches  from  the  ground.  The 
main  wire  was  about  three  m.  (9  to  10  ft.)  high  and, 
therefore,  above  the  plane  of  ordinary  vision.  These 
wires  were  absolutely  invisible  at  night  and  almost  so 
by  day.  The  main  wire  was  charged  with  a  1,500-volt 
current.  If  a  person  came  in  contact  with  one  of  the 
loose  wires  he  at  once  established  a  ground  through  his 
body  and  was  either  instantlj^  killed  or  effectively  dis- 
abled for  a  while.  Sometimes  traps  were  constructed 
with  barbed-wire  entanglements  so  j^laced  that  raiding 
parties  were  hemmed  in  by  lines  of  barbed  wire,  perpen- 
dicular to  the  front,  which  either  were  electrically  charged 
or  by  their  i)osition  forced  the  enemy  patrols  to  advance 
against  a  net  of  charged  loose  wires.  In  all  such  work 
the  French  were  particularly  skillful,  especially  in  con- 
cealing the  electric  trap. 

Such  a  protection  could  be  used  only  on  a  quiet  sector. 
If  there  was  much  artillery  activity  the  lines  would  be 
cut  so  often  by  shells  as  to  deprive  them  of  any  relia- 
bility.   The  largest  installation  was  on  the  French  front 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        209 

between  Baccarat  and  Hartmanswillerkopf,  a  ''  quiet  " 
sector  150  km.  long,  of  which  approximately  one-third 
was  protected  by  charged  wires. 

The  Germans  tried  to  do  the  same  thing,  but  they  were 
not  nearly  so  successful  as  the  French.  This  was  due 
partly  to  their  lack  of  equal  skill  and  delicacy  in  attach- 
ing and  hiding  the  obstructions,  but  chiefly  to  their  extra- 
ordinary obsession  for  conducting  operations  on  a  fixed 
methodical  time  table,  an  obsession  that  they  displayed 
with  respect  to  artillery  practice  and  other  movements, 
but  always  with  failure  to  inflict  loss  commensurate  with 
the  expenditure  of  effort.  In  the  case  of  electric  traps 
they  did  not  keep  the  wires  continuously  charged  with 
current  but  only  during  fixed  intervals.  The  French 
made  a  study  of  the  method  followed  on  different  parts 
of  the  front  and  having  discovered  the  key,  sent  out 
experienced  electricians  who  would  cut  the  wires  during 
a  dead  period  immediately  previous  to  any  contemplated 
raid  or  patrol  reconnaissance  by  French  forces. 

The  Transportation  Department  had  its  extensive 
shops  for  repairs  of  rolling  stock,  the  section  of  Light 
Railways  and  the  Motor  Transportation  Corps  had 
theirs.  The  Chief  Engineer  soon  foresaw  that  in  addi- 
tion to  the  above  he  would  need  a  shop  where  there  could 
be  repaired  the  miscellaneous  equipment  belonging  to  the 
engineers  and  not  covered  by  any  one  or  all  of  the  above. 
As  indicating  the  necessity  for  such  a  shop,  the  following 
items  of  heavy  engineering  equipment  were  on  hand, 
which  had  to  be  maintained  and  repaired.  In  the  matter 
of  repairs,  war  service  is  not  conducive  to  the  easy  keep- 
ing of  mechanical  plants  in  good  working  condition  and, 
therefore,  there  is  all  the  more  need  for  well-equipped 
sho]")s. 

Some  items  of  American  engineer  plants  on  hand  in 
France  prior  to  the  11th  of  November,  1919,  were: 


210      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

Steam  shovels 59 

Pile  drivers   35 

Concrete  mixers  350 

Locomotive  cranes 125 

Gas-electric  generators 1,600 

Motors 700 

Pumps,  hand 10,000 

Pumps,  power 1,600 

Gasoline  engines 600 

Air  compressors  150 

Derricks 300 

Boilers 200 


A  shop  section  under  the  control  of  the  Director  of 
Military  Engineering  and  Engineer  Supplies  (D.  M.  E. 
and  E.  S.),  an  officer  on  the  staff  of  the  Chief  Engineer, 
was  organized  in  December,  1917.  Later  the  Twenty- 
fourth  and  Thirty-fourth  Engineers  were  assigned  as 
shop  regiments. 

The  first  step  in  construction  was  a  shop  erected  at 
Is-sur-Tille  equipped  with  such  machine  tools  as  could 
be  purchased  in  the  European  markets.  This  original 
building  was  a  very  modest  little  affair,  being  only  fifty 
feet  wide  by  125  feet  long,  but  it  did  good  service,  soon 
beginning  to  deliver  newly  constructed  engineer  equip- 
ment urgently  needed  for  the  spring  operations. 

In  the  meanwhile  the  engineer  officers  in  command  of 
the  section  were  studying  the  question  broadly  and  rec- 
ommended the  establishment  of  a  large  shop  to  be 
ierected  at  the  principal  engineer  depot  at  Gievres,  where 
all  engineer  shopwork  for  the  Service  of  Supplies  could 
be  attended  to.  The  extension  and  application  of  the 
Is-sur-Tille  plant  to  work  for  the  Zone  of  the  Advance 
and,  what  was  equally  important,  the  acquisition  of  sev- 
eral independent  shops,  some  of  which  were  to  be  mobile, 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        211 

for  each  army  was  also  recommended.  The  plans  for 
the  main  slioi)s  at  Gievres  and  Is-sur-Tille  were  laid  out 
on  the  same  general  scheme  to  consist  of  a  group  of  six 
buildings  each  fifty  feet  by  500  feet.  By  November,  four 
of  these  buildings  and  in  addition  a  large  foundry  where 
brass  as  well  as  iron  castings  were  made,  were  erected 
at  Gievres  and  put  in  operation.  At  Is-sur-Tille,  while 
the  first  shop  established  was  retained  in  service,  a  sec- 
ond building  sixty  feet  by  400  feet  was  erected,  consist- 
ing of  the  steel-frame  work  of  an  unused  bakery  building. 
A  small  shop  was  also  established  at  St.  Sulpice,  the 
assembling  point  for  engineer  materiel  on  its  arrival  in 
France. 

Each  army  shop  consisted  of  a  semipermanent  metal 
and  wood-working  shop  with  a  number  of  mobile  outfits 
on  motor  trucks.  These  latter  were  composed  of  four 
units,  consisting  of  machine,  blacksmith  and  wood-work- 
ing shops  and  a  material  supply  car,  each  being  mounted 
on  a  five  and  one-half-ton  motor  truck  chassis.  The 
machine  shop  truck  contained,  among  other  things,  a 
work  bench,  a  drill  press,  a  portable  electric  drill,  a 
grinder  and  a  fourteen-inch  lathe.  The  blacksmith  shops 
contained  work  benches,  forges,  pipe-fitting  tools,  weld- 
ing outfit,  while  in  the  wood  car  were  drills,  saws  and 
grinders.  All  had  their  individual  gasoline-driven  power 
plants  and  full  complements  of  small  tools.  The  machine 
shop  truck  cost  $8,500  and  the  carpenter  shop  $7,600, 
including  equipment.  These  mobile  shops  were  able  to 
do  a  wide  range  of  repairs  and  even  construction  work 
in  the  field.  On  account  of  their  great  mobility,  they 
could  be  run  rapidly  to  the  points  where  needed  and  thus 
could  and  did  render  exceedingly  efficient  service.  In 
war  flexibility  and  mobility  are  features  whose  impor- 
tance cannot  be  overestimated. 

Had  the  war  continued  through  another  year  the  Shop 
Section  would  liave  grown  to  be  an  institution  of  largo 


212      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

proportions.     As   it   was  it   accomplished  most   useful 
results. 

Both  the  British  and  French  armies  maintained  tun- 
nelling comjoanies,  recruited  from  among  miners,  whose 
duty  was  the  doing  of  all  underground  work,  such  as 
excavating  dugouts  with  their  subsurface  chambers  and 
the  driving  of  tunnels  to  reach  points  beneath  the 
enemy's  positions.  The  first-named  structures  will  be 
described  in  Chapter  XXIII.  The  details  of  the  tunnels 
presented  little  of  professional  interest.  They  were 
small  drifts  only  large  enough  for  men  to  work  in  and 
timbered  no  more  than  was  necessary  to  support  the  roof 
and  sides  for  a  short  time  only.  On  reaching  the  desired 
situation,  perhaps  beneath  an  annoying  point  in  the 
opposing  lines  of  defense,  or  a  controlling  one  that  must 
be  removed  before  an  attack  could  be  launched  with  hope 
of  success,  a  transverse  gallery  or  terminal  would  be 
excavated.  In  this  chamber  a  large  supply  of  high  explo- 
sives would  be  stored  and  fired  at  the  critical  moment 
by  electricity.  What  had  been  a  moment  before  a  posi- 
tion bristling  with  machine  guns  and  crowded  with  men, 
would  be  transformed  in  a  twinkling  into  a  huge  crater. 
The  idea  was  not  new,  having  been  used  in  all  wars  for 
very  many  years.  In  the  past  war,  however,  the  intro- 
duction of  the  delicate  hearing  instruments  gave  to  tun- 
nelling a  new  aspect  and  rendered  it  a  more  hazardous 
operation  then  formerly,  one  in  which  success  was  much 
more  difficult  of  atfainment.  As  soon  as  enemy  tunnel- 
ling operations  were  discovered  to  be  in  progress,  it  was 
an  easy  matter  to  drive  a  cut-off  gallery  and  frustrate 
his  attempt.  In  spite  of  this  the  French  and  British,  and 
unfortunately  the  Germans  also,  did  succeed  in  making 
some  very  brilliant  coups.  The  American  army  did  but 
little  in  this  respect.  By  the  time  it  took  a  really  active 
part,  the  character  of  tlie  warfare  had  changed  from 
stabilized  trench  work  to  open  fighting,  which  presented 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        213 

little  opportunity  for  operations,  such  as  tunnelling,  that 
required  considerable  time  for  execution. 

There  was  one  outlet  for  engineering  energy  that  was 
just  reaching  systematic  organization  when  hostilities 
were  ended,  the  work  of  salvage.  "War  is  inevitably 
costly  and  much  waste  cannot  be  avoided.  The  engineers 
of  the  allied  armies  had  found  that  a  large  part,  however, 
of  the  waste  could  be  prevented  and  had  established  well 
organized  services  to  that  end.  They  found  that  nearly 
every  discarded  article  had  some  recoverable  value.  Old 
clothing  could  be  made  over,  parts  of  broken  weapons 
could  be  assembled,  old  food  cans  were  worth  melting 
to  obtain  the  solder,  while  even  the  refuse  of  kitchens 
and  lavatories,  if  only  it  could  be  saved,  produced 
grease,  out  of  which  glycerine  for  explosive  compounds 
was  obtainable.  The  grease  was  collected  by  ordering 
the  water  from  all  kitchens,  bath  houses,  etc.,  to  be 
passed  through  a  filter  box  in  which  one  compartment 
was  filled  with  straw.  The  soap  and  grease  were  caught 
in  the  straw,  removed  periodically  and  shipped  to  places 
where  the  glycerine  or  valuable  fats  were  extracted.  To 
encourage  saving  among  British  troops,  a  percentage  of 
the  value  of  the  recovered  glycerine  was  paid  to  the  men 
of  the  unit  according  to  the  amount  and  composition  of 
the  refuse  turned  in.  The  British  authorities  estimated 
that  the  glycerine  thus  secured  cost  about  £50  per  ton 
as  compared  with  a  price  in  the  open  market  of  £250. 
When  the  A.  E.  F.  put  the  saving  of  refuse  into  effect, 
the  value  of  the  recovered  fats  and  glycerine  amounted 
to  $57,000  in  September,  1918,  to  $109,000  in  October  and 
to  $120,000  in  November. 

Wlien  the  American  General  Staff  realized  liow  great 
were  the  possil^ilities  of  salvage  they  began  to  establish 
a  scientifically  organized  sers'ice.  The  largest  installa- 
tions were  the  shops  near  Tours,  where  discarded  shoes 
were  remade  and  clothing  repaired.     The  value  of  the. 


214      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

clothing  and  shoes  overhauled  and  made  wearable  at  this 
depot  was  nearly  $20,000,000.  In  this  total  were  included 
a  great  number  of  the  large  felt  hats  with  which  Ameri- 
can soldiers  were  at  first  equipped.  The  hats  were  sub- 
sequently abandoned  as  an  article  of  issue,  because  they 
occupied  too  much  valuable  space  in  vessels,  when  being 
sent  overseas,  and  because  they  could  not  be  worn  in  the 
field  in  connection  with  gas  masks.  Instead  of  discard- 
ing the  hats,  they  were  cut  up  at  the  Tours  shops  and 
out  of  them  excellent  slippers  for  hospital  wear  were 
made. 

There  was  not  a  part  of  a  vehicle  that  was  nof  worth 
saving  and  being  sent  to  the  Motor  Transport  Repair 
Shops  at  Verneuil  for  combining  to  make  a  new  truck 
or  wagon.  Even  the  spokes  of  broken  wheels,  fragments 
of  motors  and  the  bent  frame  of  a  truck  chassis  could  be 
and  were  made  use  of. 

The  assortment  of  articles  picked  up  by  the  salvage 
corps  was  limited  in  variety  only  by  the  number  of  dif- 
ferent things  carried  or  used  by  a  soldier.  A  list  taken 
at  random  and  given  in  *' America's  Munitions  "  records 
the  following  items  as  the  result  of  one  day's  business 
at  a  single  rail-head : 

1,100  pairs  of  leggins  275  German  rifles 

21  pairs  of  shoes  3  boxes  tent  poles 

30  leather  gun  cases  7  boxes  gun  repairs 

21  bags  of  harness  150  rifle  grenade  throwers 

350  mess  kits  4  German  machine  guns 

750  condiment  cans  200  German  canteens 

750  bacon  cans  8,000  gas  masks 

150  first-aid  packets  1  ammunition  cart 

50  saddlebags  4  ration  carts 

1,400  canteens  17  wagon  wheels 

200  caps  4  boxes  artillery  material 

900  helmets  (telephones,  etc.) 

1,025  pack  carriers  1 ,400  American  canteens 


OTHER  FIELDS  OF  ENGINEERING        215 

750  canteen  covers  400  American  rifles 

1  wagon  47  German    automatic 
76  wagon  parts  guns 

50  feed  bags  ^  75  gun  bolts 

300  pistol  holsters  100  respirators 
1  wagon  bed 

The  total  value  of  articles  salvaged  in  France  during 
the  year  1918  was  the  great  sum  of  nearly  $63,000,000,  or 
almost  as  much  as  was  appropriated  for  the  army  during 
the  fiscal  year  of  1898,  which  included  all  of.  the  pre- 
liminary expenditures  for  the  Spanish  war. 

This  total  was  made  up  as  follows: 

Value  of  output,  depots  and  shops.  $47,018,374 

Battlefield  recoveries 15,100,000 

Kitchen  economies 474,515 

Waste  sales 39,680 

Rubber 159,157 

Wool  cloth  shipped  to  the  British. .  71,984 

Lumber 69,025 


$62,932,735 


The  early  efforts  in  salvage  were  directed  by  various 
and  somewhat  disconnected  authorities,  but  at  the  close 
of  the  war  the  whole  organization  was  being  brought 
under  the  control  of  the  Chief  Engineer  Officer. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

MAPS 

In  no  branch  of  military  activity  has  the  complication 
of  modern  war  been  more  evident  than  in  the  maps  of  the 
field  of  activity  and  the  making  of  them.  No  branch,  with 
the  possible  exception  of  chemical  warfare,  has  shown  a 
greater  development.  In  1914  the  British  staff  was 
entirely  without  military  maps.  Even  the  French  relied 
on  maps  of  their  own  country  plotted  on  a  scale  of  1  over 
80,000,  or  about  three-fourths  of  an  inch  to  the  mile, 
picturesque  affairs  where  topography  was  indicated  by 
hachures,  according  to  the  skill  or  personal  taste  of  the 
draughtsman.  These  maps  bore  original  dates  of  years 
during  the  decade  beginning  with  1830,  although  marked 
revised  in  the  years  1910  to  1913.  These  were  the  largest 
scale  maps  of  the  theatre  of  operations  obtainable  in 
1914,  except  for  certain  limited  districts  in  fortress  areas 
of  which  maps  were  in  existence  on  a  scale  of  1  over 
20,000.  The  maps  of  the  1  over  80,000  scale,  which  were 
quite  sufficient  both  as  to  scale  and  accuracy  for  the  art 
of  war  as  it  existed  in  August,  1914,  formed  the  basis  on 
which  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne  was  fought  and  won. 

But  the  tremendous  increase  in  very  long  range  heavy 
artillery  and  the  application  of  the  principles  of  indirect 
fire  to  pieces  of  short  as  well  as  long  range,  together 
with  the  development  of  trench  warfare  along  the  entire 
line  of  contact,  created  a  demand  for  maps  vastly  better 
in  all  respects  than  those  existing  and  to  a  perfectly 
appalling  amount.  To  meet  this  demand  it  was  neces- 
sary to  plot  anew  France  and  Belgium,  not  only  along 
the  battle  front  but  for  very  extensive  areas  on  both 

216 


MAPS  217 

sides  of  it  —  even  well  behind  the  enemy  lines  —  on 
scales  varying  from  1  over  5,000,  where  every  little  detail 
of  topography,  including  such  items  as  farm  buildings, 
could  be  shown  accurately,  to  the  small  scale  of  1  over 
600,000  where   only   the  main   features  were  displayed. 

New  plates  had  to  be  made  frequently  in  order  that 
new  maps  might  be  issued  showing  changes  in  the  battle 
line  and  the  constant  alterations  in  and  additions  to  the 
trench  systems. 

To  do  this  by  the  ordinary  methods  of  field  surveying 
was  quite  impossible  within  the  limits  of  time  available, 
but  aerial  photography  came  to  the  relief  of  the  mapping 
Engineer  through  the  development  of  photographic  sur- 
veying. This  surveying  brought  into  play  a  new  art,  the 
reduction  of  air  photographs  to  map  form  and  accurate 
scale. 

This  improvement  in  aerial  photography  made  it  pos- 
sible to  carry  on  detail  mapping  in  the  enemy  territory 
and  to  plot  on  maps  the  greater  part  of  the  enemy's 
trenches,  lines  of  communication,  battery  positions,  build- 
ings and  supply  *'  dumps," 

The  variety  of  information  led  to  the  multiplication 
of  the  scale  of  maps  in  use,  while  the  complication  of 
modern  warfare  demanded  an  increased  amount  of 
graphic  representation  for  simplification.  In  order  to 
derive  the  greatest  benefit  from  the  increased  accuracy 
and  scale  of  the  battle  maps,  it  was  necessary  that  the 
artillery  using  indirect  fire  should  have  a  network  of 
triangulation  and  traverse  points  on  the  ground  in  order 
to  determine  the  exact  location  of  their  batteries. 

For  the  purpose  of  carrying  on  this  work  of  surveying, 
plotting,  map-making  and  printing  there  were  in  exist- 
ence in  the  various  European  armies  at  the  time  of  our 
entry  into  the  war  topogra])hical  sections  of  the  various 
staffs,  and  in  conformity  with  their  practice,  there  was 
organized  in  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  in  the 


218      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

summer  of  1917,  a  topographical  sub-section  of  the  Intel- 
ligence Section  of  the  General  Staff,  which  was  charged 
with  the  direction  and  supervision  of  the  engineer  troops 
assigned  to  this  work. 

On  the  military  maps  of  all  nations  the  scale  is  stated 
in  the  fonn  of  a  representative  fraction;  thus,  the  scale 
of  1  inch  to  the  mile  is  1/63360;  that  is,  1  foot  on  the  map 
represents  63360  feet  on  the  ground.  In  France  the  scale 
was  invariably  in  some  fraction  of  a  thousand  and  was 
always  spoken  of  in  terms  of  the  thousands  that  made 
the  denomination  of  the  fraction.  Thus  a  scale  of  1  over 
20,000  was  called  a  twenty-thousand  map.  The  scales 
used  by  the  various  armies  on  the  western  front  are 
shown  on  the  following  table : 

TYPES  AND  SCALES  OF  MILITARY  MAPS 


AMERICAN 

FRENCH 

BRITISH 

GERMAN 

1:5,000* 

1 :5,000* 

1 :5,000t 

1 :2,.500 

and 
1 :5,000 

l:10,000t 

l:10,000t 

l:10,000t 

1 :10,000 

1 :20,000 

1 :20,000 

1 :20,000 

1 :25,000 

1:40,000 

1:50,000 

1 :40,000 

1 :80,000 

1 :80,000 

1:100,000 

1 :100,000 

1:200,000 

1:200,000 

1 :250,000 

1 :600,000 

1 :600,000 

*  Suppressed  by  French  and  Americans,  August,  1918. 
t  Practically  discontinued  at  close  of  war. 


The  scales  shown  in  this  table  for  the  American  army 
are  purely  theoretical,  since  time  and  means  were  not 
available  for  surveying  or  redrafting.     The  American 


MAPS  219 

Expeditionary  Force  accordingly  adopted  the  French 
maps  and  standards.  The  decision  in  favor  of  using 
French  rather  than  British  maps  was  based  largely  on 
the  prospective  use  of  French  artillery  by  our  troops. 
The  main  difference  between  the  French  and  British 
maps  was  in  the  employment  of  the  metric  scale  by  the 
former  and  yard  measure  by  the  latter.  Before  the  close 
of  the  war  the  British  had  decided  to  change  to  the  metric 
system,  even  though  this  involved  re-calibration  and 
standardization  of  all  their  artillery  range  instruments. 

In  studying  this  table  a  surprising  feature  is  the  uni- 
formity of  practice  throughout  the  various  armies,  both 
friendly  and  enemy.  The  French  1/80000  and  1/50000 
were  hachured  maps  and  were,  therefore,  inferior  in 
appearance,  clearness  and  legibility  to  all  the  others 
which  were  contoured.  The  British  quickly  supplanted 
these  maps  by  a  new  1/40000  contoured  map,  but  prior 
to  the  entry  of  the  United  States  in  the  war,  only  sporadic 
attempts  were  made  locally  by  individual  French  armies 
to  produce  a  1/50000  contoured  map  to  take  the  place  of 
their  hachured  map.  The  battle  areas  occupied  by 
American  troops  were  entirely  covered  at  the  time  of  the 
armistice  with  1/50000  contoured  maps  produced  by 
their  own  topographical  sections,  and  after  the  armistice 
maps  of  this  scale  were  extended  to  include  the  Rhine 
valley  between  Cologne  and  Mayence. 

A  relatively  small  amount  of  original  topographical 
surveying  in  the  theatre  of  operations  was  done  by  the 
American  Expeditionary  Force,  which  took  its  base 
maps  showing  culture  and  topography  from  the  French. 
The  American  maps,  therefore,  partook  of  the  same  char- 
acteristics as  the  French.  But  the  American  engi- 
neers bore  their  full  share  of  aerial  surs'ejing  and 
plotting  of  enemy  organizations.  At  the  close  of  hostili- 
ties they  were  keeping  their  maps  up  to  date  and  print- 
ing all  the  maps  used  by  troops  under  American  direct 


220      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

command,  which  included  a  number  of  French  divisions. 

Comparing  the  British  and  French  maps,  the  former 
were  mechanically  superior.  They  were  printed  on  linen- 
backed  or  other  superior  qualities  of  paper,  were  more 
fmished  in  draughtsmanship  and  workmanship,  and  much 
more  durable.  They  were  also  more  accurate  in  detail 
for  a  variety  of  reasons.  The  old  French  maps  upon 
which  they  were  based  were  in  general  better  and  more 
up  to  date  in  that  part  of  the  line  which  the  British  held. 
The  British,  holding  the  most  vulnerable  part  of  the  line, 
were  massed  more  heavily  and  the  area  which  they 
were  obliged  to  cover  was  much  smaller.  They  were 
thus  enabled  to  do  more  new  surveying  and  to  more 
thoroughly  revise  the  old  work.  Another  factor 
which  cannot  be  neglected  is  characteristic  British 
thorouglmess. 

The  French  maps  were  superior  in  geodetic  control 
and  in  projection  as  is  explained  below.  While  the  Ger- 
man military  maps  of  Germany  itself  are  very  detailed 
and  complete  the  German  maps  of  the  theatre  of  war 
were  inferior  to  the  allied  production  both  in  accuracy 
and  workmanshij). 

When  the  battle  line  became  established  in  1914,  after 
the  first  battle  of  the  Marne,  and  trench  warfare  fol- 
lowed, there  was  an  immediate  demand  for  large  scale 
maps.  Before  this  demand  could  be  met,  there  grew  up 
all  along  the  line  a  series  of  disconnected  sketches  and 
maps  made  by  anyone  who  was  able  —  or  who  thought 
he  was  able  —  to  survey  and  draw.  These  unsystema- 
tized efforts  frequently  produced  grave  errors  in  the 
individual  maps,  and  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  join 
adjacent  maps  or  sketches,  the  result  was  often  pathetic. 
The  first  step  necessary  was  to  cover  the  entire  theatre 
of  operations  with  a  suitable  system  of  triangulation  and 
prepare  an  accurate  map  which  would  use  as  far  as  pos- 
sible the  work  already  done.     The  scale  adopted  was 


MAPS  221 

1/20000.  The  basis  for  the  control  was  the  ancient  tri- 
angulation  of  France  made  in  the  early  part  of  the  19th 
century,  which  located  every  church  spire  and  natural 
monument.  In  the  territory  occupied  by  the  French  this 
triangnlation  was  in  process  of  revision  before  the  war, 
and  a  considerable  amount  of  work  had  been  done.  In 
the  territory  occupied  by  the  British  there  had  been  no 
revision  and  the  country  had  been  so  much  fought  over 
by  the  time  that  the  battle  line  was  stabilized,  that  a 
large  number  of  the  natural  monuments  had  disappeared. 

The  question  of  map  projection  even  for  ordinary  pur- 
poses is  extremely  complicated  from  a  mathematical 
point  of  view.  The  difficulty  arises  from  the  effort  to 
portray  the  spherical  surface  of  the  earth  on  a  flat  map. 
This  inevitably  leads  to  distortion  and  all  systems  of  pro- 
jection are  based  on  an  attempt  to  distribute  these  dis- 
tortions in  such  a  manner  that  they  will  be  locally  neg- 
ligible. "When  the  average  map  user  attempts  to  join 
together  a  number  of  maps  of  a  series,  covering  a  con- 
siderable area,  the  difficulty  of  fitting  them  together  is 
usually  attributed  to  shrinkage  of  paper  or  defects  in 
the  maps  but  is  quite  commonly  due  to  failure  to  lay  out 
in  advance  the  system  of  projection  and  to  join  the  maps 
in  conformity  with  this  system.  For  ordinaiy  purposes 
errors  introduced  in  this  way  are  negligible. 

The  military  map,  however,  is  used  for  indirect  artil- 
lery fire  commonly  at  ranges  of  from  three  to  fifteen 
miles.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  the  exact  mathe- 
matical location  of  both  the  gun  and  the  target  be  known 
in  order  that  the  range  and  deflection  can  be  computed. 
As  battery  commanders  cannot  all  be  geodesists  nor  even 
mathematicians,  it  is  necessary  that  the  map  be  as 
nearly  free  from  error  as  possible  and  that  the  means  of 
determination  of  range  and  deflection  be  simple  or  *'  rule 
of  thumb  "  methods.  Even  if  the  map  as  originally 
drawn  be  free  from  error,  the  distortion  of  the  paper 


222      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

during  printing  or  from  tlie  varying  humidity  of  tlie 
atmosphere,  and  the  error  in  joining  adjacent  maps 
together  render  it  impossible  to  determine  distances  and 
bearings  by  measurements  on  the  maps.  There  is,  there- 
fore, superimposed  on  the  map  a  rectangular  grid  from 
which  the  coordinates  of  any  desired  points  can  be  deter- 
mined and  the  bearing  of  the  line  joining  gun  and  target 
can  be  computed  from  these  coordinates.  If  the  grid  be! 
laid  out  in  kilometer  squares  and  the  range  be  fifteen 
kilometers,  the  constant  error  due  to  mechanical  map 
imperfections  by  using  coordinates  will  be  reduced  to  one- 
fifteenth  of  the  error  from  using  map  measurements,  and 
the  errors  in  laying  out  lines  due  to  the  imperfect  joining 
of  maps  will  be  eliminated.  The  use  of  a  rectangular 
grid  and  coordinates  also  furnishes  a  ready  means  of 
quick  determination  and  description  of  the  location  of 
any  point  for  all  branches  of  the  service. 

The  difficult  problem  then  was  to  select  a  method  of 
projection,  which,  with  a  single  origin  for  the  whole 
theatre  of  operations,  would  not  introduce  greater  dis- 
tortions at  any  point  than  would  he  allowable  for  artil- 
lery fire  and  which  would  permit  the  superimposition  of 
a  rigid  rectangular  grid  with  an  origin  coincident  with 
that  of  the  projection.  This  problem  is  mathematically 
very  complex  and  volumes  have  been  wi'itten  on  the  sub- 
ject. Its  exposition  within  the  limits  of  this  chapter  is 
impossible  but  a  brief  description  will  be  given  of  the 
methods  of  projection  adopted  by  the  various  armies  and 
the  results  obtained. 

The  British  used  a  projection  known  as  the  Bonne 
system,  because  at  the  beginning  of  stabilized  warfare 
they  were  in  Belgium  where  maps  on  a  scale  of  1/40000 
on  the  Bonne  projection  existed.  When  they  extended 
south  into  France  it  was  natural  for  them  to  extend  the 
existing  map  system,  especially  since  the  triangulation 
of  France  had  been  computed  and  published  for  the 


MAPS  223 

Bonne  system  and  the  conversion  into  Lambert  coordi- 
nates involved  a  long  and  tedious  mathematical  process. 

The  Bonne  projection  is  defined  by  parallels  which  are 
concentric  circles  and  an  initial  meridian  which  is  a 
straight  line.  The  spacing  of  the  parallels  along  the 
initial  meridian  is  measured  by  the  true  latitude  arc  on 
this  meridian.  The  subsequent  meridians  are  obtained 
by  laying  off  on  successive  parallels  the  true  length  of 
the  longitude  units,  and  through  the  points  thus  found 
drawing  curves.  These  curves  will  intersect  at  a  com- 
mon point  on  the  initial  meridian.  It  will  be  seen  that 
distances  along  the  initial  meridian  and  along  the 
parallels  remain  without  error,  but  in  all  other  directions 
linear  errors  increase  with  the  distance  from  the  initial 
meridian  and  large  angular  errors  occur  for  a  single 
fixed  origin.  These  errors  might  reach  values  as  large  as 
1/380  in  length  and  2°  49'  in  angular  measure  for  the 
area  involved.  In  order  to  reduce  these  errors  to  the 
allowable  limit  for  artillery  fire  it  was  necessary  for  the 
British  to  adopt  several  different  origins  for  the  pro- 
jection and  the  superimposed  grid.  "Where  the  map 
sheets  prepared  on  different  origins  came  together  seri- 
ous difficulties  of  adjustment  arose. 

The  projection  used  by  the  French  in  preparing  their 
maps  was  the  Lambert,  whose  essential  features  are 
that  its  meridians  are  straight  lines  converging  at  a  com- 
mon point  and  that  its  parallels  are  concentric  circles 
whose  centres  are  at  the  point  of  convergency  of  the 
meridians,  thus  fonning  a  Rini])le  conic  projection.  Dis- 
tances along  the  initial  parallels  have  no  distortion,  but 
all  other  distances  and  angles  are  slightly  distorted.  By 
adjusting  the  distances  between  successive  parallels  a 
balance  may  be  reached  where  the  angular  and  linear 
distortions  are  the  mininuun.  This  adjusted  Lambert 
is  known  as  a  conformal  projection  to  distinguish  it  from 
a  true  mathematical  projection.    For  an  area  not  exceed- 


224      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ing  four  degrees  of  latitude  and  extending  indefinitely  in 
longitude,  angular  values  are  correct  for  all  practical 
purposes  and  linear  distances  are  correct  within  1/2,000. 

The  Germans  used  a  polyhedral  projection  over  lim- 
ited areas,  were  always  bothered  by  failure  of  their  maps 
to  join  up  at  the  division  line  between  these  various 
areas,  and  were  consequently  compelled  to  print  over- 
lapping maps  for  each  section. 

When  a  single  Lambert  projection  is  extended  over  a 
wide  range  of  latitude,  a  conformal  adjustment  intro- 
duces serious  distortions.  France  was,  therefore, 
divided  into  two  Lambert  Systems,  the  Lambert  North, 
between  latitudes  50  and  54,  and  Lambert  South  which 
included  the  territory  south  of  latitude  50.  Almost  the 
entire  theatre  of  active  oiDcrations  was  included 
within  the  area  of  the  Lambert  North  System. 

On  this  projection  was  superimposed  a  rectangular 
kilometric  grid.  The  origin  of  the  projection  and  the 
origin  of  the  grid  system  were,  of  course,  coincident; 
the  Y  ordinate  of  the  grid  system  being  superimposed 
on  the  axis  of  origin  of  the  projection  and  the  X  abscisas 
drawn  at  right  angles  to  it.  The  projection  being  conic 
and  the  grid  rectangular,  north  as  shown  by  the  grid 
agreed  with  true  north  only  at  the  origin  and  there  was 
a  constantly  increasing  divergence  when  moving  in 
either  direction  from  the  origin.  This  had  no  effect  what- 
ever on  the  use  of  the  map  by  artillery  but  for  geodetic 
reasons  and  comparison  with  magnetic  north  the  amount 
of  this  divergence  of  the  grid  north  from  l)otli  true  and 
magnetic  north  was  shown  on  each  map. 

This  superimposed  grid  system  on  the  projection 
divided  the  battle  maps  into  squares,  one  lineal  kilo- 
meter on  a  side.  The  lines  creating  this  division  were 
numbered  successively  from  left  to  right  and  from  the 
bottom  of  the  sheet  to  the  top.  These  lines,  then,  formed 
the  basis  for  the  French  system  of  coordinates. 


MAPS  225 

Through  the  unremitting  labors  of  the  hastily  organ- 
ized French  topographical  sections,  there  finally  emerged 
about  a  year  after  the  opening  of  the  war  in  1914, 
the  final  French  battle  map  or  '*  Plan  Directeur,"  and 
since  the  latter  was  adopted  by  the  American  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  it  will  be  described  in  detail.  The  scale 
was  1  over  20,000  and  the  contour  interval  ten  meters, 
or  about  thirty-three  feet;  the  culture,  including  both  the 
natural  features  and  the  works  of  man  being  printed  in 
black,  the  contours  in  brown.  Since  the  map  was  to  be 
used  for  over-printing  enemy  and  friendly  works  and  for 
numerous  other  over-printings,  only  these  two  colors 
were  used  for  the  base.  For  the  same  reason  care  had 
to  be  taken  not  to  overload  the  map  with  detail.  The 
same  consideration  governed  the  use  of  the  rather  largo 
contour  interval. 

These  maps  were  covered  with  a  rectangular  grid  of 
reference  lines  at  intervals  of  one  kilometer,  or  about 
six-tenths  of  a  mile  in  each  direction,  also  printed  in 
black.  The  origin  of  the  coordinates  was  at  a  point  in 
the  southwest  of  France  and  the  coordinates  increased 
to  the  northeast.  As  the  battle  line  ran  generally  in  an 
easterly  and  westerly  direction  and  was  about  500  kilo- 
meters long,  the  maximum  east  and  west  coordinate  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Switzerland  was  +500. 

The  numerical  X  and  Y  coordinates  of  each  grid  line 
were  printed  on  the  margin,  the  unit  being  one  kilometer 
or  1,000  meters.  Wlien  locating  a  point  within  a  kilo- 
meter square,  coordinates  were  written  out  with  a 
decimal  point  after  the  kilometer,  the  X  coordinate  first 
as  shown  on  Fig.  4,  page  231. 

For  a  location  to  ten  meters  this  meant  writing  ten 
figures,  which  proved  too  complicated  and  cumber- 
some, so  the  practice  grew  up  of  dropping  the  first  two 
figures  of  each  coordinate  and  writing  the  six  figures  on 
one  line;  the  first  three  representing  the  X  coordinate 


226      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

and  the  last  three  the  Y.  I^aturally,  with  this  method, 
repetitions  could  occur  every  ten  kilometers.  Both  Brit- 
ish and  German  practice  avoided  these  repetitions  by 
using  complicated  systems  of  lettering  and  squares. 

The  British  maps  were  printed  on  sheets  measuring 
twenty-six  inches  high  by  thirty-five  and  one-half  inches 
wide,  on  which  the  actual  map  covered  nineteen  and  three- 
quarter  inches  by  thirty-one  and  one-quarter  inches.  As 
issued  they  were  mounted  on  cloth  and  folded  to  four  and 
one-half  inches  by  six  and  one-half  inches,  a  very  con- 
venient size  for  the  pocket.  The  main  grid  system 
divided  the  surface  into  squares  6,000  yards  per  side, 
each  one  being  given  a  lettered  designation,  and  as  there 
were  twenty-four  large  squares  to  a  sheet,  these  letters 
ranged  from  A  to  X  inclusive.  The  large  squares  were 
divided  into  secondary  squares  measuring  1,000  yards 
per  side  and  numbered  1  to  30,  a  separate  series  for  each 
letter  and  each  secondary  square  subdivided  into  four 
smaller  squares  lettered,  a,  b,  c,  d.  The  map,  p.  227,  is  a 
photo  reproduction,  exact  size  of  a  part  of  a  British 
1/40000  map.  The  large  or  primary  squares  with  their 
designating  letters  are  shown,  as  well  as  the  numbered 
secondary  squares,  and  the  subdivision  of  the  latter  into 
small  squares  indicated  by  the  dotted  lines.  The  method 
of  portraying  the  features  of  the  topography  and  the 
contours  are  clearly  seen,  although  colors  are  lacking  in 
the  plate.  To  show  how  the  system  of  coordinates  was 
used  to  describe  the  location  of  a  point,  Vaucelletto 
Farm  can  be  taken  as  an  example.  This  would  be  writ- 
ten 57CX13c8.5,  where  57C  is  the  number  of  the  map, 
X  the  primary  square,  13  the  secondary  square,  c  the 
lower  left-hand  quarter  of  the  secondary  square,  and  8.5 
the  horizontal  and  vertical  coordinates  in  the  square  c, 
mieasured  from  its  lower  left-hand  corner  as  an  origin  of 
local  coordinates.  As  these  small  squares  measured  250 
yards  to  a  side,  each  decimal  unit  in  the  coordinates 


MAPS 


227 


For  Description  See  Page  220. 


MAPS  229 

represented  a  distance  of  only  twenty-five  yards.  By 
using  larger  scale  maps  and  writing  these  coordinates  in 
two  or  even  tliree  places  of  decimals,  a  very  high  degree 
of  accuracy  in  writing  the  location  of  points  on  a  map 
was  obtained. 

Finally,  toward  the  close  of  the  war,  all  allied  nations 
combined  in  a  modification  of  the  French  system. 
Every  fifty-kilometer  square  was  divided  into  twenty- 
five  ten-kilometer  squares,  each  of  which  was  given 
a  separate  letter  of  the  alphabet.  Enlargements  of  a  ten- 
kilometer  square  and  of  a  kilometer  square  are  shown  in 
Figs.  2  and  3,  and  the  method  of  designating  a  point  is 
described  under  Fig.  3.  At  the  close  of  hostilities 
both  French  and  Americans  had  effected  the  change. 
When  we  consider  the  incessant  use  of  the  military 
map  to  give  exact  locations,  and  the  constant  repeti- 
tion of  these  locations  in  documents  by  the  artillery  and 
infantry  over  the  wireless,  telephone  and  telegraph,  the 
importance  of  this  simplification  and  improvement  can- 
not be  overestimated.  This  change,  together  with  many 
others  looking  toward  the  simplification  and  standard- 
ization of  allied  practice,  was  effected  at  one  of  the  meet- 
ings of  the  Inter-Allied  Map  conferences,  which  were 
instituted  as  a  result  of  America's  entry  into  the  war. 

The  map  on  page  227  has  particular  local  interest. 
It  gives  a  part  of  the  battlefield  of  Cambrai,  that  city 
being  just  beyond  the  upper  right  corner,  the  British 
offensive  in  that  battle  beginning  just  east  of  Villers- 
Guislain,  extending  thence  north  and  west  past  Gonne- 
lieu  and  through  Villers-Plouich.  Here  it  was  that  the 
Germans  made  their  coimter  offensive,  and  at  the  point 
marked  **  Station  '*  in  square  K31,  the  Eleventh  Engi- 
neers made  their  stand,  described  officially  as  the  first 
American  participation  in  actual  fighting.  The  village 
just  on  the  edge  of  the  map  west  of  R31  is  Gouzeaucourt. 
The   size   of  the   sheet   was   exceedingly   convenient   to 


.S)0       310        3Z0        330        340        350 


A 


F 


L 


Q 


V 


B        C 


M 


R 


V/ 


H 


N 


X 


D 


J 


O 


T 


Y 


K 


U 


50 


Kilo  meters 


-300 


-290 


-280 


—£70 


-2(50 


-250 


Fia.  1. — Inter-Allied  System.    Method  of  Lettering  Fifty 
Kilometer  Squares. 


300    f      Z      3 


zecy 


9- 
8- 

7- 
6- 
5- 
4 


2Z_ 


5!fi_ 


^ 


3 

2- 

I- 

250- 


09 


^ 


KL_14 


esL_.i^ 


92_ 


QL- 


•a. 


•lu. 


99  ,.  ,.'<?.,    .\? 


SL 


281 


?2_.5l 


SL 


fSi. 


M. 


22^ 


s     7    a    9   310 


^_ 


4L 


4L 


5L 


ifi_ 


78..  la?     3ft 


aL 


K!„..i5a„  [^  .^,.,.,19?, ^ 


IL 


21. 


a2_ 


»^ 


aa_ 


«L 


M_ 


22- 


m. 


\Q  Kjlgrp^ers^ 


Fig.  2. — Inter-Allied  System.    Ten  Kilometer  Square  Enlarged — Method 
of  Numbering  Kilometer  Squares. 

230 


303 


304 


I  Ktlomgter      J 


Fio.  3.—  I.VTEB- Allied  System.  Kilometer  square  enlarged.  Point  "  A  " 
is  the  same  as  shown  on  Figs.  1  and  2.  Coordinates  of  Point 
"  A "  within  Square  V  are  Written  V3593,  a  Point  20  Meters 
N.  and  E.  of  Point  "  A  "  would  be  V352932.  A  Point  with  Sim- 
ilar Figures  May   Occur   Every  50  Kilometers. 


176 


175- 


I  Kt'lomg-hgr 


-f       750  meters      ^ 


r^- 


??0  me+ens 


243 


244 


Fio.  4.— Old  Fbench  System.  Kilometer  Square.  Coordinates  of  Point 
"A"  Written  as  Follows,  in  Full:  243.75—175.22,  or  Abbrevi- 
ated:     375.522. 


231 


232      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

handle,  and  the  form  was  better  than  the  American  in 
that  the  major  dimension  was  right  to  loft,  which  con- 
formed to  the  shape  of  desk  tops  and  was  easier  to  hold 
in  the  hands  than  one  where  the  major  dimension  was 
from  top  to  bottom. 

The  base  map  thus  prepared  formed  a  foundation  for 
the  over-printing  of  military  information.  The  Battle 
Map,  or  ^'  Plan  Directeur,"  normally  had  over-printed 
on  it  the  enemy's  trenches  and  defensive  organizations 
and  the  location  of  the  enemy's  batteries  and  means  of 
communication.  In  this  form  it  was  issued  to  troops 
down  to  units  as  small  as  companies. 

Hostile  trench  systems  were  over-printed  in  blue  and 
friendly  trenches  in  red  on  the  French  maps.  The  Ger- 
mans reversed  this  procedure  so  that  a  captured  German 
map  could  be  interpreted  by  the  French  in  the  same  way; 
as  one  of  their  own  maps.  The  British  color  system  was 
the  same  as  the  German,  that  is,  allied  trenches  in  blue, 
enemy  in  red. 

The  Battle  Map  again  formed  a  base  for  the  prepara- 
tion of  special  maps,  of  which  the  most  important  was 
the  Artillery  Bombardment  Objective  map,  which  accent- 
uated by  over-printing  in  different  colors  the  j)oints 
upon  which  fire  should  be  concentrated  so  that  the  maxi- 
mum result  could  be  obtained  from  the  minimum 
expenditure  of  ammunition. 

Next  in  importance  was  the  ^*  Enemy  First-Line 
Positions,"  a  detailed  study  for  the  infantry,  portraying 
the  important  objectives  in  the  enemy's  defensive  organi- 
zation and  the  manner  in  which  they  were  held,  the 
important  trenches  being  accentuated. 

Similar  special  maps  were  prepared  for  other  offen- 
sive branches,  such  as  the  air  service  and  tanks.  Secret 
maps  of  our  own  trenches  shown  in  red,  and  lines  of  com- 
munication were  made  for  our  own  construction  and  sup- 
ply services. 


MAPS  233 

The  size  of  the  American  sheets  was  generally  twenty- 
eight  and  one-half  inches  by  forty-two  inches,  the  major 
dimension  being  from  top  to  bottom. 

To  insure  the  most  efficient  use  by  the  artillery  of  the 
Battle  Map  and  Artillery  Bombardment  Objective  Map, 
it  was  necessary  to  lay  out  on  the  ground  for  each  battery 
or  group  of  batteries  traverse  and  triangulation  points, 
from  which  their  exact  location  and  direction  to  the  vari- 
ous objectives  could  be  determined. 

In  describing  the  organization  of  the  American 
topographical  section,  it  is  necessary  to  explain  briefly 
the  growth  of  the  European  topographical  sections  prior 
to  our  entry  into  the  war  and  their  organization  as  found 
by  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  on  the  arrival  of 
its  first  units  in  France. 

The  French  topographical  organization  was  formed 
by  a  combination  of  the  mobilized  ''  Service  Geograph- 
ique  de  PArmee  "  and  the  ''  Groupes  de  Canevas  de 
Tir,"  which  latter  may  be  freely  translated  as  Fire  Con- 
trol Sections.  The  ^'  Service  Geographique,"  operating 
in  time  of  peace  under  the  direction  of  the  Minister 
of  War,  is  the  organization  which  would  exist  in  this 
country  if  the  Coast  and  Geodetic,  Geological,  Hydro- 
graphic  and  Land  Surveys  were  combined  into  one 
bureau  under  the  War  Department.  At  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  the  *'  Service  Geograi^hi'que  "  was  strong  in 
personnel  and  materiel.  The  ''  Groupes  de  Canevas  de 
Tir  "  were  organized  originally  by  the  artillery  and  were 
controlled  by  that  arm  until  taken  over  by  the 
*'  Service  Geographique."  After  that  the  ''  Service 
Geographique  "  exercised  technical  supervision  over 
their  work  and  furnished  them  men  and  materials. 
However,  in  the  armies  and  lower  imits  they  came  at 
first  under  the  control  of  the  Second  Bureau  or  Intelli- 
gence Sections  of  the  respective  staffs,  and  finally,  rising 
to  be  a  separate  branch  of  the  staff,  reporting  directly 
to  the  Chiefs  of  Staff  of  the  respective  units. 


234      AMERICAN"  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

In  the  British  army  the  place  of  the  "  Service 
Geographique  "  was  taken  by  the  "  Ordnance  Survey," 
operating  under  the  control  of  the  map  section  of  the 
general  staff.  The  units  in  the  field  were  field  survey 
companies  working  as  part  of  a  map  subdivision  of  the 
intelligence  sections  of  their  respective  staffs,  officially 
known  throughout  the  British  Expeditionary  Force  as 
*'  Maps."  Due  to  its  work  in  the  British  colonial 
empire,  the  Ordnance  Survey  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
was  rich  in  experienced  personnel.  Like  the  American 
topographical  division,  the  entire  personnel  of  the  Brit- 
ish service,  including  the  staff  officers,  was  drawn  from 
the  engineers.  In  both  the  British  and  French  armies, 
the  Sound  and  Flash  Ranging  services,  which  had  grown 
to  large  porportions,  were  under  the  control  of  the 
topograjDhical  divisions. 

The  German  system  was  somewhat  similar  in  organi- 
zation and  staff  control,  except  that  the  sound  and  flash 
ranging  and  a  considerable  part  of  the  topographical 
duties  which  pertain  directly  to  the  control  of  artillery 
fire  remained  under  the  artillery,  as  was  formerly  the 
case  with  the  French. 

It  was  necessary  for  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force  to  create  not  only  topographical  sections  for  its 
armies,  but  also  to  maintain  in  France  a  service  similar 
to  the  British  Ol^dnance  Survey  and  French  Service 
Geographique. 

Prior  to  our  entry  into  the  war,  map  making  had  been 
a  duty  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  but  for  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force,  staff  control  was  adopted  in  con- 
formity with  European  practice.  Had  it  been  a  ques- 
tion of  original  topographical  surveys  alone,  the  work 
might  have  remained  under  engineer  direction,  but  due 
to  the  development  of  airplane  photogi^aphy,  most  of  the 
maps  included  information  regarding  the  enemy,  which 
had  been  collected  by  the  intelligence  section  of  the  Gen- 


MAPS  235 

eral  Staff.  The  topographical  work  was  accordingly 
organized  with  engineer  personnel  under  the  topograph- 
ical division  of  the  Second  or  Intelligence  Section,  Gen- 
eral Staff,  commonly  abbreviated  to  G-2-C.  At  general 
headquarters  in  each  army,  corps  and  division,  there  was 
a  staff  ofncer  (assigned  from  the  engineers)  in  the  G-2 
or  intelligence  section,  who  exercised  supervision  and 
technical  control  of  the  work  of  the  following  troops : 

G.  H.  Q. —  One  battalion  of  three  companies  (topograph- 
ical) 29th  Engineers,  operating  the  base 
printing  plant  which  corresponded  to  the 
Service  Geographique  and  Ordnance  Sur- 
vey', and  also  furnishing  a  topographical 
section  to  the  general  staff  at  General 
Headquarters. 

For  each  army: — One  battalion  of  three  companies 
(topographical)  29th  Engineers,  corre- 
sponding to  the  *'  Groupes  de  Canevas  de 
Tir  "  and  "  Field  Survey  Companies." 

For  Divisions  and  Corps: — Detachments  from  the  Army 
Topographical  battalions. 

At  the  time  of  the  Annistice  there  were  two  armies  in 
the  field  and  the  authorized  strength  of  the  attached 
topographical  troops  was  nominally  nine  companies.  Of 
these  only  five  were  on  hand,  of  which  three  had  been 
organized  in  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  from 
engineer  replacements.  This  lack  of  personnel  was 
largely  compensated  by  the  eeal  and  efficiency  of  the 
enlisted  men,  who  set  a  pace  that  although  it  lasted  over 
the  emergency,  could  not  have  been  sustained  indefinitely. 

The  detailed  duties  of  the  topographical  organization 
formed  from  the  Twenty-ninth  Engineers  were  as 
follows: 

Surveying. 

Kestitution  of  aerial  photographs. 


236      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Map  making. 

Map  printing. 

Map  distribution. 

Special  maps  and  plans  for  staff  branches. 

Triangulation  and  traverse  control  of  artillery  fire. 

Relief  map  making. 

Panoramic  photography  and  visibility  studies. 

Photographic  reproduction. 

Type  printing,  including  publications,  pamphlets  and 
propaganda. 

Engraving. 

Adopting  standards  and  furnishing  technical  advice 
and  supervision. 

In  conformity  with  French  and  British  practice  and 
because  it  could  be  more  easily  organized  and  developed 
by  engineer  personnel,  the  Sound  and  Flash  Ranging 
Service,  which  is  more  properly  a  duty  of  the  artillery, 
was  also  placed  under  the  control  of  the  Topographical 
Division,  but  its  work  will  be  described  in  another 
chapter. 

Another  important  aid  to  the  artillery,  which  in 
time  of  active  operations  occupied  about  one-third  of  the 
personnel  of  the  army  topographical  sections,  was 
the  means  afforded  by  which  the  batteries  could  locate 
their  positions  on  the  map  and  thus  compute  the  bearing 
and  distance  to  invisible  targets.  The  coordinates  of  all 
prominent  natural  objects  were  either  obtained  from  old 
records  or  determined  by  triangulation  and  were  issued 
in  the  form  of  tables,  with  silhouette  sketches  for  pur- 
poses of  identification,  to  all  battery  commanders.  Any 
artilleryman  within  view  of  three  points  could  locate  his 
battery  by  tri-secting  with  a  plane  table.  This  was  suf- 
ficient for  rough  work  in  open  warfare,  but  when  the  bat- 
tle line  was  stabilized,  traverses  tied  into  the  triangula- 
tion system  were  run  through  all  actual  or  prospective 
artillery  positions.     These  traverses  were  marked  with 


MAPS  237 

special  stakes  and  the  coordinates  of  each  station  and  the 
bearings  of  the  lines  connecting  them  were  issued  in  the 
form  of  tables.  These  traverses,  called  by  the  French 
"  Canevas  de  Tir  "  or  **  network  of  fire,"  enabled  very 
large  concentrations  of  artillery  to  be  directed  with  accu- 
racy on  invisible  targets  without  any  preliminary  regis- 
tration. This  survey  work  was  all  done  by  detachments 
of  the  Twenty-ninth  Engineers  from  the  army  topo- 
graphical battalions. 

When  the  first  units  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force  arrived  in  France,  in  July,  1917,  the  Topograpliical 
Service  consisted  of  but  one  officer  and  eight  men,  oper- 
ating a  hand  lithographic  press.  The  first  and  most 
urgent  undertaking  of  procuring  and  distributing  maps 
was  immediately  begun,  the  sources  of  supply  being  the 
French  and  British  topographical  services.  The  next 
step  was  the  construction  and  the  accumulation  of  the 
mechanical  equipment  for  a  base  printing  plant,  corre- 
sponding to  that  of  the  Service  Geographique,  and  for 
smaller  plants  for  armies,  corps  and  divisions.  All  of 
the  equipment  and  supplies  were  furnished  by  the  Engi- 
neer Corps  in  the  early  stages  through  purchase  in 
Europe,  and,  toward  the  end,  largely  by  shipment  from 
the  United  States.  The  base  printing  plant  was  placed 
in  operation  in  July,  1918.  After  September  1st,  the 
American  E.  F.  was  independent  of  outside  aid  for  its 
supply  of  maps.  The  First  Anny  plant  began  to  work 
in  August,  that  of  the  Second  Army  in  October,  and  of 
the  Third  in  November.  Meanwhile,  plant,  equipment 
and  personnel  had  been  furnished  to  each  corps  as  organ- 
ized, the  total  number  of  corps  having  reached  nine 
in  November,  1918.  These  plants  turned  out  more  than 
15,000,000  impressions  and  printed  about  4,500,000  of  the 
G,000,000  maps  distributed  to  the  American  Expedition- 
ary Force. 

While  the  mechanical  problems  connected  with  install- 


238      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ing,  equipping  and  operating  the  plant  were  successfully 
solved,  the  technical  problems  of  procuring  information 
and  the  reduction  of  this  information  to  the  most  satis- 
factory form  for  presentation,  although  also  successfully 
met,  were  much  more  difficult  of  accomplishment. 
This  was  due  partly  to  the  inherent  difficulties,  but 
largely  to  the  lack  at  the  outset  of  trained  personnel  and 
the  entire  newness  of  so  many  details  of  military  map 
making,  that  had  arisen  as  creations  of  the  war.  Of  the 
1,800  officers  and  men  in  the  topographical  service  at  the 
conclusion  of  hostilities,  about  one-half  were  employed 
in  the  reproduction  plants,  on  work  that  differed  only 
in  detail  from  their  regular  vocations  before  their 
entrance  into  the  army.  The  other  half,  scattered 
throughout  the  field  forces,  were  called  on  to  practice 
arts  which  were  either  unknown  or  little  used  before  the 
war.  The  most  important  of  these  were:  interpretation 
of  aerial  photographs  and  their  restitution  or  reduction 
to  map  form  and  scale;  the  preparation  of  initial  copies 
of  countless  special  and  periodical  maps  for  Intelligence 
operations,  artillery,  and  other  branches,  a  work  which 
required  comprehensive  military  knowledge ;  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  organization  for  gathering  the  necessary 
information  and  for  editing  and  publishing  it  in  intelligi- 
ble form  and  on  a  time  schedule,  and  the  establishment 
of  the  necessary  liaisons  with  troops  and  with  staff  corps 
for  this  purpose;  traverse  and  triangulation  surveys  for 
the  control  of  artillery  fire  and  publication  of  the  results, 
which  required  special  knowledge  of  the  principles  of 
artillery  orientation;  the  preparation  of  relief  maps;  and 
the  making  of  visibility  studies.  The  personnel  for  all 
of  this  work  were  trained  at  the  topographical  schools 
especially  established  at  Langres  in  the  autumn  of  1917, 
using  French  and  British  documents  and  photographs 
with  American  instructors  who  had  been  instructed  in 
French  and  British  schools. 


MAPS  239 

Beginning  with  the  Chateau-Thierry  operations  in 
June,  1918,  graduates  of  this  school  were  furnished  to 
the  topogTaphical  sections  of  corps  and  armies,  and 
American  data  began  to  be  used  in  the  school.  Actual 
surveys  made  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Armistice 
showed  a  gratifying  degree  of  accuracy  in  the  study  and 
mapping  of  enemy  organization. 

Not  only  was  the  American  army  independent  by 
means  of  its  own  special  force  in  the  making  and  sup- 
plying of  military  maps  at  the  close  of  the  war,  but  it 
had  outstripped  the  other  allied  services  in  two  highly 
important  respects :  speed  and  mobility. 

Speed,  so  essential  in  all  military  operations,  was 
imperative  in  the  publication  of  maps  and  other  intelli- 
gence information.  In  war,  information  a  day  late  is 
often  useless.  Greater  speed  was  secured  through  the 
superiority  of  American  machinery  and  through  the  char- 
acteristic desire  of  Americans  to  use  only  the  latest 
improvements  in  plant  and  methods. 

Mobility  was  secured  by  mounting  specially  designed 
lithographic  presses  and  auxiliary  apparatus  on  motor 
trucks,  so  that  they  were  enabled  to  accompany  armies 
and  corps  throughout  their  movements  and  to  begin  to 
operate  within  two  hours  after  arrival  at  any  place. 

The  paralysis  resulting  from  the  lack  of  such  mobility 
was  illustrated  during  the  German  offensives  in  the 
spring  of  1918,  when  three  allied  army  reproduction 
plants  were  put  out  of  action  for  periods  of  three  or  four 
weeks  with  the  same  serious  effects  as  the  stoppage  of 
the  daily  newspaper  would  have  on  modern  civilization. 
During  the  advance  to  the  Eliine,  the  British  and  French 
armies  were  accompanied  by  mobile  lithographic  trains 
loaned  by  the  American  arm}'  and  operated  by  American 
crews.  The  work  done  by  these  trains  was  the  only 
reproduction  work  which  these  armies  had  for  nearly  a 
mouth. 


240      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Before  proceeding  with  a  further  detailed  description 
of  the  base  printing  plant  and  mobile  trains,  it  would  be 
well  to  outline  the  division  of  work  between  the  base 
plant  and  the  armies.  The  surveying,  drafting  and  print- 
ing of  base  maps,  and  the  making  of  relief  maps,  was 
done  by  the  base  troops.  The  interpretation  and  study 
of  aerial  photographs,  their  restitution  and  the  over- 
printing of  enemy  organizations  on  base  maps  to  make 
a  battle  map,  and  the  establishment  of  artillery  firing 
data  were  the  functions  of  armies  and  were  performed 
by  the  army  topographical  battalion.  In  one  American 
army  at  the  close  of  hostilities  thirty-three  periodic 
maps  were  being  jaroduced,  the  time  of  publication 
ranging  from  daily  to  monthly  and  the  editions  from 
fifty  to  4,000  copies.  In  times  of  great  emergency,  such 
as  during  the  St.  Mihiel  and  Meuse-Argonne  offensives, 
when  it  was  necessary  to  revise  and  republish  in  large 
quantities  every  map  in  the  army,  the  base  printing 
plant  came  to  the  army's  assistance,  printing  nearly 
1,000,000  copies  for  these  two  operations  alone. 

The  base  printing  plant  employed  about  800  men, 
divided  into  two  twelve-hour  shifts,  and  occupied  about 
60,000  square  feet  of  floor  space.  It  included  thirty- 
eight  lithographic  presses,  eighteen  type  presses,  six 
linotype  machines,  stereotype,  photo-engraving  and  zinc- 
etching  appliances,  wet  and  dry-i^late  photography  trans- 
ferring process  rooms,  power  plant,  machine  shop  and 
the  necessary  auxiliary  machinery.  Wliile  not  so  large 
as  similar  plants  of  the  Allies,  it  was  completely  equipped 
and  especially  designed  for  the  production  of  a  large  bulk 
of  work  at  great  speed.  The  army  plants  were  much  the 
same  in  principle  though  on  a  smaller  scale.  The  mobile 
army  printing  train,  which  was  not  completely  assem- 
bled and  in  operation  until  after  the  Armistice,  consisted 
of  thirty-nine  motor  trucks  ranging  from  1,500  pounds 
to  five  tons  capacity  and  contained  the  most  modern 


MAPS  241 

equipment  for  lithograpliy  and  map  printing,  type  print- 
ing and  stereotyping  and  wet  and  dry-plate  photography, 
zinc  etching  and  photo  engraving.  Each  train  was  inde- 
pendent in  supply,  power  and  repair  facilities,  and 
contained  its  own  telephone  exchange  and  wireless 
apparatus. 

There  was  no  opportunity  to  try  out  this  train  in 
actual  warfare,  but  its  component  parts  had  all  been  in 
service  with  various  corps  and  armies  during  hostilities. 
Nevertheless,  to  demonstrate  its  practicability,  it  was 
operated  in  the  field  for  one  month  under  simulated  war 
conditions,  and  proved  a  complete  success.  That  its 
value  was  appreciated  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that 
the  French  government  placed  in  the  United  States  an 
order  for  ten  lithographic  trucks  to  form  a  nucleus  for 
similar  trains  for  tbeir  armies. 

General  Pershing  stated  in  an  official  communication 
that  no  army  ever  started  an  oifensive  operation  better 
provided  with  intelligence,  information  and  maps  than 
the  First  American  Army  in  the  St.  Mihiel  offensive. 
This  was  due  to  the  work  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Engineers, 
who,  in  addition  to  printing  and  publishing  the  great 
mass  of  intelligence  documents  that  were  used,  also  fur- 
nished 327,000  copies  of  maps  prepared  from  data  fur- 
nished or  collected  by  them.  The  initial  issue  of  fifteen 
tons  of  these  maps  was  prepared  in  less  than  two  weeks 
and  was  so  timed  as  to  permit  distribution  to  the  numer- 
ous units  which  moved  to  the  front  from  all  portions  of 
the  American  area  at  the  last  moment  in  great  secrecy. 
The  high  standard  set  in  this  achievement  was  main- 
tained, and  even  exceeded  in  some  respects,  in  the  more 
difficult  ]\reuse-Argonne  offensive. 

The  striking  feature  of  this  operation  was  the  groat 
independence  and  efficiency  developed  by  the  corps  print- 
ing trains  which  were  operated  by  the  detachments  of 
the  Twenty-ninth  Engineers.    In  the  war  of  movement 


242      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

and  tlie  consequent  interruption  of  communications  which 
developed  in  this  operation,  time  was  not  available  for 
preparing  up-to-date  battle  maps  in  the  army  topograph- 
ical section  and  base  printing  plant.  Mobile  printing 
trains,  however,  made  it  possible  to  print  maps  in  quanti- 
ties and  with  great  speed  at  the  front,  and  the  value  of 
this  work  to  cur  combatant  troops  was  immeasurable. 

After  the  Armistice  there  was  little  diminution  in  the 
work  of  the  Twenty-ninth  Engineers  until  their  depar- 
ture for  the  United  States,  in  June,  1919.  In  addition 
to  the  organizaion  and  equipment  of  the  Third  Army 
Topographical  Section  for  the  Army  of  Occupation, 
intensive  work  was  carried  on  in  the  preparation  of  maps 
of  the  occupied  territory  and  of  other  parts  of  Germany 
beyond  the  Rhine,  that  the  army  might  be  prepared  for 
the  possibility  of  a  further  advance.  In  addition  to  the 
army  and  battle  maps,  great  numbers  of  maps  were  pro- 
duced to  accompany  historical  and  technical  reports  of 
various  department  chiefs  of  the  American  Expedition- 
ary Force. 

The  volume  of  work  accomplished  is  shown  in  the  fol- 
lowing tables : 

LITHOGRAPHIC  MAPS 


NITMBER  OP  COPIES 


NtTMBER  OP 
IMPRESSIONS 


5,000 

10,000 

20,000 

60,000 

800,000 

200,000 

Special 

Map  total 

Miscellaneous  Lithosranhic  Work 


12,050 
LSI. 420 
1,016,825 
498,385 
569,975 
494,075 
458,608 

3,234,330 
1,371,200 

4,605,530 


22,100 
450,720 

2,361,300 
864,825 
596,250 

2,164,560 
875,530 

7,335,285 
1,961,440 

9,296,725 


MAPS 

ALL  GRAPHIC  REPRODUCTION  WORK 


m 


ORDERS 

IMPRESSIONS 

Lithographic  Map  Department .        

2,275 
855 

1,197 
174 

9,290,725 

Type  Printing  Di^partmcnt 

5,865,953 

Photographic  Doj)artmc'nt 

23,791 

Photograpllic  Engraving  Department 

1,622 

Totals 

4,497 

15,208,091 

When  it  is  realized  that  two-thirds  of  this  work  was 
done  in  the  five  months  from  August  to  December,  1918, 
this  represents  an  enviable  record  of  achievement.  It 
m.ust  be  remembered,  however,  that  less  than  half  the 
men  attached  to  the  topographical  section  were  engaged 
in  reproduction.  The  work  of  the  others,  whether  in 
running  artillery  traverses  or  taking  photographs  under 
fire,  or  in  the  delicate  arts  of  interpretation  and  restitu- 
tion, cannot  be  measured  by  statistics. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  AND  SEARCHLIGHT  DETECTION 

If  the  target  was  unseen  by  and  perhaps  unknown  to 
the  gunners,  through  the  use  of  indirect  fire  controlled 
from  a  distant  observation  point,  so  were  the  guns  them- 
selves equally  invisible  from  the  target.  But  if  an 
effective  reply  to  a  harassing  fire  were  to  be  made,  the 
position  of  the  guns  must  somehow  be  accurately  deter- 
mined, even  in  spite  of  this  invisibility. 

In  former  years  when  the  range  of  guns  did  not 
exceed  a  mile  or  at  most  two,  and  guns  were  individually 
aimed  over  open  sights,  they  were  in  full  view,  or  if  shel- 
tered, their  location  would  be  disclosed  by  the  pall  of 
smoke.  With  guns  of  much  longer  range  and  no  telltale 
smoke,  special  means  of  discovery  had  to  be  devised. 
This  gave  rise  to  a  most  interesting  game  of  hide  and 
seek,  where  both  sides  resorted  to  every  strategy  of  con- 
cealment and  means  of  discovery.  One  form  of  mislead- 
ing disguise  was  to  create  false  positions.  To  make  guns 
unrecognizable,  ingenious  forms  of  concealment  were 
adopted,  taking  suggestions  from  the  coloring  of  the  wild 
animals,  which  affords  them  protection  by  making  them 
indistinct  through  their  resemblance  to  surrounding 
earth  or  foliage. 

To  tear  off  the  hiding  veil,  to  see  the  unseeable,  to 
learn  of  the  unknown,  recourse  was  had,  since  the  human 
eye  was  useless  and  the  ear  unreliable,  to  many  beautiful 
applications  of  optics  and  acoustics,  employing  electro- 
mechanical instruments  almost  uncanny  in  their  accu- 
Tac}^  Among  these  instruments  were  the  microphone 
which  transforms  the  vibrations  of  sound  into  fluctua- 

244 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  245 

I 
tions  of  electric  current,  the  geophone  which  multiplies 
the  intensity  of  sound  travelling  through  the  ground  to 
many  times  its  original  volume,  and  the  amplifier  which 
magnifies  the  effect  of  an  electrical  wave.  These  instru- 
ments with  a  delicacy  of  make  hitherto  considered  prac- 
ticable only  for  laboratory  work,  permitted  men  to  see 
through  darkness  or  over  hills,  to  separate  sounds  as  a 
game  dog  will  distinguish  between  the  scent  of  different 
birds,  and  to  be  able  to  hear  actually  down  into  the  very 
earth  itself. 

Sight  is,  of  course,  man's  best  sense  for  determining 
distant  objects,  and  the  airplane  gave  him  not  only 
increased  range  but  a  wholly  new  point  of  observation. 
Hills  were  no  longer  obstacles  to  sight.  In  his  flying 
machine  he  could  surmount  them,  and  inspect  at  will  and 
in  detail  the  country  beyond.  Batteries,  unless  covered, 
could  be  detected  with  ease  and  certainty.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  owing  to  the  limited  range  of  guns  for 
vertical  fire,  observation  airplanes  could  fly  safely,  so 
far  as  attack  from  the  ground  was  concerned,  at  an  alti- 
tude of  5,000  feet.  At  such  a  height  the  human  eye  can 
satisfactorily  determine  tho  character  of  objects  on  the 
ground.  But  the  designers  of  anti-aircraft  guns  were 
active,  and  ''Archies,"  the  special  anti-aircraft  guns, 
greater  caliber,  longer  range,  and  of  greater  precision 
were  being  turned  out.  "With  each  step  in  progress  the 
airplanes  were  obliged  to  keep  at  constantly  increasing 
altitudes  until  finally  no  height  was  safe  against  surface 
guns  loss  than  15,000  feet,  or  say  three  miles.  Why  anti- 
aircraft guns  were  called  ''Archies,"  except  that  it  was 
a  contraction  of  Archibald,  could  never  be  learned.  "Who 
Archibald  was,  and  why  his  name  was  made  so  memor- 
able, no  one  seemed  to  know. 

At  a  height  of  15,000  feet  or  anything  a]-)proaehing  it, 
in  a  vibrating  machine  travelling  at  100  miles  per  hour, 
the  eye  ceases  to  be  sufficiently  accurate  and  the  more 


246      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

sensitive  instantaneous  pliotographic  lens  and  film  were 
pressed  into  service.  As  the  ''Archies  "  were  improved, 
forcing  the  planes  to  fly  higher  and  higher,  so  likewise 
was  the  photographic  apparatus  developed,  bringing  the 
earth  in  effect  nearer  and  nearer,  until  even  at  a  height 
of  15,000  feet,  pictures  were  obtained  showing  with  vivid 
clearness  all  the  objects  on  the  surface. 

But  those  in  defense  were  not  beaten,  and  art  and 
trickery  were  called  to  aid.  Guns  were  covered  with  all 
sorts  of  disguising  protection.  The  barrels  and  limbers 
were  painted  with  various  colors,  rivalling  in  gaudiness 
the  leopard  or  the  zebra,  and  when  not  in  action  they 
were  covered  with  screens  of  boughs  or  nets  in  which 
were  entwined  pieces  of  canvas  imitating  leaves  or  earth. 
As  the  photograph  would  be  taken  vertically,  it  was  not 
so  much  the  outline  of  the  object  that  would  be  shown  but 
the  shadow,  and  it  was,  therefore,  desirable  that  the  form 
of  the  gun  should  be  broken  by  contrasting  colors  and 
that  a  sharply  marked  shadow  should  not  be  cast. 

The  success  attained  by  the  camouflage  expert  in  dis- 
guising or  completely  hiding  guns  was  really  remarkable. 
Guns  actually  in  action  could  not  at  times  be  discovered 
at  a  distance  of  a  few  hundred  yards  unless  the  flash  was 
noticed  at  the  instant  of  discharge. 

Faked  positions  were  frequent  so  that  on  a  given  hill 
slope,  where  it  was  known  that  batteries  were  posted,  it 
was  difficult  to  distinguish  the  real  from  the  imitation. 
In  fact,  were  it  not  for  other  telltale  marks  it  would  have 
been  impossible  to  locate  batteries  by  direct  observation. 

These  marks  were  the  momentary  flash  of  the  gun, 
either  direct  or  reflected,  the  permanent  effect  of  the  blast 
and  the  evidences  of  human  work  and  occupancy.  The 
last  were  indicated  with  marked  distinctness  on  the  air- 
photos  by  dugouts  and  kitchens,  by  the  paths  worn  by 
the  feet  when  walking  from  them  to  the  guns  and  by  the 
joads  worn  by  wagons  in   bringing  up   supplies  and 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  247 

ammunition.  The  increasing  definiteness  of  these  tell- 
tale signs  in  pictures  taken  on  successive  dates,  was  suf- 
ficient to  lead  to  the  detection  of  the  battery.  This 
difficulty  was  iDartially  solved  by  establishing  batteries 
alongside  roads. 

The  effect  of  the  blast  of  the  guns  was  a  sure  sign,  and 
one  very  difficult  to  conceal.  The  rush  of  air  following  the 
discharge  killed  all  verdure  in  its  path,  making  a  dark 
stain,  whose  unmistakable  character  would  be  recognized 
on  the  photographic  plate.  Even  bare  ground  would  be 
affected  by  the  blast.  Ordinarily  the  shelter  afforded  by 
trees  would  offer  splendid  concealment,  but  here  the  kill- 
ing blast  would  at  once  leave  its  record.  There  was  once 
a  German  battery  that  caused  much  annoyance,  but  so 
carefully  had  it  been  hidden  from  vertical  observation 
that  its  position  could  not  be  discovered.  It  had  been 
stationed  on  the  shore  of  a  small  lake  and  the  water 
surface  gave  no  sign  of  the  blast  from  the  gTins  that 
passed  harmlessly  over  it.  With  the  coming  of  winter  the 
pond  froze.  The  next  photograph  showed  the  effect  of 
the  blast  and  the  destruction  of  the  disturbing  battery 
promptly  followed. 

This  photographic  work  was  not  the  simple  matter 
that  the  above  few  words  might  seem  to  indicate.  We 
have  all  had  experience  with  ordinary  photography  and 
know  how  details  are  lost  when  the  object  is  but  a  short 
distance  away  for,  though  a  pretty  picture  results,  the 
landscape  is  shown  in  broad  shadows  or  contrasting 
lights  without  detail.  Such  a  picture,  however  attractive 
from  an  artistic  point  of  view,  will  not  answer  military 
requirements.  The  latter  demand  that  prints  show  accu- 
rately the  minutiae  in  the  field,  exactly  as  a  distant  view 
appears  when  examined  through  a  powerful  telescope. 
In  photography  this  is  accomplished  by  using  special 
lenses  set  in  peculiar  cameras  giving  a  telescopic  effect, 
that  is,  limited  breadth  buT  magnified  detail.    But  with 


248      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

photographs  taken  vertically,  a  new  difficulty  was  found 
in  the  haze  caused  by  the  moisture  in  the  atmosphere  not 
present  close  to  the  ground,  a  difficulty  finally  overcome 
by  using  screens  or  color  filters  permitting  the  far-reach- 
ing lenses  to  pierce  the  inconvenient  haze.  The  cameras 
attached  to  the  very  swiftly  moving  airplanes  were 
subject  to  their  jarring  vibrations.  To  prevent  the  latter 
from  completely  spoiling  the  picture,  the  shutter  must 
work  with  great  rapidity,  but  such  short  exposures  will 
not  give  great  distant  detail  except  on  especially  pre- 
pared plates.  Apparatus  of  a  character  that  would  over- 
come all  the  above  disturbing  effects  did  not  exist  before 
the  war  began  and  had  to  be  developed  step  by  step,  call- 
ing for  highly  scientific  and  resourceful  research  work 
on  the  part  of  skillful  opticians  and  chemical  engineers. 
But  all  the  difficulties  were  not  yet  conquered.  The 
cameras  had  to  be  so  attached  that  they  could  be  sighted 
and  worked  by  the  aviator  with  the  minimum  of  effort 
on  his  part  so  as  to  allow  him  to  devote  his  attention  to 
his  engrossing  duty  of  handling  his  machine,  and  dodg- 
ing shells  from  enemy  Archies  or  machine  gun  bullets 
fired  from  a  hostile  plane. 

The  French  cameras  took  negatives  on  glass  18  cm.  by 
24  cm.  (approximately  7.2  in.  by  9.2  in.),  while  the  British 
used  4  in.  by  5  in.  plates.  The  latter  were  usually  enlarged 
for  examination  while  prints  from  the  former  were  made 
direct.  The  most  satisfactory  lens  was  one  with  a  focal 
length  of  about  twenty  inches.  Of  such  apparatus  the 
United  States  possessed  none  in  1917,  being  obliged  to 
develop  even  the  manufacture  of  the  optical  glass  of 
which  Germany  had  previously  supplied  the  greater  part. 
There  was  finally  evolved  a  veiy  satisfactory  camera  of 
American  design  and  manufacture,  using  films  instead 
of  glass,  but  of  the  French  dimensions,  18  cm.  by  23  cm.  As 
an  indication  of  the  demand  for  photographic  supplies, 
there  were  shipped  to  France  during  the  month  of  Octo- 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  249 

ber,  1918,  among  other  items,  1,500,000  sheets  of  paper, 
300,000  dry  plates,  20,000  rolls  of  films  and  twenty  tons 
of  chemicals. 

After  a  picture  was  taken,  developed  and  printed,  no 
little  skill  was  required  to  discover  and  correctly  read  its 
message.  To  the  untrained  eye  there  would  appear  noth- 
ing but  empty  fields  and  barren  roads,  while  the  expert 
would  see,  especially  after  comparing  the  picture  with 
previous  ones  of  the  same  locality,  results  of  shell  fire, 
new  batteries,  recent  construction  carefully  concealed,  or 
other  signs  of  troop  movements. 

Great  as  was  the  progress  of  aerial  photography  and 
the  perfection  of  the  apparatus,  batteries  could  not 
always  be  located  with  certainty  by  such  means,  and 
recourse  was  had  to  other  applications  of  scientific 
methods. 

An  accurate  means  of  locating  a  distant  gun  is  by  its 
flash.  If  a  gun  were  so  placed  that  it  could  be  seen  from 
two  points,  two  observers  using  ordinary  surveyors* 
transits  could  obtain  the  relative  bearings  of  the  spot  of 
light.  Then  with  the  distance  between  the  observers 
being  measured,  the  determination  of  the  location  of  the 
flash  on  a  map  was  a  matter  of  simple  triangulation  com- 
putation. There  was  one  serious  chance  for  error  to  be 
guarded  against  in  this  otherwise  exceedingly  simple 
method  and  that  was  that  the  observers  might  not  be 
registering  on  the  same  flash.  To  be  certain  of  this  and 
to  eliminate  all  readings  that  were  not  on  the  same  gun, 
each  observer,  usually  there  were  several,  at  the  instant 
of  noting  and  recording  a  gun  flash,  would  push  a  but- 
ton on  an  electric  wire  and  actuate  a  small  light  in  the 
central  station,  perhaps  some  miles  away.  Then  each 
one  would  immediately  telephone  to  the  same  oflice  his 
reading  of  the  bearing  of  the  flash.  If  the  lights  from 
three  or  more  of  the  observers  showed  simultaneously 
and  the  bearings   intersected   at   a   point,   it   could   be 


250      AMERICxiN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

assumed  with  absolute  assurance  that  they  were  register- 
ing the  same  gun. 

Flash  ranging  was  effective  in  locating  a  very  consid- 
erable part  of  the  field  artillery  posted  within  two  or 
three  miles  of  the  front  line,  but  was  relatively  ineffective 
in  locating  the  hostile  heavy  artillery,  which  was  usually 
so  far  back  that  even  the  reflected  flashes  were  screened 
from  direct  observation.  In  the  event  that  guns 
could  not  be  observed  by  direct  vision,  then  recourse 
to  airplane  observation  was  necessary.  But  if  the  eye 
of  man,  even  when  aided  by  telescopes  and  the  highly 
sensitive  photographic  plates,  was  the  sole  means  of 
detecting  enemy's  guns,  many,  perhaps  the  majority, 
would  have  escaped  the  most  vigilant  observer,  on 
account  of  the  difficulty  in  making  accurate  aerial  deter- 
minations for  the  reasons  given  above  or  through  the 
skill  of  camoufleurs.  Undiscovered  the  guns  could  con- 
tinue to  inflict  damage  with  impunity.  Flash  ranging 
and  airjDlane  observation  both  required  clear  weather, 
but  during  six  months  the  climatic  conditions  in  northern 
France  are  unfavorable  for  observation. 

"When  direct  vision  and  photography  failed  to  give 
results  the  engineer  called  acoustics  to  his  aid.  Light 
travels  in  straight  lines  and  if  a  hill  intervenes  between 
the  enemy  battery  and  the  target  or  observer,  the  flash 
cannot  be  seen.  But  exactly  as  the  projectile  in  its 
flight  makes  a  curved  path  from  gun  to  destination,  the 
seund  of  the  discharge  passes  over  the  obstruction.  If 
the  flash  cannot  be  seen  the  discharge  can  be  heard.  This 
physical  fact  opened  a  new  field  for  scientific  observation. 

Another  characteristic  of  the  sound  wave  in  which  it 
differs  from  that  of  light  is  in  its  vastly  slower  rate  of 
travel,  being  under  normal  atmospheric  conditions  and 
at  a  temperature  of  thirty- two  degrees  Fahrenheit  (zero 
centigrade),  1,086  feet  per  second,  as  compared  with 
185,000  miles  per  second   for  light.     This  velocity  of 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  251 

sound  is  easily  measured  and,  if  the  exact  length  of  time 
taken  by  the  passage  of  sound  between  the  point  of  origin 
and  the  hearer  is  known,  the  distance  travelled  can  be 
computed  within  a  negligible  error.  Now  if  instead  of 
one  hearer  there  be  several  who  catch  the  sound  of  the 
discharge  of  the  gun,  for  instance,  at  different  moments 
of  time  and  if  the  exact  instant  when  the  sound  reaches 
the  several  observers  can  be  separately  measured  in  sec- 
onds and  fractions  of  seconds,  the  difference  in  distance 
between  the  gun  and  each  observer  can  be  computed  on 
the  basis  of  1,08G  feet  per  second.  As  these  differences 
determine  the  direction  from  which  the  sound  comes  as 
well  as  its  distance,  it  is  the  work  of  only  a  few  minutes 
and  a  very  simple  calculation  to  ascertain  the  position  of 
the  gun  provided  the  relative  position  of  each  obser^^er, 
with  respect  to  the  others,  is  correctly  indicated  on  a  map. 
In  fact,  with  the  observing  points  plotted  on  an  accurate 
map,  the  determination  is  made  mechanically  by  the  inter- 
section of  adjustable  strings. 

The  figure  of  velocity  of  1,086  feet  per  second  is 
subject  to  small  corrections  due  to  temperature,  atmos- 
pheric humidity,  wind,  etc.,  which  are  readily  made. 
This  correction  was  determined  on  the  British  front  by 
firing  a  gun,  whose  position  was  definitely  known  with 
respect  to  all  observers,  at  frequent  regular  intervals. 
The  instruments  would  record  the  differences  in  arrival 
time  of  this  signal  sound  and  the  variation  from  a  stand- 
ard time  interval  would  give  the  combined  correction 
for  all  atmospheric  conditions  as  they  actually  existed 
at  that  instant.  The  American  method  was  to  report  the 
meteorological  conditions  as  determined  by  observation 
balloons.  Had  the  war  continued,  some  better  system 
would  have  been  installed. 

The  human  ear  is  quite  incapable  of  measuring  small 
fractions  of  seconds.  Even  if  it  could,  man  could  not 
record  the  sensation  with  sufficient  accuracy,  so  the  engi- 


252       AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

neer  was  obliged  to  devise  a  machine  that  could  both 
hear  and  record  the  gun  reports  with  absolute  faithful- 
ness and  accuracy.  "Without  absolute  accuracy  it  is  obvi- 
ous that  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  locate  enemy 
guns,  and  accuracy  means  in  this  case  a  permissible  error 
not  exceeding  one-twentieth  of  a  second. 

Such  a  machine  was  actually  devised  and  used  with 
great  success.  To  describe  in  detail  this  beautiful  instru- 
ment with  its  delicate  sensitiveness,  and  unfailing  accu- 
racy with  parts  so  rugged  as  to  be  capable  of  withstand- 
ing long  exposure  to  wet,  storm,  cold,  heat,  and  to  continue 
working  entirely  automatically  under  the  rude  conditions 
of  battle,  is  beyond  the  scope  of  such  a  book  as  this. 
But  the  solution  of  the  problem  by  the  French,  the  Brit- 
ish and  the  American  physicists  stands  as  one  of  the 
great  scientific  achievements  of  the  war,  and  is  remark- 
able as  being  one  of  the  few  steps  in  the  application  of 
science  to  war  wherein  the  Allies  distinctly  excelled  the 
Germans. 

In  general,  the  apparatus  as  a  whole  consisted  of  a 
series  of  detectors  or  sound  catchers,  each  detector  con- 
stituting, therefore,  a  separate  observing  station,  and  all 
the  detectors  being  connected  with  an  automatic  record- 
ing instrument  by  means  of  wires  carrying  a  low  electric 
current.  The  delicate  hearing  device  or  artificial  ear 
was  a  piece  of  platinum  cloth,  heated  by  an  electric  cur- 
rent. The  cloth  was  so  sensitive  that  its  temperature 
would  be  lowered  by  the  small  air  waves  which  would 
be  set  in  motion  by  the  vibrations  due  to  sound 
impinging  on  it.  The  electrical  resistance  of  the  wire 
cloth  varied  with  changes  in  temperature.  By  thus 
affecting  the  intensity  of  the  current  flowing  steadily 
through  it  the  current  gave  a  means  of  communicating  to 
a  distant  point  not  sound,  but  the  disturbances  that  indi- 
cated sound,  and  this  same  variation  in  current  operated 
the  string  of  a  string  galvanometer. 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  253 

The  field  detector  part  consisted  of  a  drum  in  whose 
diaphragm  was  fixed  the  electrically  charged  platinum 
grille  or  cloth.  These  detectors,  usually  six  to  a  group, 
were  carefully  screened  against  shell  fire  and  wind. 
They  were  scattered  over  several  miles  of  front,  depend- 
ing on  local  conditions,  but  the  location  of  each  detector 
was  accurately  known  and  plotted  on  a  map.  The  record- 
ing instrument  with  which  the  detectors  were  connected 
was  set  up  in  the  rear  in  any  convenient  dugout  or  build- 
ing where  it  would  be  reasonably  safe  from  hostile  fire. 

This  central  instrument  had  a  strip  of  sensitized  films 
on  which  were  photographed  by  a  moving  picture 
camera  the  strings  of  the  galvanometer,  each  string  being 
electrically  connected  with  one  of  the  detectors.  If  the 
electric  current  was  of  constant  intensity,  the  strings 
were  undisturbed  and  gave  straight-line  impressions  on 
the  sensitized  strip  as  it  was  unwound  mechanically  from 
a  reel.  Whenever  the  detector  diaphragms  were  affected 
by  a  sound  vibration,  the  current  was  momentarily  inter- 
rupted and  the  string  made  a  small  jump  at  right  angles 
to  the  strip,  breaking  its  straight-line  trace.  Immedi- 
ately afterwards  the  string  resumed  its  original  station- 
ary position  and  was  ready  for  another  gTin.  By  photo- 
graphing on  the  same  strip  the  strings  corresponding  to 
all  the  stations,  together  with  a  time  scale,  the  actual  dif- 
ference in  time  that  a  sound  took  to  reach  the  several 
detector  stations  could  be  recorded  and  measured. 

The  sensitized  tape  was  given  a  perfectly  regular 
motion  and  at  such  a  speed  that  intervals  of  one  lum- 
dredth  of  a  second  could  be  measured  with  accuracy. 

Since  sound  travels  at  the  rate  of  1,08G  feet  per  sec- 
ond, the  error  in  an  instrument  reading  to  hundredths  of 
a  second  becomes  negligible.  Errors  in  surveys, 
inapi)ing  and  atmospheric  corrections,  however,  affect 
results  to  such  an  extent  that  sound  rangers  claim  no 
greater  accuracy  of  location  on  a  single  reading  than 


25i      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

within  fifty  yards.  This  is  not  only  within  th*^  variation 
in  accuracy  of  a  gun  firing  at  an  unseen  target  some 
miles  away,  but  is  well  within  the  deadly  effect  of  shell 
fragments  following  the  burst  of  a  shell  directed  at  th6 
gun  in  question.  A  battery  whose  position  is  known 
within  such  a  maximum  error  in  distance  can  soon  be 
destroyed. 

Accuracy  of  determination  was  rated  on  three  scales, 
P,  Q  and  R.  A  "  P  "  location  was  one  where  four 
cords  intersected  on  a  map,  when  it  was  safe  to  assume 
that  the  error  did  not  exceed  fifty  yards.  When  only 
three  cords  intersected  on  the  map  it  was  a  "  Q  "  deter- 
mination and  the  limit  of  error  was  assumed  to  be  100 
yards,  while  two  cords  gave  an  '^  R  "  indication  with  an 
assumed  error  of  200  yards.  Repeated  observations 
which  agreed  with  each  other  gave  a  more  reliable  basis 
for  assumption  tFan  even  a  single  '^  P  "  determination. 

Skill  in  accurately  picking  out  and  reading  the  mes- 
sages on  the  films  was  quickly  attained,  and  finally 
to  a  trained  observer  the  characteristic  impression 
of  the  sound,  of  each  different  type  of  enemy  gun 
became  as  familiar  as  the  faces  of  old  friends.  This 
method  of  locating  guns  could  be  carried  on  at  all  hours 
of  the  day  or  night  and  could  be  interrupted  only  by  the 
frequency  of  sound  reaching  the  proportions  of  a  bar- 
rage. The  same  instrument  could  also  be  used  to  direct 
the  fire  of  friendly  guns  on  located  enemy  positions,  when 
the  instruments  would  be  concentrated  on  locating  the 
sound  of  the  bursts  of  the  outgoing  shells  and  correcting 
the  aim  to  the  point  at  which  the  enemy  gim  had  been 
located. 

From  these  instruments  the  best  means  of  escape  was 
either  through  a  confusion  of  sounds  by  firing  several 
guns  simultaneously,  by  frequent  changes  in  battery 
position,  or  by  registering  on  a  target  with  one  gun  and 
leaving  the  battery  that  was  to  do  the  execution  silent 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  255 

tmtil  the  moment  for  action  arrived.  Such  attempts  at 
evasion  were  highly  unsatisfactory,  and  the  fact 
remained  that  the  very  beautiful  sound-ranging  outfits 
of 'the  Allies  had  the  German  gunners  at  a  very  serious 
disadvantage. 

Both  the  French  and  British  experts  produced  sound- 
ranging  apparatus  of  highly  satisfactory  type  which, 
while  differing  in  details,  were  founded  on  the  same 
scientific  theory.  When  America  entered  the  war 
the  army  had  no  such  outfit  because  it  was  not 
only  a  most  recent  product  of  the  war,  but  even  at  that 
date  was  still  in  course  of  initial  development.  The 
Engineer  Department  selected"  the  British  machines  as 
being  more  reliabe  and  portable  than  those  of  the 
French,  and  while  supplying  our  own  troops  with  such 
instruments,  began  the  development  of  an  improved 
form,  which  promised  to  be  the  superior  of  its  proto- 
types in  cost  and  ease  of  handling,  and  to  be  less 
adversely  sensitive  to  annoying  conditions.  But  the  con- 
clusions of  hostilities  deprived  this  device  of  a  field  trial. 

The  microphone  detectors  were  placed  far  forward  in 
order  to  receive  as  great  a  sound  impulse  as  possible, 
and  if  not  actually  in  the  front  trenches,  were  set  up  but 
a  short  distance  away.  The  connecting  wires,  therefore, 
ran  back  across  the  open  country  subject  at  any  or  all 
times  to  bombardment.  Since  they  must  be  repaired  the 
moment  a  break  is  discovered,  engineers  for  this  purpose 
lived  in  forward  dugouts  whence  they  could  be  called 
quickly  by  telephone.  Under  such  conditions  mainte- 
nance was  not  the  easiest  labor,  nor  was  it  particularly 
pleasant  to  be  called  out  of  a  bunk  on  a  cold  and  stormy 
night  with  an  order  to  find  and  repair  at  once  a  break 
in  a  line,  with  no  certain  knowledge  where  the  break  or 
breaks  were,  for  there  might  be  more  than  one.  Lights 
could  not  be  carried  for  fear  of  attracting  hostile  fire. 
Perhaps  the  only  way  to  tind  the  cut  would  be  to  take 


256      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

the  wire  in  hand  and  so  follow  its  trail,  tumbling  into 
shell  craters  half  full  of  water,  climbing  in  and  out  of 
disused  trenches,  or  stumbling  over  some  object  unseen 
in  the  darkness,  and  hearing  every  few  minutes  the 
s-w-i-s-h  of  a  shell  overhead  or  the  still  more  unpleasant 
loud  c-r-r-u-m-p !  as  one  burst  nearby  scattering  splinters 
and  sodden  earth  in  all  directions. 

The  several  lines  of  signal  wire  were  usually  named 
so  that  the  message  describing  a  break  would  take  some 
such  form  as  *'  Bennie  is  dead."  One  night  a  new 
recruit  was  at  the  phone  board  and  when  the  above  mes- 
sage came  in,  he,  not  knowing  the  code,  answered,  ''  I  am 
so  sorry,  was  he  one  of  the  boys  at  Central?  " 

Besides  locating  the  guns  it  was  also  necessary  to  find 
and  render  visible  enemy  bombing  planes  at  night.  The 
German  motors  had  a  distinctive  note  and  could  be 
recognized  easily,  provided  they  were  low  enough  to  be 
heard  as  they  crossed  the  front  lines.  But  it  was  neces- 
sary to  hear  also  those  machines  that  were  flying  at  a 
great  altitude  out  of  ordinary  ear  range  as  they  rushed 
on  to  attack  some  place  far  in  the  rear,  in  order  that  a 
general  alarm  might  be  transmitted  by  telephone.  It  was 
obvious  that  the  ear  must  be  reinforced,  especially  to 
detect  machines  at  great  height,  and  the  apparatus  to  do 
this  must  be  handled  easily  so  as  to  give  results  quickly. 
Otherwise  the  planes  travelling  at  their  high  speed  would 
be  out  of  range  before  they  could  be  located.  This  called 
into  being  a  new  class  of  instruments  which,  although 
working  under  the  laws  of  acoustics,  were  quite  different 
in  principle  and  detail  from  those  employed  in  the  sound 
ranging  of  guns. 

While  the  naked  human  ear  unaided  has  but  little 
sense  of  direction,  that  is,  it  can  tell  only  in  an  approxi- 
mate way  where  lies  the  point  from  which  any  ^ven 
sound  is  coming,  it  can  with  somewhat  simple  apparatus 
and  with  a  little  training  be  converted  into  a  very  satis- 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  257 

factory  and  reasonably  accurate  instrument  of  direction. 
We  are  all  familiar  witli  the  simple  megaphone  and  how 
the  voice  can  be  directed  toward  any  point;  how  the 
megaphone,  if  placed  to  the  ear,  will  in  like  manner  give 
a  greatly  increased  volume  of  soimd  when  it  is  pointed 
in  the  direction  whence  the  sound  is  coming.  With  two 
horns,  one  connected  with  each  ear,  not  only  is  much 
greater  sensitiveness  obtained  but  there  is  also  a  closer 
approach  to  directive  accuracy,  because  when  an  equal 
volume  of  sound  is  heard  in  both  ears  it  means  that  the 
horns  are  directed  on  the  same  point.  This  principle 
which  forms  the  basis  of  underwater  signals  to  ships 
where  two  sound  receiving  boxes,  located  one  on  each 
side  of  the  bow,  when  they  transmit  equal  volumes  of 
sound  indicate  that  the  vessel  is  on  a  direct  course  to 
the  origin  of  sound,  formed  also  the  basis  for  airplane 
detectors. 

There  were  two  tjqoes  of  apparatus.  One  type 
employed  four  horns  in  pairs,  one  pair  determining  the 
horizontal  bearing  of  the  plane  as  would  be  given  by  a 
magnetic  compass,  the  other  pair  determining  the 
vertical  bearing  of  the  plane;  that  is  the  vertical  angle 
of  the  plane  above  the  horizon,  because  the  target  being 
a  point  in  space,  both  bearings  were  needed  to  fix  the 
position. 

The  other  type  of  detector  was  the  paraboloid  reflector. 
For  those  who  have  not  investigated  or  who  may  have 
forgotten  tlicir  conic  sections,  it  may  be  permitted  to 
recall  tliat  the  parabola  is  a  fig-ure  of  such  shape  that 
parallel  lines  falling  on  it  are  deflected  and  concentrated 
at  a  single  point  called  the  focus.  If  a  parabola  be 
revolved  about  its  axis  the  surface  described  is  a 
]>nral)oloid,  a  cup-shaped  structure  with  flaring  sides, 
which  brings  to  a  single  point  all  parallel  lines  or  rays 
falling  ^N-ithin  it.  A  paraboloid  if  of  sufficiently  large 
dimensions  and  made  of  material  that  would  accurately 


258      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

deflect  sounds  impinging  on  its  interior  surface,  would 
evidently  be  a  great  sound  collector  and  by  placing  the  ear 
at  tlie  focus,  sounds  otherwise  inaudible  would  become 
distinct.  Furthermore,  by  slowly  turning  the  apparatus 
first  in  one  direction  and  then  in  another,  it  would  be 
easy  to  recognize  the  moment  when  the  maximum  volume 
of  sound  was  heard.  At  that  instant  the  axis  of  the 
paraboloid  would  be  pointed  toward  the  point  whence 
came  the  sound,  and  if  the  angles  that  the  axis  made 
horizontally  with  respect  to  some  such  line  as  the 
meridian  and  vertically  with  respect  to  the  horizon,  a 
single  combined  bearing  would  be  given  at  once  by  which 
a  search-light  could  be  directed  to  the  sound  producer, 
in  this  case  an  airplane. 

In  actual  practice  it  was  found  that  a  paraboloid  with 
a  diameter  of  nine  to  ten  feet  at  the  open  end  could  be 
constructed  that  would  answer  all  the  requirements.  If 
it  were  given  free  motion  in  all  directions  with  scales 
reading  the  vertical  and  horizontal  angles  of  the  direc- 
tion of  the  axis,  an  admirable  airplane  detector  was  pro- 
duced. Of  course,  the  ear  could  not  be  placed  at  the 
focus  of  the  paraboloid,  but  two  tubes  like  the  tubes  of 
a  medical  stethoscope,  leading  to  the  cars  of  the  observer, 
answered  the  same  purpose.  To  produce  the  best  results 
it  was  necessary  that  the  observer  should  wear  a  close- 
fitting  head  case,  shutting  out  all  sounds  except  those 
coming  through  the  receiving  tubes. 

The  French  developed  the  paraboloid  and  the  Corps  of 
Engineers  at  Washington  followed  their  lead.  They  suc- 
ceeded in  making  imi^rovements,  for  while  the  French 
apparatus  weighed  three  and  one-half  tons,  the  American 
weighed  but  1,300  pounds.  This  diminution  of  weight 
gave  tremendously  increased  mobility,  so  very  necessary 
for  all  articles  connected  with  an  army  in  the  field.  The 
American  device  could  be  set  up  and  got  into  action  in 
one-sixth  of  the  time  required  for  the  French  instrument. 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  259 

The  cumbersome  weight  of  their  paraboloid  detector 
and  its  lack  of  mobility  were  fully  appreciated  by  the 
French  general  staff,  who  experimented  with  other  forms 
of  sound-colleoting  apparatus.  At  the  close  of  the  war 
they  had  developed  what  was  known  as  the  Perrin 
telesitemeter,  recognized  as  probably  the  best  form  of 
field  instrument  for  the  purpose.  It  was  based  on  the 
double  horn  and  binaural  principle  with  the  pairs  of 
horns  in  nests.  The  total  weight  was  about  the  same  as 
the  American  form  of  paraboloid,  but  the  weight  of  the 
heaviest  part  did  not  exceed  330  pounds.  Two  operators 
could  take  it  apart  in  an  hour  and  reassemble  it  in  three 
hours.  It  was,  therefore,  the  most  mobile,  the  most 
easily  worked  and  probably  the  most  accurate  sound 
detector  in  use. 

Unfortunately  with  sound  apparatus  there  were  intro- 
duced chances  for  errors  and  the  necessity  for  correc- 
tions not  present  when  dealing  with  light.  As  the 
latter  travels  through  space  with  such  a  high  velocity 
and  is  not  deflected  from  its  straight  path  within  the 
limits  of  the  problem,  all  readings  are  made  direct  with- 
out correction  for  time  or  deflection.  When  dealing  with 
sound  there  are  many  factors  that  must  be  taken  into 
account,  the  neglect  of  any  one  of  which  would  vitiate  all 
accuracy. 

In  the  first  place  the  object  is  not  stationary.  Suppose 
an  airplane  be  travelling  at  100  miles  per  hour  or  at 
nearly  150  feet  per  second.  If  the  plane  were  two  miles 
high,  there  would  be  consumed  nearly  ten  seconds  before 
the  sound  reached  the  listeners'  ears,  since  sound  travels 
at  the  rate  of  about  1,100  feet  per  second,  and  in  that 
interval  the  plane  would  have  moved  1,500  feet  from  the 
spot  where  that  particular  sound  impulse  originated.  It 
is  also  obvious  that  the  amount  of  divergence  is  at  the 
maximum  when  the  airplane  is  fljing  directly  across  the 
field   and   diminishes   according   as    the    plane    has    an 


260      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ascending  motion  as  well  as  a  horizontal  one,  becoming 
zero  when  the  plane  is  receding  directly  from  the 
observer.  A  second  source  of  error  is  the  effect  of  wind 
which,  by  changing  the  velocity  of  sonnd  increases  or 
decreases  in  a  complex  manner,  the  difference  between 
the  actual  and  apparent  position  of  the  airplane.  Then 
there  are  other  corrections  to  be  made  for  variations  in 
temperature,  humidity,  etc.,  all  of  which  affect  the 
velocity  of  sound.  These  difficulties  were  one  by  one 
overcome  until  it  finally  became  possible  to  locate  within 
a  comparatively  small  margin  of  error  the  position  in 
space  of  a  hostile  airplane  flying  even  as  high  as  three 
miles. 

In  practice  the  method  of  operation  was  for  an 
observer  to  listen  for  plares  at  night.  As  soon  as 
one  was  heard  notification  was  telephoned  to  other 
stations  where  all  the  listening  sets  were  put  in  action. 
As  fast  as  each  observer  got  his  sound  range  an  assist- 
ant would  read  the  angles,  make  the  necessary  correc- 
tions, give  the  bearings  vertical  and  horizontal  to  the 
men  with  the  search-light.  The  next  instant  a  great 
beam  of  light,  followed  quickly  by  other  beams  from 
other  search-lights,  would  flash  into  the  sky.  If  the  direc- 
tions had  been  correctly  given,  there  would  appear  a  tiny 
bright  spot  in  the  black  sky  where  the  beams  met,  the 
airplane  body  reflecting  the  rays  of  light.  Then,  as  the 
aviator  would  twist  and  squirm  and  dive  to  escape  the 
disclosing  glare,  the  ''Archies  "  would  open  fire  and 
there  would  be  seen  little  brilliant  scintillations  as  their 
shells  exploded  about  the  plane.  At  such  a  height  and 
flying  fast  the  plane  usually  escaped,  although  some- 
times it  would  be  seen  tumbling  over  and  over  as  it 
crashed  to  earth.  But  even  if  this  last  were  not  always 
the  result  the  sound  detectors  at  least  stopped  undue 
rashness,  made  the  airmen  fly  high,  rendering  accurate 
bombing  aim  difficult,  and  permitted  an  alarm  to  be  sent 


FLASH  AND  SOUND  RANGING  261 

westward,  giving  notice  in  ample  season  that  every  step 
might  be  taken  to  be  ready  to  receive  the  nocturnal  Fisi- 
tor  in  suitable  manner. 

To  the  spectator  it  was  a  wonderful  sight,  the  brilliant 
beams  from  a  dozen  great  search-lights  concentrated 
on  a  single  bright  spot  high  in  the  air,  alone,  with  shells 
bursting  all  about  it,  the  quarry  trying  to  escape  the 
hungry  guns.  In  the  absorbing  interest  of  the  watching 
it  was  easy  to  forget  that  from  the  bright  spot,  in  which 
were  human  beings  for  whom  the  apparently  unequal 
struggle  inevitably  enlisted  sympathy,  there  might 
fall  at  any  moment  a  load  of  high  explosives  on 
the  spectator's  head.  Even  if  that  did  not  occur,  there 
was  always  one  thing  that  was  certain  to  follow,  and 
that  was  that  the  fragments  of  and  the  shrapnel  from 
the  protecting  shells  that  were  bursting  so  prettily  over- 
head would  soon  be  falling,  and  with  results  that  might 
be  equally  disagreeable  as  those  of  an  enemy  bomb.  But 
one  rarely  entertained  such  thoughts,  so  absorbing  was 
the  spectacle. 

The  work  of  Flash  and  Soimd  Ranging  in  the  A.  E.  F. 
was  entrusted  to  the  Twenty-ninth  and  Fifty-sixth 
Engineers. 

The  development  of  the  apparatus  used  in  flash  and 
sound  ranging  is  a  beautiful  application  of  science  to 
the  art  of  war,  as  fascinating  and  as  strictly  theoretical 
as  any  work  done  in  a  laboratory.  But  the  experiments 
finally  producing  the  perfected  instruments  were  not 
the  only  opportunities  for  research  work  leading  to 
essentially  practical  results.  As  an  illustration  the  Gov- 
ernment report  on  America's  Munitions  records  some 
interesting  investigations  made  by  an  officer  of  the 
Ordnance  Corps  who  in  private  life  was  nothing  more 
warlike  than  a  professor  of  astronomy  in  a  large  uni- 
versity, investigations  which  led  to  radical  improvements 
in  shell  design.    A  certain  make  of  shell  intended  for  a 


262      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

sis-incli  gun  was  found  to  give  irregular  and  uncertain 
results  in  its  flight.  Major  Moulton  discovered  that  the 
cause  for  the  inaccuracy  lay  in  the  rotating  band,  a  band 
of  copper  encircling  the  lower  or  rear  part  of  the  shell 
which,  engaging  in  the  rifling  grooves  in  the  bore  of  the 
gun,  gave  the  shell  its  steadying  twist.  The  cold  copper 
actually  flowed  backwards  as  the  result  of  the  propelling 
force  behind  the  shell  and  raised  an  unsuspected  flange 
sufficient  to  cause  an  uncertain  air  resistance  that  had 
not  been  allowed  for  in  the  calculations  for  trajectory. 
This  led  to  a  general  study  of  shell  design  and  it 
was  found  that  the  laws  of  mathematics  governing 
the  orbits  of  comets  applied  to  the  flight  and  trajectories 
of  shells,  and  that,  by  giving  shells  a  particular  contour 
with  a  sharper  point  and  more  gradually  tapered  sides 
than  the  standard  design,  the  air  resistance  was 
greatly  reduced  and  the  range  of  the  gun  correspondingly 
increased  without  change  of  powder  charge.  Thus  the 
six-inch  shell  above  referred  to  which  had  a  range  of 
17,000  yards  was  given  a  range^of  22,000  yards,  while 
the  75  mm.  shell  had  its  range  increased  from  9,000  to 
12,130  yards. 


CHAPTER  XX 

ARTILLERY 

.While  guns  with  their  ammunition  and  service  are  not 
a  function  of  the  engineers,  nevertheless  through  the 
modern  development  of  cjuick-firing,  long-range  guns  the 
science  of  artillery  and  of  engineering  have  become  very 
closely  allied.  If  the  actual  training  and  firing  of  the 
pieces  is  no  concern  of  the  engineer,  the  mechanical 
details  in  their  design  and  manufacture,  their  emplace- 
ments, shelter  and  transportation,  the  construction  of 
points  for  observation,  their  protection  by  camouflage, 
the  detection  of  the  location  of  the  enemy's  batteries  and 
other  provisions  for  their  effectiveness  are  distinctly  so. 
Then  the  aiming  of  the  pieces  by  indirect  fire  depends 
absolutely  on  the  accuracy  of  the  surveys  and  maps  pre- 
pared by  the  engineers.  In  fact,  the  closest  cooperation 
between  the  two  arms  has  become  of  the  highest 
importance. 

Prior  to  the  beginning  of  the  war  artillerymen  failed 
to  realize  the  possible  development  of  their  arm  quite  as 
much  as  the  officers  of  other  corps  failed  to  do  in  respect 
to  theirs.  Although  all  military  experts  had  agreed  that, 
should  a  great  war  arrive,  the  part  to  be  taken  by  artil- 
lery would  far  and  away  transcend  that  taken  in  any 
previous  war,  yet  all  their  estimates  fell  far  short  of 
actualities.  Not  even  the  most  enthusiastic  supporters 
of  the  gun  foresaw  its  possibilities,  its  application  and 
above  all  the  tremendous  number  of  projectiles  that 
would  be  consumed.  The  Germans  came  the  nearest  to 
doing  so,  but  even  they  were  wide  of  the  mark. 

2G3 


264      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

In  the  American  civil  war  approximately  5,000,000 
rounds  of  artillery  ammunition  were  fired  on  the  Federal 
side  during  the  whole  four  and  one-quarter  years.  Dur- 
ing the  single  year  of  1918  the  British  and  French  armies 
alone  expended  nearly  13,Q00,000  rounds  per  month 
on  the  average.  Or  taking  the  maximum  yearly 
expenditure  in  the  former  war,  some  1,950,000  shots 
were  fired,  while  in  the  twelve  months  that  ended 
with  the  armistice  the  American,  British  and  French 
guns  in  France  were  discharged  more  than  160,000,000 
times.  At  Gettysburg,  which  has  always  stood  in 
American  history  as  a  great  artillery  engagement,  the 
Federal  consumption  of  ammunition  was  32,800  rounds. 
In  the  St.  Mihiel  offensive,  where  the  artillery 
preparation  lasted  only  four  hours,  after  which 
the  artillery  work  was  intermittent,  more  than  1,000,000 
rounds  were  fired,  while  the  British  guns  in  the  Messines 
Ridge  battle  fired  2,750,000  rounds  and  in  the  battle  of 
the  Somme  4,000,000  rounds.  In  the  above  totals,  shots 
fired  from  trench  mortars  and  machine  guns  are  not 
included,  as  they  are  not  classed  as  ''  guns."  These 
comparative  figures  take  no  account  of  the  fact  that  the 
average  weight  of  projectiles  greatly  exceeded  the  pre- 
vious average  weight.  So  that  if  a  comparison  were  made 
of  the  total  weight  of  metal  fired  in  the  two  wars,  the 
ratio  would  be  still  higher. 

The  weapons  that  did  this  tremendous  execution  were 
of  many  sizes,  varying  from  little  man-portable  cannon 
capable  of  being  handled  by  two  men  and  firing  a  shell 
with  a  diameter  of  one  and  one-half  inches  to  mighty 
pieces  with  a  bore  of  sixteen  inches,  heretofore  consid- 
ered possible  only  on  ships  or  on  heavily  constructed 
permanent  foundations  of  masonry. 

Artillery  can  be  divided  into  two  classes,  mobile  and 
non-mobile.  In  the  former  are  all  pieces  that  can  be 
transported  over  roads  and  follow  the  movements  of  a^ 


ARTILLERY 


265 


mobile  army.  The  other  class  includes  the  lax'ger  weap- 
ons, which  on  account  of  size  demanded  special  provi- 
sions for  movement  and  could  not  be  dragged  gaily 
across  open  country.  Thanks  to  the  development  of 
caterpillar  tractor  engines  the  maximum  limit  of  the  first 
class  was  greatly  extended  as  the  war  progressed. 

The   characteristics   of  American   field   artillery   are 
shown  in  the  following  table : 


BORE  OP  GUN 

WEIGHT 
COMPLETE 

WEIGHT 
PROJECTII.E 

RANGE 

37  mm  (U  ios) 

75  mm  (2.95  ins.) 

340  lbs. 

2887  lbs. 

9800  lbs. 
23500  lbs. 
41000  lbs. 

8000  lbs. 

198G0  lbs. 
29i00'lb3. 

U  lbs. 
16  lbs. 
45  lbs. 

95  lbs. 

95  lbs. 
200  lbs. 
200  lbs. 
290  lbs. 
35G  lbs. 

2    miles 
5^  miles 

4.7  ins 

6    miles 

5  in.s 

9    miles 

6  ins 

10    miles 

155  mm  (6  ins.)  Howitzer 

155  nun  (G  ins.)  (Long  range) . . 
8  ins.  Howitzer 

7    miles 
10    miles 

8  ins.  Howitzer 

7    miles 

9.2  ins.  Howitzer 

7^  miles 

240  mm  (9^  ins.)  Howitzer  .... 

5^  miles 
10    miles 

Note  the  comparative  lightness  of  the  field  pieces. 

A  howitzer  is  a  gun  with  a  comparatively  short  barrel, 
giving  a  lighter  and  more  mobile  piece,  but  with  a 
shorter  range  than  the  gun  of  the  same  calibre  with  a 
longer  barrel.  The  difference  in  weight  of  piece  and 
range  betwean  a  "  howitzer  "  and  a  ''  long  "  is  clearly 
shown  in  the  case  of  the  155  mm.  guns. 

The  great  variety  in  guns,  and  especially  in  substan- 
tially the  same  general  type  of  weapon,  was  due  to  the  dif- 
ferent standards  and  units  of  measure  of  the  three  allied 
powers.  The  standard  field  piece  of  the  American  army 
prior  to  1917  was  a  three-inch  gun,  as  against  a  3.3  in. 
gun  in  the  ]5ritish  service  and  the  75  mm.,  the  famous 
"  75s  "  or  the  **  Soixante-quinzos  "  of  the  French.  As 
our  supply  of  field  pieces  in  April,  1917,  was  absurdly 


266      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

inadequate  for  our  needs,  it  was  wisely  decided  not  to 
continue  the  manufacture  of  a  gun  that  would  not  take 
the  ammunition  that  could  be  obtained  abroad  and 
which  our  own  factories  were  already  equipped  to  turn 
out,  but  instead  to  build  guns  on  the  French  model.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  the  French  gun  was  a  superior  weapon, 
better  than  any  similar  gun  in  any  army,  better  than  the 
corresponding  German  77  mm.  piece. 

The  4.7  inch  gun  was  a  standard  American  gun  of 
excellence  of  which  a  certain  number  were  on  hand.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  five-  and  six-inch  pieces,  the  latter, 
however,  covering  several  different  types  of  army  and 
navy  standards.  They  were  used  for  a  while  and  in 
limited  numbers  on  account  of  our  dearth  of  supply.  The 
two  eight-inch  and  the  9.2  inch  howitzers  were  British 
types  and  were  furnished  to  some  of  our  divisions  pend- 
ing the  delivery  of  the  more  effective  240  mm.  howitzer. 

American  standards  were  thus  reduced  to  the  French 
types,  which  we  copied,  consisting  of  five  varieties,  the 
37  mm.,  75  mm.,  155  mm.,  howitzer  and  long-range  gun 
and  the  240  mm.  howitzer.  Of  these  the  75 's  and  155 's 
were  the  most  important  and  formed  the  great  bulk  of 
the  mobile  artillery,  one-half  of  the  American  artillery 
consisting  of  the  former  alone. 

There  is  one  feature  that  completely  distinguishes  mod- 
'ern  guns  from  earlier  types,  and  that  is  the  mechanical 
means  for  absorbing  the  recoil.  The  gun  in  the  previous 
states  of  the  art  was  simply  a  barrel  mounted  on  a  pair  of 
wheels,  and  the  recoil  of  the  firing  was  taken  up  by  the 
gun  kicking  back  into  an  anchorage  in  the  ground,  the 
aiming  of  the  piece  being  disturbed  each  time  it  was 
fired.  With  moderate  powder  charges,  with  pieces  that 
required  some  time  to  load  and  were  aimed  after  each 
shot,  the  matter  of  gun  "  kick  '*  with  its  disturbance  of 
position  was  not  serious.  The  quick-firing  features  of 
modern  guns  present  a  different  situation.    All  modern 


AETILLERY  267 

pieces  can  be  loaded  and  fired  with  great  rapidity,  only 
a  few  seconds  being  required  for  the  complete  operation. 
To  obtain  the  full  measure  of  rapidity  in  firing,  the  time 
lost  in  re-aiming  a  piece  after  each  discharge  must  be 
saved.  To  do  this  the  recoil  must  be  under  control  so  as 
not  to  disturb  the  aim  when  it  is  once  set,  and  permit 
the  gun  after  each  discharge  to  return  automatically  and 
exactly  to  its  original  position,  requiring  only  reloading 
for  the  next  firing. 

A  law  of  mechanics  states  that  action  and  reaction  are 
equal  in  amount  but  opposed  in  direction,  which  in  the 
case  of  gunnery  means  that  an  amount  of  energy  equal 
to  that  stored  in  the  departing  shell  is  expended  in  the 
recoil  of  the  gun.  Another  law  states  that  with  a  given 
weight  of  moving  body  the  energy  varies  with  the  square 
of  the  velocity,  that  is,  if  the  velocity  be  doubled,  the 
energy  is  quadrupled,  and  if  the  velocity  be  increased 
fourfold,  the  energy  is  sixteen  times  as  great.  A  shell 
leaves  the  muzzle  of  a  240  mm.  gun  with  a  velocity  of  a 
mile  in  a  little  more  than  two  seconds,  at  which  speed  its 
striking  energy  is  the  same  as  that  of  a  large  locomotive 
travelling  at  the  rate  of  more  than  fifty  miles  an  hour. 
The  striking  force,  the  stored-up  energy,  of  such  an 
engine  is  mentally  pictured  when  there  is  recalled  the 
sense  of  power  and  rushing  weight  of  a  locomotive  tear- 
ing past  a  railway  station  at  higli  speed.  Now  imagine 
the  stopping  of  that  great  mass  of  machinery  in  a  dis- 
tance of  four  feet  and  in  one-half  second  of  time  without 
jar  and  without  damage  to  the  locomotive.  Miraculous 
or  impossible  as  it  may  seem,  that  is  exactly  what  is  done 
with  the  240  mm.  gun.  By  an  ingenious  arrangement  of 
plungers  compressing  a  liquid  or  air  in  cylinders,  all 
requiring  most  accurate  manufacture,  the  gun  barrel 
slides  backward  on  its  mounting  about  four  feet  and  then 
is  returned  automatically  and  promptly  by  the  com- 
pressed energy  in  the  cylinders  to  its  original  position 


268      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

witli  its  axis  of  direction  absolutely  unchanged.  This 
great  achievement  was  the  work  of  a  French  engineer. 

By  means  of  the  recuperator,  as  the  device  is  called, 
a  "  75  "  can  be  reloaded  and  fired  every  three  seconds, 
all  shots  being  accurately  directed  on  a  target.  A  "  155  '^ 
is  returned  ready  and  reloaded  in  less  than  thirteen  sec- 
onds, while  even  the  largest  guns,  whose  heavy  ammuni- 
tion requires  more  time  to  handle,  can  maintain  a  care- 
fully directed  fire  at  the  rate  of  a  shot  in  less  than  one 
minute.  Furthermore,  of  such  good  material  is  the  gun 
made  that  a  75  is  capable  of  firing  12,000  rounds  with- 
out losing  its  accuracy. 

The  75 's  were  usually  drawn  by  horses,  but  the  weights 
of  the  larger  sizes  were  too  great  to  permit  them  to  be 
readily  moved  by  animal  power,  and  recourse  was  had  to 
mechanical  tractors,  which  represent  one  of  the  great 
advances  in  field  work.  Artillery  to  be  effective  must  be 
mobile.  Without  the  tractors  the  155 's  would  have  been 
moved  only  with  difficulty  and  the  240 's  not  at  all. 
Tractors  weighing  two  and  one-half,  five,  ten,  fifteen  and 
twenty  tons  were  the  adopted  standards,  nearly  25,000 
in  all  having  been  ordered.  They  were  of  the  caterpillar 
tyi^e,  that  is,  they  were  propelled  by  two  wide  metal  con- 
tinuous driving  belts,  one  on  each  side,  and  were  capable 
of  making  ten  or  twelve  miles  an  hour  under  favorable 
conditions.  They  could  traverse  the  roughest  ground 
and  climb  hills  with  a  gradient  of  forty  per  cent.  Then 
the  principle  was  carried  oue  step  farther  and  guns  as 
large  as  the  155  mm.  howitzer  were  actually  mounted  on 
a  self-propelling  vehicle.  Smaller  guns,  especially  those 
used  against  airplanes,  were  frequently  mounted  on 
motor  trucks. 

With  the  fall  of  the  massive  gam  emplacements  in 
Belgium  and  northern  France,  attention  was  focussed 
on  the  possibility  of  mounting  very  large  guns  on  spe- 
cially designed  railway  cars,  so  as  to  render  them  both 


ARTILLERY  269 

safer  against  attack  and  more  effective  in  attack  by  mak- 
ing them  mobile.  By  such  means  the  enemy  could  not 
reach  them  with  other  long-range  pieces  except  by 
chance,  nor  ever  be  sure  that  he  himself  would  not  at 
any  moment  feel  their  crushing  strength. 

Early  in  the  war  both  the  British  and  French  ordnance 
experts  mounted  naval  and  coast  defense  guns  of  calibre 
as  great  as  thirteen  inches  on  railway  cars  which  were 
accompanied  by  other  cars  carrying  extra  ammunition 
and  the  gun  crews.  To  support  these  monsters  the  engi- 
neers had  to  strengthen  the  bridges  and  lay  track  in  the 
most  substantial  manner.  The  guns  were  so  attached 
to  the  cars  that  the  smaller  pieces  could  be  revolved  on 
a  i)ivot  mount,  giving  an  ^'  all  round  "  fire,  while  the 
larger  ones  were  fired  only  lengthwise  with  the  car. 
Some  of  these  latter  pieces  had  no  horizontal  adjust- 
ments, being  held  rigidly  in  the  mounts  with  only 
vertical  movement.  Others  were  so  mounted  that  they 
could  be  swung  horizontally  through  a  small  angle 
to  the  right  and  left  of  the  axis  of  the  car.  To  provide  for 
aiming  these  large  guns  at  any  target  within  a  given  area, 
a  curved  spur  track  would  be  laid,  and  the  gun  run  on 
the  spur  to  such  a  point  on  the  curve  as  to  bring  the 
axis  of  the  car  pointing  toward  the  target.  If  the  gim 
wore  a  rigidly  mounted  one,  this  spot  would  have  to  be 
determined  accurately,  but  if  the  gun  possessed  a  small 
horizontal  movement  on  its  own  mount,  nice  adjustment 
of  aim  was  more  easily  obtained  by  swinging  the  gun 
through  a  small  angle  after  the  car  had  been  placed  in 
approximately  correct  position.  The  British  authorities 
pushed  this  idea  of  mobile  artillery  to  the  limit,  using 
even  the  light  railway  cars.  It  was  foimd  quite  feasible 
to  mount,  transport  and  fire  guns  of  as  large  a  calibre 
as  six-inch  from  the  little  cars  on  the  GO-cm.  tracks,  and 
when  hostilities  ceased  plans  were  in  hand  with  every 
assurance  of  success  to  mount  guns  as  large  as  eight-inch 


270      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

on  light  railway  cars.  Our  own  Ordnance  Department 
was  experimenting  along  the  same  line  and  contemplated 
using  twelve-inch  rifled  mortars  on  such  mounts.  The 
advantage  of  such  mobility  with  the  further  great  bene- 
fit of  freeing  the  highroads  of  slow-moving,  encumbering 
and  highly  destructive  vehicles  is  readily  appreciated. 

The  American  Ordnance  Officers  had  from  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war  been  studying  the  possibility  of  mount- 
ing very  large  guns  on  cars ;  in  fact,  certain  reports  were 
made,  even  before  1914,  suggesting  such  a  plan  for  sea 
coast  defense.  During  the  Civil  War  a  few  mortars,  very 
insignificant  pieces  as  compared  with  the  rifled  cannon 
of  to-day,  were  set  up  on  flat  cars.  "When  the  United 
States  declared  war  the  Ordnance  Department  made  an 
investigation  as  to  how  many  large  guns  could  be 
obtained  that  might  bo  sent  abroad  and  there  be  mounted 
on  cars,  because  special  guns  of  such  size  would  take  too 
long  to  manufacture  to  be  of  early  use.  More  than 
300  guns  varying  in  size  from  seven-inch  to  a  huge 
sixteen-inch  howitzer,  and  more  than  100  rifled  mortars, 
some  belonging  to  the  Navy,  others  intended  for  coast 
forts,  were  found  as  possible  of  use.  The  Ordnance 
Department  commenced  at  once  the  mounting  of  these 
guns  on  cars  and  had  made  great  progress  when  the  war 
ended,  although  only  three  eight-inch  units  were  actually 
shipped  abroad. 

But  the  Navy  Department,  having  on  hand  some 
fourteen-inch  guns,  did  succeed  in  mounting  them  and 
shipping  them  to  France  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
Argonne-Meuse  offensive.  From,  the  beginning  of  hos- 
tilities the  Germans  had  been  able  to  outrange  the  guns 
of  the  Allies.  Exclusive  of  the  ''  Big  Berthas  "  with 
which  they  bombarded  Paris  at  a  distance  of  seventy-five 
miles,  a  phenomenal  performance,  although  more  spec- 
tacular than  practical,  the  longest  ranged  guns  on  either 
side  were  those  the  Germans  established  near  Ostende, 


ARTILLERY  271 

and  which  threw  shells  into  Dunkerque  —  a  distance  of 
50,000  yards  or  nearly  twenty-nine  miles.  The  British 
and  French  had  some  gims  of  twelve-  and  thirteen-inch 
calibres  mounted  on  railway  cars  but  with  a  maximum 
range  not  exceeding  twenty  miles  and  there  was  needed 
something  more  powerful  but  still  fully  mobile  with 
which  to  reach  the  German  back  areas,  especially  such 
targets  as  railway  junctions  or  large  ammunition  dumps. 

These  American  naval  guns  weighed  nearly  100  tons 
each  and  had  a  length  of  fifty  calibres,  that  is  fifty  times 
the  diameter  of  the  bore.  To  make  them  effective  they 
must  be  mounted  on  and  fired  from  railway  cars.  The 
year  1918  had  begun,  the  gims  were  still  in  the  United 
States  and  not  even  a  design  for  a  railway  mount  of  such 
capacity  was  in  existence.  In  fact,  it  was  very  doubtful 
whether  a  satisfactory  mount  could  be  designed  at  all, 
and  even  if  designed,  it  appeared  almost  impossible  that 
it  could  be  constructed  in  time,  so  that  the  guns  and 
mounts  could  be  sent  to  France  to  take  part  in  the  com- 
ing crisis.  But  this  astonishing  feat  was  accomplished 
by  the  Ordnance  Department  of  the  Navy,  and  the  con- 
struction was  carried  out  by  the  Baldwin  Locomotive 
AVorks  and  the  American  Bridge  Company,  the  first 
mount  being  delivered  in  the  incredibly  short  time  of 
seventy-two  days. 

The  extraordinary  car  on  which  the  guns  rested  was 
supported  on  two  pairs  of  six-wheeled  trucks,  or  twenty- 
four  wheels  in  all,  one  pair  of  trucks  being  at  each  end 
of  the  car.  The  total  weight  of  gun  and  car  was  535,000 
pounds  or  267.5  tons,  of  which  the  gun  constituted 
192,500  pounds,  and  the  car  342,500  pounds.  The  gun 
was  so  mounted  that  with  an  angle  of  elevation  not 
exceeding  fifteen  degrees,  at  which  elevation  it  had  a 
range  of  23,300  yards  or  more  than  thirteen  miles,  it 
could  be  fired  with  no  other  support  than  the  car  and 
trucks,  the  horizontal  component  of  the  reaction  being 


272       AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

taken  up  by  the  car  brakes  and  friction,  the  car  sliding 
backward  on  the  rails.  As  the  gun  under  these  conditions 
had  no  means  of  lateral  adjustment,  the  car  had  to  be 
replaced  in  a  predetermined  exact  spot  on  a  curved 
track  after  each  shot  to  get  the  correct  aiming.  However, 
by  using  a  special  foundation  beneath  the  car  the  gun 
could  be  elevated  to  forty-three  degrees,  giving  an 
effective  range  of  45,000  yards  or  nearly  twenty-six  miles. 

This  foundation  consisted  of  a  pit  into  which  the  rear 
part  of  the  gun  supi^ort  dropped  as  the  piece  was  ele- 
vated. The  gun  support  was  then  firmly  braced  against 
timbers  at  the  back  of  the  pit  to  give  rigid  resistance 
when  the  gun  was  fired.  When  the  gun  car  had  been  run 
over  the  pit,  the  weight  of  the  gun  was  transferred  by 
jacks  from  the  car  to  the  specially  prepared  platform. 
After  lifting  the  gun  from  the  car  it  could  be  given  a 
horizontal  movement  through  two  degrees  thirty  minutes 
on  either  side  of  the  axis  of  the  car,  thus  permitting  accu- 
rate adjustment  of  aim. 

When  the  gun  was  fired  from  the  car  without  other 
support,  the  pressure  on  the  centre  bearing  of  the  rear 
truck  was  increased  from  a  dead  load  of  180,470  pounds 
to  315,160  pounds,  each  axle  transmitting  62,000  pounds 
to  the  rails.  When  the  gun  had  the  maximum  elevation 
of  forty-three  degrees,  the  pressure  on  the  main  resisting 
casting  was  772,000  pounds.  These  weights  and  pres- 
sures give  an  idea  of  the  problem  solved  by  the  engineers 
in  designing  the  car.  Wlien  the  car  was  rigidly  held  and 
the  thrust  of  the  recoil  was  taken  up  by  the  pit  timbers 
the  recoil  mechanism,  which  absorbed  the  shock,  was  so 
neatly  adjusted  that  the  ponderous  weapon  had  a  move- 
ment of  only  forty-four  inches.  After  each  discharge  it 
was  at  once  and  automatically  returned  to  battery,  with 
true  aim  unaffected. 

The  powder  charge  weighed  480  pounds  and  the  pro- 
jectile 1,400  pounds.     The  latter  left  the  gun  with  a 


R    o 


y.    ^ 


ARTILLERY  273 

velocity  of  2,800  feet  per  second  or  at  tlie  rate  of  con- 
siderably more  than  a  mile  in  two  seconds  or  more  than 
two  and  a  half  times  the  velocity  of  sound.  So  accurate 
were  these  guns  that  four  shots  fired  on  a  French  prov- 
ing ground  at  a  range  of  29,000  yards  showed  an  average 
variation  of  only  fifty  yards. 

The  complete  outfit  for  each  gun  consisted  of  one  loco- 
motive, one  gun  car  carrying  the  gun,  and  ten  other  cars, 
some  with  living  accommodations  for  the  gun  and  train 
crews,  others  for  ammunition  and  equipment  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  pits  and  special  foundations. 

The  battery  personnel  exclusive  of  the  train  crew  con- 
sisted of  four  officers  and  sixty-seven  men.  There  were 
five  such  trains,  each  of  which  was  a  complete,  self- 
sustained,  mobile  unit.  In  addition  to  the  five  battery 
trains  there  was  a  staff  in  a  headquarters  train,  com- 
posed of  one  locomotive  and  seven  cars,  carrying  the 
officer  commanding  all  the  guns,  his  staff,  and  the  extra 
hospital  service. 

The  mounting  of  great  guns  on  railway  cars  imposes 
no  limit  on  the  size  of  the  gun  that  can  be  mounted,  cer- 
tainly not  as  the  size  of  guns  is  viewed  to-daj*.  That  being 
the  case,  the  thought  naturally  comes,  will  the  military 
engineer,  when  hereafter  planning  coast  defenses,  con- 
tinue to  suggest  isolated  expensive  forts  with  rigidly  fixed 
emplacements?  Forts  whose  positions  are  accurately 
known  can  be  reached  by  an  unseen  enemy  on  land  or 
sea,  an  enemy  to  whom  no  reply  can  be  made,  as  his  posi- 
tion is  not  quickly  ascertainable.  With  this  in  view  will 
not  the  engineer  be  inclined  to  build  railway  tracks,  or 
use  the  lines  of  existing  railways,  constructing  occa- 
sional spurs  along  such  portions  of  the  coast  or  frontier 
that  he  wishes  to  protect,  and  on  which  tracks  ho  can 
move  his  great  guns  at  will?  The  cost  of  one  permanent 
fort  will  pay  for  many  guns  and  cars. 

Against  these  mobile  units  an  enemv  can  no  longer 


274       OIEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

attack  at  will  the  points  of  defense,  because  such  points 
being  constantly  moved,  their  position  will  never  be 
known.  Such  tracks  would  permit  the  concentration  of 
defensive  energy  at  any  place  or  places,  and  the  imme- 
diate removal  after  a  decisive  blow  had  been  dealt,  or 
should  a  frontier  be  forced,  the  complete  withdrawal  of 
the  main  defenses  to  new  positions. 

The  efficacy  of  mobility  as  contrasted  with  the  old  mili- 
tary conception  of  defense  in  rigid  immobility  is  well 
illustrated  in  the  French  defense  of  Verdun,  one  of  the 
triumphs  of  the  war  and  at  the  same  time  a  great  engi- 
neering achievement. 

Verdun  was  one  of  a  great  chain  of  fortified  points 
with  Belfort,  Nancy  and  other  cities  facing  the  German 
frontier.  There  was  a  central  citadel  and,  encircling  the 
city  on  the  north  and  east  sides,  a  group  of  forts,  each 
constructed  of  massive  masonry  and  earthworks,  with 
deep  moats  for  protection  against  assault,  all  mounting 
heavy  guns.  "With  the  fall  of  the  Belgian  fortresses  the 
French  were  quick  to  see  that  places  like  Verdun,  in 
spite  of  all  the  thought  and  labor  expended  on  them, 
were  far  from  being  impregnable,  and  seeing  that,  they 
were  quick  to  act.  Many  of  the  guns  were  removed  from 
their  rigid  emplacements  and  mounted  on  cars  that  per- 
mitted them  to  fire  from  one  point  to-day,  from  another 
to-morrow.  Then  they  dug  trenches  and  relied  on  a 
mobile  army  for  the  defense  of  Verdun.  In  February, 
1916,  the  enemy  attacked  in  unparalleled  force. 

Verdun,  before  the  war,  was  served  by  two  double- 
track  railways  of  importance.  One  reached  it  from  the 
south,  running  down  the  valley  of  the  Meuse,  the  other, 
the  main  line  from  Paris,  turned  from  the  valley  of  the 
Aire  at  Aubreville,  and  thence  ran  due  east  to  Verdun. 
These  two  routes  were,  therefore,  substantially  at  right 
angles  to  each  other,  Verdun  being  at  the  point  of  the 
angle.    There  was  a  third  line,  a  local  railway  with  a 


ARTILLERY  275 

gauge  of  one  meter,  that  reached  Verdun,  but  on  account 
of  heavy  gradients  and  its  single  track  was  not  given 
serious  consideration  as  a  carrier. 

AVhen  the  German  wave  rolled  south  in  191-1,  it  passed 
to  the  westward  of  Verdun  and  some  miles  beyond  the 
railway  running  through  Aubreville,  Verdun  holding  as 
an  outpost.  xVfter  the  battle  of  the  Marne  the  German 
line  fell  back  north  of  the  Aubreville  railway  but 
remained  south  of  Varennes.  Then  in  October,  1914,  a 
drive  was  made  east  of  Verdun  with  the  intent  of 
breaking  its  defenses,  an  attack  that  resulted  in  the 
occupation  of  St.  Mihiel  and  the  creation  of  the  annoy- 
ing salient  across  the  Meuse,  which  included  within  its 
limits  four  miles  of  the  railway,  the  main  highroad  and 
the  canal  leading  to  Verdun.  This  salient  the  enemy 
held  until  they  were  forced  to  evacuate  it  by  the  Ameri- 
can offensive  beginning  September  12,  1918.  Verdun 
was  thus  reduced  to  depend  on  the  one  railway  through 
Aubreville.  In  February,  1916,  the  great  struggle  began 
for  this  key  to  the  gateway  to  eastern  France.  Time 
after  time,  as  fast  as  the  French  would  rebuild  the  rail- 
way, the  Germans  would  again  cut  it  with  artillery  fire 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Aubreville  whence  their  front 
line  was  distant  but  four  miles.  Finally  the  French, 
with  much  reluctance,  gave  up  the  effort  to  operate  the 
line  and  began  the  seemingly  impossible  task  to  supply 
the  army  holding  Verdun  by  means  of  the  meter  gauge 
line  and  such  traffic  as  could  be  taken  care  of  on  the  cross- 
country highvrays.  By  straining  all  facilities  to  the 
utmost,  they  succeeded  in  sending  daily  to  Verdim  2,000 
tons  of  supplies  over  the  little  railway  and  almost  the 
same  over  the  road  in  motor  trucks,  but  that  was  not 
enough.  If  the  fortress  wore  to  hold  out  against  the  con- 
tinued enemy  attack,  more  food,  anunmiition  and  other 
supplies  would  be  consumed  than  that  amount,  while  any 
break  in  the  line  would  spell  immediate  disaster.    The 


276       AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

engineers  undertook  to  solve  the  problem  by  constructing 
a  new  standard  gauge  railway,  sixty  kilometers  long, 
located  midway  between  the  two  main  lines  and  out  of 
reach  of  the  German  guns.  This  they  accomplished  in 
three  months.  The  rest  is  known.  Verdun,  thanks  to  the 
ability  of  the  French  engineers  to  mount  the  guns  so  as 
to  be  mobile  and  to  construct  the  railway,  held  out  and 
was  never  taken  in  spite  of  a  succession  of  attacks  involv- 
ing unstated  losses  to  the  besiegers. 

Thus  the  gunnery  experts  and  the  engineers  have 
worked  together  in  the  design  of  the  weapons,  in  the  pro- 
duction of  special  steel,  in  the  manufacture  of  the  guns 
and  parts,  and  finally  in  their  manipulation  in  the  field. 
How  they  further  cooperated  in  the  determination  of 
range,  in  the  protection  of  their  own  batteries  and  the 
detection  of  the  enemy's  is  another  story  and  was  told 
in  the  previous  chapter. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

LIGHT  RAILWAYS 

For  many  years  all  military  men  had  been  aware  that 
at  the  very  front  along  a  battle  line  there  would  be 
needed  a  system  of  rail  transportation  of  lighter  con- 
struction than  a  standard  gauge  line,  one  with  smaller 
cars  and  narrower  gauge,  one  that  could  be  laid  quickly 
and  perhaps  as  quickly  removed.  They  saw  that  such  a 
railway  by  its  mobility  and  elasticity  would  be  better 
adapted  to  serve  the  scattered  and  smaller  local  needs  of 
a  lighting  army  in  the  field  than  a  standard  gauge  line 
with  its  stouter  construction  and  heavier  equipment.  But 
as  was  the  case  with  many  other  engineering  features, 
the  military  men  failed  to  realize  fully  what  an  important 
function  these  little  railways  would  fill  in  a  modern  war. 

Even  as  late  as  1916,  when  the  United  States  was  on 
the  very  verge  of  declaring  war,  the  Corps  of  Engineers 
produced  an  excellent  handbook  on  railways  of  which  but 
fourteen  small  pages  were  devoted  to  this  important 
branch  of  military  railway  engineering,  although  it  spoke 
of  these  lines  whose  "  possibilities  for  both  offense  and 
defense  are  very  great  and  have  never  been  fully  util- 
ized." It  is  amusing  now  to  recall  that  less  than  two 
years  after  those  words  wore  written,  the  United  States 
had  nearly  14,000  men  endeavoring  to  utilize  the  same 
offensive  and  defensive  "  possibilities  "  but  on  a  far 
greater  scale  than  anyone  in  1916  could  picture  even  in 
his  wildest  imagination. 

The  American  handbook  on  ]\[ilitary  Railways  named 
these  small  lines  *'  combat  railways,"  not  a  particularly 
happy  term,  because  at  times  standard  gauge  railways 

277 


278      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

were  used  as  such,  and  fixed  no  definite  gauge  for  them, 
though  suggesting  one  of  two  feet,  or  two  feet  six  inches. 
Even  when  war  was  declared  there  was  no  adopted  or 
recommended  gauge  for  American  ''  combat  railways  " 
and  there  was  no  equipment  on  hand. 

In  the  Russian-Japanese  war  narrow-gauge  railways 
were  made  use  of  by  both  belligerents,  the  Russian  gauge 
being  75  cm.  (2  ft.  5i/^  in.)  and  the  Japanese  60  cm.  fol- 
lowing the  accepted  standard  of  their  German  instructors. 
In  Europe  both  Germany  and  France  had  given  the  ques- 
tion much  study  and  they  had  each  adopted  a  gauge  of 
60  cm.  (1  ft.  llVo  in.)  as  the  most  suitable.  The  British 
had  previously  decided  on  a  gauge  of  two  feet,  which 
was  close  enough  to  the  continental  gauge  to  permit  such 
ec|uipment  as  they  had  on  hand  to  be  worked  in  connec- 
tion with  it  without  confusion  until  new  60  cm.  rolling 
stock  could  be  constructed. 

The  French  called  these  little  railways  "  voies  de 
soixante,"  using  the  dimension  of  the  gauge  for  a  name 
which  was  shortened  into  "  une  soixante  "  or  "  les 
soixantes  "  for  singular  or  plural.  The  British  gave 
them  a  generic  appellation  of  ''  light  railways,"  which 
name  was  adopted  by  our  own  forces  when  we  came  to 
establish  a  narrow-gauge  service,  although,  of  course, 
our  lines  were  constructed  to  the  French  gauge  of  60  cm. 

The  field  where  these  light  railways  were  used  most 
was  at  the  very  front.  The  ordinary  standard  gauge 
railways,  or  broad  gauge  as  they  were  usually  called  to 
distinguish  them  from  the  light  railways,  were  never  or 
very  rarely  used  within  possible  observation  by  the 
enemy  or  within  the  range  of  his  light  artillery.  The 
point  on  each  broad-gauge  line  where  traffic  ceased  was 
called  a  rail-head,  developed  in  practice  into  a  terminal 
transfer  yard  with  some  warehouse  capacity  for  perish- 
able goods.  These  rail-heads  were  usually  from  five  to 
ten  miles  behind  the  front  lines  and,  therefore,  within. 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  279 

reach  of  long-range  guns.  To  avoid  a  great  disaster 
in  case  of  being  shelled,  concentration  of  supplies  was 
avoided  as  much  as  possible  and  such  supplies  as  were 
held  in  storage  were  distributed  into  different  '*  dumps" 
according  as  they  consisted  of  engineer,  ordnance,  quar- 
termaster, or  commissary  materiel  with  ammunition 
always  by  itself. 

The  rail-heads  were  so  laid  out  that  access  to  the  stor- 
age houses,  storage  places  or  cars  could  be  had  either 
by  motor  truck  or  light  railway  trains.  For  the  latter 
the  most  convenient  arrangement  was  to  have  a  broad- 
gauge  track  on  one  side  of  a  warehouse,  unloading  plat- 
form or  open  storage  space  and  a  light  railway  track  on 
the  other.  It  was  rarely  economically  possible  to  transfer 
loads  directly  from  broad-gauge  car  to  light  railway  car. 

From  these  rail-heads  the  light  railways  reached  out 
in  all  directions,  carrying  supplies  to  small  scattered  for- 
ward dumps  and  the  ammunition  to  the  front  trenches 
or  to  battery  i:)ositions.  In  short,  it  might  be  said  that 
they  did  the  retail  delivery  work,  leaving  the  wholesale 
business  to  the  broad-gauge  lines. 

The  track  was  composed  of  the  ordinary  T-shaped 
rails  laid  on  steel  or  wooden  crossties.  The  rail  varied 
in  weight  from  fifteen  to  twenty-five  pounds  per  yard. 
The  lighter  rails  were  used  in  the  early  days  when 
experience  was  lacking,  but  as  traffic  increased  and  the 
possibilities  of  the  light  railways  were  recognized, 
heavier  rails  were  called  for  until  finally  it  was  the  con- 
sensus of  opinion  of  the  American,  French  and  British 
offigineers  that  there  was  no  economy  from  any  point  of 
view  in  laying  rails  of  less  weight  than  twenty-five 
pounds  per  yard.  They  gave  a  more  resistant  track 
against  heavy  traffic,  and  the  extra  weight  did  not  prove 
to  be  a  serious  or  even  appreciable  handicap  in  rapid 
track  laying. 

Fr6nch  track  was  made  up  in  sections  five  meters  long, 


280      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

the  rails  LeiDg  riveted  to  steel  ties.  Some  of  tlie  track 
sections  were  curved  to  radii  of  30  and  50  meters  to  save 
bending  rails  in  the  field.  The  British,  though  using  some 
metal  ties,  preferred  those  of  wood  four  inches  wide  by  six 
inches  thick  and  four  feet  long.  The  American  sector 
being  a  part  of  the  original  French  front,  much 
of  the  light  railway  track  was  of  French  stand- 
ard practise.  On  new  work  the  American  Engi- 
neers preferred  wooden  ties  with  rails  thirty  feet 
long,  bending  them  in  the  field  to  fit  any  desired 
curve.  When  American  steel  ties  were  used,  they 
were  generally  held  to  the  rails  by  clips  and  bolts 
rather  than  by  rivets,  and  they  were  attached  as  the  track 
was  laid.  This  arrangement  of  non-connected  parts 
made  the  actual  work  of  track  laying  a  little  slower,  an 
objection  that  was  offset  by  the  greater  ease  in  shipping 
the  rails,  fastenings  and  ties  separately,  and  the  greater 
convenience  in  storing  the  track  material  in  engineer 
dumps. 

The  rolling  stock  presented  many  interesting  features. 
Locomotives  were  of  two  classes,  those  that  burned  coal 
and  consequently  gave  off  smoke  and  those  that  did  not. 
So  long  as  the  light  railways  were  not  hidden  from 
observation,  it  was  possible  to  use  locomotives  of  the  first 
class,  the  preferred  type  on  account  of  the  simplicity  of 
the  mechanism  and  the  ease  of  repairs,  but  when  they 
approached  the  actual  front  positions  they  were  no 
longer  safe.  For  even  if  the  tracks  were  sheltered  from 
direct  sight,  the  ascending  smoke  would  disclose  the  pres- 
ence of  a  train.  As  all  such  trains  were  suspected  of 
being  loaded  with  ammunition  and  most  of  them  were, 
the  first  signs  of  smoke  were  apt  to  draw  the  fire  of  the 
enemy. 

As  the  location  of  all  railway  tracks,  broad  or  light, 
were  known  through  aerial  photographs  and  accurately 
plotted  on  the  maps,  enabling  the  range  of  every  yard 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  281 

of  track  to  be  computed  with  respect  to  every  battery, 
it  was  an  easy  thing  to  hit  a  train  even  in  motion  if  only 
the  smoke  of  its  locomotive  disclosed  its  presence. 

For  the  forward  portions  of  the  line  gasoline  motor 
locomotives  or  gasoline-electric  motors  were  used.  In 
the  latter  a  gasoline  engine  drove  an  electric  generator. 
Although  there  was  a  duplication  of  motor  engines 
with  some  loss  of  power  in  the  transformation  by  pass- 
ing the  developed  energy  through  the  medium  of  elec- 
tricity instead  of  using  it  directly  after  its  first 
production,  in  the  gasoline  engine  there  were  certain 
mechanical  advantages  that  were  held  by  some  to  be  com- 
pensatory. For  example,  variation  in  speeds  could  be 
controlled  without  changes  in  gears,  and  a  higher  tension 
pull  was  obtainable  by  a  rotary  than  a  reciprocating 
engine  at  the  moment  of  starting.  The  American  loco- 
motive designers  decided,  however,  that  the  disadvan- 
tages due  to  the  great  complication  of  the  intricate 
machineiy  were  paramount  and  no  engine  of  the  com- 
bined type  was  built  for  our  own  service. 

So  long  as  intervening  ground  shut  off  direct  observa- 
tion, trains  drawn  by  these  non-producing  smoke  loco- 
motives were  reasonably  safe,  even  in  daytime,  except 
against  a  chance  shot  or  detection  by  airplanes  overhead. 
If,  however,  the  tracks  were  visible  from  the  enemy 
observation  posts,  traffic  on  such  parts  of  the  line  had  to 
be  handled  exclusively  at  night. 

Of  steam  locomotives  there  were  several  varieties,  with 
a  total  weight  varying  from  about  14,000  to  36,000 
pounds  and  with  different  combinations  of  driving  and 
non-driving  wheels,  or  as  expressed  in  the  usual  tenns, 
0-4-0,  0-6-0,  0-8-0,  0-4-4-0,  2-6-2  and  4-6-0.  To  the  non- 
professional reader  it  may  be  proper  to  explain  that  the 
first  and  last  figure  of  each  series  gives  the  number  of 
wheels  in  the  guiding  or  trailing  trucks,  and  the  interme- 
diate figure  or  fi.gures  the  number  of  connected  driving 


282      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

wheels.  Thus  0-4-0  means  that  the  engine  is  mounted  on 
only  four  driving  wheels,  that  is,  on  two  axles; 
4-6-0  indicates  an  engine  that  has  ten  wheels,  four 
of  which  make  up  a  front  guiding  truck,  behind  which 
are  six  driving  wheels  with  no  trailing  wheels.  Inas- 
much as  the  United  States  entered  the  war  without  any- 
light  railway  equipment  and,  therefore,  without  preju- 
dice, the  American  engineers  were  free  to  design  their 
own  equipment.  After  taking  full  advantage  of  British 
and  French  experience  which  was  freely  offered,  the 
type  of  engine  finally  adopted  as  the  American  stand- 
ard, probably  represents  the  most  satisfactory  type. 
This  machine  was  a  saddle-tank  engine,  but  with  the 
tanks  carried  as  low  as  possible,  a  most  important 
detail,  for  otherwise  the  elevated  center  of  gravity 
greatly  increased  the  natural  instability  of  these 
machines  on  the  narrow  gauge.  The  wheel  arrangement 
was  2-6-2,  giving  a  guiding  axle  on  both  ends  with  three 
driving  axles,  making  a  combination  particularly  well 
adapted  for  running  in  either  direction  over  rough  track. 
The  front  and  trailing  trucks  guided  and  steadied  the 
engine  and  also  gave  opportunity  for  the  maximum 
boiler  and  tank  capacity  within  the  limited  weight  per- 
mitted on  the  driving  wheels.  The  total  weight  of  the 
engine  was  33,700  pounds,  distributed  as  follows : 

On  front  truck 5,000  lbs. 

On  driving  wheels 23,100  lbs. 

On  rear  truck 5,600  lbs. 

The  total  wheel  base  was  fifteen  feet  seven  inches,  of 
which  the  rigid  driving  base  was  five  feet  ten  inches. 
The  diameter  of  the  driving  wheels  was  twenty-three  and 
one-half  inches,  while  that  of  the  truck  wheels  was  six- 
teen inches.  The  cylinders  were  nine  inches  by  twelve 
inches,  and  the  fuel  and  tank  capacity  were  1,700  pounds 
and  476  U.  S.  gallons  respectively. 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  283 

The  French  operated  a  peculiar  tj-pe  of  engine  to 
which  they  were  much  attached.  This  locomotive,  known 
as  the  Pechot,  had  two  boilers  served  by  a  single  fireman. 
It  weighed  28,000  pounds  and  rested  on  eight  driving 
wheels  which,  coupled  in  pairs,  were  so  independent  of 
each  other  that  the  rigid  wheel  base  was  less  than  twenty- 
eight  inches.  It  possessed  many  advantages  in  light  rail- 
way work,  including  great  facility  in  operation  over  a 
rough  and  tortuous  track,  and  being  built  in  two  units, 
either  or  both  could  be  used  for  power,  thus  conser\'ing 
fuel.  Either  engine  could  function  even  if  the  other  had 
been  damaged  by  shell  fire.  Furthermore,  since  the  fire 
box  was  in  the  centre,  no  matter  how  steep  the  gradient, 
the  water  always  maintained  the  same  elevation  at  the 
center  and,  therefore,  always  covered  the  crown  sheet. 

Gasoline  locomotives  were  smaller  than  the  steam  loco- 
motives, as  there  was  less  need  for  large  power  at  the 
immediate  front,  the  trains  being  lighter.  The  United 
States  had  two  types  of  gasoline  machines  which  were 
fairly  typical  of  general  practice.  They  were  of  the 
same  wheel  arrangement,  nameW,  four  driving  wheels 
without  leading  or  trailing  trucks.  The  distinguishing 
feature  was  their  weight,  one  weighing  10,000  and  the 
other  15,000  pounds,  with  the  following  comparative 
details : 

Total  weight 10,000  lbs.  15,000  lbs. 

Length 10  ft.  9  ins.  13  ft.  0  ins. 

Width 4  ft.  71/0  ins.  5  ft.  2  ins. 

Driving  wheel  diameter  24  ins.  30  ins. 

Wheel  base,  length 3  ft.  0  ins.  4  ft.  0  ins. 

Speeds  in  either  direc- 
tion    2  speeds  4  and  8  miles 

Fuel  tank  capacity 25  gals.  30  gals. 

Cars  were  for  tlio  most  part  of  the  gondola  and  flat 
types,  for  the  easy  loading  of  heavj  material  for  short 


284      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

haul,  the  former  alone  constituting  nearly  one-half  of  the 
whole  equipment.  There  were  also  box  car?  and  cars  for 
special  purposes,  such  as  tank  ?ars  for  hauling  water. 
The  cars  were  about  twenty  feet  long  and  were  mounted 
on  two  four-wheeled  bogie  trucks,  giving  great  flexibility 
on  curves.  The  normal  carrying  capacity  of  the  cars 
was  22,000  pounds  and  the  cars  themselves  weighed, 
empty:  flat  cars  8,000  pounds,  gondolas  9,000  pounds, 
boxes  12,000  pounds.  These  standards  were  substan- 
tially the  same  in  the  French  and  British  services  as  well 
as  the  American,  though  the  German  cars  had  one-half 
the  above  nominal  capacity  and  weighed  about  one-half 
as  much.  The  wheels  had  a  diameter  of  fifteen  and  three- 
quarter  inches  and  the  truck  wheel  base  was  three  feet, 
the  trucks  being  fifteen  feet  apart,  center  to  center. 

As  to  the  construction  of  these  light  railways  there  is 
little  to  be  said,  except  that  every  effort  was  made  to 
eliminate  heavy  work  so  as  to  advance  track  laying  with 
rapidity.  On  account  of  the  narrowness  of  the  gauge, 
sharp  curves  could  be  and  were  freely  used,  radii  as 
short  as  100  feet  giving  no  trouble  in  operation.  As 
trains  were  usually  short,  gradients  steeper  than  what 
would  be  desirable  on  main  lines  were  permissible.  Usu- 
ally a  maximum  of  2.5  per  cent  was  fixed  for  light 
railway  gradients  but  in  exceptional  cases  rates  of  climb 
as  high  as  three  per  cent  or  even  four  per  cent  were 
encountered.    The  last  two  were,  however,  exceptional. 

The  soil  of  France  is  usually  of  a  clayey  nature,  so 
that  all  roadbeds  had  to  be  well  drained  and  the  track 
stone  ballasted.  Without  such  ballast  it  would  have  been 
impossible  to  maintain  a  usable  track  composed  of  light 
rails  and  small  ties.  It  was  on  this  account  that  the  Brit- 
ish engineers  advised  that  wooden  ties  be  used  rather 
than  the  built-up,  ready-to-lay  track,  in  accordance  with 
French  practice.    They  gave  a  better  bearing,  and  if  the 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  285 

ground  were  very  soft  or  muddy,  larger  ties  could  be  used 
in  an  emergency. 

Derailments  were  not  infrequent.  The  saddle-tank 
locomotives  with  their  high  center  of  gravity  gave  much 
trouble  if  the  track  were  rough,  resulting  sometimes  in 
the  whole  engine  toppling  over.  But  in  spite  of  such 
annoyances  and  the  smallness  of  the  equipment  the 
amount  and  extent  of  service  rendered  by  these  little 
railways  were  very  remarkable.  A  wider  gauge  would 
have  made ,  the  locomotives  more  stable,  would  have 
reduced  the  number  of  derailments  and  would  have 
enabled  heavier  trains  to  be  run.  For  these  reasons  a 
gauge  wider  than  two  feet  was  recommended  by  some 
engineers.  The  function  of  these  light  railways,  how- 
ever, was  to  be  really  light.  They  were  intended  to  serve 
only  as  local  distributors  and  were  not  intended  to 
attempt  the  heavy  service,  properly  the  function  of  the 
broad-gauge  lines.  A  wider  gauge  would  have  meant 
heavier  track,  equipment  with  more  elaborate  construc- 
tion and  an  invasion  of  the  field  occupied  by  the  larger 
lines.  The  true  principle  to  follow,  under  conditions 
as  they  existed  in  France,  is  to  maintain  broad-gauge 
rail-heads  as  far  advanced  as  possible,  to  carry  sup- 
plies to  such  i^oints  in  train-load  lots  or  as  near  full 
train  loads  as  is  feasible,  and  then  to  rely  on  the  little 
lines  to  do  the  local  distribution  and  delivery  beyond. 

The  original  purpose  of  a  light  railway  was  to  deliver 
heavy  ammunition  to  forward  battery  positions.  Such 
material  was  awkward  to  handle  in  motor  trucks  and  still 
more  so  in  horse-drawn  wagons,  the  chief  means  of 
transportation  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  It  was  for 
the  reason  that  their  chief  function  was  in  connection 
with  the  gims  that  French  light  railways,  though  con- 
structed by  the  engineers,  were  operated  by  a  special 
railway  corps  attached  to  the  artillery  arm.  Their  scope 
of  service,  their  utility  to  all  other  arms  carried  the 


286      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

development  of  the  light  railways  far  beyond  any  esti- 
mate conceived  during  the  first  part  of  the  late  war  of 
what  they  should  do  or  even  were  capable  of  accomplish- 
ing. As  indicating  the  scope,  variety  and  extent  of  the 
traffic,  the  distribution  of  the  tonnage,  equating  troops 
in  tons,  hauled  on  the  American  light  railways  during 
the  autumn  of  1918  when  the  great  St.  Mihiel  and 
Argonne-Meuse  offensives  were  being  carried  out  was 
per  week: 

Am*munition 5,000  tons 

Engineer  materiel   2,900  tons 

Forage 1,300  tons 

Rations 3,500  tons 

Water ^ 1,000  tons 

Personnel 1,700  tons 

Road  materiel 4,600  tons 

Other  army  tonnage 2,600  tons 

Total  army  tonnage 22,600  tons 

Light  railway  materiel 12,400  tons 

Total  tons  per  week 35,000  tons 


These  figures  were  not  maxima,  because  during  one 
week^  while  the  Argonne  offensive  was  at  its  height,  no 
less  than  10,000  tons  of  ammunition  alone  were  sent  for- 
ward. But  large  as  this  last  figure  is,  it  was  exceeded 
nearly  fourfold  on  the  system  of  British  light  railways 
that  supplied  their  five  armies.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  on  account  of  their  older  and  broader  establish- 
ment, both  the  British  and  French  systems  of  light  rail- 
ways were  more  complex,  more  completely  laid  out  and 
did  a  heavier  traffic  than  our  own. 

The  large  amount  of  light  railway  materiel  trans- 
ported was  due,  of  course,  to  the  rails  and  ties  required 


LIGHT  RAILAVAYS  287 

in  the  construction  of  new  or  the  repairs  of  old  lines, 
as  the  army  advanced. 

For  those  who  are  interested  in  statistics  of  train 
operation  the  above  American  tonnage  was  handled  on 
554  kilometers  (335  miles)  of  main  line.  The  ton- 
kilometers  were  584,000,  the  train-kms.  were  21,800,  the 
locomotive-kms.  44,500,  the  loaded-car-kms.  80,800  and 
the  empty  car-kms.  52,200.  The  average  haul  of  a  ton 
of  freight  was  16.7  kms.  These  figures  gave  26.8  ton- 
kms.  per  train-km.  and  1,050  ton-kms.  per  kilometer  of 
line. 

Nor  were  individual  loads  negligible  affairs.  In  one 
instance  one  of  these  little  cars,  supposed  to  carry  only 
22,000  pounds,  was  actually  loaded  with  400  complete 
rounds  of  155  mm.  shells,  weighing  45  kilos  (99  lbs.) 
each,  a  total  of  nearly  40,000  pounds.  In  another  case 
when  an  emergency  was  pressing,  a  train  of  eight  cars 
was  moved  40  km.,  each  car  containing  365  large  shells, 
a  net  weight  per  car  of  36,211  pounds,  while  a  426  cm. 
{16%  ins.)  gun  weighing  74,710  pounds  was  shipped  on 
three  cars. 

The  light  railways  were  not  restricted  to  freight.  It 
was  found  that  troops  with  their  equipment  could  be 
more  easily  moved  on  such  trains  than  in  any  other  way. 
Di\nsions  in  the  front  trenches  were  always  relieved  at 
night,  in  order  to  avoid  attracting  enemy  notice  at  what 
was  always  a  critical  juncture.  While  this  was  being 
done  it  was  essential  that  the  outgoing  troops  should  be 
withdrawn  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  avoid  confusion  or 
interference  with  the  division  moving  in  to  take  their 
place.  Under  such  crcumstances  all  available  means  of 
transport  were  called  into  requisition.  ]\[iles  of  old 
Paris  and  Loudon  busses,  painted  a  dull  grey,  with  every 
outward  vestige"  of  previous  life  on  the  boulevards  or 
Piccadilly  obliterated,  proved  exceedingly  convenient. 
But  the  little  railways  did  their  part,  too,  so  well  that 


288      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

23,000  men  witli  their  arms  and  otlier  eqnipment  were 
moved  in  one  relief,  during  five  nights,  with  more  than 
6,000  men  during  a  smgle  night,  this  in  connection  with 
other  traffic. 

The  use  of  the  busses  gave  an  opi3ortunity  to  coin 
new  words,  and  very  useful  ones,  too.  The  loading  and 
unloading  of  troops  were  referred  to  as  "  embussing  '* 
and  ''  debussing,"  following  the  form  of  entrain  and 
detrain. 

Eeference  has  already  been  made  to  the  placing  of 
guns  on  the  little  cars  and  to  the  still  more  ambitious 
plans  for  the  mounting  of  very  large  pieces  that  were 
cut  short  by  the  signing  of  the  Armistice. 

But  the  British  inaugurated  a  new  step  and  used  the 
light  railways  to  transport  wounded.  They  believed,  as 
the  tracks  of  these  local  lines  reached  all  points  along 
the  front,  that  during  and  after  an  engagement  wounded 
men  could  be  carried  in  railway  cars  more  readily  and 
more  comfortably  to  receiving  hospitals  than  in  motor 
ambulances  on  the  highway.  On  the  road  they  would  be 
subject  to  annoying  if  not  serious  delays  by  the  front- 
ward flow  of  road  traffic,  traffic  that  could  go  by  no  other 
means.  To  make  a  practical  test,  they  connected  two 
large  receiving  hospitals,  or  casualty  clearing  stations 
as  they  were  officially  named,  with  the  whole  network  of 
light  railways  serving  that  particular  front,  just  prior 
to  a  major  engagement  that  they  knew  was  to  take  place. 
Several  trains  of  cars  were  fitted  with  racks  to  hold  the 
stretchers.  The  wounded  could  thus  be  and  were  taken 
directly  from  the  field,  placed  on  a  waiting  train  and 
delivered  to  the  hospital  without  further  rehandling  and 
probably  in  less  time  than  was  possible  by  using  the 
ordinary  road  ambulance  service. 

The  innovation  worked  well,  the  men  arriving  in  good 
shape  and  with  much  less  delay  than  on  previous  occa- 
sions.   But  during  a  lull  in  arrivals  the  surgeon  com- 


LIGHT  KAILWAYS  289 

manding,  seeing  an  intelligent-looking  sergeant  on  a 
stretclier,  tliouglit  to  ask  his  impression  of  the  method. 
**  It  is  very  good,  sir!  The  service  is  excellent,  but  if 
I  might  be  permitted  to  criticize  anything,  I  do  think  the 
speed  was  a  bit  rapid."  The  surgeon  was  surprised, 
because  he  had  given  strict  orders  that  the  speed  should 
not  exceed  ten  miles  pei'  hour,  realizing  that  any  speed 
faster  than  that  on  the  rough  track  and  over  the  poor 
springs  of  the  cars  intended  primarily  for  heavy  freight, 
would  injure  the  wounded.  So  he  sent  for  the  locomotive 
driver  who  had  just  brought  in  the  train.  Now  it  hap- 
pened that  the  crew  of  this  train  consisted  of  Americans. 
"  Were  you  the  driver  of  the  last  train  to  arrive?  " 
asked  the  surgeon.  "  Yes,  sir,"  was  the  reply.  *'  What 
speed  did  you  make!  "  "  'Bout  forty  "  came  the 
startling  answer.  **  But  surely  you  had  orders  in  regard 
to  speed  limit?  "  *'  Oh!  yes,"  said  the  driver.  **  I  was 
fold  to  go  and  to  get  there."  With  Yankee  nerve  he 
''  got  there."  How  the  train  kept  the  rails  at  such  a 
speed  around  curves  with  radii  of  100  feet  is  still  a  mys- 
terj^,  but  at  least  it  justified  the  restrained  criticism  of 
the  wounded  sergeant  as  not  being  an  exaggeration  that 
the  speed  was  a  '^  bit  rapid." 

These  little  railways  were  nearly  all  single-track 
lines,  and  as  there  were  frequent  junctions,  few  regu- 
lar stations  and  no  time  tables,  train  dispatching  was  no 
easy  matter.  The  only  way  by  which  trains  under  such 
circumstances  can  be  handled  is  by  the  aid  of  a  well  con- 
structed telo]ihone  system  with  boxes  set  along  the  track 
at  short  intervals,  from  which  train  crews  can  call  up 
headquarters  and  get  their  orders.  The  regiments  that 
bore  the  burden  of  light  railway  work  were  the  Twelfth 
and  Fourtocnth  Engineers,  who  were  continuously 
engage  in  such  work  from  August,  1917,  and  always  in 
the  advanced  area. 

When  hostilities  ceased.  Die  American  light    inilwnv 


290      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

system  consisted  of  about  2,240  kilometers  (1,350  miles), 
of  which  280  kms.  had  been  inherited  from  the  French  as 
different  parts  of  the  front  were  taken  over,  200  kms.  had 
been  constructed  by  American  engineers  and  1,740  kms. 
were  German  lines  captured  in  the  advance  in  the 
Argonne-Meuse  and  St.  Mihiel  offensives.  During  these 
offensives  the  average  number  of  kilometers  operated  was 
554,  and  the  maximum  force  engaged  was  13,650  men,  of 
whom  more  than  one-half  were  occupied  on  construction, 
so  great  was  the  demand  for  new  lines  or  the  rehabilita- 
tion of  the  old  as  the  advance  progressed. 

The  equipment  consisted  on  November  11th  of  about 
300  locomotives  of  which  about  160  were  worked  by 
steam  and  140  by  gasoline,  with  approximately  1,600 
cars.  It  is  difficult  to  give  exact  figures  regarding  the 
equipment  in  actual  service  as  more  than  the  above  num- 
bers of  locomotives  and  cars  had  been  shipped  to  France 
and  were  being  set  and  sent  to  the  front  as  rapidly  as 
possible,  though  many  locomotives  and  cars  had  not  left 
the  port  of  entry  when  hostilities  ceased.  Thirty-three 
steam  and  fifty  gasoline  locomotives  as  well  as  358  cars 
were  captured  from  the  Germans. 

Following  the  practice  of  the  French  and  the  British, 
the  American  engineers  established  a  complete  central 
repair  shop  with  a  full  assortment  of  special  machine 
tools,  where  all  repairs  of  every  nature  could  be  made  to 
any  class  of  rolling  stock.  The  parts  and  the  dimensions 
of  the  parts  of  locomotives  and  cars  differed  so  much 
from  those  of  standard  gauge  stock  that  there  was  no 
advantage  in  combining  the  repairs  of  standard  and 
narrow-gauge  equipment  in  the  same  shop  or  shops.  It 
was  found  better  to  give  each  class  of  equipment  its  own 
separate  repair  facilities,  equipped  with  special  tools, 
operated  by  a  personnel  experienced  in  each  particular 
class  of  rolling  stock  and  where  the  different  kinds  of 
spare  parts  could  be  stored  by  themselves.    Any  attempt 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  291 

at  combining  in  one  shop  the  work  of  repairing  two  such 
distinct  types  of  vehicles,  as  locomotives  or  cars  used  on 
broad-  or  narrow-gauge  railways,  resulted  in  confusion 
and  lost  motion. 

In  short,  the  Lilliputian  railway  that  at  the  beginning 
of  hostilities  was  little  more  than  a  toy  with  apparently 
limited  possibilities,  had  grown  into  a  very  husky  system 
and  was  a  very  potent  factor  in  the  solution  of  the 
problem  of  transportation,  nearly  always  the  greatest 
problem  that  the  engineer  has  to  face  no  matter  what  the 
character  of  the  work.  The  driving  of  a  tunnel,  the  oper- 
ation of  a  steam  shovel  or  dredge,  depend  upon  how  fast 
cars  or  scows  can  be  delivered  empty  and  taken  away 
loaded.  The  capacity  of  the  excavating  machines  them- 
selves always  exceeds  that  of  the  attending  transporta- 
tion units.  So  it  is  with  an  army  under  modern  conditions 
of  war.  An  army  is  dependent  absolutely  for  its  fight- 
ing efficiency  upon  transportation  facilities,  and  its 
demands  in  this  line  exceed  the  possibility  of  supply  by 
such  railways  or  highways  as  are  available  even  in  such 
a  well  equipped  country  as  France.  No  matter  what  the 
amount  of  transportation  facilities  that  are  ready  at 
hand,  they  will  be  found  in  a  great  measure  to  fall 
lamentably  short  of  actual  requirements.  In  studying 
the  needs  of  future  wars  and  making  provision  for 
them,  transportation  should  be  and  undoubtedly  will  be 
one  of  the  major  subjects  to  engross  the  attention  of  the 
authorities,  and  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  ever  before. 

The  method  of  administration  of  light  railways  differed 
radically  in  the  three  chief  allied  nations  on  the  western 
front.  As  explained  above,  the  French  lines  were  built 
l)y  the  engineers  but  operated  under  the  artillery  arm. 
The  British  organization  consisted  of  a  directorate  or 
section  of  the  Department  of  Transportation,  adminis- 
tered by  an  officer  who  happened  to  have  the  rank  of 
brigadier-general,  with   the   title  of  Director  of  Light 


292      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Railways  (D.  L.  R.).  He  reported  to  the  Director  Gen- 
eral of  Transportation  (D.  G.  T.)  and  had  charge  of  all 
matters  concerned  with  these  little  lines,  whether  of  con- 
struction, operation,  or  maintenance  of  either  equipment 
or  permanent  way.  This  authority  was  extended  over 
the  lines  in  the  army  area  as  well  as  those  in  the  rear. 

To  keep  liaison  with  army  requirements  an  Assistant 
Director  was  attached  to  each  army  headquarters  and 
another  ofificer  junior  to  him  at  each  corps  headquarters. 
These  officers  working  in  close  cooperation  with  the  army 
and  corps  commanders  saw  to  it  that  army  needs  were 
cared  for,  but  they  remained  under  the  direction  of  the 
Director  of  Light  Railways,  calling  on  him  for  all  rolling 
stock,  track  and  other  materiel,  and  additional  troops  for 
railway  service,  if  they  were  needed.  This  arrangement 
had  two  great  advantages.  Firstly,  the  demands  from 
the  several  British  armies,  of  which  there  were  five,  were 
coordinated  through  the  Director  of  Light  Railways  and 
adjusted  by  him  in  case  of  conflict.  Secondly,  the  fact 
that  the  Director  was  a  member  of  the  transportation 
department,  ranking  with  the  directors  of  other  trans- 
portation services,  all  of  whom  reported  to  one  head,  the 
Director  General,  assured  that  the  demands  of  the 
Light  Railway  Section  as  a  whole  received  attention 
at  least  equally  with  all  other  transportation  demands. 
In  the  event  of  a  shortage  of  supplies  or  labor,  the  most 
pressing  needs  of  the  entire  system  were  satisfied  in  their 
order  of  importance.  The  British  organization  was 
based  on  the  principle  of  centralization. 

The  American  method  was  the  converse.  Here  the  view 
was  taken  that,  as  the  light  railway  lines  lay  wholly 
within  the  army  area,  the  entire  system  operating  beyond 
the  broad  gauge  rail-heads  was  an  adjunct  of  the  com- 
batant forces,  intended  to  keep  them  supplied  with 
ammunition,  stores  and  engineer  materiel  used  in  their 
operations.     It  was   held  that   the   army   commander, 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  293 

advised  by  his  corps  commanders,  was  the  best  judge  of 
army  needs,  and  that  to  refer  matters  back  to  General 
Headquarters  involved  certainly  a  loss  of  time  and  pos- 
sible conflict  of  judgment,  either  of  which  might  be 
exceedingly  serious  during  a  period  of  important  mili- 
tary oi3erations.  At  such  a  moment  action  must  immedi- 
ately follow  decision  whether  right  or  wrong. 

In  the  first  organization  of  the  Transportation  Depart- 
ment, as  was  explained  in  detail  in  Chapter  VII,  there 
was  a  Manager  of  Light  Railways  on  the  staff  of  the 
Director  General  of  Transportation,  following  the  Brit- 
ish principle  of  centralization.  In  the  subsequent  reor- 
ganization of  the  engineering  department  in  February, 
1918,  the  section  of  Light  Railways  was  taken  from  the 
Director  General  of  Transportation  in  accordance  with 
the  decision  to  separate  the  army  service  from  that  of 
general  transportation.  It  was  raised  to  the  dignity  of 
a  separate  department,  being  combined  with  the  work 
on  roads,  and  was  placed  under  a  Director  of  Light  Rail- 
ways and  Roads  who  reported  to  the  Chief  Engineer. 

In  August,  1918,  when  the  First  Army  was  organized 
the  authority  of  the  Director  of  Light  Railways  and 
Roads  was  reduced  substantially,  being  limited  so  far  as 
light  railways  were  concerned  to  the  control  of  the  cen- 
tral repair  shop  at  Ablainville,  the  general  stores,  and 
the  tracks  leading  from  them  to  the  advanced  system. 
"Within  the  army  areas  all  control,  not  only  of  light  rail- 
ways but  also  of  roads,  passed  to  the  Chief  Engineer  of 
each  army  who  acted  through  an  Engineer  of  Railways 
and  Roads.  From  this  latter  officer  all  troops  assigned 
to  light  railways  in  the  army  area  received  instructions. 
It  was  he  who  decided  all  matters  of  construction  and 
who  had  charge  of  operation. 

In  Reptcml)er,  1918,  a  Table  of  Organization  was 
issued  by  the  'General  Staff  which  defined  the  light  rail- 
way service  for  each  army  as  consisting  of: 


294      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Five  light  railway  regiments,  each  of  two  bat- 
talions of  engineers  (each  first  battalion  composed 
of  three  operation  companies  and  one  advanced  shop 
company,  and  each  second  battalion  composed  of  two 
maintenance  of  way  companies  and  one  construction 
company). 

One  battalion  (three  companies),  shop  men  for 
central  repair  shops. 

Eleven  service  battalions  (four  companies  each). 

There  was  also  a  road  service  laid  out  for  each  army 
as  follows : 

Five  battalions  engineers  (roads)  (four  companies 
each). 

Ten  truck  companies. 

Five  wagon  companies. 

Eight  service  battalions  (four  companies  each). 

Two  battalions  engineers  (quarry)  (four  com- 
panies each). 

Three  service  battalions  (quarry)  (four  com- 
panies each). 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  although  the  orders  were  issued, 
the  actual  organization  of  the  troops  on  the  above  sched- 
ule was  not  carried  out,  the  work  being  done  by  such 
army  troops  and  others  who  were  available.  The  result 
in  general  was  that  there  was  no  central  organization 
of  a  Light  Railway  Department.  What  happened  to  the 
organization  of  Roads  is  told  at  length  in  connection 
with  the  road  work  in  The  following  chapter. 

Much  is  to  be  said  in  favor  of  both  the  principle  of 
centralization  and  its  converse  when  considered  theo- 
retically. The  A.  E.  F.  being  composed  of  only  two 
combatant  armies,  one  of  which  carried  on  extensive 
military  offensive  operations,  the  second  army  being  on 
the  point  of  attacking  when  the  Armistice  was  signed, 
it  was  not  difficult  to  achieve  good  results  with  a  segrega- 


LIGHT  RAILWAYS  295 

tion  of  authority.  For  several  armies  tlie  centralization 
2:»rinciple  i^resents  many  attractive  features,  and  by 
selecting  men  of  judgment  to  act  as  Assistant  Directors 
at  Army  Headquarters  and  by  confiding  to  them  ample 
authority  for  action  at  times  of  emergency,  the  British 
were  able  to  avoid  friction,  secure  harmony  and  pro- 
duce cooperation,  all  of  which  is  so  essential  to  military 
success. 


CHAPTEE  XXII 

ROADS 

Before  they  were  damaged  or  destroyed  by  the  direct 
action  of  war  or  suffered  to  fall  into  a  state  of  bad 
repair,  France  could  boast  of  roads  that,  in  excellence  of 
construction  and  systematic  convenience  in  location, 
were  not  surpassed  by  the  highways  of  any  country  in 
the  world  and  that  were  equalled  only  by  those  of  Ger- 
many. No  matter  where  the  traveller  went,  whether 
through  the  rich  and  populous  districts  or  those  but 
rarely  visited,  the  highways,  usually  straight  and  marked 
with  rows  of  tall  and  stately  poplars,  were  a  source  of 
continuous  joy.  The  surface  was  good,  the  ditches  were 
well  kept,  little  depressions  were  repaired  before  they 
reached  the  dignity  of  holes,  and  there  was  a  generous 
supply  of  accurate  direction  signs  and  distance  posts. 

There  are  three  classes  of  French  highways,  the 
'*  Eoutes  Nationales,"  which  are  the  main  arteries  built 
and  maintained  by  the  General  Government;  the  ''Routes 
Dei3artmentales,"  the  responsibility  of  the  departments 
into  which  France  is  politically  divided,  and  the  local 
roads  or  "  Routes  Communales  '^  within  the  limits  of 
the  communes  or  what  would  be  called  townships  in 
America.  These  roads  were  all  metalled,  except  for  a  few 
exceptions  among  the  Routes  Communales.  In  the 
vicinity  of  some  of  the  large  cities  the  Routes  Nationales 
were  paved  with  stone  blocks  to  withstand  the  heavy 
concentrated  vehicular  traffic,  but  elsewhere  all  the  roads 
may  be  said  to  have  been  constructed  of  a  water-bound 
macadam  with  no  oil  or  other  coating  and  with  widths 
and  thicknesses  that  were  governed  by  their  comparative 

296 


ROADS  297 

importance.  While  no  definite  rules  can  be  given,  it  may 
be  said  that  the  first  two  classes  of  roads  have  a  six-inch 
surface  laid  on  a  solid  foundation,  well  drained  and  with 
established  limits  of  gradients  and  curves,  while  the 
communal  roads  have  a  lighter  four-inch  construction. 
By  this  system  of  definitely  separated  responsibility  for 
the  care  of  roads,  there  resulted  a  splendidly  planned 
system  of  inter-city  and  inter-department  highways  that 
became  excellently  well  adapted  to  the  long-distance  mili- 
tary traffic  of  war  times. 

The  usual  method  of  maintaining  French  roads  in 
times  of  peace  is  to  divide  them  into  sections  with  one 
man  called  a  "  cantonnier  "  in  charge  of  each.  Piles  of 
broken  stone  are  delivered  along  the  road  with  which  the 
cantonnier  repairs  soft  spots  and  small  breaks  as  fast 
as  they  appear.  He  also  sees  to  the  drainage  and  the 
removal  of  excessive  mud.  In  this  way,  a  road  is  always 
kept  in  service.  When  finally  the  whole  road  needs  a 
general  overhauling  it  is  done  by  large  gangs  of 
''  entrepreneurs."  Rock  suitable  for  road  construction 
abounds  generally  throughout  France  and  the  question 
of  machinery  and  equipment  for  maintenance  was  not  a 
serious  problem,  especially  since  the  cantonnier  was 
accustomed  to  break  by  hand  the  stone  he  needed. 

The  practical  road-building  problems  confronting  the 
engineers  of  the  American  Expeditionary  Force  were  of 
two  kinds  —  the  more  permanent  repairs  in  the  Zone  of 
the  Rear  for  the  Service  of  Supplies  and  the  hasty 
construction  and  reconstruction  with  improvised  equip- 
ment and  tools  for  the  active  army  at  the  front.  In  the 
work  in  the  forward  area,  the  best  engineering  practice 
in  permanent  and  economical  road  building  was  fre- 
quently of  secondary  importance  to  the  maintaining  of 
military  communications.  The  latter  consideration  was 
so  decidedly  paramount  as  to  justify  a  choice  of  materials 
and  a  character  of  temporary  repairs  that  would  ordi- 


298      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

narily  be  condemned  in  civil  practice.  The  successful 
officer  on  this  duty  was  he  who  recognized  that  time  was 
always  the  all-imi3ortant  element,  at  the  sacrifice  of  all 
other  considerations,  and  who  successfully  kept  the  traf- 
fic moving  day  and  night. 

The  work  in  the  Service  of  Supplies  being  removed 
from  the  actual  front  more  nearly  approximated  normal 
conditions  except  that  it  was  always  executed  under 
great  pressure.  The  work  in  the  army  area  reflecting  the 
strenuous  conditions  of  battle  presented  phases  that  are 
of  greater  technical  interest. 

The  first  requirement  of  a  military  road  in  France, 
and  it  admitted  of  no  exception,  was  that  there  must  be 
a  special  and  hard-wearing  surface.  Under  motor  trucks 
carrying  five  and  even  more  tons  of  ammunition,  tractors 
hauling  heavy  guns,  and  an  unbroken  procession  of  all 
kinds  of  other  vehicles,  a  dirt  road  would  not  only  not 
withstand  the  wear  even  for  a  short  while,  but  would  be 
a  deceiving  trap  leading  traffic  into  an  impasse.  There 
were  only  two  kinds  of  road  surface  used,  stone  and 
wood.  To  furnish  the  former,  all  available  French 
quarries  were  called  on,  new  ones  were  opened,  and  at 
frequent  intervals  to  save  transportation,  while  at  times 
of  emergency  bricks  and  stones  from  the  walls  of  ruined 
houses  were  taken  and  crushed. 

It  is  interesting  to  trace  the  building  of  the  A.  E.  F. 
road  organization,  beginning  with  the  rather  loose  pro- 
vision made  early  in  1918  for  the  care  of  certain  impor- 
tant highways  in  the  Service  of  Supplies,  and  carry  it 
through  the  period  of  tlie  establishment  of  the  First, 
Second  and  Third  Armies  with  their  special  require- 
ments in  their  active  areas.  War  Department  Order  108, 
1917,  which  provided  for  the  organization  of  special 
engineer  regiments,  made  provision  for  this  branch  of 
work.  The  Twenty-third  Engineers  was  assigned  to  the 
important  duty.    Like  the  other  regiments,  the  Twenty- 


KOADS  299 

third  was  recruited  of  specialists  from  all  parts  of  tlie 
United  States,  including  among  its  enlisted  personnel  a 
very  large  number  of  technical  college  graduates,  engi- 
neers chosen  from  the  staffs  of  various  state  highway 
commissions,  and  contractors  experienced  in  road  and 
bridge  building  and  quarry  operation.  The  regiment  was 
equipped  with  motor  trucks,  wagon  train  auxiliaries  and 
special  road  tools.  Arriving  in  France  during  the  early 
part  of  1918,  during  the  dark  days  of  the  German 
offensive,  they  found  the  American  forces  facing  the 
necessity  of  adapting  themselves  to  the  needs  of  the 
moment  and  of  planning  the  work  in  advance,  so  far  as 
engineering  effort  could  do  so,  in  conjunction  with  the 
French,  as  the  date  for  the  formation  of  the  American 
army  as  an  independent  unit  had  not  been  fixed.  Port 
facilities  were  being  rushed,  and  the  large  supply  depots 
were  matters  of  such  immediate  importance  on  account 
of  the  increasing  volume  of  troop  arrivals  that  it  became 
necessaiy  to  divide  the  Twenty-third  Fmgineers  and 
make  use  of  the  engineering  ability  of  separate  units  on 
harbor,  dock  and  water  supply  construction  at  the  base 
ports,  and  on  hospital,  warehouse,  railway  and  bridge 
building  in  the  Service  of  Supplies,  in  addition  to  their 
attending  to  road  construction  and  maintenance  required 
by  different  American  sen^ices  in  various  parts  of 
France. 

During  this  period  the  charge  of  the  roads  for  the 
Service  of  Supplies  came  under  the  Director  of  Construc- 
tion and  Forestry,  operating  through  section  engineers, 
and  for  the  Zone  of  the  Advance  under  the  Director  of 
Light  Railways  and  Roads.  Such  organization  generally 
existed  until  August,  1918,  when  the  First  Army, 
A.  E.  F.,  took  over  the  highway  work  in  its  own  anny 
area.  These  section  engineers  and  their  staffs  were  usu- 
ally oflicers  of  engineering  organizations  or  casual  offi- 
cers appointed  more  or  less  permanently  in  charge  of  the 


300      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

large  engineering  work  in  different  localities,  wliere 
road  construction  was  an  incident  to  the  requirements  of 
other  construction. 

There  existed  many  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the 
proper  solution  of  road  problems,  with  little  effort  made 
at  that  time  toward  the  standardization  of  specifications 
and  methods.  Distribution  of  the  scanty  supply  of  road- 
building  machinery  and  equipment  was  made  many  times 
without  coordination  of  the  requirements  as  a  whole. 
The  eiforts  on  military  roads  were,  practically  speaking, 
concentrated  in  the  immediate  vicinities  of  large  engi- 
neering projects.  The  section  engineers  had  available 
only  a  constantly  shifting  body  of  troops  for  the  work, 
the  special  road  regiment  being  employed  in  other  lines 
in  many  different  localities. 

In  spite  of  these  inevitable  irregularities  incident  to 
the  development  of  a  great  organization,  the  results  that 
were  obtained  were  remarkable  and  will  make  a  proud 
chapter  in  the  list  of  achievements  of  the  American  army 
engineer. 

The  actual  work  done  was  mainly  tho  maintenance  of 
the  heavy  traffic  roads  in  re-surfacing  and  patching  of 
holes  as  they  developed,  the  stone  being  obtained  from 
quarries  operated  by  Americans  and  also  through  pur- 
chase from  French  sources.  The  obtaining  of  sufficient 
binder  and  screening  material  was  frequently  a  serious 
problem,  and  repair  gangs  were  forced  to  use  sand 
and  sometimes  loam  to  hold  the  top  course  of  the  road 
together  temporarily,  the  work  being  carried  out  at  all 
times  under  full  traffic.  Equipment  in  the  shape  of 
rollers  and  crushers  was  purchased  or  leased  from  the 
French  in  order  to  eke  out  the  scanty  supply  of  American 
equipment  on  hand,  and  was  worked  frequently  night  as 
well  as  day. 

The  organization  for  the  solving  of  road  problems  of 
the  army  was  in  a  process  of  development  even  up  to  the 


ROADS  301 

time  of  the  Armistice.  Tlie  necessary  brigading  of  the 
American  troops  with  the  French  and  the  British  to  stop 
the  German  offensive  in  the  spring  of  1918,  was  one 
obstacle  to  the  prom^Dt  creation  of  an  efficient  road  engi- 
neer organization.  Troops  which  had  been  designed  to 
be  army  troops  and  had  been  sent  over  in  the  spring  of 
1918  with  equipment  purchased  specially  for  them,  had 
not  been  immediately  used  as  such.  Consequently  the 
men  and  tools  were  scattered  throughout  the  various 
projects  of  the  Service  of  Supplies. 

In  the  short  time  during  which  the  First  and  Second 
Armies,  A.  E.  F.,  were  in  active  operation  as  such, 
namely,  from  August  10,  1918,  to  the  signing  of  the 
Armistice,  there  was  not  enough  time  to  complete  the 
segregation  of  the  highway  troops  as  planned.  There- 
fore, the  engineer  officers  of  the  army  charged  with 
the  responsibility  for  the  road  work  were  forced  to  adopt 
temporary  expedients  in  order  to  do  the  utmost  possible 
in  keeping  the  road  building  and  repair  work  up  to  the 
fast  and  steadily  increasing  demand  of  the  army. 

Previous  to  the  beginning  of  the  St.  Mihiel  offensive, 
the  forward  dumps  of  road  material  were  stocked 
through  the  agencies  of  both  the  light  railways  and 
roads.  Such  a  division  of  authority  seemed  to  be  a 
logical  one  and  serving  the  requirements  of  expedience 
in  organization,  the  movement  being  controlled  by  an 
officer  known  as  Engineer  of  Light  Railways  and  Roads, 
reporting  to  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army.  Later 
when  the  great  importance  of  both  of  these  arteries  for 
the  supply  of  the  army  became  such  as  to  render  neces- 
sary the  operation  of  the  two  as  equally  important  func- 
tions of  engineer  troops,  a  further  division  of  authority" 
was  adopted. 

Undor  the  Engineer  of  Light  Railways  and  Roads  of 
the  First  Army  there  were  officers  known  as  Corps 
Road    Officers,    to    whom   was    given    the    direction    of 


302      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

road  work  in  certain  geographical  areas  corresponding 
rouglily  to  those  of  army  corps.  To  these  officers  were 
assigned  engineer  troops  and  labor  battalions,  as  well  as 
equipment  and  supplies  both  for  work  in  hand  and  for 
that  in  contemplation  to  be  required  in  following  the 
advance  of  the  army.  These  Corps  Road  Officers  were 
charged  with  making  such  reconnaissance  as  might  be 
necessary  and  within  their  areas  were  allowed  prac- 
tically the  full  control  of  such  troops  as  might  be 
assigned  by  the  Engineer  of  Light  Railways  and  Roads. 
Practically,  however,  they  were  officers  detached  in  most 
instances  from  their  own  troops  over  whom  they  retained 
general  administrative  responsibility.  On  the  other  hand, 
engineer  troops  and  other  organizations  were  assigned 
to  these  same  Corps  Road  Officers  for  work  and  not 
supervision.  This  situation  could  not  work  to  the 
best  possible  advantage,  but  the  general  require- 
ment of  expediency  must  be  borne  in  mind.  The  dou- 
ble responsibility  of  these  officers  in  exercising  an 
administrative  command  over  their  own  troops  while  at 
the  same  time  rendering  the  special  services  for  which 
they  had  been  detached,  made  it  extremely  difficult  to 
accomplish  results  to  the  best  advantage  both  for  proper 
administration  and  constructive  engineering  work. 

There  were  five  Corps  Road  Officers  appointed  at  the 
time  of  the  St.  Mihiel  offensive,  and  to  each  of  them  were 
assigned  companies  of  the  motor  and  wagon  train  of  the 
Twenty-third  Engineers  as  well  as  service  battalions. 
The  separation  of  these  troops  from  their  own  battalion 
commanders  and  administration  orders  undoubtedly 
worked  a  hardship  on  their  efficient  administration  and 
led  to  results  that  bore  evidence  of  individual  efforts 
rather  than  unified  efficient  team  action. 

The  great  rapidity  with  which  the  objectives  were 
reached  in  the  St.  Mihiel  offensive  made  but  a  small  call 
upon  the  road  troops  during  the  active  advance.    In  the 


ROADB  303 

consolidation  of  tlie  new  front,  road  work  became  a  prob- 
lem of  repair  rather  than  of  construction.  This  problem 
was  not  serious,  as  the  German  engineers  had  kept  the 
roads  behind  their  front  in  excellent  condition.  But  the 
work  across  No  Man's  Land  required  the  filling  of  shell 
holes  and  complicated  trench  systems,  and  the  removal 
of  a  number  of  very  solidly  constructed  obstacles  espe- 
cially in  connection  with  the  German  lines. 

For  two  or  three  weeks  prior  to  the  greater  American 
offensive  of  the  Argonne-Meuse  there  was  exceedingly 
intensive  preparation.  But  during  the  attack  and  espe- 
cially as  it  developed  in  intensity,  the  care  of  roads  for 
the  army  was  divided  into  three  parts :  first,  the  Division 
Engineers  who  undertook  the  necessary  pioneer  work 
from  the  front  line  as  far  back  as  the  division  authority 
extended,  generally  speaking  to  include  the  divisional 
light  artillery  positions.  Behind  the  division  troops  and 
their  responsibility  for  roads  and  bridges  were  the  Corps 
Engineers,  whose  authority  extended  back  to  include  the 
forward  ammunition  and  supply  dumps.  The  Army 
road  engineers  undertook  the  care  of  the  more  permanent 
army  roads,  which  in  general  lay  behind  the  foi*ward 
dumps.  The  Road  Department  was  one  of  the  new 
departments  where  proper  relations  between  division, 
corps  and  army  troops  were  consistently  maintained. 

As  may  be  imagined,  the  amount  of  road  repair  and 
construction  increased  the  further  the  area  became 
extended,  due  to  the  advancing  front  lines.  Both  divi- 
sional and  corps  troops  were  forced  by  the  emergencies 
to  adopt  many  expedients  to  accomplish  the  necessary 
road  results  in  order  to  accommodate  the  rapidly  chang- 
ing tactical  situation.  The  situation  was  further  com- 
plicated by  the  different  needs  of  the  several  divisions 
making  up  a  corps  front.  Such  differences  demanded 
special  routing  of  traffic  and  the  maintaining  of  separate 
lines  of  commimication.    The  divisional  troops  also  wero 


304      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

changed  and  rested  as  their  divisions  were  placed  in  line 
or  withdrawn.  The  many  problems  of  the  individual 
division  were  considered  as  practically  solved  when  the 
work  had  been  brought  to  a  point  that  furnished  imme- 
diate relief,  even  if  in  a  temporary  manner  only.  The 
executing  troops  had  meagre  mechanical  equipment  and 
relied  on  ready-made  methods  and  hand  labor.  As  one 
illustration  of  similar  character  expedients  used,  canvas 
bags  were  provided  in  wliich  men  carried  on  their  shoul- 
ders stone  obtained  from  demolitions  and  ruins  in  the 
neighborhood,  carts,  horses  or  mechanical  traction  power 
being  entirely  lacking. 

The  degree  of  permanency  in  road  work  increased 
according  as  the  work  was  handled  by  the  corps  and 
army  troops  until  a  point  was  reached  where  heavy 
equipment,  such  as  crushers  and  road  rollers,  was 
employed. 

As  time  went  on  the  problems  of  light  railways  and 
roads  became  so  great  of  themselves  as  to  render  the 
efficient  active  management  of  both  by  one  officer  prac- 
tically impossible,  and  it  beoame  harder  to  coordinate  the 
work  of  the  assistant  coi^ps  officers  and  the  troops  under 
their  jurisdiction.  About  October  20th,  a  separation  in 
the  organization  was  effected,  and  the  commanding  officer 
with  the  staff  of  the  Twenty-third  Engineers,  the  army 
highway  regiment,  was  withdrawn  from  work  on  the 
construction  projects  in  the  Service  of  Supplies,  ordered 
to  the  First  Army  and  appointed  Engineer  of  Roads 
First  Army,  reporting  directly  to  the  Chief  Engineer  of 
'the  First  Army.  "With  this  division  of  organization  and 
with  the  greater  number  of  the  experienced  road  officers 
of  this  regiment  available,  corrections  in  the  former 
organization  were  made  to  allow  for  the  further  expected 
extension  of  road  responsibility  in  following  up  the 
offensive.  Additional  service  troops  were  assigned,  a 
definite  system  for  maintenance  and  repair  was  organ- 


KOADS  305 

ized,  and  liaison  was  established  with  corps  engineers 
so  that  the  rapidly  increasing  army  needs  for  highways 
could  be  attended  to  more  easily  and  quickly. 

The  advisability  of  this  recognition  of  the  vast  impor- 
tance of  highways  to  an  advancing  army  was  well  borne 
out  in  practice,  especially  in  the  time  between  the  start- 
ing of  the  second  phase  of  the  Argonne-Meuse  offensive, 
November  1,  1918,  and  the  Armistice  on  November  11th. 
On  this  latter  date  nearly  800  kilometers  of  road  were 
actively  under  supervision  and  repair  by  the  technical 
troops  of  the  Twenty-third  Engineers,  with  their  motor 
and  wagon  trains  and  a  number  of  service  battalions  and 
pioneer  infantry  regiments  assigned  to  them  for  labor. 
These  army  road  troops  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Engineer  of  Roads,  First  Army,  on  November  11,  1918, 
amounted  to  some  21,000  men. 

Little  has  been  said  in  the  above  of  the  natural  diffi- 
culties under  which  the  work  described  was  executed. 
The  practically  incessant  rain  was  a  factor  which  heavily 
taxed  the  efforts  of  the  troops  employed  to  keep  the 
roads  in  passable  condition,  and  further,  was  a  great  ele- 
ment in  the  rapid  deterioration  of  the  surface  and  foun- 
dation, strained  as  they  were  by  the  tremendous  volume 
of  truck  and  automobile  traffic.  This  traffic,  particularly 
in  the  army  area,  was  necessarily  confined  to  main 
arteries  of  communication  supplying  the  three  corps  of 
the  First  Army  front.  The  traffic  census  taken  in 
Varennes  showed  more  than  12,000  vehicles  passing 
one  point  in  twentj^-four  hours,  so  that  the  practical 
difficulties  of  making  road  repairs  while  the  surface" 
and  shoulders  of  the  road  proper  were  rapidly  deterio- 
rating under  the  traffic,  may  be  imagined.  Coupled 
with  these  difficulties,  the  shelling  of  the  back 
areas  by  the  Gennans  became  many  times  a  disturb- 
ing factor  to  the  morale  of  the  troops  employed,  and 
it  is  a  proud  tribute  to  the  perseverance,  energy,  inge- 
nuity,   and    determination    of    the    American    enc:ineer 


306      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

troops  on  this  work  that,  in  spite  of  always  increasing 
demands  and  working  against  the  constant  obstacles  of 
weather,  traffic  and  shelling,  there  was  no  instance  in 
the  army  area  where  traffic  was  stopped  dne  to  a  failure 
on  the  part  of  the  engineer  troops  to  have  any  road  ready 
to  bear  its  designed  volume  of  traffic. 

"With  the  coming  of  the  armistice,  the  road  problems 
of  the  army  engineers  changed  to  those  that  contem- 
plated a  greater  degree  of  permanency  in  both  construc- 
tion and  maintenance.  Shortly  after  the  cessation  of 
hostilities,  all  road  work  of  the  American  Expeditionary 
Force  in  France  was  placed  under  the  charge  of  the 
Director  of  Construction  and  Forestry.  Road  districts 
were  established,  and  a  system  of  patrolling,  similar  to 
the  French  peace-time  "  cantonnier  "  method,  was  intro- 
duced with  engineer  officers  in  charge  of  districts  and 
with  a  better  rearrangement  of  engineer  troops  and  sup- 
plies. Serious  difficulties  were  again  encountered  in  the 
spring  of  1919  at  the  time  of  the  spring  thaw,  which 
again  forced  the  road  toops  to  work  under  high  pressure 
in  order  to  keep  abreast  of  the  traffic  requirements. 

In  the  area  of  occupation  of  the  American  Third 
Army,  the  control  of  road  work  was  given  to  the  Chief 
Engineer  of  the  Third  Army,  who  employed  to  a  large 
extent  local  civilian  labor  maintaining  the  arteries  of 
communication  within  the  area. 

Generally  speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  the  roads  of 
France  as  used  by  the  American  Armies  were  left  in  a 
good  state  of  rough  repair,  as  an  effort  was  made  before 
the  troops  were  withdrawn  from  France  to  put  them  in 
as  satisfactory  a  condition  as  possible.  But  the  wear 
caused  by  the  intense  and  long  continued  war  traffic  calls 
for  a  complete'  resurfacing  to  restore  the  roads  to  the 
same  state  of  excellence  as  existed  before  the  war,  in 
spite  of  all  the  energy  and  material  that  was  expended 
in    their    repair.      The    great    quantities    of    material 


EOADS  307 

that  will  be  needed  for  this  perfect  restoration,  espe- 
cially when  all  the  other  roads  in  France  are  con- 
sidered whose  condition  is  quite  similar  to  those  in  the 
American  sector,  cannot  possibly  be  available  for  even 
several  years  if  the  present  output  of  the  French 
quarries  be  taken  as  a  basis  for  the  supply.  It  is  this 
work  of  permanent  resurfacing  which  the  French,  with 
labor  available  after  their  own  demobilization,  are 
willingly  taking  up  systematically  as  one  part  of  their 
gigantic  task  in  effacing  the  scars  of  th6  war. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  American  road  organization 
was  in  a  continuous  process  of  development  up  to  the 
signing  of  the  armistice  and  it  had  not  reached  the  point 
where  actual  experience  dictated  precedents.  In  fact,  no 
attempt  was  made  to  establish  individual  American 
precedents  or  standards,  the  officers  realizing  that  it 
was  far  better  to  follow  French  practice.  Therefore,  to 
give  examples  of  standards  that  were  in  principle  com- 
mon to  the  allied  armies,  recourse  must  be  had  to  the 
experience  of  the  French  and  British. 

The  width  of  the  stoned  surface  of  French  roads  was 
from  three  to  live  and  a  half  meters.  For  mili- 
tary service  it  was  found  that  there  was  needed  for 
single-line  traffic  a  width  of  at  least  three  m.,  for  double 
traffic  six  m.  and  for  triple  traffic  eight  m.  To  widen 
one  kilometer  of  road  from  three  m.  to  six  m.,  1,800 
tons  of  stone  were  required  calling  for  1,800  days 
of  labor  in  the  quarrying,  six  light  railway  train 
loads  for  the  transportation,  120  truck  days  and  2,400 
labor  days  on  the  placing,  in  addition  to  a  large  amount 
of  heavy  equipment  of  road  rollers,  sprinklers  and 
crushers. 

In  the  construction  of  new  or  the  reconstruction  of  old 
roads  a  strong  foundation  was  absolutely  necessary, 
otherwise  the  heavy  artillery  and  tnioks  would  soon 
break  through.     It  ^Yas  fomid  that  such  a  course  of 


308      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

large  stones  should  be  not  less  tlian  ten  inches  thick. 
These  stones  were  placed  by  hand,  set  on  edge  and 
diagonally  across  the  road,  or  preferably  like  the  letter 
V.  The  crevices  were  then  filled  with  small  stones  and 
the  whole  rolled  with  a  ten-ton  roller.  On  this  base  an 
eight-inch  layer  of  broken  stone  three  inches  in  size  was 
spread,  sprinkled  and  rolled.  On  this  a  second  layer  of 
the  same  thickness  but  of  smaller  stone  was  placed. 
These  two  layers  gave  a  compacted  thickness  of  about 
twelve  inches. 

It  was  found  desirable  to  keep  the  roads  as  flat  as  pos- 
sible, as  excessive  "  crown  "  caused  skidding  when  the 
surface  was  wet,  resulting  in  traffic  jams.  "When  an 
unbroken  procession  of  vehicles  can  be  measured  in  miles 
it  is  plain  that  anything  tending  to  cause  a  jam  must  be 
avoided.  The  road  engineers  learned  that  it  was  much 
more  economical  to  maintain  drainage  by  scraping  than 
to  pick  up  overturned  trucks,  because  when  once  a  truck 
on  a  busy  highway  had  slipped  into  a  ditch,  the  only 
thing  to  do  was  to  overturn  it.  To  this  same  end  it  was 
found  desirable  to  have  some  sort  of  a  curb  to  prevent 
wheels  from  leaving  the  stoned  surface  when  they  would 
either  break  the  shoulders  or  dig  into  the  soft  earth  and 
become  stalled.  Piles  of  broken  stone  to  be  used  in 
repairs  well  answered  the  purpose.  In  all  such  matters 
hasty  expedients  and  makeshifts  were  the  rule,  while 
the  following  of  standard  plans  was  the  exception,  the 
engineers  on  the  ground  having  great  opportunity  for 
the  exercise  of  individual  judgment. 

The  alternate  material  for  road  surface  was  plank,  a 
method  of  road  construction  very  popular  with  the  Brit- 
ish. Such  roads  were  laid  on  six  rows  of  stringers,  if 
for  a  single  line  of  traffic,  with  a  plank  decking  three 
inches  thick  if  of  hard,  and  five  inches  if  of  soft  wood. 
Spikes  were  used  which  could  be  driven,  but  if  work  were 
done  near  the  enemy's  lines,  holes  were  bored  in  advance 
to  reduce  the  noise  of  hammering. 


KOADS  309 

The  great  advantages  of  plank  roads  were  the  speed 
with  which  they  could  be  laid  and  the  possibility  of  con- 
structing them  when  stone  roads  could  not  be  built,  as 
for  instance,  across  a  country  covered  with  shell  holes, 
where  the  filling  deposited  in  the  latter  would  have 
required  much  time  to  become  sufficiently  consolidated 
to  provide  a  foundation.  As  for  speed,  the  British  in 
front  of  Cambrai  built  a  double-way  plank  road  two  and 
one-half  miles  long  in  ten  days,  and  the  French  estimate 
was  that  sixty  men  could  lay  one-quarter  mile  of  road 
four  meters  wide  in  ten  hours.  Plank  roads  would  not 
answer  on  gradients  steeper  than  ten  per  cent,  and  even 
on  rates  much  less  than  that,  a  coating  of  gravel  was 
found  to  be  very  helpful.  In  wet  or  soft  ground  the 
French  used  bundles  of  fascines  laid  diagonally,  staked 
and  wired  down  to  give  a  firmer  bearing  for  the 
plank  surface  to  rest  on.  Such  roads  were  very 
expensive  and  temporary  in  character,  although  they 
would  last  for  several  weeks.  But  the  rapidity  with 
which  they  could  be  built  rendered  them  most  valuable 
when  speed,  as  during  a  drive,  was  all  important. 

The  maintenance  of  roads  during  war  depends  on 
repairs,  but  also  on  care  during  the  thaws  and  on 
rigid  control  of  traffic.  The  first  may  be  dis- 
missed from  consideration  here  as  repairing  of 
roads  under  war  conditions,  even  in  the  Zone  of 
the  Advance,  presented  few  features  out  of  the 
ordinary  except  in  the  matter  of  temporary  expedi- 
ents as  explained,  but  the  second  is  of  the  highest  impor- 
tance. Next  to  the  wear  caused  by  the  heavy  traffic,  the 
greatest  destructive  agency  was  alternate  thawing  and 
freezing.  So  long  as  roads  were  tightly  frozen  there 
was  no  trouble,  but  when  the  included  ice  expanded 
during  the  act  of  thawing,  the  road  surface  was 
"  heaved  '^  and  the  bond  between  the  stones  loosened. 
In  such  condition  tlie  passage,  especially  at  high  speed, 


310      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

of  a  few  heavy  motor  vehicles  would  destroy  large  areas 
and  call  for  extensive  repairs.  To  obviate  this  or  to 
reduce  the  resulting  damage  to  the  minimum,  both  the 
French  and  British  road  authorities  enforced  strict  traf- 
fic regulations  during  periods  of  thaw.  At  such  times 
the  French  closed  the  principal  roads  against  automobile 
trucks,  loaded  wagons  in  convoy,  and  loaded  wagons 
isolated  when  hitched  to  more  than  one  horse  for  a  two- 
wheeled  cart,  and  to  more  than  two  horses  for  a  four- 
wheeled  wagon.  Light  passenger  automobiles  were 
restricted  to  a  speed  of  ten  miles  an  hour  and  horse- 
drawn  vehicles  not  otherwise  barred  were  held  to  a  walk. 

The  British  regulations  provided  for  the  prior  stor- 
ing at  advanced  posts  of  sufficient  supplies  to  permit  the 
closing  of  roads  against  all  but  emergency  traffic  for  five 
days,  and  the  placing  of  road  repair  material  in  piles 
at  the  road  sides.  Immediately  a  thaw  began  or  was 
known  to  be  imminent,  telegraphic  orders  were  sent  out 
putting  thaw  precautions  into  effect.  These  called  for, 
first,  the  elimination  of  all  unnecessary  traffic  of  every 
kind,  and  the  limiting  of  emergency  traffic  to  speeds  of 
eight,  ten  and  fifteen  miles  per  hour  for  trucks,  ambu- 
lances, and  light  passenger  cars  respectively,  the 
emergency  in  each  case  being  indicated  by  a  special  pass. 
The"  repair  gangs  then  removed  all  slush  and  mud  from 
the  surface  and  repaired  all  soft  spots  as  fast  as  they 
appeared. 

Traffic  control  as  in  a  city's  streets  was  an  absolute 
necessity.  Wlien  the  number  of  vehicles  on  a  highway 
reached  the  enormous  total  of  17,000  in  a  day,  which 
means  that  a  vehicle  of  some  sort  passed  every  five  sec- 
onds throughout  the  whole  twenty-four  hours,  it  is  obvi- 
ous that  unless  traffic  rules  were  intelligently  worked  out 
and  strictly  enforced,  circulation  would  be  superseded  by 
a  hopeless  tangle,  especially  as  it  must  be  kept  in  mind 
tiaat  at  night  near  the  front  all  lights  were  forbidden  and 


ROADS  Sir 

traffic  had  to  be  handled  in  darkness.  If  such  a  number 
of  vehicles  were  exceptional,  figures  closely  approximat- 
ing it  were  of  frequent  occurrence  during  periods  of 
stress.  The  regulations  provided  in  general  that  a  mili- 
tary policeman,  whose  orders  were  supreme,  was  sta- 
tioned at  all  road  intersections  where  traffic  routes 
crossed  or  joined,  and  that  unless  otherwise  specially 
permitted,  vehicles  must  keep  in  single  file ;  that  convoys 
were  to  leave  spaces  every  tenth  vehicle  to  allow  ambu- 
lances and  high-speed  official  cars  to  cut  in  and  so  pass 
ahead,  and  that  a  disabled  vehicle  must  be  at  once  drawn 
aside,  or  overturned  if  necessary. 

The  volume  of  material  required  for  the  construction 
and  up-keep  of  roads  was  tremendous.  American  experi- 
ence showed  that  a  minimum  of  5,000  tons  of  stone  per 
day  per  army  area  would  be  needed.  A  typical  French 
army  consisting  of  250,000  men  used  during  a  period  of 
eighteen  montlis  no  less  than  2,000,000  tons  of  stone,  or 
an  average  of  3,700  tons  per  day  during  the  whole  time 
on  approximately  1,000  kilometers  of  roads  within  the 
army  area.  The  British  transportation  figures  in  France, 
after  the  army  and  consequently  freight  shipments  had 
become  established  on  a  regular  basis,  show  that  rail- 
way material  accounted  for  32  per  cent  of  the  tonnage, 
and  road  material  for  22.5  per  cent,  while  the  weight 
of  ammunition,  ordnance  and  general  supplies,  the  last 
including  food,  did  not  when  put  together,  amount  to  as 
much  as  that  of  road  material  alone. 

The  labor  of  maintaining  the  roads  was  exceedingly 
severe.  In  the  French  and  British  armies,  men  who  had 
been  wounded,  and  although  recovered,  were  incapaci- 
tated for  the  more  active  but  the  not  more  strenuous 
work  in  the  trenches,  were  assip^ned  to  road  service.  Had 
the  war  continued  sufficiently  long  for  a  similar  body  of 
men  to  have  been  collected  in  the  American  Army  analo- 
gous action  would  probably  have  followed.     An  excel- 


312      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

lent  picture  of  tlie  human  side  of  road  repair  work  is 
given  in  the  following  verses  by  an  English  officer,  whose 
name  a  diligent  search  has  failed  to  reveal : 

CORP'L   GILES 
We's  working  'pon  the  Blankcourt  Roads  wi'  shovel  an'  wi'  pick; 
An'  Corp'l  Griles  from  Hatherleigh  directing  wi'  his  stick, 
'Tes  one  long  line  o'  traffic  up,  another  long  line  down ; 
'Busses  an'  carts,  for  all  the  world  like  streets  in  London  town, 
Horses  an'  marchin'  infantry  an'  batteries  o'  guns, 
Groin'  up  to  teach  good  manners  to  them  nasty-minded  'Uns ; 
Lorries  an'  wains  an'  moty-cars,  for  miles  an'  miles  an'  miles." 
"  'Tes  like  a  year  o'  market-days,"  says  I  to  Corp'l  Giles. 

We  makes  the  roads  an'  mends  the  roads,  an'  makes  them  all  again, 
The  traffic    tears  'em  all  abroad,  wi'  one  good  shower  o'  rain. 
We  scrapes  off  mud  an'  strows  our  stone  beneath  the  grinding  wheels. 
The  sweat   runs  down  behind  our  ears,  we'm  muck  from  caps  to  heels. 
We'm  deaf,  an'  halt,  an'  some's  half  blind,  an'  Corp'l  Giles  he's  lame. 
The  smart    young  gunners  laughs  at  us,  which  seems  to  me  a  shame.  ■ 
"But,  Lord,  who  minds  'em  laughing?     If  'twam't  for  such  as  we. 
How  would  'em  get  their  guns  to  front?  "  says  Corp'l  Giles  to  me. 

They  goes  up  sweatin'  in  the  sun,  or  singin'  through  the  rain, 
An'  when  they  change  Divisions  some  comes  singin'  back  again. 
An'  some  stays  where  the  wooden  crosses  mark  the  last  advance, 
(There's  Unes  o'  little  crosses  all  acrost  the  North  o'  France.) 
An'  past  the  singin'  muddy  boys  the  Red  Cross  motors  go. 
Packed  full  o'  quiet  bandaged  forms,  an'  rollin'  very  slow. 
It  makes  'ee  sad.  .  .  .  "An'  yet  you  knows,  if  wam't  for  such  as  we, 
The  wounded  wouldn't  ride  so  smooth,"  says  Corp'l  Giles  to  me. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE 

The  winter  of  1917-1918  was  not  a  trying  one.  Severe 
cold  set  in  early  in  December  and  continued  unbroken 
until  the  middle  of  January  with  considerable  snow. 
Then  it  moderated  slowly  and  evenly  so  that  the  frost, 
as  it  came  out  of  the  ground,  did  but  little  damage  to  the 
roads.  After  the  1st  of  February  the  weather  and  the 
physical  features  of  roads  and  country  presented  as 
pretty  conditions  for  fighting  as  anyone  could  desire. 
In  other  years  February  had  always  ushered  in  the 
spring  campaign  with  a  movement  by  one  side  or  the 
other,  or  by  both.  But  the  situation  of  1918  was  quite 
different  from  that  of  other  years.  The  fighting  during 
the  previous  autumn,  culminating  with  the  double  battle 
of  Cambrai,  had  shown  that  a  practical  deadlock  existed. 
While  local  gains  had  been  made  during  the  year,  they 
led  to  no  real  advantage,  certainly  not  when  cost  was 
counted. 

The  opposing  forces  viewed  the  deadlock  through  very 
different  spectacles.  The  Anglo-French  allies  knew  that 
an  army  had  already  begun  to  arrive  from  the  west 
across  the  sea  and  that  soon  there  would  be  at  their  sides 
a  force  giving  them  a  great  preponderance  of  numbers. 
They  could  afford  to  wait.  The  enemy  saw  the  same 
thing  but  with  emotions  of  another  kind.  The  German 
high  command,  no  matter  what  they  might  give  out  to 
the  effect  that  Americans  in  number  wore  not  in  France, 
that  none  could  pass  the  line  of  submarines,  and  that  if 
any  did  arrive  they  were  not  trained  to  fight,  knew  well 
that  a  real  army  was  coming  and  that  if  victory  were  to 

313 


314      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

be  gained  the  allies  must  be  beaten  before  summer, 
otherwise  all  was  lost.  Along  the  front  the  quietness  was 
broken  only  by  an  occasional  shell  fired  apparently  with- 
out object,  by  some  small  raids  with  no  other  intent  than 
to  gain  information  as  to  what  enemy  forces  were  hold- 
ing the  opposing  line. 

The  enemy  situation  was  critical  and  only  desperate 
means  could  save  it,  because  time,  the  only  antagonist 
against  which  man  cannot  compete,  was  running  against 
him.  It  was  generally  recognized  in  the  allied  ranks 
that  the  enemy  could  and  undoubtedly  would  deliver  a 
great  smashing  blow  in  which  all  his  strength  would  be 
concentrated  in  the  hope  of  overcoming  the  allies  by  one 
supreme  effort,  a  sort  of  gambler's  stake  where  all  is 
risked  to  win  all.  There  was  nothing  else  for  him  to  do. 
On  the  allies'  side  all  were  waiting  for  the  blow  to  fall. 
Where  and  when  would  it  fall? 

Field  Marshal  Sir  Douglas  Haig  stated  that  he  had 
every  reason  to  believe  that  from  apparent  German  con- 
centration the  attack  would  be  delivered  somewhere 
south  of  the  Sensee  River.  On  March  19th  he  learned 
that  it  wouJd  be  launched  on  the  next  or  second  day  on 
the  Arras-St.  Quentin  front. 

At  that  time  there  were  but  three  American  units  in 
the  northern  sector,  all  engineers,  the  Twelfth  and  Four- 
teenth Regiments  and  a  battalion  of  the  Sixth  Engineers. 
The  first  two  were  occupied  on  forward  light  railways, 
with  headquarters  of  the  Twelfth  Regiment  west  of 
St.  Quentin,  and  those  of  the  Fourteenth  southeast  of 
Arras,  while  the  Sixth  Engineers  were  building  some 
bridges  near  Peronne. 

Before  dawn  on  March  21st,  a  date  that  will  always 
be  one  of  the  milestones  that  mark  epochs  on  history's 
road,  an  intense  bombardment  of  the  whole  front  from 
the  river  Oise  to  the  river  Scarpe  began  and  continued 
for  five  hours,  during  which  shells  filled  with  high  explo- 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      315 

sives  and  the  deadliest  of  gases  were  mixed  promis- 
cuously, forcing  the  engineers  working  the  trains  to 
wear  masks.  It  was  evident  that  the  Germans  intended 
to  attack  the  Fifth  Army,  B.  E.  F.,  with  an  overwhelm- 
ing force.  This  army  was  on  the  extreme  British  right 
and  was,  therefore,  next  to  the  French  left.  The  enemy 
apparently  hoped  to  fmd  a  weak  plane  of  cleavage  in  the 
line  of  junction  of  the  two  nations.  The  Germans  had 
concentrated  more  men  on  this  part  of  the  front  than 
there  were  in  the  entire  British  army  in  France  (Field 
Marshal  Haig's  report).  The  attacking  party  always 
has  the  advantage.  Ivnowing  where  he  intends  to  attack 
he  can  bring  to  bear  such  forces  as  he  desires.  The  party 
on  the  defensive  must  be  prepared  to  parry  a  blow  to  be 
delivered  at  any  point  and  cannot  move  up  his  reserves, 
not  only  until  the  attack  has  begun  but  after  he  is  certain 
that  the  attack  in  question  is  the  real  offensive  and  not 
a  mere  feint.  Five  hours  after  the  bombardment  began 
the  enemy  infantry  attacked  in  great  force  on  a  front  of 
f]fty-four  miles. 

It  is  not  the  province  of  this  book  to  describe  this 
battle  which,  had  it  succeeded,  would  have  cut  the  British 
army  from  contact  with  the  French,  would  have  severed 
the  lines  of  transportation  running  north  and  south  and 
would  have  given  the  Germans  access  to  the  Channel.  In 
that  event  the  war  would  probably  have  been  brought  to 
a  disastrous  conclusion  before  American  participation 
had  become  sensible.  The  story  of  the  offensive  is  well 
known  in  general  terms.  Wlien  all  the  facts  on  both  sides 
are  finally  obtained,  it  will  provide  material  for  military 
debates  and  arguments  for  many  years.  This  book  is 
concerned  only  with  the  engineers. 

At  5:30  P.  M.  on  the  21st  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  Twelfth  Engineers  received  orders  to  withdraw  from 
his  advanced  headquarters  at  j\[ontiguy  to  Le  INfesnil, 
running  back  the  equipment  on  the  light  railways.  Most 
of  the  rolling  stock  was  saved,  but  the  shelling  was  so 


316      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE  ' 

severe  that  some  vehicles  were  intentionally  destroyed 
before  being  abandoned.  On  the  22d,  regimental  head- 
quarters were  again  moved,  this  time  to  Fay.  At  3  P.  M., 
March  24th,  orders  were  received  to  abandon  Fay  at 
once  and  to  destroy  all  rolling  stock.  Outlying  detach- 
ments of  the  regiment  had  a  similar  experience,  falling 
back  stage  by  stage  through  the  four  days,  March  21-24, 
running  the  little  engines  and  cars  over  such  lines  as 
were  open  until  the  rear  ends  of  the  light  railway  system 
were  reached,  when  trains  could  be  run  no  further.  Then, 
but  not  till  then,  all  locomotives  and  cars  were  destroyed 
to  prevent  their  capture.  The  regiment  having  lost  its 
regular  assignment  through  the  light  railways  having 
passed  to  enemy  hands,  was  detailed  to  assist  in  con- 
structing the  trenches  along  a  line  running  near  Villers- 
Bretonneux,  east  of  Amiens,  a  position  that  the  British 
high  command  had  decided  to  fortify  and  hold. 

The  experience  of  the  Fourteenth  Engineers  was  simi- 
lar. During  the  twenty-first  they  were  engaged  in  haul- 
ing ammunition  to  the  forward  batteries  and  repairing 
the  lines  as  fast  as  they  were  cut  by  shell  fire.  On  the 
following  day  they,  too,  were  obliged  to  commence  a 
retreat,  carrying  with  them  their  rolling  stock,  with 
which  they  succeeded  in  salving  much  ammunition,  some- 
thing very  precious  at  such  a  time. 

The  Sixth  Engineers  had  their  turn  on  March  26th. 
After  a  continuous  rear-guard  action  of  the  greatest 
intensity  it  was  but  natural  that  the  orderly  arrange- 
ment of  the  line  should  have  been  considerably  disturbed. 
Late  on  the  25th,  General  Grant,  Chief  Engineer  of  the 
Fifth  Army,  B.  E.  F.,  learned  that  a  gap  was  being  cre- 
ated by  the  line  drawing  apart  under  the  enemy  pressure, 
a  gap  that  must  be  stopped  or  disaster  might  follow. 
He  seized  the  Sixth  Engineers,  various  scattered  detach- 
ments of  all  arms,  and  oven  stragglers  who  had  become 
separated  from  their  units,  and  amalgamating  them  into 
a  brigade  he  threw  it  into  the  widening  gap.    Then  he 


TEENCHES  AND  TRENCH  :WARFARE   317 

turned  the  command  over  to  Brigadier-General  Carey. 
This  scratch  brigade,  known  as  *'  Carey's  Army,'* 
though  suffering  severe  casualties,  held  their  position  in 
front  of  Amiens  for  some  days  until  relieved,  by  which 
time  the  new  British  position  had  been  made  reasonably; 
secure. 

It  was  now  evident  to  the  British  high  command  that 
the  expected  great  offensive  had  begun,  and  that  the 
enemy  would  make  a  continued  effort  supported  by  the 
full  force  at  his  disposal  to  reach  the  channel  ports.  A 
review  of  the  field  showed  that  the  advance  already  made 
by  the  enemy  had  overrun  many  lines  of  defense,  calling, 
therefore,  for  extended  supplemental  defenses  as  well  as 
developing  into  works  of  a  more  permanent  and  better 
equipped  character  those  that  had  been  hastily  con- 
structed. It  was  still  an  engineer's  war.  While  the 
army  in  the  north  was  being  reinforced  by  all  available 
British  and  French  reserves  to  prevent  the  onrushing 
enemy  from  reaching  Amiens,  Field  Marshal  Haig  wired 
the  American  General  Headquarters  for  two  regiments 
of  engineers.  The  Eleventh  and  Fifteenth  were  at  once 
designated  to  join  their  comrades  in  the  valleys  of  the 
Somme  and  IjJS,  the  former  to  strengthen  the  defenses 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Arras  and  Bethune,  the  latter  to 
construct  new  lines  of  communication  replacing  the 
transportation  facilities  that  had  been  lost. 

A  ditch  with  the  excavated  earth  forming  a  parapet 
has  constituted  one  of  the  simplest  and  most  easily  made 
defenses,  since  the  time  when  men  began  to  be  armed 
with  guns.  In  the  American  war  between  the  States,  the 
construction  and  systematic  utilization  of  trenches  under- 
went great  development  and  the  elaborate  trenches  in 
front  of  Petersburg,  resulting  in  a  deadlock  for  many 
months,  are  famous.  The  Turkish-Russian  and  the' 
Russian-Japanese  wars  saw  trendies  used  on  a  still 
larger  scale,  but  the  late  war  carried  them,  both  in  gen- 
eral extent  and  in  complete  details  of  construction,  far 


318      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

and  away  beyond  any  previously  conceived  possible  limit. 

From  and  after  the  battle  of  the  Marne  in  September, 
1914,  to  the  beginning  of  the  final  offensive  in  Septem- 
ber, 1918,  both  sides  faced  each  other  from  line  upon 
line  of  earth  trenches  with  a  total  length  that  has  never 
been  measured.  These  trenches  extending  over  a  front 
of  about  450  miles  can  be  estimated,  without  doubt,  in 
terms  of  tens  of  thousands  of  miles. 

The  general  principles  of  trench  warfare:  and  trench 
construction  were  the  same  in  the  Allied  and  German 
armies,  but  details  differed  radically  and  to  a  large 
extent  according  to  national  idiosyncrasies.  In  system- 
atic layout,  in  thoroughness  of  construction,  and  in 
elaborateness  of  design  the  Germans  excelled  all  the 
others.  The  sides  of  their  trenches  were  strengthened  by 
posts  and  at  times  reinforced  with  concrete.  There  were 
steel  shields  to  protect  snipers,  and  concrete  structures, 
or  ''  pill  boxes,''  for  machine  guns.  Row  upon  row  of 
trenches  were  dug  with  acres  of  wire  entanglements, 
many  of  which  were  never  used,  but  were  constructed 
so  as  to  be  ready  for  use  if  needed,  while  dugouts  existed 
of  great  capacity  and  most  elaborate  construction. 

Some  of  these  dugouts,  especially  those  for  field  head- 
quarters, were  really  works  of  art,  if  anything,  whose 
appearance  resembles  a  rathskellar,  can  be  said  to  par- 
take of  the  nature  of  art.  They  were  panelled  with  wood, 
furnished  with  rustic  tables  and  chairs,  lit  by  electric 
lights  and,  as  German  officers,  especially  of  high  rank, 
seemed  to  be  particularly  anxious  as  to  their  personal 
safety,  they  were  made  very  deep  with  plenty  of  earth 
cover  and  had  steel  doors  to  protect  the  entrances  against 
shell  splinters. 

The  German  trench  system  was  really  a  connected 
chain  of  redoubts  or  field  forts.  As  part  of  such  a  chain 
they  skillfully  utilized  the  ruins  of  villages  whenever  the 
latter  were  situated  so  that  they  might  be  used.   Thus  the 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      319 

streets  of  a  village  on  the  front  line  would  be  so  arranged 
as  to  constitute  a  series  of  euls-de-sac  with  no  outlet 
at  the  far  end,  so  that  in  the  event  of  their  being  rushed 
the  entering  troops  could  not  advance.  Nor  could  they 
move  laterally  because  the  doors  and  windows,  or  what 
remained  of  doors  and  windows,  were  heavily  wired. 
Troops  once  in  such  a  street  would  be  exposed  to  a 
galling  fire  from  the  buildings  without  the  possibility  of 
attacking  the  defenders.  As  the  cellars  of  these  houses 
were  connected  with  the  trenches  by  tunnels  or  under- 
ground passages,  they  offered  extraordinary  facilities 
for  defense.  It  was  said  that  the  German  soldier, 
trained  to  be  a  part  of  a  great  machine  where  personal 
initiative  was  discouraged,  could  not  be  depended  on  for 
stout  resistance  unless  he  felt  assured  that  he  had  the 
best  means  of  protective  defense. 

Opposed  to  this  was  the  French  theory,  that  an  army 
acting  always  on  the  defensive  can  never  win.  To  the 
offense  and  not  to  the  defense  comes  victory.  A  soldier 
should,  therefore,  be  given  all  necessary  protection,  but 
he  must  not  be  encouraged  to  rely  on  that  protection  nor 
to  feel  that  any  position  he  occupies  is  anything  more 
than  temporary.  The  French  trenches  were,  compared 
with  the  Germans,  much  smaller,  far  less  comfortable, 
and  less  permanent  in  character. 

The  British  trenches  were  between  these  extremes  in 
design  and  execution.  They  were  usually  better  built 
than  the  French,  deeper  and  wider,  with  parapets  and 
firing  steps  more  systematically  laid  out  and  with 
rather  better  headquarters  arrangements.  They  fell  far 
short  of  the  elaborate  German  standard  and  so  did  not 
develop  or  yield  to  the  natural  human  propensity  toward 
a  fondness  for  permanent  security.  The  British  held 
that  it  was  unwise  and  unnecessary  to  permit  men  to 
place  an  undue  reliance  on  the  strength  of  their  defenses. 
If  any  criticism  of  the  British  system  of  defense  will  lie, 


320      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

it  was  that  they  depended  too  much  on  a  system  of 
front-line  trenches  and  did  not  provide  enough  reserve 
jDositions  on  other  lines  in  the  rear  capable  of  being  held 
should  the  first  defenses  be  carried.  The  argument 
against  such  provision  was  that  men  when  hard  pressed 
would  be  more  inclined  to  fall  back  if  they  knew  that 
there  was  a  position  in  the  rear  ready  for  occupancy. 

This  is  an  interesting  point  in  psychology,  a  science 
that  should  not  be  overlooked  in  its  application  to  the 
successful  conduct  of  war.  To  be  able  to  form  a  correct 
estimate  of  the  mental  workings  of  masses  of  men  under 
war  conditions  is  one  of  the  most  valuable  faculties  that 
a  general  can  possess.  Perhaps  it  is  not  too  much  to 
say  that  unless  he  can  do  so,  no  matter  what  his  military 
ability,  he  cannot  be  a  great  leader  of  men.  The  British 
trench  system  was  in  general  accepted  by  the  American 
Expeditionary  Force  as  the  best  standard  to  follow, 
(except  that  General  Pershing  went  even  further  than  the 
Allies  in  dislike  to  permanent  positions.  He  believed 
that  the  war  must  be  won  in  the  open  and,  perhaps,  at 
no  distant  day.  He  was,  therefore,  opposed  to  American 
troops  becoming  accustomed  to  trench  warfare. 

A  map  of  trench  positions  shows  in  most  striking  man- 
ner the  difference  between  allied  and  enemy  methods. 
While  the  allied  defenses  consisted  frequently  of  but 
three  lines  and  rarely  more  than  six,  the  German 
trenches  were  numbered  by  the  dozens  and  extended  back 
from  the  Front  trench  to  a  distance  of  several  thousand 
yards,  rows  of  trenches  and  wire  entanglements.  They 
were  enabled  to  construct  these  labyrinths  by  drawing 
on  the  French  and  Belgian  civil  population  for  assisting 
labor.  There  is  no  question  that  they  placed  unwar- 
ranted confidence  in  these  constructions,  and  their, 
morale  was  undoubtedly  shaken  when  they  found  that 
their  positions  in  spite  of  all  the  labor  and  skill  expended 
on   their   creation,   were   pregnable.     Once   they  were 


322      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 


Map  Showing  Compabattve  Exteitt 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      323 


.~w^ -GERMAN  TRANCHES  "■<- 1000  YARDS    -> 


EACH  SQUARE  l§   IQOO  YARDS  WIPE 
or  Gemua^  a-hd  Aixied  Trenches. 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      325 

driven  out,  they  never  succeeded  in  making  a  stand  in 
the  open.    See  the  map  of  opposing  trenches  on  pp.  322-3. 

As  trenches  actually  existed  in  the  field  it  would  have 
been  very  difficult  for  an  observer  to  have  recognized 
any  system  or  underlying  scientific  theory  in  their  gen- 
eral layout.  Time  and  the  vicissitudes  of  battle  tended 
to  efface  the  marks  of  orderly  arrangement.  Some  parts 
of  a  system  might  be  destroyed  by  a  concentrated  bom- 
bardment, be  captured  or  be  abandoned  as  not  located 
to  the  best  advantage,  or  some  *'  switch  *'  or  additions 
might  be  constructed,  any  one  of  which  steps  would  alter 
the  design  of  the  original  plan.  Nevertheless  there  were 
certain  general  principles  which  governed  the  laying  out 
of  trenches,  and  the  closer  they  were  adhered  to,  the  bet- 
ter was  the  defense  offered. 

A  trench  is  primarily  a  construction  intended  to  afford 
protection  to  troops  holding  the  front  line.  It  may  be 
dug  like  a  ditch  wholly  beneath  the  surface  of  the  ground, 
or  it  may  be  between  raised  ramparts,  as  was  done  in 
the  low  lands  of  Flanders.  But,  of  whatever  form,  it 
was  still  a  trench  in  a  military  sense.  As  all  the  troops 
assigned  at  any  one  time  to  front-line  service  could  not 
occupy  a  single  trench,  nor  was  it  desirable  that  they 
should  be  huddled  together,  other  trenches  for  their 
accommodation  and  for  additional  lines  of  defense  had 
to  be  constructed.  Since  such  additional  trenches  were 
a  part  of  the  front-line  defense,  they  had  to  be  cross- 
connected  so  that  troops  might  pass  freely  from  one  part 
to  another  and  without  exposure. 

In  general,  a  trench  system  consisted  of  at  least  three 
lines  of  trenches  substantially  parallel,  called  the  Front, 
Support  and  Reserve. 

The  Front  or  Firing  trench  was  the  main  line  of 
defense  and  consequently  was  prepared  for  offense.  If 
possible,  it  was  so  located  as  not  to  be  so  close  to  the 
enemy's  front  line  as  to  permit  its  being  bombarded  bj^ 


326      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

trench  mortars,  nor  so  far  away  as  not  to  command  (in 
a  military  sense)  the  intervening  space.  But  this  dis- 
tance was  one  determined  largely  by  local  circnmstances 
among  which  the  enemy's  wish  was  one  very  important 
item.  In  actuality  the  distance  varied  from  fifty  yards 
to  one  mile.  While  the  Front  trench  was  continuous  it 
was  never  straight,  as  the  engineer  in  laying  out 
trenches  abhorred  a  straight  line  quite  as  much  as  nature 
is  reputed  to  do. 

The  ideal  location  for  a  defensive  position  was  on  the 
slope  of  a  hill,  in  which  case  the  Front  trench  fol- 
lowed as  closely  as  possible  the  military  crest.  Perhaps 
if  the  technical  reader  will  grant'  pardon,  it  may  be  con- 
venient to  recall  to  the  non-technical  reader  the  differ- 
ence between  the  military  and  topographical  crests.  The 
latter  is  the  top  of  the  hill.  But  as  the  slopes  of  any  hill 
are  convex,  it  is  rarely  found  that  from  the  actual  hilltop 
all  points  on  the  slope  can  be  seen,  and  it  is  usual  that 
this  can  be  done  only  along  some  line  on  the  slope  itself, 
perhaps  at  a  considerable  distance  below  the  top.  That 
line,  giving  "  command  "  or  "  sight  "  of  all  points  below 
it,  is  called  the  military  crest,  and  is  the  one  with  which 
an  engineer  engaged  in  fortifying  problems  is  most 
concerned. 

Below  the  military  crest  there  are  no  "  dead  spots  ** 
in  its  immediate  vicinity ;  that  is,  spots  due  to  small  local 
variations  in  the  surface,  that  cannot  be  seen  from  it. 
Dead  spots,  not  being  exposed  to  sight  and  consequently 
direct  rifle  fire,  furnish  excellent  places  for  attacking 
troops  to  pause,  whence  by  a  short  rush  they  can  reach 
the  enemy's  position.  The  ideal  location  for  the  Front 
trench  is  along  the  military  crest,  but  in  practice  this  is 
not  always  feasible  at  all  points.  If  it  be  found 
imjoossible  either  by  advancing  or  withdrawing  the  loca- 
tion to  avoid  a  dead  spot,  adjacent  sections  must  be  so 
located  so  as  to  give  a  cross  fire  sweeping  the  spot  that 


TEENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      327 

is  dead  when  viewed  directly  from  the  front.  When 
**  siting,"  as  locating  is  technically  known,  was  being 
done  for  new  trenches  and  pro\4ded  there  was  time  to 
make  a  careful  study,  dead  spots  could  be  determined 
only  by  the  siting  engineer  lying  down  on  the  ground 
and  putting  his  eyes  in  the  same  plane  that  the  eyes  of 
the  defenders  would  be  in,  when  the  latter  came  to 
occupy  the  trench 

Behind  the  Front  trench  and  preferably  distant  from 
it  80  to  200  yards  lay  the  Support  trench.  If  possi- 
ble it  was  sited  just  below  the  topographical  crest,  but 
not  so  close  to  it  that  men's  heads  showing  above  the 
trench  parapet  would  be  silhouetted  against  the  sky. 
The  Support  trench,  as  its  name  indicates,  held  the 
troops  assigned  to  support  those  in  the  firing  line.  The 
troops  in  support  are  ready  to  go  forward  to  the 
assistance  of  any  part  of  the  Front  line  in  danger,  while 
the  Support  trench  itself  was  prepared  to  receive  the 
defenders  of  the  Front  line  if  they  were  compelled  to 
withdraw.  If  the  two  trenches  were  sited  according  to 
system,  on  sloping  ground,  the  Support  being  higher 
than  the  Front,  the  former  was  a  position  with  com- 
mand over  the  Front  line,  and  from  it  an  annoying  fire 
could  be  directed  on  the  Front  trench  should  the  enemy 
ever  secure  a  lodgment  there.  These  two  trenches  were, 
therefore,  closely  linked  and  inter-dependent  members 
of  a  single  fortification. 

The  third  or  Reserve  trench  lay  well  behind  the  Sup- 
port, not  less  than  200  yards  nor,  as  a  rule,  more  than 
500  yards,  though  at  times  the  nature  of  the  ground 
required  the  latter  distance  to  be  exceeded.  It  was  pre 
fcrred  that  the  Reserve  trench  be  located  on  the  reverse 
slope  of  the  hill,  that  is,  on  the  slope  opposite  from  the 
other  trenches  or,  in  other  words,  over  the  top  of  the  hill. 
The  Reserve  trench  was,  therefore,  not  exposed  to  direct 
fire,  it  could  not  be  reached  by  any  shells  or  bullets  aimed 


328      AMEEICAN  EN'GINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

at  either  of  the  other  two,  and  so  was  well  adapted  to 
house  and  shelter  the  reserves.  It  became  a  fighting 
trench  only  in  the  event  of  the  Front  and  Support 
trenches  being  carried,  when  the  troops  holding  the 
Reserve  could  fire  on  the  attacking  column  as  it  came 
over  the  crest  of  the  hill  and  presented  Si  fine  target 
against  the  light  background  of  the  sky. 

In  this  case  the  term  "  reserve,"  as  applied  to  troops, 
must  not  be  misunderstood.  When  a  unit  was  ordered 
into  the  line,  it  went  there,  under  ordinary  routine  of 
stabilized  trench  warfare,  for  a  definite  number  of  days 
during  which  time  its  men  would  be  distributed  in 
rotation  between  the  three  trenches,  those  in  the  Reserve 
usually  acting  as  carriers  for  supplies  and  ammunition 
to  the  troops  in  the  Front  and  Support  lines.  When  the 
period  of  service  expired,  the  unit  would  be  withdrawn 
to  the  rear  for  a  period  of  '*  rest,"  as  work  in  the  rear 
was  euphemistically  called.  During  times  of  great 
activity,  such  as  offensives  or  defensives,  these  regular 
schedules  were,  of  course,  forgotten.  While  a  unit  was 
in  the  line  the  men  composing  it  took  their  place  in  the 
three  trenches  in  turn. 

The  three  trenches  were  connected  by  frequent  Com- 
munication trenches  to  provide  passageways  between 
them,  through  which  men  could  pass  without  being 
observed  by  the  enemy.  There  was  no  rule  as  to  how 
close  together  these  Communication  trenches  should  be\ 
That  depended  on  the  nature  of  the  ground,  on  the 
importance  of  the  position  and  the  number  of  men  hold- 
ing it.  They  were  usually  set  apart  about  100  to  200  yards 
when  between  the  Front  and  Support  trenches,  and  from 
200  to  500  yards  between  the  Support  and  Reserve.  If 
the  Reserve  was  on  the  reverse  slope  of  a  hill  and,  there- 
fore, out  of  sight,  troops  could  enter  and  leave  it  in  the 
open.  If  it  was  exposed  to  direct  vision,  Communication 
or  Entry  trenches  leading  to  it  had  to  be  dug  back  to 


fTRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      329 

points  where  concealment  was  obtained,  because  tlie 
moment  of  relief  was  always  an  anxious  one.  If  the 
enemj  could  learn  the  hour  of  relief  they  were  sure  to 
do  shelling  with  serious  effect,  as  the  trenches  would  then 
be  filled  with  twice  the  normal  number  of  men,  one  unit 
arriving,  the  other  departing,  and  probably  both  units 
weighted  with  their  kits. 

In  front  of  the  Front  trench  there  were  frequently  out- 
posts and  nearly  always  machine  gun  posts,  positions 
consisting  of  small  detached  trenches  or  shell  holes  impro- 
vised for  occupation.  Here  small  parties  remained, 
unable  to  move  in  daylight  but  ready  to  repel  an  attack. 

The  Communication  trenches  were  usually  not  laid  out 
at  right  angles  to  the  trenches  that  they  connected,  but 
preferably  at  an  angle  of  about  forty-five  degrees,  which 
prevented  their  being  enfiladed  by  direct  fire.  They 
were  also  usable  as  firing  trenches  in  case  any  part  of 
the  trench  in  front  should  be  entered  by  the  enemy. 
In  such  cases  they  became  temporary  or  permanent 
**  switches,"  that  is,  alternate  sections  for  the  kind 
of  trench  next  in  front.  If  a  position  was  held  for  a  long 
time,  additions  to  the  trenches  were  made  for  the  above 
and  other  reasons,  so  that  instead  of  three  lines  there 
might  be  many  more  in  close  j)roximity.  The  Germans 
were  particularly  fond  of  multiplying  lines,  and  such 
multiplication  undoubtedly  strengthened  the  powers  of 
resistance  of  a  position. 

In  plan,  or  *'  trace,"  trenches  were  of  four  types: 
**  Traversed,"  **  Bastioned  "  or  "  Octagonal,"  **  Zig- 
zag "  and  "  "Wavy."  There  was  one  thing  they  must 
not  be,  and  that  was  straight,  because  a  straight  line 
would  never  adjust  itself  to  the  undulations  of  ground. 
If  it  did  so  for  any  considerable  distance,  the  enemy,  by 
taking  position  at  one  end  or  at  a  distance  in  the  direc- 
tion of  its  length,  could  sweep  it  with  an  enfilading  fire. 
Even  if  it  were  impossible  to  enfilade  a  straight  trench, 


330      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

a  shell  falling  in  it  would  certainly  scatter  its  fragments 
to  considerable  distances  right  and  left,  causing  many 
casualties.  The  trace  must,  therefore,  be  of  such  plan  as 
to  fit  the  ground  and  must  have  bends,  or  splinter-proof 
barriers,  dividing  it  into  short  lengths. 


30'     ,-/?.W7f 


M- 


-V 


r 


TRAVERSED  TRENCH 

Fig.  5. 


The  Traversed  trench  was  the  one  most  used  at  first, 
perhaps  because  in  plan  it  retained  some  of  the  old  char- 
acteristics of  permanent  fortifications,  and  the  human 
mind  is  loath  to  depart  from  old  forms  and  familiar 
outlines.  It  was  one  for  which  the  French  exhibited 
great  fondness,  even  to  the  end.  As  will  be  seen  from 
the  annexed  Fig.  5,  it  consisted  of  a  number  of  right 
angled  turns  caused  by  leaving  undisturbed  masses 
of  earth  projecting  backwards  from  the  front  face.  The 
traverses  built  at  first  were  about  eight  to  ten  feet  thick, 
but  against  concentrated  modern  shell  fire  that  thickness 
was  much  too  small,  as  such  small  traverses  were  quickly 
blown  away  and  failed  to  give  lateral  protection.  They 
should  not  be  less  than  twelve,  and  preferably  at  least  six- 
teen feet  thick,  separated  by  bays  about  thirty  feet  long. 
They  were  made  twelve  feet  deep  so  as  to  lap  or  cover 
the  traverses  projecting  forward  from  the  back.  It  will 
be  seen  that  these  traverses  cut  a  trench  into  a  series  of 
isolated  though  connected  compartments,  along  which 
it  was  impossible  to  see  from  one  compartment  to  tha 
next. 

The  story  is  told  of  an  Irish  battalion  holding  such  a 
trench.    During  a  critical  quarter  of  an  hour  and  just 


.TEENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      331 

after  a  shell  had  exploded,  a  man  in  one  bay  called  to  a 
companion  on  the  other  side  of  the  intervening  traverse, 
''Are  you  there,  Mike?  "  "  Sure,"  came  back  the  cheer- 
ful answer.  A  few  minutes  later  another  vicious  shell 
exploded  and  with  it  again,  "Are  you  still  there,  Mike?  '* 
When  this  happened  a  third  time,  Mike  became  a  little 
irritated,  and  inquired  somewhat  petulantly  as  to  the 
cause  of  the  unwonted  interest  in  his  welfare.  "I'm  not 
meaning  any  harm,  Mike,  me  boy,"  came  the  apology, 
"  but  we  have  a  little  pool  here  as  to  who'll  be  the  next 
man  hit,  and  I've  drawn  you." 


BA&T/ON  TRENCH 

Fig.  6. 


The  Traverse  tj^pe  was  very  wasteful  of  space  and 
time,  especially  after  the  necessity  for  wide  traverses 
became  apparent.  A  large  part  of  'the  fighting  front  was 
necessarily  sacrificed,  the  trace  was  awkward  to  fit  to 
undulating  ground,  the  right-angled  turns  increased  the 
distance  and  consequently  retarded  progress  through  the 
trench,  and  it  demanded  the  maximum  amount  of  labor 
to  construct.  Its  advantage  was  good  protection  against 
enfilading  fire  and  shell  fragments. 

These  objections  were  obviated  or  greatly  modified  in 
the  Bastion  or  Octagonal  layout,  whore  any  face  can 
become  a  firing  face,  and  in  addition,  the  faces  on 
the  side  can  deliver  a  cross  fire,  an  advantage  not  possi- 
ble with  the  Traverse  type.  The  standard  dimensions  of 
American  and  British  practice  with  trenches  of  this  char- 
acter are  given  in  the  following  table : 


332      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 


BASTION  OR  OCTAGONAL  TRENCH 


DIMENSIONS 

AMERICAN   STANDARD 

BRITISH  STANDARD 

A 
B 

C 
D 
E 
corner  angles 

30  feet 

12  feet-6  inches 
50  feet 

12  fcet-6  inches 
25  feet 
135° 

10  yards 
83  yards 

17  yards 
6    yards 

10  yards 
120° 

The  next  type,  the  '^  Zig-zag,"  was  a  modification  of 
the  above,  where  all  angles  were  the  same,  and  all  sides 
were  of  equal  length.    This  type  of  trench  was  very  easy 


QO'Amer/coo 

Z/G-ZAG  TRENCH 

Fig.  7., 


both  to  lay  out  and  to  construct.  As  to  laying  out,  all 
that  was  necessary  for  the  siting  engineer  to  do  was  to 
mark  the  angles,  and  the  engineer  troops  following  him 
would  cut  lines  connecting  the  angle  points  and  begin 
digging.  In  American  practice  the  distance  between 
entrant  angles  was  eighty  feet,  as  compared  with  fifty- 
one  feet,  in  the  British,  while  the  depth  was  the  same, 
fifteen  feet.  The  shorter  British  length  and  conse- 
quently more  acute  angles,  gave  better  protection  against 
bursting  shells  or  enfilading  fire.  It  must  be  kept  in 
mind  that  all  these  dimensions  were  suggestive  only,  to 
be  adhered  to  only  as  far  as  the  nature  of  ground  per- 
mitted. In  order  to  follow  a  given  contour  or  the 
irregularities  of  the  surface  the  engineer  when  siting 
had  to  make  many  modifications  of  dimensions. 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      333 

From  the  Zig-zag  it  was  an  easy  transition  to  the 
trench  where  the  angles  were  rounded,  giving  a  succes- 
sion of  curves  instead  of  broken  lines.  This  type  of 
trench  was  named  the  *'  "Wavy  "  trace,  and  is  shown  in 


'  Scr/imerjcan 

WAVY  TRENCH 

FlQ.  8, 

the  diagram  above,  the  dimensions  being  the  same 
as  its  prototype  the  Zig-zag,  the  American  standard 
giving  longer  sweeps  than  the  British.  The  Wa\y 
trench  possessed  many  advantages  which  were  so  strik- 
iug  as  to  make  it  the  superior  of  all  unless  there  were 
special  local  reasons  to  the  contrary,  among  which 
advantages  may  be  mentioned: 

1  —  Ease  and  rapidity  in  construction. 

2  —  Great  facility  in  passing  through  it,  hence  espe- 

cially advantageous  for  communication  trenches. 

3  —  Could  be  used  as  a  fire  trench  at  any  point. 

The  disadvantage  was  that  most  men  preferred  a 
straight  and  not  a  curved  edge  to  fire  over. 

In  details  and  dimensions  of  cross-section,  the  trenches 
underwent  some  modification  as  the  result  of  experience 
during  the  war.  The  early  trenches  were  made  both  too 
shallow  and  too  narrow.  It  was  found  that  they  should 
be  sufficiently  deep  that  men's  heads  would  be  below  the 
level  of  the  ground  so  that  men  need  not  rely  on  the  cov- 
ering presented  by  the  parapet  formed  by  the  excavated 
material  as  giving  any  real  protection.  A  narrow  trench 
affords  a  little  more  protection  against  flying  shell  frag- 
ments, but  this  benefit  is  more  than  offset  by  the  incon- 
venience to  men  passing  through,  by  the  difficulty  of 
handling  stretchers  and  by  the  certainty  that  a  fall  of 
the  bank  following  a  direct  shell  hit  will  completely  block 


334      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

it.  Such  were  the  results  of  British  experience,  which 
led  to  standards  whose  dimensions  were  even  somewhat 
more  generous  than  our  own. 

For  a  good  substantial  trench  the  depth  of  the  bottom 
below  the  surface  was  placed  at  six  feet,  the  width  of 
the  excavation  at  the  top  at  six  feet  six  inches,  and  at 
the  bottom  two  feet  six  inches,  so  that  the  sides  had  a 
slope  of  two  feet  in  six  feet,  or  three  on  one.  This  cross- 
section  or  profile,  to  use  the  technical  expression,  was 
the  minimum  for  any  trench  whether  used  for  firing  or 
communication.  Such  parts  as  were  to  be  used  for  firing 
were  widened  on  the  exposed  side  by  excavating  a  bench 
or  *'  fire  step  "  three  feet  below  the  top  and  two  feet 
wide,  so  that  at  such  places  the  top  width  became  eight 
feet  six  inches.  The  fire  steps  were  not  continuous,  nor 
did  they  occur  in  every  bay  even  in  the  Front  trench. 
It  was  not  advisable  to  make  any  one  step  more  than 
eighteen  feet  long,  so  as  to  avoid  the  temptation  for  men 
to  congregate,  which  longer  steps  invited,  and  so  expose 
themselves  to  simultaneous  casualties.  If  fifty  or  sixty 
per  cent  of  the  whole  length  of  even  the  Front  trench 
was  provided  with  fire  steps,  it  was  usually  sufficient, 
while  of  the  Support  trench  not  more  than  forty  to  fifty 
per  cent  was  made  available  for  firing,  with  still  less  in 
the  Reserve. 

The  excavated  earth  was  thrown  both  in  front  and 
behind  the  trench  and  kept  back  from  the  edge  about  one 
foot  six  inches  to  two  feet.  The  earth  in  front,  the 
parapet,  was  leveled  off  to  a  gentle  slope  so  that  men 
could  place  their  rifles  on  it.  If  the  edge  toward  the 
trench  was  left  one  foot  six  inches  high,  a  man  standing 
on  the  fire  step  could  rest  his  elbows  on  the  original 
surface  and,  with  his  rifle  lying  on  the  parapet,  fire  com- 
fortably. The  excavated  earth  in  the  rear,  the  parados, 
was  left  irregular  so  as  to  prevent  the  head  of  a  man 
looking  over  the  parapet  from  being  clearly  outlined. 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      335 


CROSS  SECT/ON  OF  TRENCH 

(mfh  F/re^fep) 
Fig.  9. 

In  the  front  face  of  the  trench  there  were  excavated 
receptacles  for  surplus  ammunition  and  hand  grenades. 
Covered  lookout  posts  were  established  at  intervals, 
"where  sentries  could  stand  and  watch  over  No  Man's 
Land,  looking  through  slits  between  sand  bags. 

In  France  the  subsoil  is  usually  a  clay  or  chalk  and 
consequently  resistant  against  slips  or  falls.  As  a  gen- 
eral thing,  therefore,  and  very  fortunately,  the  sides  of 
the  trenches  were  self-sustaining  and  remained  so  for 
months,  even  when  exposed  to  the  weather.  "Wlien  soft 
material  was  encountered,  or  a  direct  hit  was  scored  on 
the  trench  involving  placing  of  the  sides,  support  for  the 
soft  earth  was  obtained  by  driving  stakes  into  the  bot- 
tom. Sometimes  the  stakes  alone  would  be  sufficient,  but 
if  not,  hurdles  made  of  brush  were  placed  against  the 
bank  behind  the  stakes  or  the  banks  were  covered  with 
closely  woven  chicken  wire.  If  the  ground  were  very 
soft  and  the  bottom  hard,  into  which  stakes  could  not  be 
driven,  a  braced  frame  was  designed,  the  long  vertical 
legs  on  the  sides  acting  as  the  bank's  support. 

The  groat  enemy  of  trenches,  or  rather  the  great 
enemy  of  the  men  in  the  trenches,  was  water.  The  dif- 
ficulties of  disposing  of  it  being  accentuated  by  the 
impervious  character  of  the  subsoil.    If  trenches  wore 


336      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

constructed  on  a  sloping  liillside,  drains  could  sometimes 
be  dug  to  tlie  front,  permitting  the  accumulated  water 
to  run  away.  But  as  the  trenches  were  six  feet  deep,  it 
was  not  always  possible  to  get  ground  with  a  sufficient 
fall  by  which  the  water  could  be  naturally  drained  off 
through  any  reasonable  length  of  ditch.  Then  again  a 
ditch,  after  it  had  been  put  into  use  through  hours  of 
labor,  might  be  blocked  by  a  single  shell.  Where  natural 
drainage  could  not  be  had,  pumps  were  installed  which 
had  to  be  worked  by  hand.  Even  at  the  best  they  were 
very  unsatisfactory. 

Stories  have  been  told  of  the  mud  in  the  trenches  which 
unfortunately  are  not  exaggerations.  Material  falling 
into  the  trench  from  the  banks,  loose  earth  blown  into 
the  trenches  by  shells  would,  when  tramped  under  con- 
stantly passing  feet,  become  thoroughly  broken  up  and 
finally,  unless  the  drainage  were  exceptionally  good,  take 
the  consistency  of  a  thick  brown  soup.  Long  stretches  of 
trenches  after  a  spell  of  wet  weather  would  have  this 
fluid  mud  actually  thigh  high  on  the  men.  An  effort  was 
made  to  reduce  the  inconvenience  by  flooring  the  bottom 
of  the  trenches  with  ''  duck  boards,"  a  foot-walk  con- 
sisting of  two  longitudinal  stringers  about  one  and  one- 
half  inches  wide  by  three  inches  deep,  on  which  were 
nailed  light  cross  slats.  These  duck  boards  were  made 
and  consumed  in  enormous  quantities  for  use  in  camps 
as  well  as  trenches.  They  were  the  one  redeeming  ele- 
ment that  under  some  conditions  made  living  possible. 
An  eminent  American  medical  authority  when  asked  his 
opinion  as  to  what  was  the  greatest  medical  achievement 
in  the  war,  replied  unhesitatingly  the  "  Duck  Board," 
as  it  had  saved  more  lives  than  any  other  discovery. 

The  near  presence  of  ground  water  to  the  surface  in 
some  localities,  especially  in  the  plains  of  Flanders,  pre- 
vented the  digging  of  trenches.  If  it  were  possible  to 
dig  part  of  a  trench  it  was  dug  to  such  depth  as  could 


TKENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      337 

be  obtained,  and  then  above  the  surface  of  the  ground 
there  was  erected  a  rampart,  the  inside  face  of  which 
consisted  of  stout  stakes  driven  into  the  ground,  sup- 
porting brush  hurdles,  the  tops  of  the  stakes  being  held, 
from  turning  over,  by  wires  leading  to  anchor  posts  in 
front.  Earth  was  then  piled  up  on  the  outside  against 
the  hurdles  to  a  thickness  of  six  feet  at  the  top,  with  an 
exterior  slope  of  one  on  two.  The  trace  of  such  a  trench 
was  usually  of  the  Bastion  form.  In  order  to  protect 
the  men  from  shells  falling  behind  them,  a  similar 
embankment  was  constructed  in  the  rear,  thus  giving  a 
trench  profile  of  the  same  dimensions  as  the  standard 
trench.  Firing  steps  were  constructed  upon  such  bays 
as  were  selected  for  that  purpose.  The  combined  height 
of  trench  and  rampart  was  the  same  as  the  standard 
depth  of  trench. 

Forests  were  always  used  by  both  sides  as  points  for 
defense.  The  only  objection  to  organizing  forests  for 
this  purpose  was  that  the  enemy  would,  probably,  if  the 
location  of  the  defense  works  were  known,  saturate  the 
locality  with  gas.  Gas  in  a  thick  forest,  especially  if  it 
were  mustard  gas,  would  remain  for  days  before  final 
evaporation.  Details  of  trenches  in  forests  did  not  dif- 
fer from  those  constructed  in  the  open  except  that  they 
were  usually  reinforced  more  generously  with  machine 
gun  posts  and  other  isolated  points  of  defense,  called 
strong  points. 

Among  the  trees,  avenues  were  cut,  whence  all  under- 
brush and  small  trees  were  removed.  These  avenues 
were  laid  out  radiating  from  various  strong  points,  so 
that  an  attacking  force  passing  through  the  forest  would 
be  subjected  to  crossfire  from  several  points.  "Whenever 
trenches  and  outposts  were  constructed  in  woods,  the 
big  trees  were  loft  so  far  as  possible,  so  as  to  hide  from 
airplane  observation  the  traces  of  either  the  outposts  or 
the  cross  avenues. 


338      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

The  Commimication  trenches  resembled  the  other 
trenches  both  in  trace  and  profile,  and  were  provided 
with  fire  steps  on  some  bays  so  that  they  could  be  used, 
if  so  needed,  as  fire  trenches.  Inasmuch  as  they  were 
intended  primarily  for  passages,  they  were  given  the 
Zig-zag  or  Wavy  trace,  as  that  trace  obstructed  as  little 
as  possible  the  movement  of  men.  The  upper  ends  of 
Communication  trenches  were  made  straight  for  about 
fifty  yards,  whence  a  diverted  connection  was  made  with 
the  Main  trench.  Support  or  Reserve.  At  the  end  of  the 
straight  stretch  there  was  a  fire  step  on  the  Main  trench, 
with  a  parapet  so  constructed  as  to  permit  an  enfilading 
fire  of  the  Communication  trench  to  be  directed  from  it. 
This  was  done  so  that,  in  the  event  of  the  trench  in  front 
being  carried  by  the  enemy,  the  next  line  of  trench  could 
not  be  approached  through  the  Communication  trenches. 
Not  more  than  two  men  at  a  time  could  advance  through 
such  a  trench  abreast,  and  certainly  one  or  two  men  with 
rifles  could  easily  defend  it.  The  distance  of  fifty  yards 
for  the  straight  stretch  was  deemed  sufficient  to  prevent 
the  defenders  from  being  reached  by  hand-thrown 
grenades,  the  much  dreaded  weapon  in  close  fighting. 

In  digging  trenches,  except  on  the  immediate  front 
during  an  engagement,  it  was  foimd  desirable  to  do  so 
by  allotting  daily  tasks  to  the  men,  on  the  completion 
of  which  they  might  return  to  camp,  rather  than  to 
keep  them  all  digging  a  certain  fixed  number  of  hours. 
The  first  task  consisted  of  digging  the  upper  half  of  the 
trench,  the  second  task  completing  it.  With  the  normal 
profile  as  above  described,  the  upper  half  of  the  trench 
exclusive  of  the  first  step  and  in  a  length  of  ten  feet  gave 
6.1  cubic  yards  of  excavation,  and  this  was  taken  as  a 
day's  task.  It  was  actually  found  that  when  men  were 
worked  by  the  day  of  ten  hours  that  nothing  more  than 
this  on  the  average  would  be  accomplished,  while  on 
the  task  basis  a  good  man  would  complete  that  amount 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      339 

of  trench,  throwing  tKe  excavated  material  over  the  top, 
in  four  hours  when  working  in  ordinary  clay  or  loamy 
soil.  In  fact,  one  of  the  engineer  regiments  reported 
that  that  amount  of  material  had  actually  been  disposed 
of  by  one  man  in  two  hours.  In  chalk,  cemented  gravel 
or  stiff  blue  clay,  the  above  task  would  constitute  a  full 
day's  work. 


fRONT  LINE  DUGOUT 


Fig.  10. 


The  lower  half,  or  second  task,  contained  four  cubic 
yards  of  excavation  and  took  about  as  long  to  accom- 
plish as  the  first  task,  the  lessor  amount  of  earth  handled 
being  offset  by  the  extra  lift  to  the  material.  The  aver- 
age lift  of  the  earth  in  the  second  task  was  about  six 
feet,  as  it  not  only  had  to  be  lifted  from  the  trench  but 
thrown  on  top  of  the  excavated  material  from  the  first 
task.  Then,  too,  some  rchandling  of  the  excavated 
material  was  necessary  in  order  to  make  room  for  new 
deposit. 


340      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Trenches  were  incomplete  unless  some  provisions  were 
made  for  giving  the  men  living  accommodations.  These 
accommodations  consisted  preferably,  and  always  if  time 
loermittcd,  in  the  construction  of  dugouts.  "While  dug- 
outs were  being  built,  temporary  and  quickly  made  pro- 
vision was  furnished  by  shelters  excavated  in  the  banks 
and  roofed  over  with  timbers  or  concrete  beams  covered 
with  as  much  earth  as  could  be  heaped  upon  them  in  the 


HsiKf  Coyer  25 f/-. 


DUGOUT  FOR 
BATTALION  HEADQUARTER3 

Wifh  accommocfofion  for  26msn 


Fig.  1L 

time  available  but  without  making  them  marked  targets. 
Such  shelters  afforded  protection  against  all  shell  splin- 
ters and  even  against  a  direct  hit  from  a  77  mm.  shell. 
In  addition  to  these  more  or  less  simple  accommodations 
there  were  needed  in  all  occupied  positions  some  place  or 
places  for  headquarters,  hospitals,  storage  of  ammuni- 
tion, etc.,  where  reasonable  protection  could  be  had 
against  direct  hits  from  guns  of  almost  any  calibre,  cer- 
tainly up  to  those  of  210  mm.  (8.3  inches).  Such  protec- 
tion could  be  secured  only  in  deep  dugouts  under  a 


TEENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      341 

cover  of  nndisturbed  earth  at  least  twenty  feet  in  depth. 
There  were  many  different  designs  for  such  dugouts, 
depending  upon  the  character  of  the  soil,  the  topography 
of  the  ground,  the  time  available  for  their  construction 
and  the  personal  views  of  the  engineer.  But  those 
shown  in  figures  10  and  11  were  for  their  several  purposes 
quite  satisfactory  and  can  be  taken  as  fairly  typical. 

The  dugouts  were  reached  by  inclines  running  down 
at  an  angle  of  about  forty-five  degrees  with  steps  on  the 
bottom.  At  least  two  inclines  were  given  to  every 
dugout,  to  prevent  access  being  cut  off  and  the  men 
buried  by  a  single  lucky  shot.  They  were  driven  like 
ordinary  mining  galleries  and  were  lined  with  timber 
frames  of  three-inch  plank,  giving  a  clear  opening  three 
feet  wide  by  five  feet  high.  The  galleries  at  the  bottoms 
of  these  inclines  had  six  feet  head  room  and  were  also 
lined  on  all  sides  with  planks,  while  the  roofs  and  sides 
of  the  rooms  leading  off  from  the  galleries  were  sup- 
ported by  ordinary  miners'  timbers.  These  dugouts 
were  frequently  lighted  by  electricity  and  were  venti- 
lated either  by  using  the  chimney  from  the  cookstove, 
which  if  there  were  no  other  way  of  reaching  the  surface, 
passed  up  one  of  the  inclines,  or  else  by  putting  a  brazier 
at  the  bottom  of  an  incline,  converting  it  into  an  upcast 
ventilating  shaft. 

Keeping  dugouts  free  from  water  was  not  as  serious 
a  matter  as  at  first  thought  it  seemed  to  be.  The  clay 
subsoil  in  the  war  zone  of  France  was  usually  impervious 
to  surface  water,  so  that  the  dugouts  were  as  a  general 
thing  reasonably  dry.  The  only  serious  matter  in 
respect  of  drainage  was  to  care  for  the  water  that  might 
flow  in  from  the  open  trenches.  At  the  foot  of  the 
inclines  small  j)its  or  suinps  were  dug  to  which  hand 
pumps  were  attached  and  the  water  removed  at  intervals. 
The  great  danger  in  dugouts  and  in  fact  the  only  real 
danger,  because  most  were  quite  safe  against  shell  fire, 


342      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

was  gas,  which  flowing  down  the  iuchnes,  would  remain 
in  the  dugout  undisturbed  for  hours,  perhaps  even 
unnoticed. 

As  was  explained  in  Chapter  XVI  when  dealing  with 
noxious  gases,  entrances  to  dugouts  were  covered  by 
blankets  soaked  in  gas-absorbing  chemicals.  In  cases 
where  gas  attacks  were  to  be  expected  frequently,  these 
blankets  were  hung  in  pairs,  separated  by  an  interval  of 
a  few  feet.  They  thus  constituted  a  sort  of  air  lock,  pre- 
venting the  passage  of  gas  which  would  happen  when- 
ever a  man  would  lift  a  single  blanket  on  leaving  or  enter- 
ing the  dugout.  With  two  blankets,  one  was  always 
down. 

In  this  discussion  of  trenches  and  dugouts  it  is 
assumed  that  time  is  available  in  which  these  elaborate 
structures  can  be  produced  according  to  plans,  either 
when  preparing  a  position  in  advance  which,  of  course, 
means  in  anticipation  of  a  possible  retirement, 
or  when  a  series  of  improvements  can  be  slowly  carried 
out  while  actually  holding  a  front  position. 

In  front  of  the  forward  trench  were  the  wire  entangle- 
ments intended  to  hold  an  attacking  wave  long  enough 
to  permit,  even  in  case  of  surprise,  a  sufficient  concen- 
tration of  machine  gun  or  rifle  fire  to  destroy  it  before 
reaching  the  trench.  To  this  end  the  entanglements  were 
placed  so  close  to  the  trench  that  it  could  not  be 
approached  or  the  wire  cut  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
sentries  in  the  trench.  And  yet  they  were  sufficiently  far 
away  to  give  the  men  a  sense  of  security  against  imme- 
diate hand-to-hand  fighting  and  so  encourage  deliberate 
careful  aiming.  A  distance  between  trench  and  wire 
neither  too  short  nor  too  long  was  from  twenty-five  to 
fifty  yards.  The  rule  was  laid  down  that  entanglements 
should  never  be  placed  in  dead  spots,  to  avoid  which  it 
was  better  to  set  them  at  a  greater  distance  than  normal. 
On  the  other  hand  it  was  very  advantageous  that  parts 


TEENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      343 

of  an  entanglement  be  subject  to  an  enfilading  fire  from 
some  portion  of  the  Front  trench. 

There  were  many  different  ways  of  stringing  wire, 
the  result  of  individual  views  of  different  army  engi- 
neers, but  the  general  principle  of  construction  was  a 
fence  with  sloping  wires  in  front  and  behind  called  a 
**  double  apron."  The  central  standing  portion  resem- 
bled an  ordinary  barbed-wire  fence,  four  strands  high, 
attached  to  posts  or  pickets  five  to  six  feet  long 
driven  three  yards  apart  and  so  deep  that  four  feet  were 
above  the  ground.  Two  yards  in  front,  and  also 
behind  the  main  posts,  were  two  rows  of  short  pickets 
driven  well  down.  Inclined  wires  led  from  the  top  of 
each  fence  picket  to  the  anchor  pickets,  forming  in  plan 
a  series  of  crosses.  Three  horizontal  wires  were 
attached  to  these  inclined  wires  on  each  side  of  the 
central  fence  and  spaced  approximately  equidistantly 
between  the  top  and  the  ground,  making  ten  horizontal 
wires  in  all. 

In  front,  that  is,  on  the  enemy  side  of  the  forward 
apron,  were  usually  two  sets  of  low  wire  entanglements. 
Each  of  these  consisted  of  two  rows  of  short  pickets  pro- 
jecting when  driven  about  two  feet  above  the  ground 
and  set  alternately  at  three-yard  intervals,  with  inclined 
wires  running  from  the  top  of  the  rear  picket  to  half  way 
down  the  picket  in  front.  If  two  sets  of  low  wires  were 
used,  one  row  of  intermediate  pickets  answered  for  the 
front  row  of  one  set  and  the  rear  row  of  the  next,  each 
row  being  two  yards  from  its  neiglibor.  About  these 
inclined  wires  were  twisted  coils  of  loose  unattached 
wires.  There  was  a  tendency  of  wiring  parties  to  place 
too  many  wires,  especially  of  loose  coils,  a  tendency  that 
was  perhaps  understandable  though  always  discouraged 
when  discovered.  If  there  were  too  many  wires,  men 
could  actually  walk  on  them  and  trample  them  down  to 
something  like  a  heavy  carpet.    German  wire  entangle- 


344      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

ments  were  much  more  complicated  and  consisted  of  sev- 
eral rows,  as  many  as  seven  being  not  uncommon  with 
horizontal  wires,  diagonal  wires  connecting  the  tops  of 
the  pickets,  and  some  loose  wires  besides. 

The  entanglements  were  never  continuous,  gaps  being 
left  to  give  means  of  egress  and  return  for  the  patrols 
who  scoured  No  Man's  Land  nightly.  These  gaps  were 
made  by  building  the  entanglements  in  sections  of  sev- 
eral hundred  yards  in  length,  according  to  local  condi- 
tions, but  having  the  end  of  one  section  overlap  that  of 
the  next  with  an  interval  between.  The  enemy  could  not 
then  see  where  the  gaps  were.  In  case  an  attack  was 
feared,  these  gaps  were  closed  by  stretching  across  them 
''  French  "  or  ''  Concertina  "  wire,  spiral  coils  of  plain 
and  barbed  wire  respectively.  The  first  had  a  diameter 
of  three  feet  six  inches  and,  when  pulled  out,  made  a  cyl- 
inder sixty  feet  long.  The  second  was  usually  four  feet 
in  diameter  and  gave  a  length  of  eighteen  feet.  The  con- 
certina type  was  naturally  more  effective,  but  was  more 
awkward  to  carry  and  to  handle  in  an  emergency.  Both 
were  held  in  place  by  pickets  and  were  used  not  only  to 
stop  gaps,  but  to  close  roads  and  to  create  entanglements 
that  in  some  emergency  might  have  to  be  placed  in  a 
great  hurry. 

The  pickets  were  of  wood,  when  they  could  be  driven 
by  a  maul  without  fear  that  the  noise  would  attract  fire. 
But  when  silence  must  be  observed,  as  when  new  lines 
were  being  strung  or  old  ones  repaired  in  No  Man's 
Land,  screw  pickets  were  used,  made  of  round  metal 
with  one  end  twisted  like  a  corkscrew  so  that  it  could  be 
screwed  into  the  ground,  and  with  eyes  to  which  the  wire 
could  be  attached. 

Wire  entanglements  could  be  cut  and  broken  by  shell 
fire.  When  an  attack  was  contemplated  they  were  sub- 
jected to  a  concentrated  bombardment.  When  damaged 
by  accidental  fire,  something  of  daily  occurrence,  the 


TRENCHES  AND  TRENCH  WARFARE      345 

engineers  were  called  on  to  repair  them  at  night,  always 
a  dangerous  task,  because  probably  notice  of  their  pres- 
ence would  be  given  by  the  listening  apparatus,  when 
immediately  the  ground  would  be  illuminated  by  some 
form  of  air  bomb,  which  would  burn  for  several  seconds. 
Then  the  sharpshooters  became  disagreeably  active.  The 
best  means  of  disposing  of  wire  was  the  tank,  which  was 
able  to  smooth  entanglements  quite  flat  over  which  men 
could  run  subject  to  no  more  inconvenience  or  delay  than 
possibly  being  tripped  by  loose  wires. 

The  trench  system,  composed  of  at  least  three  main 
lines  and  with  any  number  of  communications,  switches, 
by-passes,  etc.,  and  with  all  the  twists,  turnings,  and 
sinuosities,  made  a  veritable  labyrinth,  in  which  men, 
especially  new  arrivals,  might  easily  be  lost.  To  simplify 
matters  as  much  as  possible,  they  were  all  named  (and, 
of  course,  mapped)  with  the  names  in  some  orderly 
arrangement ;  that  is,  various  stretches  of  the  Front-line 
trench  as,  for  instance,  between  adjacent  Communicating 
trenches,  were  given  names  that  began  with  the  same 
letter,  while  similar  sections  of  the  Support  and  Reserve 
lines  had  other  letters.  Thus  Georgetown,  Gregory  or 
Good  would  indicate  locations  in  the  Front  trench,  and 
Harold,  Harwich  or  Henry  similar  locations  in  the  Sup- 
port directly  in  the  rear.  Communication  trenches  had 
their  system  of  initial  letters,  as  also  switches  or  other 
irregular  additions.  Signs  with  these  names  were 
erected  at  every  junction  point  like  the  signs  at  the  inter- 
section of  streets  in  a  city. 

Through  perhaps  their  long  stay  in  France,  the  Brit- 
ish went  to  great  lengths  in  giving  new  names  to  places 
and  localities.  Some  of  the  names  being  quite  amusing. 
Treacle  Trench,  Tadpole  Copse,  Oxford  Street  and 
other  designations  certainly  not  of  Gallic  origin  were 
placed  on  the  maps,  and  undoubtedly  many  will  rise  cen- 
turies hence  under  distorted  disguises  to  provide  mate- 


346      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

rial  for  heated  pliilological  discussion.  Several  such 
anglicized  names  will  be  found  on  the  fragment  of  the 
map  shown  on  page  227. 

The  enemy  trenches  were  carefully  mapped  from  air 
photographs  and  were  likewise  named,  so  that  in  the 
plans  for  an  attack,  various  units  would  receive  orders  to 
capture  and  occupy  the  portion  of  the  enemy  trenches 
designated  by  name. 

Under  such  conditions  in  dark,  damp  dugouts,  in  mud, 
in  slimy  ditches,  to  look  from  which  meant  instant  death, 
exposed  to  constant  wasting  fire,  and  subject  to  bombard- 
ment or  attack  at  any  moment,  the  men  of  the  allied 
armies  had  lived  for  three  and  a  half  years  even  before 
the  American  entry  in  the  war,  with  all  the  relieving 
interest  of  open  warfare  absolutely  unknown.  The  only 
change  was  when  the  period  of  line  service  was  over  and 
the  unit  was  withdrawn  for  a  few  days'  rest  in  the 
reserve,  there  to  wait  for  it's  next  turn  of  duty  in  the 
trenches.  Such  life  was  more  nerve  racking  than  the 
sustaining  excitement  of  a  great  offensive.  Never  have 
there  been  conditions  of  war  that  tried  men's  courage  as 
those  that  existed  from  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne  until 
the  final  victorious  movement  began  on  the  18th  of  July, 
1918,  a  period  lacking  less  than  two  months  to  make  four 
full  years. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

FINAL  PHASE 

The  drama  was  fast  drawing  to  a  close. 

At  the  end  of  August,  1918,  the  headquarters  of  the 
First  Army,  A.  E.  F.,  had  been  temporarily  located  at 
Neufchateau  in  the  department  of  the  Vosges.  In  Sep- 
tember they  were  moved  to  Ligny  and  Bar-le-Duc  in 
Meuse  in  order  to  be  nearer  the  scene  of  activity,  when 
the  sector  extending  easterly  from  the  Argonne  forest  to 
the  Alsatian  frontier  opposite  Nancy  had  been  definitely 
assigned  for  American  operations.  By  this  date  the 
American  troops  in  France  numbered  nearly  2,000,000 
men  and  the  whole  combatant  force,  except  the  Second 
Corps  which  was  cooperating  with  the  British  and  the 
recent  arrivals  still  undergoing  training,  was  concen- 
trated on  or  immediately  behind  this  front.  All  the  units 
of  the  nine  original  engineer  regiments  that  could  be 
transferred  from  fixed  duties  were  gradually  moved  dur- 
ing the  month  of  August  and  September  to  the  First 
Army  area,  with  the  exception  of  the  Seventeenth  and 
Eighteenth  Regiments  which  could  not  be  spared  from 
the  work  of  continued  development  of  the  wharf  facili- 
ties at  St.  Nazaire  and  Bordeaux,  and  the  Nineteenth, 
whose  duties  of  maintaining  locomotives  and  cars  at 
Nevers  and  other  points  were  paramount.  The  other 
regiments  were  not  transferred  simultaneously,  nor  even 
as  complete  units,  but  in  separated  bodies  usually  as 
companies  and  never  larger  than  battalions,  in  order  not 
to  draw  attcTition  to  the  concentration  that  it  was  desired 
to  effect  quietly. 

The  sector  described  above  included  the  famous  St. 

347 


348      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Mihiel  salient  wliicli  tlie  Germans  had  held  continuously 
since  October,  1914,  in  spite  of  several  determined  efforts 
of  the  French  to  retake  it.  As  the  result  of  these  failures 
both  sides  had  settled  down  to  the  realization  that  the 
Germans  were  too  strongly  intrenched  to  be  dislodged. 
A  continued  deadlock  ensued  whose  quiet  was  broken 
only  by  an  occasional  raid  or  the  daily  exchange  of  a  few 
shells.  The  tip  of  the  salient  lay  on  the  high  ground  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse.  Included  between  the  north 
and  south  limits  were  about  four  miles  of  the  river 
Meuse,  the  Canal  de  I'Est,  a  canal  of  the  first  category, 
the  two  highways  in  the  valley  and  the  double  tracks  of 
the  main  line  of  the  standard  gauge  railway  connecting 
Verdun  with  the  south. 

The  general  plan  laid  down  by  the  Generalissimo, 
Marshal  Foch,  was  for  the  three  forces,  American, 
French  and  British,  to  make  a  simultaneous  forward 
movement  on  the  whole  front  from  the  Meuse  to  the 
North  Sea,  in  which  movement  the  American  force  was 
to  occupy  the  right,  thus  leaving  aside  for  the  moment 
any  offensive  directed  against  the  strongly  fortified  posi- 
tion of  Metz.  To  make  such  a  movement  it  was  neces- 
sary first  to  reduce  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  and  recover 
possession  of  the  railway  and  highway  in  the  valley  of 
the  Meuse  in  order  to  have  the  physical  facilities  for 
transferring  men  and  supplies  to  the  Verdun  portion 
of  the  front. 

Accordingly  on  the  night  of  September  12th  the 
American  Commander-in-Chief  launched  the  first  great 
American  offensive.  To  attempt  to  storm  the  dominat- 
ing hills  of  St.  Mihiel  would  have  been  futile  and  sui- 
cidal, because  during  their  four  years  of  possession  the 
Germans  had  strengthened  the  already  strong  natural 
position  by  every  conceivable  device  of  engineering  sci- 
ence, and  made  it  practically  impregnable  against  direct 
attack.    General  Pershing,  therefore,  directed  his  main 


FINAL  PHASE  349 

offensive  westerly  from  the  Moselle  at  Pont-a-Mousson 
across  the  level  plains  to  the  hills  lying  east  of  St.  Mihiel, 
of  which  Mont  Sec  was  the  dominating  feature.  In  the 
early  morning  hours  the  attack  was  opened  by  an  intense 
bombardment  lasting  until  dawn,  when  the  infantry 
*'  went  over."  At  the  same  time  some  American  divi- 
sions, aided  by  a  French  colonial  corps,  attacked  on  the 
face  of  the  salient  lying  between  St.  Mihiel  and  a  point 
east  and  south  of  Verdun.  The  offensive  proved  to  be  a 
great  surprise  to  the  enemy,  although  it  was  hard  to 
understand  why  it  should  have  been,  because  there  had 
been  a  steady  concentration  of  troops  and  of  supplies 
for  nearly  a  month  previously  and  there  was  gossip  all 
over  France  to  the  effect  that  a  great  offensive  was 
planned  for  somewhere  north  of  Toul.  Perhaps  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  knowledge  deceived  the  enemy  through 
its  being  so  widespread  and  led  him  to  believe  that  the 
reports  were  being  purposely  circulated  with  intent  to 
deceive.  At  any  rate  the  first  day's  objectives  were 
quickly  occupied  with  surprisingly  small  losses  and  the 
flow  of  prisoners  who  began  to  appear  early  in  the  after- 
noon were  evidence  that  the  enemy  was  beaten.  The 
quality  of  the  prisoners  gave  much  hope  that  the  end  was 
not  far  away,  because  among  them  were  many  old  men 
and  boys,  who  in  conversation  did  not  hesitate  to  admit 
that  they  were  surprised  and  by  the  fierceness  of  the 
assault  completely  routed. 

During  the  night  of  September  12th-13th  the  Ger- 
mans evacuated  St.  Mihiel  itself  without  firing  a  shot 
in  its  defense,  and  all  their  labor  spent  in  digging  miles 
of  trenches,  in  raising  acres  of  wire  entanglements  had 
gone  for  naught.  They  saw  clearly  that,  if  the  American 
attack  were  resumed  on  the  morrow  and  pressed  with  the 
same  vigor  that  it  had  been  during  the  12th,  the  whole 
garrison  would  be  cut  off  and  be  compelled  to  surrender. 
If  they  were  to  leave  at  all  and  of  their  own  volition  it 


350      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

must  be  then  and  under  the  cover  of  darkness.  The  next 
few  days  saw  not  only  the  long  maintained  salient  aban- 
doned but  a  wide  belt  of  country  in  the  rear  recaptured. 
The  Germans,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  fell  back  considerably 
more  than  they  were  expected  to  do.  They  apparently 
fancied  the  attack  to  be  the  beginning  of  one  in  force  on 
Metz  and  hastily  withdrew  to  cover  that  important  gate- 
way to  the  Rhine  valley.  They  learned  when  too  late 
that  it  was  only  a  move  to  clear  the  way  for  the  greater 
offensive  from  the  Meuse  westward.  Afterward  the 
Second  Army,  A.  E.  F.,  made  complete  preparations  for  a 
drive  on  Metz  and  to  the  eastward  of  Toul,  but  the  sign- 
ing of  the  Armistice  on  the  very  eve  of  the  attack  stopped 
it  before  it  began. 

In  the  St.  Mihiel  offensive  the  work  that  the  engineer 
regiments  accomplished  was  chiefly  in  the  matter  of 
lines  of  transportation.  They  took  over  the  French  sys- 
tem of  light  railways  which  served  their  old  front,  and 
followed  up  the  advance  with  new  lines  connecting  them 
with  the  w6ll  built  German  system  which  the  enemy  had 
not  been  able  to  destroy,  so  quickly  did  he  retreat.  All 
this  involved  new  rail-heads,  new  storage  depots,  and 
new  means  for  local  distribution.  Roads  had  to  be 
repaired,  actually  rebuilt  where  they  crossed  the  long 
abandoned  territory  lying  between  the  lines  where  they 
had  been  pounded  by  the  shells  from  both  armies  during 
more  than  three  years;  mine  craters  iDurposely  blown  up 
at  road  intersections  had  to  be  filled  in  with  logs,  earth 
or  the  debris  of  houses;  new  water  supply  points  estab- 
lished and  a  great  mass  of  other  details  aftended  to  in 
order  that  the  combatant  forces  could  advance  and,  after 
they  had  advanced,  be  supplied.  Then  there  were  the 
standard  gauge  lines  to  be  operated,  lines  that  had  been 
long  unused,  that  freight  in  broad-gauge  cars  might  be 
run  as  far  forward  as  possible  without  breaking  bulk 
or  being  transferred  to  the  smaller  light  railway  cars. 


FINAL  PHASE  351 

A  meter  gange  railway,  belonging  to  the  local  communal 
system  rmining  northeasterly  from  Commercy,  crossing 
the  German  trenches  at  Apremont  and  then  skirting  the 
base  of  Mont  Sec,  occupied  a  very  desirable  location  for 
a  standard  gauge  line,  and  it  was  decided  to  widen  the 
gauge. 

This  little  railway  had  been  completed  in  the  summer 
of  1914  and  consequently  had  never  been  operated  except 
for  a  few  weeks.  Four  years  later  it  was  completely 
overgrown  with  grass.  Having  decided  to  reconstruct  it 
the  11th  Engineers  were  instructed  to  make  the  plans  and 
preparations  but  were  forbidden  to  begin  work  in  the 
field  until  the  offensive  had  actually  commenced  for  fear 
of  drawing  the  attention  of  enemy  airplanes  to  new 
work  in  progress.  The  track  consisted  of  fifty-poimd 
rails  laid  on  ties  two  meters  {Gyi  ft.)  long  but  held  by 
screw  spikes.  Prior  to  the  engagement  a  few  men, 
widely  scattered,  were  set  to  work  drawing  the  spikes, 
while  timbers  were  collected  with  which  to  strengthen 
the  bridges.  On  the  morning  of  the  12th  the  engineers 
began  to  move  the  rails  outward  to  the  broad  gauge, 
using  for  the  moment  the  small  ties,  thus  giving  at  once 
a  track  over  which  could  be  and  was  run  a  construction 
train  carrying  standard  gauge  ties,  with  which  the  track 
was  relaid.  The  light  rails  were  permanently  retained 
and  did  good  service. 

Beyond  the  German  trenches  the  roadbed  was  found 
to  be  in  bad  condition.  They  had  removed  all  the  track 
material  for  use  in  light  railways,  since  a  very  short  and 
independent  line  with  a  gauge  of  one  meter  and  con- 
nected with  no  similar  railway  in  their  area  had  abso- 
lutely no  value  for  them.  Large  craters  existed  where 
the  Germans  had  blown  up  the  roadbed,  but  ap]iarently 
long  previously  to  tlieir  retirement,  so  that  north  of 
Apremont  the  whole  line  had  to  be  largely  rebuilt.  Wlion 
this  was  done  it  constituted  the  chief  standard  gauge 


352      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

connection,  and  with  a  rail-head  and  transfer  station  at 
Woinville  it  functioned  in  connection  with  the  recon- 
structed and  extended  light  railway  system. 

During  this  and  the  immediately  subsequent  Argonne- 
Meuse  offensive  the  work  of  the  engineers  was  noted  not 
for  remarkable  or  spectacular  individual  pieces  of  con- 
struction, but  rather  for  the  large  amount  of  work  done 
as  a  whole  and  its  widely  varied  character  executed  under 
the  most  trying  conditions.  Time  in  such  circumstances 
is  the  governing  factor.  Railways,  roads,  water  supply 
and  trenches  that  are  to  be  constructed  must  be  con- 
ceived on  a  plan  that  will  lead  to  the  quickest  results 
rather  than  give  a  perfected  structure  to  which  the 
author  may  subsequently  point  with  pride  as  an  example 
of  his  scientific  skill.  The  polish  and  neatness  with 
which  a  conscientious  engineer  likes  to  finish  construc- 
tion entrusted  to  his  care  must  be  quite  lacking  in  work 
done  during  the  stress  of  battle.  Under  such  circum- 
stances the  highest  type  of  engineering  is  that  which 
produces  a  given  result  in  the  fewest  hours,  regardless 
of  permanence  or  economical  operation.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that  the  work  accomplished  by  the  engineers  in 
these  two  offensives,  great  in  scope  and  varied  in  type 
as  it  was,  presents  but  few  examples  of  accomplishment 
worthy  of  extended  engineering  analysis.  As  one  meas- 
ure of  the  mass  of  work  accomjolished,  the  number  of 
standard  gauge  trains  moved  by  a  single  regiment  (the 
Thirteenth  Engineers)  is  interesting.  This  regiment, 
occupied  wholly  in  the  operation  of  railways  on  that  part 
of  the  French  front,  including  St.  Mihiel,  Verdun  and  the 
Argonne,  moved  no  fewer  than  17,315  trains,  the  greater 
part  during  the  American  offensives,  carrying  nearly 
9,000,000  tons  of  freight  with  an  unknown  number  of 
passengers  which  certainly  ran  into  millions,  when  all 
movements  and  counter  movements  of  troops  were 
counted.    During  September  and  October,  1918,  when  the 


FINAL  PHASE  353 

Argonne  offensive  was  in  progress,  this  same  regiment 
handled  3,082  trains  with  2,400,000  tons  of  freight. 

In  the  execution  of  work  during  a  great  offensive  there 
were  frequent  disappointments  and  much  discourage- 
ment. Often  after  finishing  the  construction  of  a  bridge, 
or  railway  yard  or  important  water  point,  done  under 
the  most  trying  of  circumstances,  including  rain,  wind, 
cold,  little  food  and  sleep,  a  sudden  change  in  battle  plan 
would  render  it  all  unnecessary,  or  an  enemy  raid  would 
capture  it,  or,  what  was  of  frequent  occurrence,  the 
enemy,  advised  of  the  construction,  would  wait  until  the 
last  member  had  been  put  in  place  and  then,  with  their 
long-range  guns,  knock  it  all  down  like  a  house 
of  cards.  A  fine  example  of  this  last  experience 
was  a  French  railway  viaduct  in  the  Vosges,  cross- 
ing the  valley  of  the  Largue.  This  handsome  structure, 
like  so  many  other  similar  ones  in  France,  sources 
of  joy  to  the  artistic,  and  of  interest  to  the  scientific 
man,  was  about  460  meters  long  with  an  average  height 
of  twenty-one  meters  and  consisted  of  a  series  of  forty- 
two  arches  of  a  span  of  8.6  meters  each  with  a  central 
arch  over  the  river  with  an  opening  of  twenty-five 
meters,  all  constructed  in  brickwork.  While  the  retreat 
of  1914  was  in  progress,  the  French,  fearing  that  this 
important  structure  might  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  Ger- 
mans, destroyed  its  immediate  usefulness  by  blowing  up 
the  central  arch  and  the  two  adjacent  arches  on  each  side. 
In  the  following  spring,  when  fear  of  a  further  German 
advance  on  this  front  had  disappeared,  the  French,  who 
needed  the  railway  for  their  own  service,  decided  to 
rebuild  the  viaduct.  With  the  customary  French  desires 
for  good  workmanship  and  not  yet  having  learned 
the  lesson  that  such  standards  have  no  jilace  in  war,  the 
engineers  reconstructed  the  broken  part  in  reinforced 
concrete  and  restored  tho  original  artistic  outline  of  the 
stucture.    On  the  night  of  May  25,  1915,  the  rebuilding 


S54      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

had  been  jBnislied  without  any  untoward  incident  and 
they  began  to  remove  the  falsework  and  arch  centering. 
Four  days  later  the  enemy  opened  fire  with  a  gun  of 
420  mm.  (I6I/0  ins.)  calibre  at  a  range  of  about  12  km. 
(71/4  miles).  In  a  few  hours  fifty-one  shots  had  struck 
the  bridge  or  fallen  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  The  struc- 
ture was  in  ruins.  A  length  of  120  meters  was  com- 
pletely demolished,  and  the  central  arch  with  four  small 


Dannernofie  y/ex/ucf  befo/^  ffiff  Mar 


'^mmi^mmmammms^^' 


^fftr  ^»B(Xnbanslrnenf 


+/"£fidf 


Fig.  12. 


arches  were  severely  damaged.  The  Germans  had 
waited  until  the  reconstruction  was  completed  and  then 
bombarded  it,  the  fire  being  directed  by  aviators. 

The  pictures  opposite,  copies  of  official  French  photo- 
graphs, illustrate  the  construction  and  damage.  It  will 
interest  engineers  to  know  that  the  reinforced  concrete, 
although  fresh,  resisted  destructive  action  better  than 
the  briclnvork,  and  the  attention  of  engineers  is  particu- 
larly invited  to  the  fact  that  great  masses  of  the  brick- 
work in  one  of  the  piers  were  moved  laterally  without 


MAY    2~).     1  !)!;■).        FREXCir     KIXOXSTRUCTIOX     FIXlSIIK.n 


MAY    ;il).    liU.").      KKFKCT  OF  CKKMAX    AIMII  I  IKY    I  lUK 


OAWi  \i<)i;ir  \  lAiu  I  1' 

[{■<    lu'i.hiccm.nt    liy    llu'    I'nnrli    :iii.l    I  luiiu'diatc    Di'stnict  ion    liy    (n'riiiiin 

Artillery   fnmi   a    Di-taiirc  oi   Woy,'    Than  Twi-lve   Kil.mn'ti'rs 


FINAL  PHASE  355 

internal  disturbance  and  solely  by  the  effect  of  concus- 
sion of  an  exploding  shell  transmitted  through  the  air. 

The  diagram  of  the  Dannemorie  ^daduct  over  the 
Largue  shows  the  pre-war  elevation,  the  parts  demol- 
ished by  the  bombardment  and  the  extraordinary  accu- 
racy of  the  artillery  fire,  every  shot  either  actually  hitting 
the  bridge  or  falling  within  a  maximum  error  of  less 
than  fifty  feet  in  the  case  of  the  first  shot.  After  this 
costly  experience  the  French  effected  a  crossing  of  the 
valley  on  a  low  and  easily  rebuilt  wooden  trestle,  one 
that  was  not  worth  the  expenditure  of  ammunition  to 
destroy. 

With  the  St.  Mihiel  salient  removed  and  the  arteries 
of  travel  in  th6  valley  of  the  Meuse  restored  to  French 
control,  the  way  was  open  for  the  main  general  offensive. 
If  there  had  been  idle  talk  about  the  St.  Mihiel  attack, 
there  was  none  about  the  other.  Commanding  officers 
were  aware  that  some  movement  was  at  hand,  but  beyond 
orders  to  hold  their  commands  in  readiness  for  any 
emergency  they  knew  nothing  definitely.  Therefore,  the 
experience  of  myself  and  my  regiment  was  typical 
of  that  of  many  others.  On  September  22d  I  was 
warned  that  we  would  be  moved  presently,  and  on  the 
morning  of  the  24th  I  was  ordered  to  proceed  immedi- 
ately to  Vraincourt,  a  small  village  just  east  of  the 
Argonne  forest,  and  was  advised  that  trucks  would  carry 
a  part  of  my  regiment  during  the  night. 

For  some  days  there  had  been  much  activity  after 
dark.  From  dusk  each  evening  until  early  morning  there 
was  a  steady  procession  of  guns,  trucks  loaded  with 
ammunition  and  men,  and  wagon  tniins  of  every  descrip- 
tion, all  moving  north,  sure  signs  of  something  big  at 
hand.  During  the  night  the  procession  never  paused. 
It  camped  by  day,  leaving  the  roads  em])ty  and  thus 
concealing  the  movement  from  aerial  observation. 

Before    daybreak    on   September    25th   the    Eleventh 


356      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Engineers  arrived  at  Vraincourt  and,  in  accordance  with 
orders,  remained  under  cover.  Vraincourt  liad  been 
selected  as  a  place  of  concealment  as  well  as  being  con- 
venient for  headquarters,  because  it  had  never  been 
shelled  systematically  and  was  believed  to  be  unknown 
to  the  Germans,  as  certain  captured  maps  did  not  show 
its  location.  This  proved  to  be  an  idle  empty  dream,  for 
Vraincourt  was  heavily  shelled  that  very  day.  Some  of 
the  Fourteenth  Engineers  were  quartered  in  the 
village  and  two  companies  of  the  Fifteenth  Engineers 
nearby. 

All  knew  that  the  battle  hour  was  not  far  away,  per- 
haps to  begin  that  night,  but  of  this  no  one  was  certain. 
At  11  P.  M.  there  were  some  sharp  artillery  exchanges, 
which  died  down  after  twenty  minutes.  At  2  A.  M.  on 
the  26th  there  was  heard  a  sudden  violent  roar.  After  ten 
minutes  with  no  sign  of  abatement,  it  was  evident  that 
the  zero  hour  was  passed  and  that,  what  might  be,  and 
in  reality  was,  the  greatest  battle  in  history  had  already 
opened.  It  did  not  take  me  long  to  dress  and  to  reach  the 
hilltop  behind  which  Vraincourt  had  received,  during 
nearly  four  years,  some  small  measure  of  protection.  It 
was  a  wonderfully  glorious  night.  Every  star  was  shin- 
ing brightly  in  the  crisp  cool  air  of  that  September  morn- 
ing, while  the  moon,  strong  in  its  third  quarter,  revealed 
all  the  features  of  the  scene.  Below,  running  east  and 
west  was  the  valley  of  La  Couzance,  a  tributary  of  the 
river  Aire  which,  after  picking  up  its  little  affluent  at  a 
short  distance  to  the  left,  continued  its  course  to  the 
north  into  the  territory  that  had  been  continuously  in 
German  hands  since  September,  1914.  Down  in  the  val- 
ley lay  a  dense  white  fog,  and  buried  in  that  fog  were 
some  large  French  naval  guns  on  railway  cars,  that  had 
been  run  into  place  during  the  immediately  preceding 
nights  and  covered  with  camouflage. 

On  the  slope  of  the  ridge  in  front  there  was  a  series 
of  constant  flashes,  looking  for  all  the  world  like  giant 


FINAL  PHASE  357 

fire-flies.  They  were  not  fire-flies  but  flashes  from  guns 
close  together,  row  on  row,  being  loaded  and  fired  with 
all  the  rapidity  that  modern  gun  mechanism  made  possi- 
ble. Although  directly  in  front  the  flashes  of  the  indi- 
vidual guns  could  be  seen,  one  began  to  lose  them  to  the 
right  and  left,  or  rather  they  began  to  blend  into  greater 
lights,  at  first  like  brilliant  sheets  of  so-called  summer 
lightning,  only  at  very  short  intervals.  Then  in  the 
farther  distances  these  sheets  themselves  blended  and 
the  sky  became  lurid  as  by  a  great  conflagration  with 
similar  throbbings  of  intensity.  In  the  valley  below 
the  naval  guns  were  being  fired  more  slowly,  and  as  each 
one  was  discharged,  though  the  flash  could  not  be  seen, 
an  area  of  the  fog  bank  turned  for  an  instant  red  and 
yellow.  Thousands  of  guns  over  miles  of  front  were  in 
action. 

The  noise  was  as  grand  and  as  awe-inspiring  as  the 
sight,  and  can  perhaps  be  best  compared  with  that  of  a 
wild  ocean  storm  pounding  on  a  gravel  beach.  There 
was  a  continuous  roar,  the  mingled  soimd  of  the  distant 
guns,  like  the  steady  roar  of  distant  surf.  On  this  back- 
ground of  sound  there  stood  out  the  separate  discharges 
of  the  nearby  guns,  with  the  deep-voiced  punctuations  of 
the  big  naval  pieces  dominating  all,  just  as  the  crash  of 
individual  waves  can  be  distinguished  above  the  confused 
din  of  the  storm.  It  was  a  sight  to  hold  one  for  an  hour 
spellbound ;  when  suddenly,  as  if  nature  herself  had  been 
aroused  to  jealousy  and  to  a  spirit  of  competition,  a  great 
white  meteor  drifted  slowly  and  silently  across  the  sky. 

I  went  down  to  the  valley  through  the  ruined  village 
of  Courcelles,  whose  broken,  jagged  walls  looked  like 
gaunt  spectres  in  the  moonlight.  A  sanitary  train  had 
taken  refuge  under  the  lea  of  a  kind  bank.  It  had  been 
ordered  to  take  post  in  the  village  but  the  commanding 
officer,  fearing  that  the  enemy  guns,  in  retaliation  for  the 
punishment  they  were  receiving,  might  select  the  village 


358      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRx\NCE 

for  one  of  their  targets,  had  stationed  his  train  just  out- 
side. The  enemy,  however,  was  too  busy  trying  to 
escape  the  fearful  deluge  of  shells  to  have  time  for  reply. 
In  the  valley  some  stragglers  inquired  how  to  find  their 
divisions,  an  ambulance  stopped  to  ask  for  the  sanitary 
train,  while  trucks  heavy  with  shells  to  feed  the  ever- 
hungry  guns  went  lumbering  by.  Orders  to  lengthen  the 
range  were  coming  by  telephone  to  the  naval  guns  from 
some  advanced  observation  point,  for  the  moment  had 
come  for  the  infantry  to  go  over  the  top. 

It  was  all  a  great  prelude  before  the  curtain  rose  for  the 
final  act.  Then  the  sky  began  to  turn  gray,  and  the  stars 
to  fade,  warnings  that  day  was  breaking  and  that  a 
return  to  camp  must  be  made  for  a  hurried  breakfast  so 
as  to  be  ready  to  execute  the  orders  already  received  as 
against  this  very  hour. 

The  work  of  the  army  engineer  troops  in  the  Argonne- 
Meuse  offensive  was  in  principle  similar  to  that  in  the 
St.  Mihiel  offensive,  but  on  a  larger  scale,  over  a  more 
extended  area  and  for  a  longer  time.  As  always  the 
great  demand  was  for  transportation  facilities.  In  the 
sector  over  which  the  American  part  of  the  offensive  was 
conducted  there  was  a  great  lack  of  railway  lines.  The 
character  of  the  topography  had  not  encouraged  construc- 
tion before  the  war  beyond  meeting  the  bare  local  neces- 
sities and  these  accommodations  even  if  in  the  best  of 
condition  were  absolutely  insufficient  for  the  present 
exigency.  There  was  the  main  line  running  east 
toward  Verdim,  parallel  with  and  just  behind  the  French 
battle  front  as  it  had  remained  stabilized.  This  was  the 
line  that  the  Germans  had  cut  by  shell  fire  and  rendered 
unusable  in  their  Verdun  attack  in  1916.  It  had  not  since 
then  been  put  into  operation.  The  American  engineers 
reopened  it,  however,  immediately  following  the  com- 
mencement of  the  American  offensive.  There  was  another 
double-track  railway  following  the  Meuse  north  from 


FINAL  PHASE  359 

Verduu  to  Sedan.  Tlie  latter  railway  existed  only  in 
name.  Crossing  as  it  did  the  field  of  the  intense  fighting 
in  1916  where  the  tide  of  victory  had  flowed  and  ebbed 
so  many  times,  especially  over  the  hill  known  as  Le  Mort 
Homme,  the  railway  was  found  to  be  in  a  condition  that 
required  complete  reconstruction  as  soon  as  the  enemy 
was  forced  back  sufficiently  to  permit  details  from  the 
Eleventh  and  Fifteenth  Engineers  to  undertake  it.  The 
roadbed  was  fullof  shell  holes,  bridges  were  down  and 
the  only  rails  left  in  place  were  broken  and  twisted, 
because  both  sides  in  turn  had  removed  rails  fit  to 
relay.  These  two  railways  were  the  only  standard  gauge 
lines  serving  the  field  of  the  Argonne-Meuse  offensive 
over  which  the  American  operations  were  to  be  con- 
ducted. The  latter  of  these  was  quite  out  of  service, 
while  the  former  had  but  one  main  track  connected  for 
running  and  was  without  yard  or  siding  facilities.  There 
was  no  other  existing  railway  in  front  of  the  Americans 
until  the  main  east  and  west  line  through  Sedan  was 
reached,  and  that  line  was  not  captured  from  the  enemy 
until  the  very  last  days  of  hostilities. 

The  Germans  had  made  up  for  their  own  deficiency 
by  constructing  a  fairly  complete  light  railway  system 
with  th6  60  cm.  gauge,  which  gave  them  all  the  facilities 
they  needed  for  the  transport  of  supplies  along  what  had 
been  an  inactive  front  since  the  French  counter-offensive 
in  front  of  Verdun  had  come  to  an  end  in  1916.  As  was 
usually  the  case,  the  German  light  railways  were  found 
to  be  in  excellent  condition  with  heavy  rails,  that  is, 
heavy  for  light  railways,  and  heavier  than  those  ordi- 
narily used  by  the  allies  for  similar  tracks,  with  good 
tics  and  a  sufficiency  of  ballast. 

The  Chief  Engineer  of  the  First  Army  decided  to  meet 
the  railway  shortage,  so  far  as  the  American  needs  were 
concerned,  by  reconstituting  the  Verdun-Aubroville  line 
with  its  access  to  St.  Dizier,  an  important  supply  base, 


360      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

to  construct  in  connection  with  it  additional  side-track 
capacity,  to  rebuild  the  Verdun-Sedan  line  as  fast  as  it 
was  recovered  from  the  enemy  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
build  a  new  standard  gauge  line  along  the  eastern  edge 
of  the  forest  of  the  Argonne  from  Aubreville,  following 
the  valley  of  the  Aire  through  Varennes  to  Apremont 
(not  to  be  confused  with  the  Apremont,  east  of  St. 
Mihiel),  where  it  was  expected  to  make  connection  with 
a  previously  existing  single-track  line  that  had  a  termi- 
nus there.  When,  however,  Apremont  was  reached  it 
was  found  that  the  Germans  had  rebuilt  the  stand- 
ard gauge  railway  into  one  with  a  gauge  of  60  cm.  The 
railway  was  pushed  through  to  Varennes,  the  place  where 
Louis  XVI  was  recognized  and  captured  on  his  flight 
from  Paris.  At  Varennes  an  extensive  rail-head  waa 
established  until  the  advance  had  progressed  sufficiently 
beyond  to  permit  the  extension  to  Apremont,  with  subse- 
quent reconstruction  to  Grand  Pre.  This  railway  became 
the  main  line  of  American  supply  on  the  west. 

The  light  railway  system  was  extended  as  the  front 
went  forward,  captured  German  lines  and  even  German 
rolling  stock  being  used.  Much  of  the  latter  the  enemy 
had  succeeded  in  withdrawing  at  least  to  the  limits  of  the 
light  railway  system,  but  the  tracks  as  a  general  thing- 
were  left  intact.  All  high  roads  were  in  bad  shape  and 
quite  insufficient  to  accommodate  the  enormous  traffic 
incident  to  the  huge  army  of  1,200,000  men. 

As  in  the  casei  of  railways,  the  best  location  for  high- 
ways had  been  in  the  valley  of  the  Aire.  Elsewhere 
Toutes  would  have  had  frequent  and  abrupt  changes  of 
gradients,  since  those  with  a  northerly  direction  ran 
across  and  not  with  the  deeply  marked  lines  of  natural 
drainage.  But  the  old  national  highway  through 
Varennes  was  impassable.  The  principal  bridges  had 
been  blown  up  or  damaged  by  shell  fire,  while  the  French 
liad  deliberately  fired  a  mine  in  an  'embankment  about 


FINAL  PHASE  361 

forty  feet  high  just  behind  their  front  line,  south  of 
Boureuilles,  completely  annihilating  it  and  digging  a 
great  crater  in  addition.  This  they  did  to  block  the  road 
against  a  possible  German  advance.  Curiously  enough 
the  Germans  did  precisely  the  same  thing  behind  their 
lines  but,  of  course,  like  the  French,  they  did  this  many 
months  before  any  offensive  was  even  contemplated. 
The  double  act  indicated  how  both  sides  on  this  front  had 
conceded  a  state  of  deadlock  to  exist  and,  having  aban- 
doned all  expectation  of  advance,  took  steps  to  hinder  a 
possible  advance  by  the  enemy  should  he  attempt  it. 

Until  a  standard  gauge  railway  could  be  built,  a 
task  necessarily  involving  considerable  time,  a  time  that 
was  not  shortened  nor  the  task  made  lighter  by  the  heavy 
rains,  the  Varennes  highway  was  the  only  artery  over 
which  troops  could  move,  the  long  trains  of  guns,  ammu- 
nition, food  and  supplies  of  all  sorts  go  up  and  the 
endless  procession  of  ambulances  come  back.  Tem- 
porary detours  around  the  craters  were  constructed  until 
a  detachment  of  French  bridge  engineers  with  their  well 
equipped  field  mobile  plant  could  bridge  first  the  greater 
gap  and  afterward  the  smaller  one.  As  the  major  one 
of  these  detours  or  run-arounds  had  steep  gradients 
which  were  not  metalled,  the  heavy  trucks  with  their 
loads  of  ammunition  soon  dug  deep  ruts,  in  the  soft  mud 
of  the  temporary  road,  that  called  for  a  superhuman 
effort  to  get  traffic  through  at  all.  There  were  times 
when  the  road  was  blocked  with  two  lines  of  vehicles  for 
miles,  and  everyone  was  in  constant  dread  that  the  Ger- 
mans would  shell  it.  They  could  easily  have  done  so, 
but  for  some  unknown  reason  did  not.  Finally  some  of 
the  Twenty-third  Regiment  and  other  engineers  of  the 
road  service  department  succeeded  in  getting  the  obsta- 
cles removed  and  the  traflic  moving  as  freely  as  battle 
conditions  permitted. 

Such  offensives  as  that  of  St.  Mihiel  and,  to  a  greater 


362      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

degree,  tliat  of  the  Argonne-Meuse  on  acooimt  of  its 
longer  maintained  advance,  made  strenuous  demands 
on  the  Water  Supply  Troops  who  had  to  keep  up  with 
the  advance.  The  Germans  had  a  well  established  sys- 
tem of  their  own  which,  fortunately,  they  could  not,  or  at 
least  did  not,  destroy  as  they  fell  back.  While  the  supply 
was  sufficient  for  their  own  consumption,  it  was  not  so 
for  a  force  many  fold  greater.  In  the  St.  Mihiel  offen- 
sive the  Water  Supply  Regiment  prepared  in  advance 
seven  pumping  plants,  twelve  reservoirs  or  tanks,  instal- 
lations for  filling  carts  and  collected  25,000  feet  of  piping 
for  the  laying  of  new  lines.  As  the  attacking  troops 
went  forward  the  Water  Supply  Engineers  followed 
close  on  their  heels,  rendering  available  the  local  sources 
of  supply,  setting  up  the  canvas  reservoirs  to  receive 
water  hauled  forward  by  motor  tanks  until  permanent 
water  points  were  established,  converting  three  captured 
German  installations  to  American  use  and  locating  ani- 
mal water  points  with  the  necessary  troughs.  To  assure 
purity  of  supply  while  examinations  were  made,  two 
sterilizing  installations  with  connected  storage  tanks 
were  operated  in  addition  to  five  mobile  purification 
plants  on  motor  trucks.  During  the  first  six  days  of  the 
offensive,  over  and  above  the  water  obtained  from  wells 
and  local  sources,  250,000  gallons  of  water  were  delivered 
by  motor  trucks  besides  a  large  but  unrecorded  amount 
hauled  in  light  railway  tank  cars,  holding  2,000  gallons 
each. 

For  the  Argonne-Meuse  offensive  the  previous  prepa- 
rations were  similar,  including  the  assembling  of  com- 
plete outfits  of  pumps,  reservoirs  and  sterilizing  plants. 
Lnmediately  after  the  attack  was  begun,  steps  were  taken 
quite  like  those  of  St.  Mihiel.  At  first  hand  pumps 
were  installed  by  means  of  which  the  portable  canvas 
reservoirs  were  filled,  whence  water  was  carried  for- 
ward and  distributed  by  the  ever-useful  motor  truck. 
Finally,  the  permanent  erections  were  accomplished  to 


FINAL  PHASE  363 

the  number  of  no  less  than  seven  gravity  and  thirty-one 
pumping  stations,  exclusive  of  many  water  stations  for 
standard  gauge  and  light  railways  and  all  in  addition 
to  the  existing  sources  of  supply  found  and  captured. 

On  November  10th  the  First  Army,  A.  E.  F.,  had 
reached  Sedan,  had  swept  the  enemy  from  the  valley  of 
the  Meuse  and  back  to  the  northern  frontier  of  France. 
The  Second  Army  was  on  the  point  of  attacking  through 
Alsace  when  at  5  A.  M.,  November  11th,  the  Aimistice 
was  signed  and  orders  were  flashed  along  the  whole  line 
to  cease  firing  at  11  o'clock.  Hostilities  had  at  last  come 
to  an  end.  The  problem  that  faced  the  engineers  nine- 
teen months  earlier  had  been  solved.  An  army  of 
2,000,000  men  had  been  transported  overseas,  the  rail- 
ways and  roads,  ports  and  wharves,  storage  yards  and 
depots  had  been  constructed,  and  the  correlated  services 
for  water  supply,  motor  transport,  camouflage,  mapping, 
chemical  warfare  and  the  more  delicate  operation  of 
range  finding  had  been  organized,  while  trenches  had 
been  excavated  and  dugouts  driven.  It  was  a  great  work. 
Mistakes,  of  course,  had  been  committed,  but  they  had 
been  made  unavoidably  and  pardonably.  There  remained 
an  accomplishment  of  which  the  members  of  the  profes- 
sion of  engineering  and  the  people  of  the  country  may 
well  be  proud.  From  a  small  handful  of  trained  military 
engineers  there  had  grown  a  tremendous  army  of  engi- 
neers with  experience  in  every  field  of  applied  science. 
The  details  of  the  problems  that  were  presented  to  them 
were  new,  the  task  as  a  whole  was  stupendous,  but  in 
sotting  out  to  solve  the  former  and  to  accomplish  the  lat- 
ter, tliey  took  for  their  guiding  spirit  the  motto  of  the 
Corps  of  Engineers  which  had  been  handed  down  from 
that  eminent  French  engineer  officer,  the  founder  of  the 
corps,  Major  L 'Enfant,  a  motto  denoting  a  modest  con- 
fidence that  is  based  on  hope  witli  a  determination  that 
knows  no  fear  — 

*'  ESSAYONS  " 


CHAPTER  XXV 

ORGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS  IN  THE  FIELD 

The  organization  of  engineer  troops,  their  control  and 
the  assignment  to  them  of  duties  varied  considerably  in 
the  three  principal  allied  armies.  The  best  illustration 
of  this  difference  in  practice  is  perhaps  in  the  case  of 
troops  engaged  in  the  work  of  transportation,  the  larg- 
est and  the  most  important  tield  of  engineer  activity. 
The  principles,  underlying  the  composition,  organization 
and  equipment  of  railway  troops,  in  force  in  the  armies 
of  the  United  States,  France  and  Great  Britain  are 
typical  of  the  principles  adopted  for  other  special  engi- 
neer troops.  As  military  engineering  is  now  a  matter  of 
broad  civil  engineering,  the  question  naturally  follows 
whether  some  of  the  principles  on  which  the  special 
troops  have  been  organized  do  not  find  application  to  all 
engineer  units  in  the  army  of  the  United  States.  Here- 
tofore the  army  has  not  recognized  the  close  connection 
between  many  of  the  engineering  features  of  civil  and 
military  practice  to  the  same  extent  as  did  the  armies 
of  some  foreign  countries. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  August,  1914,  the  British 
organization  of  railway  troops  consisted  of  only  two  com- 
panies of  Royal  Engineers,  out  of  whom  and  on  whom 
had  been  built  the  large  and  complex  transportation 
structure  that  existed  when  the  war  was  ended,  an 
organization  that  finally  included  more  than  100,000  men. 
One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  the  British  General  Staff 
toward  the  creation  of  a  special  railway  corps  was  to 
accept  an  offer  made  by  the  Canadian  Pacific  Railway 
Company  to  furnish  a  detachment  called  the  Canadian 

364 


ORGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    365 

Railway  Overseas  Construction  Corps,  which  consisted 
of  two  companies  under  the  command  of  a  major,  every 
man  in  it  being  carefully  selected.  So  satisfactory  was 
the  work  of  this  corps  that  further  calls  were  made  on 
Canada  to  send  more  such  men  to  meet  the  ever  increas- 
ing railway  needs.  The  British  set  a  high  value  on  these 
Canadian  railway  troops  because  they  believed  that 
the  standards  of  the  rapid  and  temporary  character  of 
railway  construction  as  used  in  western  Canada  more 
closely  approximated  war  conditions  than  the  thorough, 
elaborate  and  permanent  standards  of  Great  Britain. 
This  experience  of  the  Canadians  proved  to  be  particu- 
larly valuable.  The  Canadian  troops  were  organized 
in  conformity  with  British  infantry  regulations  on  the 
basis  of  battalions,  each  battalion  consisting  of  thirty- 
four  officers,  sixty-one  warrant  and  non-commissioned 
ofScers,  and  1,010  men,  a  total  of  1,105  of  all  ranks. 
These  battalions  were  sent  overseas  with  an  equipment 
extensive  in  character  and  elaborate  in  detail,  and  were 
completely  self-sustained  units  capable  of  undertaking 
railway  construction  of  any  kind  and  on  any  scale.  Their 
equipment,  in  addition  to  a  very  generous  supply  of 
small  tools,  included  wheel  and  drag  scrapers,  road- 
grading  machines  and  grading  plows,  large  and  small 
motor  trucks,  horse-drawn  wagons,  surveying  and  tele- 
phone outfits  and  in  some  cases  track  laying  trains  and 
steam  pile  drivers. 

The  Royal  Engineer  unit  in  the  British  army  was  a  com- 
pany consisting  of  six  officers  and  250  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men.  Originally  the  companies  were  under  the 
command  of  two  captains,  one  of  whom  had  charge  of  all 
matters  of  administration  and  the  other  of  work.  It  was 
finally  found  desirable  to  assign  to  the  first-named  duty 
an  officer  with  the  rank  of  major,  so  as  to  insure  one  of 
more  years  with  corresponding  experience  and  judgment. 
These  companies  ^hen  engaged  on  railway  work  were 
furaished  with  a  supply  of  all  the  necessary  small  toola 


S66      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

but  had  no  surveying  outfit,  nor  were  they  equipped  to 
undertake  heavy  construction.  So  far  as  possible  they 
were  permanently  quartered  in  railway  cars  which  were 
moved  from  place  to  place  as  needed,  thus  giving  to 
each  unit  the  maximum  of  mobility.  The  personnel  of 
these  companies  was  carefully  selected  and  consisted  of 
representatives  of  the  various  skilled  trades  likely  to  be 
used  in  any  form  of  railway  construction,  such  as  track- 
men, bridgemen,  masons,  machinists,  etc.  For  what  is 
known  as  common  labor  they  depended  on  having  unem- 
ployed infantry  units,  or  special  service  or  labor  bat- 
talions attached  to  them.  Equipped,  as  above  stated, 
with  all  the  necessary  small  tools,  they  drew  on  some 
central  depot  for  large  machine  tools  such  as  pile 
drivers,  steam  shovels,  derricks,  or  grading  machines  if 
needed.  Although  they  worked  side  by  side  with  the 
more  fully  equipped  Canadian  battalions,  it  was  the  cus- 
tom to  leave  to  the  latter  all  work  of  a  heavy  character, 
the  British  Royal  Engineer  companies  doing  the  lighter 
work  that  was  more  easily  handled  by  a  mobile  unit. 
The  whole  theory  in  the  British  army  was  that  the  Royal 
Engineer  companies  were  not  organized  to  plan  or  lay 
out  work  but  were  intended  for  execution  only. 

The  planning  and  the  laying  out  of  work  was  done 
under  the  direction  of  a  regional  engineer  called  a  Rail- 
way Construction  Engineer,  or  R.  C.  E.  as  he  was  always 
known.  He  had  under  him  Assistant  R.  C.  E.'s  in  charge 
of  districts,  each  assistant  with  the  necessary  survey 
units,  and  the  engineer  companies  reported  to  them  for 
work  orders  only.  The  Construction  Engineer  had  noth- 
ing to  do  with  any  question  of  the  internal  administra- 
tion of  the  companies.  The  R.  C.  E.,  whose  region  of 
control  was  approximately  that  of  an  army,  m  turn 
reported  to  the  Chief  Railway  Construction  Engineer 
(C.  R.  C.  E.),  a  departmental  officer  on  the  staff  of  the 
Director  General  of  Transportation. 


OEGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    367 

During  the  first  two  years  of  the  war  it  is  rather  curi- 
ous to  note,  as  an  instance  of  the  existence  of  the  com- 
posite character  of  the  British  army,  that  the  Canadian 
troops  and  the  Royal  Engineers  reported  to  quite  sepa- 
rate authorities.  The  former  had  their  own  Brigadier- 
General  commanding,  while  the  Royal  Engineers  were 
all  under  the  Chief  Railway  Construction  Engineer. 
Before  the  war  closed  this  anomalous  system  was  sim- 
plified by  creating  a  Director  of  Construction,  through 
whom  all  these  troops  received  their  orders,  including 
those  engaged  in  the  construction  of  light  railways. 
The  Chief  Railway  Construction  Engineer,  and  subse- 
quently the  Director  of  Construction,  had  jurisdiction 
over  all  matters  of  construction  whether  within  or  with- 
out the  zone  of  the  armies,  in  accordance  with  the  basic 
principle  of  the  organization  of  the  department  of  trans- 
portation. This  centralized  control  of  railway  construc- 
tion the  British  found  worked  well  and  was  preferable 
to  allowing  each  army  to  do  its  own  work  separately. 
They  believed  that  the  unification  thus  obtained  obviated 
any  possibly  injurious  competitive  struggle  between  two 
zealous  army  commanders  for  the  necessarily  limited 
supply  of  men  and  materiel. 

Besides  the  railway  construction  personnel  the  Chief 
of  Railway  Construction  Engineer  also  had  control  of 
the  large  and  small  tools  and  supplies  such  as  rails. 
Under  him  were  pooled  the  men  and  equipment  thus  ren- 
dered available  for  use  at  any  point.  He  had  his  main 
depots  for  tools  and  materiel  upon  which  he  could  draw 
to  meet  any  emergency  or  to  make  good  deficiencies.  In 
addition  to  the  base  depots  there  were  the  smaller  dumps 
under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  several  Railway  Construc- 
tion Engineers. 

In  the  French  army  there  was  an  organization  of  rail- 
way troops  that  had  been  in  existence  for  some  years 
before  the  war.    The  French  General  Staff  realized,  to 


3G8      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

some  extent  more  than  the  British  did,  the  important 
part  that  transportation  would  play  in  a  future  war, 
although  their  estimate  failed  to  fully  measure  the  situ- 
ation as  it  actually  developed.  The  French  had,  as  has 
been  explained  before,  one  advantage  over  the  two  asso- 
ciated armies  in  that  they  were  operating  in  their  own 
country  and  in  connection  with  their  established  railway 
systems  which  carried  the  burden  of  their  separate 
administration.  Practically  speaking,  from  a  military 
construction  point  of  view,  there  were  for  the  French  no 
lines  of  communication. 

As  part  of  the  regular  establishment  during  times  of 
peace  there  had  existed  a  regiment  of  railway  troops 
known  as  the  Fifth  Regiment  of  Engineers,  or  as  they 
were  called  in  French,  '^  Sapeurs  de  Chemins  de  Fer." 
This  regiment  under  the  command  of  a  colonel  was 
really  a  training  corps.  The  course  of  instruction 
extended  over  a  year.  In  addition  to  their  military 
duties,  the  officers  and  men  were  instructed  in  surveying 
and  all  the  details  of  military  railway  construction  and 
operation,  including  track,  bridges,  buildings,  rolling 
stock,  water  supply,  and  telegraph  and  telephone  lines. 

The  instruction  was  thorough  and  practical,  the  Gov- 
ernment availing  itself  of  its  ownership  of  the  state  rail- 
way attached  both  the  officers  and  men  to  the  staff  of 
that  railway  during  a  part  of  the  school  year.  Connected 
with  and  working  alongside  of  the  Fifth  Engineers  was 
the  Ecole  de  Chemins  de  Fer,  with  a  central  office  at 
Versailles  and  a  large  park  for  the  storage  of  materiel 
located  near  there.  This  school  was  a  permanent  estab- 
lishment and  continued  to  function  during  the  war,  as  it 
was  charged  with  the  collection  and  keeping  of  all  rail- 
way materiel,  the  administration  of  repair  shops,  the 
organization  of  technical  bureaus,  methods  of  instruc- 
tion, and  all  matters  of  personnel. 

The  peace  footing  of  the  Fifth  Engineers  consisted  of 


OEGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    369 

nineteen  construction  companies,  one  supply  company 
and  one  company  of  drivers  for  both  horse-drawn 
wagons  and  motors.  Each  company  was  composed  of 
six  ofifieers,  two  captains  and  four  lieutenants,  with  200 
men.  Of  these  nineteen  companies,  sixteen  were  sta- 
tioned with  headquarters  at  Versailles  for  purposes  of 
instruction,  and  three  were  territorial  companies  located 
in  the  French  colony  of  Morocco.  The  total  peace  foot- 
ing of  railway  troojDs  was,  therefore,  including  the  head- 
quarters staff,  126  officers  and  4,200  men.  This  was 
a  considerably  more  numerous  and  highly  trained  organ- 
ization than  the  similar  corps  with  the  British  army  and 
one  that  provided  an  excellent  foundation  on  which  to 
build  a  complete  war  organization,  especially  as  the  men 
had  been  so  thoroughly  trained. 

The  administrative  functions  of  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  Fifth  Engineers  changed  immediately  on 
the  commencement  of  the  war.  As  an  officer  of  instruc- 
tion his  duties  obviously  ceased.  The  companies  of  his 
regiment  were  at  once  scattered  and  attached  to  other 
officers  for  work,  over  which  work  he  exercised  no  control. 
His  duties  were  limited  practically  to  matters  of  dis- 
cipline in  the  so-called  regiment  and  to  certain  questions 
of  personnel.  Although  the  regimental  organization 
remained  in  nominal  existence,  it  had  ceased  to  function. 
To  all  practical  purposes  the  French  adopted  the  separate 
company  system  exactly  the  same  as  the  British,  as  each 
company  was  a  distinct  entity  so  far  as  its  internal 
administration  was  concerned.  The  regimental  form  of 
organization  of  the  regiment  was  a  highly  convenient 
arrangement  for  administrative  purposes  during  peace, 
but  the  French  contemplated  dropping  it  and  actually  did 
so  during  the  period  of  hostilities,  when  something  more 
elastic  was  needed,  reverting  to  it  when  the  emergency 
had  passed. 

Attached  to  the  Ministry  of  Public  Works  was  a  gen- 


370      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

eral  officer  with  the  title  of  Directeur  General  de  Trans- 
port Militaire,  which  for  convenience  was  abbreviated  to 
its  initial  letters  — D.  G.  T.  M.  On  the  staff  of  each 
army  commander  there  was  an  officer,  usually  of  the  rank 
of  Colonel,  to  whom  was  given  the  title  of  Directeur  de 
Transport  Militaire  de  I'Armee  (D.  T.  M.  A.).  This 
officer  ascertained  the  army  needs,  prepared  the  general 
plans,  and  submitted  them  to  his  superior,  the  Directeur 
General  for  approval  and  execution.  The  latter  was 
charged,  therefore,  both  in  theory  and  practice,  with 
great  powers  and  responsibility.  He  not  only  had  under 
his  orders  all  the  railway  troops  but,  during  the  period 
of  the  war,  the  plant  of  the  school  at  Versailles,  and  he 
exercised  authority  through  the  Minister  of  Public 
Works  over  all  the  commercial  railway  systems  of 
France. 

One  thing  which  stood  out  in  the  equipping  of  these 
special  troops  was  the  work  trains  coraposed  both  of  mo- 
tor trucks  and  railway  cars.  These  work  trains  possessed 
the  quality  of  mobility  in  the  greatest  measure.  So 
excellent  were  they  that  the  British  copied  them.  The 
motor  truck  trains  consisted  of  three  vehicles.  The  first 
vehicle  was  a  motor  truck  and  tractor  combined,  contain- 
ing the  machine  and  hand  tools  for  both  metal  and  wood 
workers,  engaged  in  the  various  trades  of  fitters,  black- 
smiths, miners,  boiler  makers  and  carpenters,  and  with 
tools  for  the  cutting  of  rails  either  hot  or  cold.  The  sec- 
ond vehicle  was  designed  for  the  conveyance  of  work- 
men with  the  necessary  hand  tools  for  track  grading 
stored  beneath  the  seats.  The  third  vehicle  was  equipped 
with  an  electric  generating  three-kilowatt  set  of  200 
yolts,  with  electric  drills  for  both  wood  and  mefeal 
workers  and  a  lighting  plant.  These  motor  trucks  were 
exceedingly  mobile  and  could  be  run  from  point  to  point 
with  great  convenience.  They  contained  everything  both 
in  the  way  of  tools  and  men  that  might  be  necessary  for 


ORGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    371 

the  repairs  of  lines  abandoned  by  the  enemy,  or  work  of 
a  temporary  character  preceding  the  more  permanent 
reestablishment  of  the  track. 

The  work  trains  of  standard  gauge  railway  cars  were 
of  two  kinds,  the  ''  Pares  sur  Rails  "  according  to  the 
French  official  designation  and  the  train  work  shop  or 
''  Train  Atelier."  One  Pare  train  was  supposed  to  be 
attached  to  every  company  of  railway  troops  and  formed 
their  park  of  heavy  tools  and  materials.  It  consisted  of 
seven  cars  which  contained: 

a.  Tools  for  various  mechanical  trades,   carpenters, 

tinsmiths  and  plumbers,  lumbermen,  telegraph 
and  telephone  lineman,  tracklayers,  masons, 
miners,  blacksmiths  and  litters. 

b.  Lighting  plant. 

c.  Transport  vehicles,  wagons,  mooter  trucks  and  rail- 

way inspection  cars. 

d.  Explosives. 

e.  Ejector  pump. 

f.  Steam  pile  driver. 

g.  Derrick. 

h.  Lifting  tools,  blocks,  tackles,  jacks,  etc. 

i.  Switch  apparatus. 

j.  Trestle  timbers  and  irons. 

k.  Small  boat. 

i.  Library  and  drawing  equipment. 

With  such  a  train,  capable  of  being  easily  moved,  a 
company  of  skilled  mechanics  assisted  by  service  bat- 
talions could  execute  almost  any  work. 

The  work  shop  trains  were  more  elaborate  installa- 
tions, intended  to  make  up  for  the  lack  of  industrial 
machine  shops  existing  in  the  devastated  regions  at  the 
front,  one  train  being  assigned  to  a  group  of  companies. 
A  force  as  large  as  several  companies  combined  and  with 
the  aid  of  a  Train  Atelier,  could  execute  very  heavy 
reconstruction,  including  that  of  large  bridge  trusses. 


372      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

These  trains  were  composed  of  nine  cars,  one  containing 
electric  generating  sets  to  produce  power  for  operating 
the  tools,  two  others  were  equipped  with  large  machine 
tools,  one  contained  a  forge  and  foundry,  and  another 
wood-working  tools,  one  held  material,  one  served  for 
an  office,  while  two  were  devoted  to  tools  and  supplies 
for  pneumatic  rivetting.  The  only  equipment  that  could 
compare  in  completeness  and  efficiency  with  these  Pares 
and  Ateliers  were  similar  German  trains. 

The  French,  and  the  British  to  some  extent,  did  not 
limit  mobility  to  the  working  force,  but  extended  the 
benefits  of  it  to  the  regional  officers.  Each  Director  of 
Army  Transportation  (D.  T.  M.  A.)  of  the  French  serv- 
ice was  housed  permanently  in  exceedingly  well 
appointed  trains,  in  which  were  not  only  lodging  and 
boarding  accommodations  for  himself  and  staff,  but 
designing  and  clerical  offices.  These  trains  were  moved 
from  place  to  place,  so  that  fhe  Transportation  Officer 
could  be  in  close  contact  with  the  operations  that  were 
most  important  at  the  moment.  On  the  train  was  a  tele- 
phone exchange  and  a  generous  supply  of  wire  and  field 
equipment,  so  that  after  a  train  took  a  new  station  the 
D.  T.  M.  A.  was  put  in  direct  touch  with  headquarters 
and  other  points. 

The  motor  trucks  were  supplemental  to  the  railway 
trains.  In  the  case  of  an  advance  the  motor  trucks  could 
go  beyond  the  rail-heads  and  make  the  first  repairs  or 
track  restoration,  j)ermitting  the  heavier  railway  trains 
to  follow  and  establish  a  permanent  way.  In  addition 
to  these  trains,  the  French  had  on  hand  in  the  school  at 
Versailles  a  very  complete  collection  of  machine  tools  of 
all  kinds,  consisting  of  grading  and  track-laying  trains, 
excavators,  electrical  screw-spiking  machines  to  drive 
the  French  screw  spikes,  drilling  sets  to  drill  spiking 
holes  in  wood  ties,  light  manual  cranes  for  the  handling 
of  rails,  portable  field  electrical  light  plants  for  work  at 


ORGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    373 

night  where  not  exposed  to  direct  enemy  fire,  mobile  and 
semi-mobile  steam  engines,  pile  drivers,  compressed  air 
outfits,  cable  conveyors,  concrete  mixers,  all  the  plants 
necessary  for  water  supply  and  drainage,  including  well- 
boring  outfits,  a  very  complete  supply  of  various  types 
of  bridges  from  rolled  beams  to  girders  for  various 
lengths  of  spans  to  as  great  as  forty-eight  meters,  ties, 
timbers  of  various  dimensions,  and  rails  with  their 
fastenings. 

The  railway  section  of  the  French  army  was  an 
organization  well  conceived,  thoroughly  trained  and  com- 
pletely equipped.  It  had  a  complement  of  officers  who 
were  masters  of  railway  construction  and  operation, 
under  whose  leadership  great  results  were  achieved  with 
the  maximum  of  expedition  and  the  minimum  of  friction. 
The  French  system  of  organization  and  equipment  is  one 
deserving  close  study  by  our  own  authorities,  if  the  les- 
sons of  the  war  are  to  be  taken  to  heart. 

The  American  system  of  special  troops  differed 
radically  from  either  the  British  or  the  French  system. 
"When  the  United  States  entered  the  war,  there  were  two 
regiments  of  engineers  actually  organized,  with  five 
others  authorized  and  in  a  more  or  less  advanced  state  of 
development.  These  troops  were  intended  for  general 
militaiy  engineer  work  so  that  there  was  nothing  in 
existence  comparable  with  the  French  Fifth  Engineers, 
or  capable  of  executing  undertakings  calling  for  special- 
ized technical  skill.  The  first  step  towards  raising  such 
units  was  in  the  call  for  volunteers  for  the  original  nine 
engineer  regiments,  intended  primarily  for  railway  con- 
struction, maintenance  and  operation.  These  regiments 
were  followed  in  quick  succession  by  others  for  water 
supply,  forestry,  roads,  mapping,  and  the  other  fields 
of  engineering,  as  well  as  for  assignment  with  divisions 
as  sappers.  The  manner  in  which  these  regiments  dif- 
fered from  corresponding  units  in  either  of  the  other 


374      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

armies  was  in  size.  In  their  first  constitution  the  Tables 
of  Organization  for  Engineer  Troops  were  followed, which 
called  for  thirty-three  officers  and  1,038  men,  or  a  grand 
total  of  1,071.  Subsequently  the  Tables  of  Organization 
were  changed  and  an  engineer  regiment  on  a  war  estab- 
lishment was  fixed  at  a  total  of  1,700  officers  and  men, 
consisting  of  fifty-four  commissioned  officers  and  1,646 
of  other  ranks.  In  actual  practice  it  was  an  exceedingly 
rare  occurrence  when  any  one  engineer  regiment,  except 
the  engineers  attached  to  a  division,  worked  together  as 
a  unit.  The  experience  of  other  engineer  regiments,  cer- 
tainly of  every  one  working  in  the  advanced  area,  was 
that  the  component  parts  were  separated,  sometimes 
very  widely.  Not  infrequently  they  were  detached  from 
the  command  of  their  own  regimental  commanding  officer 
and  assigned  to  the  temporary  command  of  others. 

The  analysis  of  the  make-up  of  an  engineer  regi- 
ment shows  that  out  of  the  fifty-four  officers  eighteen  of 
them  were  attached  to  regimental  and  battalion  head- 
quarters, and  out  of  the  1,646  men  116  served  under  simi- 
lar assignment.  That  is  to  say,  while  thirty-six  officers 
were  serving  with  their  companies,  no  less  than  eighteen, 
or  half  as  many,  were  with  headquarters.  Of  the  men 
7.6  per  cent  were  in  the  category  of  what  would  be 
termed  in  civil  life,  overhead  expense. 

Such  a  heavy  proportion  of  officers  and  men  in  non- 
productive capacity  involved  in  the  first  place  a  waste 
of  man  power  and  in  the  second,  inefficiency.  An  Ameri- 
can engineer  regiment  was  supposed  to  b6  a  complete 
entity.  So  it  should  be  and  was  when  used  as  a  division 
unit.  Consequently,  in  accordance  with  the  official  estab- 
lishment, it  had  among  other  sections  a  topographical 
officer  with  all  the  necessary  surveying  instruments  and 
men  to  handle  them.  Commanding  officers  of  regiments 
were,  therefore,  expected  or  required  to  do  the  surveying 
for,  and  detailed  planning  of,  work  entrusted  to  them  for 


ORGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    375 

execution.  But  it  usually  happened  that  the  headquar- 
ters of  a  regiment  moving  with  a  part  of  a  regiment 
assigned  to  some  particular  piece  of  construction,  would 
generally  arrive  on  the  very  eve  of  the  undertaking. 
The  commanding  officer  would  in  such  case  have  to  make 
his  own  studies,  without  jDrevious  investigation  or 
information,  instead  of  devoting  his  time  and  the  energy 
of  his  men  to  the  carrying  out  of  plans  already  digested. 
The  result  was  frequently  lack  of  proper  preliminary 
examination  and  consequently  inefficiency  in  execution. 

With  the  French  and  British  systems  all  this  was 
entirely  obviated.  There  was  no  waste  through  high 
ranking  officers  in  regimental  headquarters  being  par- 
tially unemployed,  because  each  company,  the  work  unit, 
had  only  the  minimum  number  of  officers  necessary, 
wliile  officers  of  more  advanced  standing  served  on 
regional  or  army  detail.  There  was  no  lack  in  efficiency 
or  uncertainty  as  to  the  details  of  the  work,  because  the 
regional  officers  wore  fully  instructed  prior  to  the  com- 
mencement of  any  great  movement  as  to  the  general 
1^1  ans  of  the  higher  command.  They  made  their  surveys, 
drew  up  their  detailed  plans,  had  them  approved  by 
their  superior  officers,  thus  insuring  coordination,  filed 
their  requisitions  for  their  necessary  materiel  and  men, 
and  were  quite  ready  for  the  actual  doing  of  the  work 
when  the  moment  arrived.  Under  such  a  system  all  that 
the  individual  and  separate  companies  of  engineers 
would  have  to  do  would  be  to  report  at  the  very  last 
moment.  The  officers  in  command  of  those  companies 
would  then  be  given  the  plans  and  orders  that  they  were 
to  carr}"  out.  Friction,  loss  of  time  and  uncertainty 
were  avoided. 

The  lack  of  any  practical  value  in  or  the  reason  for 
the  size  of  an  engineer  regiment  being  fixed  at  a  total 
of  1,700  officers  and  men  soon  became  a])pnrent  to  the 
American   military   authorities.     In    several   instances 


376      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

regiments  were  organized  that  differed  widely  from  this 
establishment.  The  forestry  regiment,  for  instance,  as 
has  been  stated,  included  about  20,000  officers  and  men, 
the  Nineteenth  Engineers,  one  of  the  original  nine, 
organized  on  the  basis  of  thirty-three  officers  and  1,038 
men  with  two  battalions  and  six  companies,  finally  grew 
into  a  unit  of  five  battalions  and  fifteen  companies, 
containing  about  3,600  men.  Other  regiments,  notably 
the  Twenty-third  and  Twenty-ninth  Engineers,  were  also 
expanded,  retaining  the  regimental  number  and  the  regi- 
mental organization  for  purposes  of  administration  only. 

The  above  is  not  written  in  any  spirit  of  criticism  of 
what  was  done.  When  the  United  States  declared  war 
it  had  a  very  small  army  with  no  provision  to  meet  the 
demands  of  a  modem  war.  For  the  moment  there  was 
nothing  else  to  do  but  to  follow  the  standards  then  in 
force,  and  to  modify  them  later  when  and  how  experience 
dictated.  Radical  changes  were  introduced.  More  would 
have  followed  had  war  continued.  What  the  author 
wishes  to  emphasize  is  how  it  seems  to  him  that  engi- 
neers should  be  organized  both  in  peace  and  war.  As  the 
result  of  two  years'  experience  in  active  service,  the 
author  is  of  the  belief  that  if  the  lessons  of  the  war  are 
to  be  learned  and  profit  to  be  derived  from  them,  provi- 
sion should  be  made  in  the  permanent  establishment  of 
the  army  for  the  practical  training  of  officers  and,  if  pos- 
sible, some  men  in  all  the  applications  of  engineering 
science,  not  merely  in  those  few  branches  that  only 
recently  were  considered  'as  embracing  military  engi- 
neering. He  further  urges  that  the  company  rather  than 
the  regiment  should  be  the  unit  of  strength. 

The  organization  of  the  French  Fifth  Engineers  might 
well  be  taken  as  a  type  convenient  for  American  needs 
in  peace.  During  such  time  the  usual  regimental  organi- 
zation would  be  very  convenient,  providing  as  it  does  for 
an  officer  of  years  and  experience  to  be  at  the  head,  one 
capable  of  seeing  that  the  officers  and  men  under  him  are 


ORGANIZATION  OF  ENGINEER  TROOPS    377 

properly  trained  in  their  respective  specialties.  But 
should  war  again  break  out,  for  the  possibility  of  war  is 
always  present,  it  is  urged  that  the  operation  of  engi- 
neering work  in  the  field  would  best  be  entrusted  to  a 
series  of  regional  engineers  reporting  either  to  the 
respective  army  commanders,  or  to  some  single  author- 
ity with  jurisdiction  over  the  whole  theatre  of  operations, 
whether  in  the  Zone  of  the  Advance  or  of  the  Rear. 
These  engineers  should  be  men  of  experience  and 
matured  judgment,  which  means  that  the  posts  should  be 
filled  with  officers  who  would  ordinarily  have  the  rank 
of  Lieutenant-Colonel  or  higher.  To  them  the  necessary 
surveying  and  designing  staffs  would,  of  course,  be 
attached.  On  them  should  fall  the  burden  of  preparing 
all  the  'detailed  plans  for  whatever  work  is  to  be  done, 
and  so  insure  coordination.  The  units  of  the  engineer 
troops  should  be  the  company  and  not  the  regiment,  with 
the  company  commanded  by  an  officer  holding  the  rank 
of  major,  whose  duties  would  be  those  of  administration. 

As  to  the  size  of  these  companies,  for  ordinary  con- 
struction purposes  in  war,  the  limit  of  250  men  would 
seem  to  be  well  adapted,  although  for  work  in  which 
specialists  and  experienced  mechanics  are  needed,  a  com- 
pany with  one-half  the  size  would  probably  be  sufficient. 
These  small  companies  should  be  housed  either  in  trains 
or  in  motor  vehicles,  or  so  equipped  as  to  be  moved 
readily  and  quickly  to  whatever  point  their  services 
might  be  needed.  Such  men  would  take  care  of  all  work 
that  required  special  teclmical  skill,  the  heavy  labor 
being  performed  by  specially  organized  but  imskilled 
service  battalions. 

The  same  method  of  organization  might  also  apply 
to  division  troops.  There  does  not  seem  to  be  any  par- 
ticular reason  why  a  fixed  number  of  engineers  should 
be  assigned  to  every  division.  Some  divisions  require 
more  than  others.  If  the  engineers  were  organized  into 
companies,  as  many  companies  could  be  assigned  to  a 


378      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

division  as  there  were  engineers  available  or  as  the  work 
of  the  division  required  from  time  to  time.  If  the  com- 
pany and  not  the  regiment  were  the  nnit,  the  division 
engineer  would  be  an  officer  on  the  staff  of  the  division 
commander  and  ex  officio  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  troops.  His  functions  would  be  exactly  the  same  as 
the  regional  officers,  namely,  to  lay  out  the  engineering 
work  for  the  division  in  conformity  with  the  plans  of 
the  division  commander  and,  after  consultation  with  him, 
direct  the  commanding  officers  of  the  various  ca'jnpanies 
assigned  to  the  division  to  execute  the  work  as  planned. 
This  would  permit  the  division  engineer  to  devote  his 
whole  time  to  the  proper  consideration  of  his  engineer- 
ing problems  and  relieve  him  of  the  burden  of  regi- 
mental administration.  With  the  two  tasks  resting  on 
the  same  man  there  is  the  danger  of  one  or  both  being 
sacrificed.  This  scheme  would  also  permit  men  to  be 
selected  for  staff  duty  who  were  particularly  well  quali- 
fied for  such  service,  rather  than  to  take  as  a  temporary 
staff  officer  the  man  who  happened  to  be  the  senior 
officer  of  the  attached  engineer  unit,  a  man  who,  while 
perhaps  an  excellent  commander  of  troops  in  the  field, 
might  not  have  the  qualifications  for  a  competent  staff 
officer. 

This  war  was  essentially  an  engineers'  war.  In  other 
wars  to  come,  science  in  its  various  applications  will 
play  a  far  greater  role  than  it  did  even  in  the  past  one. 
In  the  war  of  1917  the  United  States  fortunately  had  the 
advantage  of  having  two  great  allies  who  had  worked  out 
for  themselves  a  solution  of  many  of  the  engineering 
problems  involved,  and  who  gave  the  results  of  their 
experience  freely  and  gladly  to  their  new  associate.  In 
another  war  the  United  States  may  not  be  so  well  placed. 
We  may  suddenly  find  ourselves  involved  facing  some 
great  and  powerful  antagonist,  and  facing  him  without 
any  more  preparation  than  we  had  made  prior  to  1917. 
The  time  to  prepare  for  such  a  contingency  is  now. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

EXGIXEER  OnGANIZATIOX  AXD  EXGIXEER  WORK  IN  THE 
UNITED  STATES 

The  precedin.2:  chapters  give  a  picture  of  what  engi- 
neers were  reciuired  to  do  in  France,  a  picture  from 
which  details  have  necessarily  been  omitted  in  order  to 
reduce  it  to  such  a  size  that  it  might  be  viewed  as  a  whole. 
That  the  results  described  could  be  achieved  there  was 
needed,  in  addition  to  the  men  who  did  the  work  of  execu- 
tion in  the  field,  a  well  developed  and  smoothly  running 
organization  in  the  United  States.  The  purpose  of  such 
an  organization  was  to  secure  and  train  those  who  were 
to  go  overseas,  to  collect  the  plant  and  equipment  that 
were  required,  and  to  construct  the  accommodations  at 
home  to  house  both  the  men  and  supplies  prior  to  their 
shipment.  By  plant,  equipment  and  accommodations 
there  is  meant  not  only  those  items  that  are  intended  for 
engineer  use,  but  those  for  the  whole  army,  the  army 
that  was  held  in  the  United  States  as  well  as  the  army 
of  which  the  A.  E.  F.  was  composed.  The  extent  of  thej 
plant  and  accommodations  was  enormous.  The  capacity 
of  the  accommodations,  for  instance,  can  best  be  meas- 
ured in  terms  of  cities  because  such  dimensions  as  square 
yards  or  cubic  feet  were  scales  far  too  insignificant  for 
the  structures  erected. 

This  organization  came  under  the  personal  direction 
of  the  Chief  of  Engineers  in  Washington,  Major-General 
William  M.  Black,  and  the  work  of  preparation  in  the 
United  States  with  which  engineers  were  especially  con- 
cerned may  bo  smnmarized  under  two  general  headings : 

379 


380      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

1.  The  construction  of  camps,  cantonments  and  miscel- 

laneous structures  by  the  Quartermaster  Corps. 

2.  The  activities  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  subdivided 

as  follows: 

a.  Construction  of  engineer  depots  and  engineer 

shipping  ports. 

b.  Purchase  and  shipment  of  engineer  materiel 

and  equipment. 

c.  Research  work  in  connection  with  the  perfec- 

tion of  old  and  the  development  of  new 
engineer  materiel,  equipment,  processes 
and  methods. 

d.  The   organization,   training,   equipping  and 

shipping  abroad  of  engineer  units : 

(a)  Divisional   and   Corps   Sapper  Regi- 

ments. 

(b)  Railway  Units. 

(c)  The  Transportation  Corps. 

(d)  Units  for  Special  Engineering  Serv- 

ices. 

(e)  Service  Battalions  (general  laborers). 

(f)  The  Russian  Railway  Service  Corps. 

In  the  organization  of  the  Department  of  Engineering 
of  the  army,  known  as  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  there  was 
a  bureau  called  the  General  Engineer  Depot,  whose  duty 
it  had  been,  even  prior  to  the  war,  to  acquire  the  various 
equipment  needed  by  the  Cor|3s  of  Engineers.  The  Depot 
had  three  subdivisions: 

1.  Engineer  and  Purchasing  Department  with  general 
charge  of  the  procurement  and  transportation  of  material 
into  storage  at  various  depots.  The  Purchasing  Depart- 
ment had,  as  one  of  its  subdivisions,  and  as  a  distinct 
organization  a  Research  Department,  composed  of  spe- 
cialists and  scientists  engaged  in  the  study  of  engineer 
problems  connected  with  the  duties  of  the  Corps.  This 
subsequently  proved  to   be   a  most  valuable  piece  of 


ENGINEER  WORK  IN  UNITED  STATES    381 

machinery,  as  it  furnished  the  foundation  for  the  creation 
of  a  very  extensive  and  highly  useful  bureau. 

2.  The  Depot  Department,  with  charge  of  accounting, 
storage  and  cantonment  supplies.  This  department  car- 
ried on  investigations  as  to  possible  depot  sites,  leases  of 
land,  storehouses,  piers  and  railway  tracks,  the  prepara- 
tion of  plans  for  structures,  the  purchase  of  operating 
machinery  and  the  development  of  plans  for  receiving, 
storing,  shipping  and  accounting  for  property. 

3.  The  business  administration  ha\'ing  charge  of  the 
office  clerical  force,  contracts,  legal  and  financial  matters. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1917  the  Engineer  Depot 
had  a  force  of  one  officer  and  twenty  civilians  who  were 
housed  in  a  few  rooms  in  Washington  Barracks  with  a 
floor  area  of  3,500  square  feet.  By  July  the  office  accom- 
modations covered  15,000  square  feet  and  during  the 
autumn  grew  to  25,000  square  feet.  In  April,  1918,  six 
portable  buildings  were  erected  for  their  use,  giving 
10,000  additional  square  feet  of  office  space,  and  during 
October,  1918,  the  Depot  organization  was  gathered 
together  into  one  building,  where  it  occupied  90,000  square 
feet  of  floor  area.  By  this  time  the  force  had  expanded 
to  1,454  people,  of  whom  182  were  officers,  711  enlisted 
men  and  561  civilians. 

Much  of  the  construction  work  in  the  United  States 
came  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Quartermaster  Corps 
as  well  as  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  the  former,  through  its 
own  staff  of  engineers,  caring  for  the  erection  of  build- 
ings and  camps.  Such  work  was,  however,  distinctly  of 
an  engineering  character,  so  with  no  intention  of  ignor- 
ing the  Quartermaster  Corps  and  with  every  recognition 
of  the  exceedingly  valuable  service  rendered  and  results 
accomplished  by  it,  the  work  of  construction  in  the 
United  States  will  here  be  reviewed  as  a  whole  and 
treated  as  an  achievement  of  engineering. 

As  was  explained  in  the  early  part  of  this  book,  the 


382      AMEEICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FEANCE 

French  and  British  Commissions  made  it  clear  to  the 
authorities  in  Washington  during  April,  1917,  that  the 
most  pressing  and  immediate  need  was  for  increased 
transportation  facilities  both  in  men  and  material.  In 
this  respect  the  army  of  the  United  States  was  quite  lack- 
ing. It  possessed  neither  men  skilled  in  transportation 
nor  any  rolling  stock  or  other  equipment,  except  such 
email  amounts  as  were  used  on  local  railways  on  various 
government  reservations.  The  first  step  toward  secur- 
ing the  men  and  procuring  the  equipment  was  taken 
svhen  in  April  the  Chief  of  Engineers  called  to  his  aid 
Mr.  Samuel  M.  Felton,  president  of  the  Chicago  Great 
Western  Eailroad,  an  engineer  and  railway  executive  of 
long  and  varied  experience.  During  the  threatened 
troubles  along  the  Mexican  border  in  1916  Mr.  Felton 
had  acted  as  consulting  engineer  to  the  Chief  of 
Engineers  on  railway  matters. 

Plans  were  at  once  prepared  for  the  formation  of  a 
railway  division  of  the  Engineer  Department  in  the 
army,  at  the  head  of  which,  in  July,  1917,  Mr.  Felton  was 
appointed,  with  a  title  of  Director  General  of  Eailways. 
Subsequently  on  the  appointment  of  a  Director  General 
of  Transportation  for  the  A.  E.  F.  in  France,  Mr.  Fel- 
ton's  title  was  changed  to  be  Director  General  of  Mili- 
tary Eailways.  In  order  to  avoid  confusion,  Mr.  Felton 
refused  to  accept  military  rank,  but  continued  to  act  in  a 
civilian  capacity  until  all  need  for  his  services  had 
passed,  when  he  resigned  and  received  the  Distinguished 
Service  Medal  in  recognition  of  what  he  had  accom- 
plished. 

The  Director  General  of  Military  Eailways  prepared 
the  specifications  and  contracts  for  purchases  of  material, 
made  the  arrangements  directly  with  the  manufacturers, 
(except  as  to  standard  supplies,  such  as  rails  and  small 
tools,)  and  then  turned  the  agreements  over  to  the  Gen- 
eral Engineer  Depot  for  execution.   In  this  way  the  newly 


ENGINEER  WORK  IN  UNITED  STATES    383 

organized  Railway  Department  cooperated  without  fric- 
tion with  the  previously  existing  Depot  organization. 

The  results  obtained  by  the  Director  and  the  Engineer 
Depot  were  stupendous,  and  the  figures  of  the  value  of  the 
purchases,  running  as  they  did  to  hundreds  of  millions 
of  dollars,  would  have  been  in  any  other  period  of  the 
world's  history  beyond  credibility. 

The  details  of  these  purchases  will  be  found  at  some 
length  in  the  following  chapter  on  ''  Statistics,"  but  it  is 
convenient  to  point  out  here  that  between  July,  1917,  and 
November  11,  1918,  the  total  value  of  all  orders  placed 
by  the  General  Engineer  Depot  for  Engineer  material 
and  supplies  was  $740,242,507,  with  an  approximate  ton- 
nage of  such  supplies  of  4,567,800. 

These  expenditures  and  tonnage  were  quite  exclusive  of 
those  due  to  purchases  made  in  the  ordinary  course 
of  work  for  items  not  connected  with  the  war,  such  as 
the  normal  construction  and  maintenance  of  lighthouses, 
sea-coast  defenses,  and  rivers  and  harbors  in  the  United 
States. 

Although  contracts  for  the  above  purchases  were  made, 
as  a  matter  of  fact  all  the  contracts  were  not  fully 
executed  owing  to  the  termination  of  hostilities,  and  con- 
sequently the  full  complement  was  neither  required  nor 
called  for.  However,  of  the  above-mentioned  amount, 
1,506,000  tons  of  engineer  material  were  actually  shipped 
to  the  A.  E.  F.  and  160,000  tons  were  at  the  ports  wait- 
ing transportation  when  the  Armistice  was  signed.  Of 
the  grand  total  the  value  of  railway  material  alone, 
including  rolling  stock,  rails,  etc.,  amounted  to 
$526,000,000  for  the  Expeditionary  Force,  not  including 
the  value  of  similar  material  used  in  connection  with 
various  war  industries  in  the  United  States. 

It  is  not  without  interest  to  note  that  the  average  cost 
per  ton  for  all  material  sent  overseas  was  $168.00;  taking 
the  average  of  everything  from  tonpenny  nails  to  electric 


384      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

locomotives,  the  average  cost  of  the  railway  equipment 
of  all  kinds  was  $155.00  per  ton,  of  automobile  equipment 
$800.00  per  ton,  and  of  general  machinery  $400.00. 

Of  the  purchases  of  railway  equipment  the  principal 
items  were  the  following : 

Standard  gauge  locomotives 3,750 

Light  railway  locomotives 1,501 

Standard  gauge  cars 91,519 

Light  railway  cars 8,530 

Rails,  tons 749,345 


The  figures  of  the  details  were  on  the  same  great 
scale.  To  mention  but  a  few  items,  there  were  actually 
shipped  overseas  or  used  in  the  United  States : 

Trucks  of  various  kinds 7,137 

Portable  buildings 2,082 

Boilers G,006 

Dump  cars 3,504 

Screw  posts  for  wire  entangle- 
ments    2,308,225 

Nails,  tons 10,612 

Shovels,  various  kinds 2,923,936 

Picks 1,731,913 

Barbed  wire,  tons 131,802 

Paint,  gallons 1,000,000 

Saws,  various  kinds 399,877 

Eighty-three  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  sent  abroad 
passed  through  the  ports  of  New  York  and  Norfolk,  with 
Norfolk  leading. 

The  above  figures  of  purchases  are  quite  exclusive  of 
materials  purchased  abroad.  No  less  than  1,800,000 
tons  of  miscellaneous  engineering  supplies,  costing 
$205,000,000,  were  thus  purchased,  chiefly  in  France, 
England  and  Switzerland,  about  sixty  per  cent  being  fur- 
nished by  France. 

The  activities  of  the  Director  General  of  Military  Rail- 


ENGINEER  WORK  IN  UNITED  STATES    385 

"ways  were  not  confined  wholly  to  Ihe  acquisition  of 
inanimate  objects,  but  covered  also  the  human  element. 
During  1917  the  Director  supervised  the  organization, 
from  among  the  railway  systems  in  the  United  States,  of 
eleven  regiments  of  engineers,  aggregating  506  oflScers 
and  12,765  men.  Before  the  war  ended  41  special  rail- 
way units  had  been  sent  abroad,  consisting  of  1,314 
officers  and  53,352  men. 

All  the  above  force  was  sent  to  the  western  front.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  war  the  War  Department  appointed 
a  Commission  under  Mr.  John  F.  Stevens,  formerly  Chief 
Engineer  of  the  Panama  Canal,  as  chairman,  and  sent 
them  to  Russia  to  investigate  the  railway  situation  in 
that  country.  Later,  at  the  request  of  Mr.  Stevens,  the 
Director  organized  a  railway  unit  to  go  to  Russia,  to  be 
paid  by  the  Russian  Government.  Although  the  mem- 
bers of  the  unit  did  not  form  a  part  of  the  army  of  the 
United  States  they  were  given  nominal  military  rank. 

This  organization,  which  sailed  from  San  Francisco  on 
November  11,  1919,  consisted  of  1  Colonel,  George  H. 
Emerson;  5  Lieutenant-Colonels,  14  Majors,  22  Captains, 
80  First  Lieutenants,  166  Second  Lieutenants,  32  Inter- 
preters, 16  Mechanics  and  1  Medical  Officer,  a  total  of  337 
persons,  who,  in  si)ite  of  the  many  difficulties  and  disap- 
pointments, finally  succeeded  in  rendering  valuable  serv- 
ices in  connection  with  the  rehabilitation  and  operation 
of  Russian  railways. 

There  was  one  field  of  engineering  activity  which  was 
less  commercial  than  buying  locomotives  by  the  gross  or 
the  whole  output  for  months  of  various  factories. 
Though  it  called  for  fewer  men  than  were  required 
to  run  even  the  contract  department,  it  produced 
tangible  results  whose  tremendous  value  was  beginning 
to  be  clearly  apparent  when  hostilities  ceased,  and  which 
before  that  had  already  won  t)fii('ial  approval.  This  was 
the  field  of  experimentation  and  investigation. 


386      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

As  was  mentioned  above,  there  was  in  the  Purchasing 
Department  of  the  Engineer  Depot,  a  Bureau  of 
Research.  Prior  to  the  war  its  functions  were  limited, 
but  after  the  commencement  of  war  it  quickly  became  a 
vast  productive  laboratory.  There  are  few  more  fasci- 
nating stories  than  its  record  of  study  and  investigation 
in  the  fields  of  chemistry,  physics  and  electricity,  investi- 
gations that  involved  long  and  tedious  laboratory  experi- 
ments calling  for  the  highest  technical  skill  and  unlimited 
patience.  Among  other  accomplishments,  the  Bureau  of 
Research  examined  into  the  composition  and  methods  of 
manufacture  of  toxic  gases  and  gas  defense  measures,  it 
designed  the  delicate  but  highly  accurate  range  sound 
detectors  and  other  instruments  of  precision,  as  well  as 
mobile  machine  shops,  portable  pile  drivers,  field  map- 
printing  plants  and  photographic  apparatus  for  various 
uses.  It  standardized  the  requirements  of  paints  and 
varnishes,  produced  standard  specifications  for  mechan- 
ical rubber  goods,  pointed  out  how  the  enamel  coating 
on  hardware  and  kitchen  utensils  could  be  improved, 
studied  the  rating  of  internal  combustion  engines,  con- 
ducted a  series  of  experiments  which  finally  resulted  in 
the  improvement  of  certain  high  explosives  and  the 
designing  of  a  new  machine  for  exploding  detonating 
caps. 

The  most  substantial  result  of  the  work  done  by  the 
Bureau  of  Research  as  measured  by  output  was  in  the 
production  of  toxic  gas.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the 
manufacturing  capacity  of  gas  of  this  character  in  the 
United  States  was  practically  negligible,  there  being  but 
little  commercial  demand  for  it.  The  chemists  were  with- 
out experience,  but  thanks  to  the  new  work  done  by  them, 
the  Bureau  of  Research  was  able  to  convince  the  Gov- 
ernment that  it  was  sound  policy  to  erect  a  manufactur- 
ing plant  of  its  own  where  gases  could  be  manufactured 
on  a  huge  scale.    In  addition  the  Bureau  assisted  in 


ENGINEER  WORK  IN  UNITED  STATES    387 

encouraging  various  private  industries  tlirougliout  the 
country  to  j^roduce  gases  in  quantity. 

The  plant  that  was  erected  was  the  Edgewood  Arsenal, 
near  Aberdeen,  Md.  Before  the  war  came  to  an  end  558 
buildings  had  been  constructed  on  the  groimds,  including 
86  cantonment  structures  capable  of  housing  4,000  men. 
There  were  hospitals,  separate  buildings  for  the  welfare 
work  and  three  power  houses  with  a  total  installed  poten- 
tiality of  526  kw.  There  were  21  miles  of  standard  gauge 
railway,  15  miles  of  narrow  gauge  railway,  nearly  15 
miles  of  highways,  and  2  water  systems  with  a  combined 
capacity  of  3,500,000  gallons  daily.  At  one  time  no  fewer 
than  7,400  troops  were  at  work  because,  on  account  of  the 
dangerous  character  of  the  operations,  it  was  decided  to 
mobilize  the  forces  so  as  to  put  them  imder  army 
discipline. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  war  the  gas  industry  had 
grown  from  approximately  nothing  to  a  total  actual 
output  capacity  of  more  than  6,000  tons  of  lethal  gases 
per  month. 

As  indicating  how  far  the  activities  of  this  Bureau 
reached  out  even  to  small  matters,  a  certain  concern  had 
been  accustomed  to  produce  before  the  war  about  15,000 
watch  pocket  compasses  per  year.  Their  production  had 
to  be  so  speeded  up  so  as  to  have  them  turn  out  no  fewer 
than  10,000  of  these  compasses  each  week  in  order  that 
the  officers  in  the  field  might  be  supplied.  This  was 
accomplished  through  the  insistence  and  on  the  sugges- 
tions of  the  Bureau  of  Research. 

Then  there  was  the  great  housing  and  building  pro- 
gramme executed  by  the  engineers  of  the  Quartermaster 
Corps.  The  magnitude  of  the  problem  that  confronted 
the  engineers  cannot  be  described  in  better  terms  than 
those  in  the  letter  of  instruction  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Emergency  Construction  of  Buildings  addressed  to  tho 
officers  in  charge. 


388      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

'*  In  sixteen  weeks  you  are  expected  to  have  suitable 
quarters  ready  for  the  training  of  1,100,000  men. 

'*  You  must  be  building  in  32  places  at  once.  Most  of 
the  sites  for  the  cantonments  have  not  yet  been  chosen. 
When  they  have  been  fixed  a  group  of  engineering  jorob- 
lems  of  first  importance  must  be  settled.  The  water 
supply  for  each  camp  must  be  carefully  studied.  Failure 
to  supply  abundance  of  pure  water  may  jeopardize  the 
whole  undertaking.  Proper  sewerage  must  be  provided 
if  the  danger  of  epidemic  is  to  be  forestalled.  Heating, 
lighting,  refrigerating  and  laundry  facilities  must  be  fur- 
nished. The  solution  of  these  engineering  problems  will 
be  different  in  every  locality." 

"What  the  above  figures  mean  is  that  within  a  period 
of  less  than  four  months  there  were  being  erected  build- 
ing accommodations  sufficient  to  house  the  combined 
populations  of  Buffalo,  N.  Y. ;  Washington,  D.  C,  and 
San  Francisco,  Cal. 

All  told  there  were  44  of  these  camps  erected,  with 
accommodations  for  a  total  of  1,695,691  men  at  an 
approximate  cost  of  $373,466,184.00. 

The  lumber  that  was  ordered  for  these  camps  has  been 
computed  as  being  sufficient  to  have  made  a  board-walk 
twelve  feet  wide  and  one  inch  thick  reaching  from  the 
earth  to  the  moon  and  half  way  back  again. 

To  house  the  material  and  supplies  needed  for  the 
army  at  home  and  overseas,  until  such  time  as  they  were 
called  for,  or  sent  abroad,  great  storehouses  were  erected, 
and  terminal  projects  were  designed  and  carried  to 
execution  with  almost  feverish  speed  in  order  that  freight 
intended  for  the  A.  E.  F.  might  be  loaded  on  board  ship 
without  delay  and  in  such  manner  as  to  reduce  port  con- 
gestion to  the  minimum.  AVith  the  existing  scarcity  of 
ocean  tonnage  it  was  of  the  most  pressing  importance 
that  vessels  be  not  held  in  the  harbor. 

The  new  terminal  facilities  for  ships  that  were  created, 


ENGINEER  WORK  I^  UNITED  STATES    389 

exclusive  of  those  in  existence  before  the  war,  were 
equivalent  to  those  of  a  wharf  eight  miles  long  with 
berthing  capacity  for  65  shijos.  The  warehouses  erected 
at  the  ocean  ports  and  depots  in  the  interior  contained 
no  less  than  690  acres,  or  more  than  one  square  mile,  of 
covered  storage  space  provided  by  buildings  built  of 
reinforced  concrete.  So  extensive  were  these  buildings 
that  the  material  entering  into  their  construction  would 
have  sufficed  for  a  storehouse  70  feet  wide  and  as  long 
as  from  New  York  to  Philadelphia.  To  serve  the  ter- 
minals and  other  depots  there  were  constructed  650  miles 
of  railways  and  1,000  miles  of  concrete  roadways. 

At  Brooklyn,  in  the  Port  of  New  York,  two  8-story 
reinforced  concrete  warehouses  were  undertaken,  each  of 
which  was  980  feel  long.  One  of  them  was  200  feet  wide 
and  the  other  300  feet  wide,  with  a  combined  capacity  to 
store  700,000  tons  of  suj^plies  or  the  equivalent  of  about 
100  ship  loads.  The  car  tracks  of  this  single  installation 
were  sufficient  to  hold  1,300  cars  at  one  time. 

This  was  the  largest  single  unit,  but  other  big  terminal 
plants  were  erected  at  Boston,  Norfolk  and  New  Orleans. 
The  combined  terminals  and  interior  storage  depots  had 
an  aggregate  floor  area  of  29,861,514  square  feet,  and  cost 
approximately  $169,456,537.00 

Then  there  were  hospitals  of  which  42  were  erected 
with  a  total  capacity  stated  in  beds  of  59,045  and  at  a  cost 
of  $28,957,223.00. 

The  total  cost  of  various  buildings  erected  and 
equipped  by  the  War  Department  in  the  United  States 
exceeded  $1,000,000,000.  The  best  general  picture  of 
what  this  unthinkable  ligure  means  is  given  in  the  official 
report  on  America's  Munitions: 

"  We  can  gain  a  picture  of  the  size  of  this  construction 
by  considering  the  l)nil(ling  records  of  the  United  States. 
In  this  country  there  are  about  150  cities  large  enough 
and  ambitious  enough  to  keep  annual  building  statistics 


390      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

as  the  indices  of  their  prosperity.  In  these  cities,  whose 
populations  range  in  size  from  that  of  New  York  down 
to  those  of  communities  of  20,000  or  25,000  inhabitants, 
dwell  nearly  a  quarter  of  all  the  Americans.  They  are 
metropolitans,  the  people  who  demand  most  of  the 
builder  for  their  comfort  and  luxury.  Yet  in  no  one  year 
had  the  building  construction  in  these  150  largest  Ameri- 
can cities  combined  approached  in  amount  within 
$250,000,000  of  the  cost  of  our  military  construction 
undertaken  during  the  war." 

To  design,  direct  and  supervise  the  above  construction 
there  was  created  a  special  bureau  known  as  the  Con- 
struction Division. 

The  engineer  officers  had  other  problems  to  solve  than 
those  of  laying  out  camps,  constructing  terminal  store- 
houses, designing  searchlights  or  conducting  intricate 
chemical  investigations.  There  were  such  very  practical 
things  requiring  attention  as  sending  away  the  sup- 
plies after  they  had  reached  the  ports.  Even  this  prob- 
lem necessitated  special  study  and  called  for  many  inno- 
vations from  ordinary  standard  practice,  because  the 
supplies  had  to  be  loaded  on  ships,  not  merely  as  so  much 
tonnage  to  be  sent  away  on  export,  but  as  precious  cargo 
that  would  be  received  and  disposed  of  at  the  port  of 
entry  under  peculiarly  novel  and  abnormal  conditions. 
The  manner  in  which  locomotives  were  packed  in  the 
holds  of  vessels  so  as  to  give  the  minimum  of  incon- 
venience when  discharging  them  in  France  is  one 
illustration  of  how  the  seemingly  impossible  was 
accomplished. 

Ordinarily  locomotives  are  shipped  '*  knocked  down  "; 
that  is,  the  boilers,  frames,  trucks,  operating  mechanism 
and  other  parts  are  loaded  separately,  and  when  received 
at  destination  the  dismembered  pieces  are  placed  on 
cars,  sent  to  some  erecting  shop  and  there  assembled. 
Owing  to  the  conditions  that  existed  in   France,   this 


ENGINEER  WORK  IN  UNITED  STATES    391 

arrangement  was  very  inconvenient  and  costly  in  time, 
labor  and  space.  The  discharge  of  a  bulky  article  like 
a  locomotive  boiler,  which  demanded  that  a  special  car 
be  ready  to  receive  it  from  the  unloading  crane,  seri- 
ously disturbed  the  even  flow  of  the  mass  of  freight  con- 
sisting chiefly  of  boxes  of  food  stuffs,  clothing  or  ammu- 
nition which  were  deposited  in  jDiles  on  the  wharf  and 
thence  loaded  into  cars  or  trucked  to  storehouses.  Then 
after  the  boiler  and  other  heavy  parts  were  securely 
placed  on  cars,  they  had  to  be  drawn  to  some  locomotive 
shop,  unloaded  and  set  up.  All  this  involved  much 
rehandling,  delayed  unloading,  caused  confusion,  created 
traffic  for  a  terminal  railway  already  badly  congested, 
threw  work  on  shops  that  were  short  of  skilled  mechan- 
ics, and  above  all  delayed  the  discharge  of  the  ship,  a 
loss  of  time  that  was  very  precious. 

The  British,  after  experiencing  similar  troubles,  placed 
locomotives  on  barges  without  any  attempt  to  dismantle 
them,  and  thus  sent  them  from  England  to  France,  a  not 
very  difficult  feat  because  the  water  journey  was  so  short. 
But  the  American  Director  General  of  Transportation 
saw  the  possibilities  contained  in  the  idea  and  requested 
that  our  own  locomotives  be  loaded  on  board  ship, 
*'  ready- to-run,"  so  that  when  unloaded  they  could  be  set 
directly  on  the  rails  and  hauled  away.  This  was  a  radi- 
cally novel  suggestion,  involving  all  manner  of  mechan- 
ical difficulties  seemingly  insuperable,  when  there  are 
called  to  mind  the  great  weight  and  awkward  outlines  of 
a  complete  locomotive.  The  form  of  locomotives  is  so 
irregular  as  almost  to  defy  their  stowing  in  the  deep 
confined  hold  of  a  ship,  with  freight  below  and  above,  and 
yet  all  so  securely  packed  as  to  resist  the  pitching  and 
rolling  motion  of  a  ship  in  an  Atlantic  storm.  But  the 
engineers  in  the  United  States  succeeded  in  doing  it  as 
they  solved  many  other  new  problems.  Only  the  smoke- 
stack and  drivers'  cab  were  removed,  everything  else 


392      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

being  left  in  place.  The  levers  and  the  other  operating 
devices  attached  to  the  boiler-head  were  boxed  in  to  pre- 
vent damage.  Then  the  engines  and  their  tenders,  with 
all  wheels  attached,  were  picked  up  bodily  by  large 
cranes  and  lowered  into  the  hold  of  a  waiting  steamer, 
where  they  rested  on  stout  timbers.  The  spaces  between 
them  were  filled  with  small  packages  such  as  boxes  or 
bales  to  keep  them  from  moving.  On  arrival  they  were 
again  handled  by  a  crane,  set  on  the  rails, 'run  off  on 
their  own  wheels  to  some  small  shop,  where  it  was  a  sim- 
ple job  to  attach  the  stack  and  cab.  Then  all  that 
remained  was  to  put  on  board  coal,  water  and  oil,  and 
another  hauling  unit  was  ready  to  carry  men  or  ammuni- 
tion to  the  front.  The  illustration  at  the  beginning  of 
this  book  shows  a  large  locomotive  being  loaded  on  board 
ship  in  the  port  of  New  York. 

The  figures  are  at  hand  showing  the  saving  that 
resulted  from  shipping  locomotives  whole.  St.  Nazaire 
was  selected,  in  the  early  days  of  American  participation, 
as  the  port  through  which  locomotives  would  be  shipped, 
as  unloading  cranes  and  the  needed  special  facilities  for 
handling  bulky  weights  were  installed  there.  But  it  was 
found  impossible  to  take  the  locomotive  parts  as  they 
came  off  the  steamers,  crated  or  boxed,  directly  into  the 
shops,  as  there  was  barely  room  to  care  for  the  erect- 
ing. Furthermore,  it  was  frequently  necessary  to  unload 
almost  entirely  a  boat  before  all  the  parts  of  a  complete 
locomotive  were  found.  As  each  locomotive  was  shipped 
in  thirty-two  different  crates  or  boxes,  some  of  which 
weighed  over  30,000  pounds,  and  as  many  as  forty  loco- 
motives arrived  in  a  single  ship,  it  will  be  readily  seen 
that  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  large  storage  yard  in 
which  to  uncrate,  sort  and  store  by  locomotive  numbers 
the  parts  of  same.  This  yard  the  engineers  built,  involv- 
ing much  filling,  and  until  this  was  in  operation,  it  was 
necessary  to  utilize  dock  space,  shop  space  and,  in  fact, 


ENGINEER  WORK  IN  UNITED  STATES    393 

every  available  space  for  the  unboxing  and  sorting  of 
locomotive  parts. 

After  the  scattered  members  of  a  locomotive  had  been 
collected  and  brought  to  the  shop,  twenty-six  hours  of 
shop  time  were  required  to  erect  them  into  a  complete 
machine.  When  locomotives  were  received  minus  only 
stack  and  cab,  the  time  needed  to  prepare  one  for  service 
was  reduced  to  six  hours  —  or  eight  at  the  maximum. 
In  addition  there  were  the  benefits  of  a  great  saving  in 
wharf  space  and  the  hastening  of  the  discharge  of  vessels. 

The  personnel  of  engineer  units  was  selected  as  far  as 
possible  from  men  with  mechanical  experience,  but  the 
efficient  engineer  recruits  had  to  be  instructed  in  mili- 
tary duties  and  in  certain  phases  of  military  engineering 
with  which  they  were  not  familiar.  During  the  first  six 
months  of  the  war  special  instructors  were  detailed  by 
the  French  and  British  to  give  training  to  American 
recruits  at  the  camps  in  the  United  States  in  the  laying 
out  and  digging  of  trenches,  the  excavating  of  dugouts, 
the  handling  of  grenades  and  the  doing  of  the  many  inno- 
vations produced  by  the  war.  Later  as  iVinerican  officers 
obtained  first  hand  experience  in  Europe,  they  were  sent 
back  to  serve  as  engineer  instructors  and  relieve  our 
allies  from  this  duty. 

It  was  a  great  army  of  engineers  that  went  to  France, 
but  they  would  have  been  helpless  without  the  organiza- 
tion at  home.  Those  that  went  overseas  had  the  reward 
of  excitement  and  field  activity.  Those  that  remained 
did  other  work  at  the  desk,  in  the  designing  room  or 
laboratory,  largely  unnoticed  and  rarely  seen.  It  was 
not  their  good  fortune  to  share  with  the  others  in  the 
danger  and  glory  of  battle,  but  to  them  there  is  due 
quite  as  much  credit  for  the  final  success  as  to  those  who 
went  over  the  top.  Both  were  equally  members  of  the 
Corps  of  Engineers  of  the  Army  of  the  United  States. 

Remarkable  as  were  the  actual  achievements  in  organ- 


394      AMERICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 

izing,  equipping  and  sending  troops  to  France,  and  the 
development  and  perfection  of  a  great  variety  of  engi- 
neering and  scientific  equipment  methods  and  processes, 
they  were  relatively  insignificant  as  compared  with  what 
undoubtedly  would  have  been  accomplished  had  the  war 
continued  a  little  longer.  The  necessary  preliminary 
work  had  all  been  done,  cantonments,  hospitals,  ware- 
houses were  all  erected  and  in  splendid  working  order 
both  in  the  United  States  and  in  France.  Industrial 
plants  had  been  tuned  up  to  produce  every  conceivable 
article  needed  in  modern  warfare,  in  vast  quantities  and 
with  incredible  speed.  The  many  months  of  patient 
scientific  research  work  had  resulted  in  the  perfection  of 
new  methods  and  new  devices  which  in  a  short  time 
could  have  supplied  all  the  articles  needed  in  such  quanti- 
ties as  to  have  still  further  revolutionized  modern  meth- 
ods of  warfare,  while  the  fruits  of  other  theoretical 
investigations  were  on  the  very  point  of  receiving  prac- 
tical application. 


CHAPTER  XXVn 

STATISTICS 

The  dimensions  of  the  war,  regarded  from  any  point 
of  view  and  in  every  detail  except  the  one  of  time,  cannot 
be  measured  by  any  comparison  with  similar  dimensions 
of  other  wars.  The  statistical  branch  of  the  War  Depart- 
ment of  the  United  States  government  has  issued  a 
report,  entitled  "  The  War  With  Germany,"  covering 
the  main  features  not  only  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the 
United  States,  but  to  some  extent  as  they  relate  to  the 
allied  and  enemy  countries  as  well.  This  report  gives 
probably  as  good  a  measure  of  the  size  of  the  war  as  any 
report  that  can  be  produced.  So  valuable  are  these  fig- 
ures, so  striking  are  the  deductions  that,  with  the  consent 
of  the  statistical  branch  of  the  General  Staff,  the  follow- 
ing condensed  extracts  have  been  made  as  showing  so 
far  as  figures  can,  the  organization,  equipping  and  sup- 
plying of  the  army,  its  transportation  to  and  from 
France,  the  results  accomplished  and  the  cost  in  money, 
materials  and  the  most  important  item  of  all,  men. 

The  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  during  the  war, 
April  6,  1917,  to  November  11,  1918,  numbered  approxi- 
mately 4,800,000.  About  4,000,000  served  in  the  Army, 
the  Navy,  the  Marine  Corps,  and  the  remaining  800,000 
in  the  other  services.  Approximately  five  out  of  every 
100  American  citizens  took  up  arms  in  defense  of  their 
country. 

The  number  of  men  serving  in  the  Army  and  Navy  of 
the  Northern  States  during  the  Civil  war  was  2,400,000, 
or  about  ten  out  of  every  100  inhabitants.  CoTuparing 
the  effort  of  the  United  States  in  the  war  with  Germany 

395 


396      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

with  that  of  the  Northern  States  in  the  Civil  war,  we  see 
that  the  entire  United  States  raised  actually  twice  as 
many  men  as  the  Northern  States  raised  in  the  Civil 
war,  hut  proportionately  to  the  population  only  half  as 
many.  It  cost  twenty  times  as  much  to  recruit  the 
2,400,000  men  who  fought  on  the  Northern  side  during 
the  Civil  war  as  it  did  to  recruit  the  4,800,000  men  who 
were  raised  to  fight  against  Germany,  or  fifty  times  as 
much  for  each  soldier,  sailor,  and  marine. 


STATISTICS 


397 


SIZE  OF  THE  AEMY  ON  FIRST  OF  EACH  MONTH  DURING 
THE.  WAR  WITH  GERMANY 


IN  THE 

UNITED  STATES 

AND   POSSESSIONS 


AMERICAN 

EXPEDITIONART 

FORCE 


1917 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September 

October. . . 

November 

December. 
1918 

Januarj'. . . 

Februar}- . . 

March. .  .  . 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 

September 

October. .  . 

November 

December. 
1919 

January. . . 

February. . 

March  .  .  . 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August 


200 
290 
390 
480 
516 
646 
883 
996 
1,060 

1,149 
1,257 
1,386 
1,476 
1,529 
1,390 
1,384 
1,365 
1,422 
1,590 
1,663 
1,679 

1,163 
914 
761 
680 
666 
578 
579 
442 


000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 

000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 

000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 


20,000 
35,000 
45,000 
65,000 
104,000 
129,000 

176,000 

225,000 

253,000 

320,000 

424,000 

722,000 

996,000 

1,293,000 

1,579,000 

1,843,000 

1,971,000 

1,944,000 

1,837,000 

1,710,000 

1,562,000 

1,376,000 

1,088,000 

730,000 

357,000 

133,000 


200 
290 
390 
500 
551 
691 
948 
1,100 
1,189 

1,325 
i;482 
1,639 
1,796 
1,953 
2,112 
2,380 
2,658 
3,001 
3,433 
3,634 
3,623 

3,000 
2,624 
2,323 
2,056 
1,754 
1,308 
936 
575 


000 

000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 

000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 

000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 


SOURCES  OF  THE  ARMY 


APRIL, 

1917 

PER 
CENT 

TOTAL 
FOR 
WAR 

PER 

CENT 

Regular  Army 

133,000 
67,000 

67% 
33% 

527,000 

382 ,  000 
3,091,000 

13% 

National  Guard 

77% 

National  Army 

Grand  Totals 

200,000 

1007o 

4,000,000 

100% 

Note. — The  round  total  of  4,000,000  in  thi.s  tal)le  covers  all  inductions 
into  the  army.  The  dilTercnce  botwtxn  this  figure  and  that  of  3,634,000  for 
November,  1919,  in  the  preceding  table,  is  accounted  for  by  deaths  and  dis- 
cbargC3  previous  to  the  .<\j:mistice. 


398      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

PERCENTAGE  OF  DRAFTED  MEN  PASSING  PHYSICAL 
EXAMINATIONS  BY  STATES 


70%  to  80% 

Arkansas 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 

Minnesota 
Nebraska 
New  Mexico 
North  Dakota 

Oklahoma 
South  Dakota 
Texas 
Wyoming 

65%  to  69% 

Alabama 
Florida 
Illinois 
Indiana 

Louisiana 
Maryland 
Mississipp 
Missouri 

Montana 

North  Carolina 

Ohio 

West  Virginia 

Wisconsin 

60%  to  64% 

Georgia 

Idaho 

Nevada 

New  Jersey 

Oregon 

Pennsylvania 

South  Carolina 
Tennessee 
Utah   _ 
Virginia 

50%  to  59% 

Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 

Delaware 
Maine 

Massachuetts 
Michigan 

New  Hampshire 
New  York 
Rhode  Island 
Vermont 
Washington 

OFFICERS  COMMISSIONED  FOR  LINE  DUTY  FROM 
TRAINING  CAMPS  BY  SERVICES 


BRANCH  OF  SERVICE 

NUMBER  COMMISSIONED 

PER  CENT 

Infantry 

Field  Artillery 

48,968 

20,291 

3,067 

2,063 

2,032 

1,906 

1,262 

767 

152 

60.7 

25.2 

Quartermaster 

3.8 

Coast  Artillery 

2.6 

Cavalry ....         

2  5 

Engineer 

2.4 

Signal 

Ordnance 

1.6 
1.0 

Statistical 

.2 

Total 

80,568 

100.0 

STATISTICS  399 

SOURCES  OF  THE  COMMISSIONED  PERSONNEL 


SOURCE 

NfMBER 

PER  CENT 

OfFicora'  Training  Camps 

Physicians 

96,000 
42,000 
26,000 
16,000 
12,000 
6,000 
2,000 

48 

21 

Civil  Life 

13 

Enlisted  Men 

8 

National  Guard 

6 

I'lcgular  Army 

3 

Chaplains 

1 

Total 

200,000 

100 

Training  of  the  Army 

The  American  soldier  who  fought  in  France  had  on 
the  average  six  months'  training  in  the  United  States, 
two  months'  training  overseas  before  entering  the  line, 
and  one  month  in  a  quiet  sector  before  going  into  battle. 

Two  out  of  every  three  American  soldiers  who  reached 
France  went  into  battle.  The  number  that  saw  active 
gervice  in  the  front  line  was  1,390,000  out  of  a  total  of 
2,084,000  who  debarked  at  French  ports.  In  this  total 
are  included  the  men,  amounting  to  nearly  400,000,  who 
reached  France  in  September,  October  and  November, 
1918,  within  less  than  three  months  of  the  signing  of  the 
armistice,  and  who  had  not  completed  their  full  period 
of  training.  Some  of  these  troops,  nevertheless,  saw 
active  service. 

The  greater  proportion  of  our  overseas  forces  received 
their  training  in  infantry  divisions  which  are  our  tjq^ical 
combat  units,  and  consisted  of  about  1,000  officers  and 
27,000  enlisted  men.  Forty-two  such  divisions  were  sent 
to  France,  besides  several  hundred  thousand  supple- 
mentary artillery  service,  and  supply  troops, 

American  divisions  were  composed,  when  at  full 
strength,  of  28,000  officers  and  men  and  were  the  largest 
divisions  of  any  army  on  the  western  front.    The  British 


400      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

divisions  contained  in  actuality  about  15,000  each,  while 
the  French  and  the  German  divisions  contained  only 
about  12,000  each. 

The  training  of  our  army  in  the  United  States  was 
assisted  by  nearly  800  specially  skilled  French  and  Brit- 
ish officers  and  noncommissioned  officers,  who  rendered 
invaluable  service  as  instructors  in  the  training  camps. 

More  than  two-thirds  of  our  line  officers  were  gradu- 
ates of  the  officers'  training  camps. 

Teansportation  of  the  Army 

More  than  2,000,000  American  soldiers  were  trans- 
ported to  France  in  the  nineteen  months  during  which  we 
took  part  in  the  war.  Half  a  million  went  over  in  the  first 
thirteen  months,  and  a  million  and  a  half  in  the  last  six 
months.  It  was  not  until  December,  1917,  that  the  sail- 
ings approximated  50,000  a  month.  The  following  table 
shows  the  number  sailing  each  month  for  France  in  1918, 
and  for  America  between  the  signing  of  the  armistice 
and  June  30, 1919. 


MEN.  SAILING    FROM    AMERICA 
TO  FRANCE 


1917—9  months  (approx.)-  200,609 

1918 

January 47,833 

February 49,110 

March 84,889 

April 118,642 

May 245,945 

June 278,664 

July 306,350 

August 285,974 

September 257,457 

October 180,326 

November 30,201 

Total  (19  mo3.) 2,086,000 

Average  per  mo 110,000 


MEN  SAILING  FROM  FRANCE 
TO  AMERICA 


1918 

November 26,245 

December 99,111 

1919 

January 115,382 

February 181,751 

March 212,899 

April 290,377 

May 333,303 

June 364,163 

Total  (8  mos.) 1,623,231 

Average  per  mo 203,000 


STATISTICS 


401 


Growth  of  the  Transport  Fleet 
To  convey  this  great  army  to  France,  to  keep  it  sup- 
plied with  food,  clothing,  arms,  ammunition  and  other 
requisites  for  effective  service,  and  to  bring  the  men 
home  after  the  war,  demanded  the  creation  of  an  ade- 
quate transport  fleet  at  a  time  when  the  world  was 
experiencing  its  most  acute  shortage  of  ocean  tonnage. 
The  development  of  this  fleet  is  shown  in  the  following 
table,  which  gives  its  size  in  dead-weight  tons  on  the  first 
of  each  month. 


TRANSATLANTIC  FLEET  IN  DE.AD-WEIGHT  TONS 


BT  MONTHS 


1917 

July  1 .  . 

August  1 

Sept.  1.. 

Oct.  1.. . 

Nov.  1.. 

Dec.  1 . . 
1918 

Jan.  1..  . 

Feb.  1 .  . 

Mar.  1. . 

Apr.  1 .  . 

^lay  1 .  . 

June  1 .  . 

July  1 .  . 

Aug.  i . . 

Sept.  1.. 

Oct.  1... 

Nov.  1 . . 

Dec.  1 .  . 
1919 

Jan.  1..  . 

Feb.  1 .  . 

Mar.  1.. 

Apr.  1 .  . 

May  1 .  . 


TRAXSPORTS 


CARGO  SHIPS 


59,000 
168,000 
195,000 

243,000 
243,000 
250,000 
274,000 
372,000 
395,000 
403,000 
394,000 
401,000 
397,000 
390,000 
493,000 

681,000 
797,000 
878,000 
928,000 
1,087,000 


229,000 
297,000 
467,000 

543,000 

620,000 

718,000 

926,000 

1,066,000 

1,184,000 

1,350,000 

1,485,000 

1,633,000 

1,933,000 

2,310,000 

2,753,000 

2,567,000 
2,047,000 
1,713,000 
1,198,000 
752,000 


Total 


94,000 
131,000 
177,000 
2.88,000 
465,000 
682,000 

786,000 
863,000 
968,000 
1,200,000 
1,438,000 
1,579,000 
1,753,000 
1,879,000 
2,034.000 
2,330,000 
2,700,000 
3,246,000 

3.248,000 
2,844,000 
2,591,000 
2,126,000 
1,839,000 


Cooperation  of  Allies 

Of  the  2,086,000  American  troops  that  sailed  to 
France,  927,000  went  in  American  vessels,  while  1,027,000 
.were  carried  in  British  transports,  20,000  in  Russian 


402      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

ships  under  British  control,  65,000  in  Italian,  and  47,000 
in  French  ships.  To  put  it  another  way,  of  every  100  sol- 
diers who  went  overseas,  forty-nine  sailed  in  British 
ships,  forty-five  in  American  ships,  three  in  Italian  ships, 
two  in  French  ships,  and  one  in  Russian  shipping  under 
British  control. 

The  American  transports  carried  more  men  in  pro- 
portion to  tonnage  than  those  of  the  cooperating  nations. 
Tliis  was  due  to  two  factors,  our  transports  exceeded 
those  of  the  Allies  in  the  speed  of  their  turnarounds ;  and, 
under  the  pressure  of  the  critical  situation  on  the  western 
front,  ways  were  devised  to  increase  the  loading  of  our 
own  transports  by  as  much  as  fifty  per  cent. 


PORTS  OF  EMBARKATION  AND  DEBARKATION 


AMERICAN 
PORTS 

BAILED 

•     ENGUSH  PORTS 

ARRIVED 

Quebec 

11,000 

34,000 

1,000 

5,000 

6,000 

46,000 

1,656,000 

35,000 

4,000 

288,000 

Glasgow 45,000 

Manchester 4,000 

Liverpool 844,000 

Bristol  Ports 11,000 

Falmouth 1,000 

Plymouth 1,000 

Southampton 57,000 

London 62,000 

Montreal 

St.  Johns 

Halifax 

Portland 

Boston 

New  York 

Philadelphia 

Baltimore 

Newport  Nawi. . 

1,025  000 

FRENCH  PORTS 

Le  Havre 13,000 

Brest 791,000 

St.  Nazairc 198,000 

La  Pallice 4,000 

Bordeaux 50,000 

Marseille 1,000 

1,057,000 

ITALIAN  PORTS 

2,000 

Total 

2,086,000 

2,084,000 

Note; — The  difference  of  2,000  between  those  who  sailed  from  American 
and  those  who  landed  in  France  is  accounted  for  in  part  by  dcaths'in  transit 
and  in  part  by  those  who  sailed,  but,  for  one  reason  or  another,  were  not 
landed. 


STATISTICS  403 

ARMY  CARGO  SHIPPED  TO  FRANCE  TO  APRIL  30,  1919 


BHIPMBNTS  BT  MONTHS 

DISTRIBUTION 

PER  CENT 

Short  Tons 

Branch  of  Service     Short  Tons 

Per  cent 

1917 

June 16,000 

July 12,000 

August 19,000 

September •    53,000 

October 115,000 

November 78,000 

December 180,000 

1018 
January 122,000 

Quartermaster 3,606,000 

Engineer 1,506,000 

Ordnance 1,189,000 

48.39 
20.21 
15.96 

Food  Relief 285,000 

Motor  Tran.sport          214,000 
French  Material ....    208,000 

Signal  Corps 121,000 

Medical 111,000 

Aviation 61,000 

Red  Cross 60,000 

3.82 
2.87 
2.79 
1.62 
1.49 
.82 
.81 

February 228,000 

March 289,000 

April 373,000 

Y.  M.  C.  A 45,000 

Miscellaneous 35,000 

Chemical  Warfare..    "11,000 

.60 
.47 
.15 

May 450,000 

June 425,000 

July 536,000 

August 572,000 

September 681,000 

October 750,000 

Novenbcr 829,000 

December 687,000 

1919 

January 363,000 

February 266,000 

March 298,000 

April 211,000 

Total  (23  months) .   7,453,000 

7,452,000 

100.0 

Note: — The  discrepancy  of   1,000  tonB  in  these   totals   is  very  email 
ooDflidcring  that  only  round  numbers  are  used  in  these  estimates." 


404      AMEEICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

Ameeica's  Pakt  in  the  Actual,  Fighting 

THIRTEEN  MAJOR  OPERATIONS  IN  WHICH 
AMERICANS  PARTICIPATED 


OPERATION 


West  front — campaign  of  1917: 

Cambrai,  Nov.  to  Doc.  4 

West  front — campaign  of  1918: 

German  offensive,  March  21  to  July  IS 

Somme,  March  21  to  April  6 

Lys,  April  9  to  27 

Aisne,  May  27  to  June  5 

Noyon-Montdidier,  June  9  to  15 

Champagne,  Marne,  July  15  to  18 

Allied  Offensives,  July  18  to  Nov.  11: 

Aisne-Marne,  July  18  to  Aug.  6 

Somme,  Aug.  8  to  Nov.  11 

Oige-Aisne,  Aug.  18  to  Nov.  11 

Ypres-Lys,  Aug.  19  to  Nov.  11 

St.  Mihiel,  Sept.  12  to  16 

Mouse- Argonne,  Sept.  20  to  Nov.  11..  . 
Italian  front — campaign  of  1918: 

Vittorio-Veneto,  Oct.  2-4  to  Nov.  4  .  . .  . 


APPROXIMATE 

NUIMBEU  OF 

AMERICANS 

ENGAGED 


2,500 


2,200 

2,600 

27,500 

27,000 

85,000 

270,000 

54,000 

85,000 

108,000 

550,000 

,200.000 

1,200 


AlklERICAN  DATA  FOR  THE  MEUSE-ARGONNE  BATTLE 

Days  of  battle 47 

American  troops  engaged 1,200,000 

Guns  employed  in  attack 2,417 

Rounds  of  artillery  ammunition  fired 4,214.000 

Airplanes  used 840 

Tons  of  explosives  dropped  by  planes  on  enemy  lines 100 

Tanks  used 324 

Miles  of  penetration  of  enemy  line,  maximum 34 

Square  kilometers  of  territory  taken 1,550 

Villages  and  towns  liberated 150 

Prisoners  captured 16,059 

Artillery  pieces  captured 468 

Machine  guns  captured 2,864 

Trench  mortars  captured 177 

American  casualties 120, 000 


The  actual  weight  of  the  ammunition  fired  in  this  bat- 
tle was  greater  than  that  used  by  the  Union  forces  during 
the  entire  Civil  war. 


STATISTICS  405 

In  the  preceding  Battle  of  St.  Mihiel,  550,000  Ameri- 
cans were  engaged,  as  compared  with  about  100,000  on 
the  Northern  side  in  the  Battle  of  Gettysburg  in  the  Civil 
war.  At  the  Battle  of  St.  Mihiel  the  artillery  fired  more 
than  1,000,000  shells  in  four  hours,  which  is  the  most 
intense  concentration  of  artillery  fire  recorded  in  history. 

Amekicax  Artillery  in  France 

The  most  significant  facts  about  our  artillery  are  pre- 
sented in  the  following  table,  which  takes  into  account 
only  light  and  heavy  field  artillery,  and  does  not  include 
either  the  small  37  mm.  guns  or  the  trench  mortars. 

SUMMARY 


Total  pieces  of  artillery  received  to  November  11,  1918 3,499 

Number  of  American  manufactured 477 

American  made  pieces  used  in  battle 130 

Artillery  on  firing  line 2 ,251 

Rounds  of  ammunition  expended 8,8.50,000 

Rounds  of  American  made  ammunition  expended 208,327 

Rounds  of  American  made  ammunition  expended  in  battle 8,400 


The  facts  shown  in  the  above  table  may  be  para- 
phrased with  approximate  accuracy  by  saying  that  the 
American  army  in  France  had  in  round  numbers  3,500 
pieces  of  artillery,  of  which  less  than  500  were  made  in 
Auierica,  and  that  we  used  on  the  firing  line  2,250  pieces, 
of  which  only  130  (less  than  six  per  cent)  were  made  in 
America. 

Note  by  the  Author:  The  guns  that  were  used  were 
of  French  manufacture.  As  the  American  army  was 
intended  to  cooperate  largely  with  the  French,  it  was 
deemed  advisable  to  equip  it  with  French  artillery. 
This  the  French  government  undertook  to  do  provided 
America  sent  the  steel  and  other  raw  material.  It  was 
greatly  to  the  credit  of  France  that  after  nearly  four 


406      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 


years  of  war  she  was  still  able  to  produce  a  surplus  of 
manufactured  equipment  if  only  the  material  were 
furnished. 

TOXIC  GASES  MANUFACTURED  IN  1918— IN  TONS  (2,000  lbs.) 


MANtJFACTUKKD 
DURING  MONTH 


TOTAL 
TO  DATB 


January . . 
February . 
March..  .  . 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August .  . . 
September 
October .  . 
November 


10 

61 

211 

399 

697 

993 

1,351 

1,548 

1,911 

2,726 

910 


10 

71 

282 

681 

1,378 

2,371 

3,722 

5,270 

7,181 

9,907 

10,817 


Aviation 
FLYING  OFFICERS  IN  THE  ARMY— BY  MONTHS 


IN  U.  8. 

IN  A.  E.  T. 

75 

105 

139 

199 

203 

25 

270 

31 

572 

31 

831 

45 

989 

157 

1,576 

321 

1,712 

485 

2,248 

650 

2,563 

1,800 

3,841 

2,200 

3,944 

2,840 

4,974 

2,692 

5,916 

3,060 

6,306 

3,450 

6,171 

4,252 

7,118 

4,307 

TOTAL 


1919 

April 

May 

June 

July 

Augu.st..  . . 
September 
October. . . 
November. 
December. 

1918 
January. . . 
February. . 
March. .  . . 

April 

May 

June 

July 

August. . . . 
September 
October. .  . 
November. 


75 
105 
139 
199 
229 
301 
603 
876 
1,146 


1,897 
2,197 
2,898 
4,363 
6,041 
6,784 
7,666 
8,976 
9,756 
10,423 
11,425 


STATISTICS  407 

PHODUCTION  OF  SERVICE  PLANES— TO  END  OP  EACH  MONTH 


1917 

September 

October. . . 

November. 

December. 
1918 

January. . . 
:  .  February. . 

March. . .  . 

April 

May 

June 

.    July 

Augu.st..  .  . 

September, 

October. . . 

November. 


FROM 
FOREIGN 
SOURCES 


6 

75 

258 

266 

304 

402 

552 

695 

969 

1,345 

1,975 

2,536 

3,047 

3,483 

3,800 


FROM 

AMERICAN 
SOURCES 


9 
13 
30 

196 
541 
1,028 
1,184 
1,892 
3,014 
4,089 


6 

75 
258 
266 

304 
411 

565 
725 
1,16,5 
1.886 
3,003 
3.720 
4,939 
6.497 
7,SS9 


SERVICE  PLANES  SENT  TO  ZONE  OF  ADVANCE  BY  END  OF 

EACH  MONTH 


FROM 
FOREIGN 
BOURCE8 

FROW 
AMERICA:^ 
SOURCES 

TOTAI, 

1917 
October 

1 
0 
3 

4 

22 

119 

180 

376 

476 

810 

1,205 

1,722 

1,938 

2,031 

1 

November 

0 

December 

3 

r 

1918 
January 

4 

February 

22 

March 

119 

Auril 

180 

^'  ay 

376 

Juno 

476 

July 

34 

178 
518 
627 
667 

844 

August 

1,3S3 

September 

2,240 

October 

2,565 

.  November 

a, 698 

^ 

Note. — Nine-tenths  of  the  airplanes  received  from  foreign  Bouroea  were 
of  French  manufacture. 


408      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 

To  summarize,  of  the  2,698  planes  sent  to  the  Zone  of 
the  Advance  for  American  aviators,  667,  or  less  than  one- 
fourth,  were  of  American  manufacture. 

American  air  squadrons  took  important  parts  in  the 
battles  of  Chateau-Thierry,  St.  Mihiel,  and  the  Meuse- 
Argonne.  They  brought  down  in  combat  755  enemy 
planes,  while  their  own  losses  were  only  357  planes. 

Casualties 
BATTLE  DEATHS  IN  THE  ARMIES  ENGAGED  IN  THE  WAR 

Russia 1,700,000 

Germany 1,600,000 

France 1,385,300 

Great  Britain 900,000 

Austria 800,000 

Italy 364,000 

Turkey 250,000 

Serbia  and  Montenegro 125,000 

Belgium 102,000 

Roumania 100,000 

Bulgaria 100,000 

United  States 50,300 

Greece 7,000 

Portugal 2,000 

Total 7,485,600 

Of  every  100  American  soldiers  and  sailors,  two  were 
killed  or  died  of  disease.  Among  the  other  great  nations 
betiveen  twenty  and  twenty-five  in  each  100  called  to  the 
colors  were  killed  or  died. 

The  total  battle  deaths  in  this  war  were  greater  than 
all  the  deaths  in  all  the  wars  for  more  than  100  years 
previous.  From  1793  to  1914  the  total  deaths  in  war  may 
be  safely  estimated  at  something  under  6,000,000.  Bat- 
tle deaths  from  1914  to  1918  totaled  about  7,500,000. 

American  Casualties  in  the  War 

Wounded,  Prisoners  and  Missing 

For  every  man  who  was  killed  in  battle,  six  others  were' 
wounded,  taken  prisoner,  or  reported  missing.    The  total 


STATISTICS 


409 


battle  casualties  in  the  expeditionary  forces  are  shown  in 
the  following  table.  The  number  who  died  of  wounds 
was  only  seven  per  cent  as  large  as  the  number  who  were 
wounded.  The  hospital  records  show  that  about  eighty- 
five  per  cent  of  the  men  sent  to  hospitals  on  account  of 
injuries  were  returned  to  duty.  About  half  the  wounded 
were  reported  as  slightly  wounded  and  many  of  them 
would  not  have  been  recorded  as  casualties  in  pre\'ious 
wars. 

BATTLE  CASUALTIES  IN  THE  AMERICAN  EXPEDITIONARY 

FORCE 


Killed  in  action 35,560 

Died  of  Wounds 14,720 

Total  dead — 50,280 

Wounded  severely 90,830 

Wounded  slightly 80,480 

Wounded,  degree  undetermined 34,380 

Total  wounded 205,690 

Missing  in  action  (August  1,  1919) 46 

Taken  prisoner 4,480 

Grand  Total 206,496 


1 


CAUSES   OF   DEATH   IN   THE   AMERICAN   ARMY 


NUMBER 

PER  CENT 

Killed    in    battle  or  died    of    wounds, 
A.  E.  F 

Died  of  dwease: 

InA.  E.  F 21,410 

InU.  S 36.050 

Total  by  disease 

Deaths  from  other  causes  A.  E.  F 

50,280 

57.460 
7,920 

43 

50 

7 

Total 

115,660 

ioo7o 

410      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 


DISEASE  AND  BATTLE  DEATHS  IN  AMERICAN  ARMY 

IN  FOUR  WARS 
The  figures  give  the  number  of  deaths  for  each  1,000  troops. 


Mexican  War,  1846-48 

Ciril  War  (North)  1861-65 

Spanish  War  1898 

War  with  Germany: 

A.  E.  F.  to  Nov.  11,  1918.  . 

Total  forces  to  May  1,  1919 


DISEASE 

BATTLE 

110 

15 

65 

33 

26 

5 

19 

53 

15 

13 

125 
98 
31 

72 
28 


DEATHS  BY  DISEASES— PRINCIPAL  CAUSES 

Both  in  the  A.  E.  F.  and  United  States  for  Entire  Army,  Expressed  in  Per- 
centages 

PneumoHia 83 . 6 

Meningitis 4.1 

Tuberculosis 2.3 

Empyema 1.1 

Septicemia .6 

Bright*'  Disease .5 

Typhoid .5 

Peritonitis .5 

Appendicitis .4 

Organic  Heart  Diseases .4 

Scarlet  Fever .3 

Measles .3 

Other 5.3 

Total 100. 0 


Wah  Expenditures 

For  a  period  of  twenty-five  months  from  April,  1917, 
through  April,  1919,  the  war  cost  the  United  States  con- 
siderably more  than  $1,000,000  an  hour,  or  $21,850,000,000 
exclusive  of  nearly  $10,000,000,000  loaned  to  the  Allies. 

This  amount  is  twenty  times  the  pre-war  national  debt. 
It  is  nearly  enough  to  pay  the  entire  costs  of  our  Govern- 
ment from  1791  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  war. 
The  expenditures  in  this  war  were  sufficient  to  have  car* 


STATISTICS 


411 


ried  on  the  Revolutionary  war  continueusly  for  more 
than  a  thousand  years  at  the  rate  of  expenditure  which 
that  war  actually  involved. 

During  the  first  three  months  war  expenditures  were 
at  the  rate  of  $2,000,000  a  day.  During  the  next  year 
they  averaged  more  than  $22,000,000  a  day.  For  the  final 
ten  months  of  the  period  the  daily  costs  reached  the  ienor- 
mous  total  of  more  than  $44,000,000. 

MY  PURCHASES  OF  FOUR  ARTICLES  IN  1918  COMPARED  WITH 
TOTAL  PRODUCTION  IN  1914 


ARTICLE 

PURCHASED,  1918 

PRODUCED,  1914 

Blanketa 

18,000,000 
13,000,000 
96,000,000 
19,000,000 

8,000,000 
30,000,000 
61,000,000 
98  000  000 

Wool  gloves 

Wool  Bocks 

Shoes 

Some  International.  Comparisons 

TOTAL  WAR  EXPENSES  OF  PRINCIPAL  NATIONS. 

(Estimated  to  April  30*h,  1919.) 

Great  Britain  and  Dominions $38,000,000,000 

France 26,000,000,000 

United  States 22,000,000,000 

Russia 18,000,000,000 

Italy 13,000,000,000 

Belgium,  Roumania,  Portugal,  Jugo-Slavia 5,000,000,000 

Japan  and  Greece 1,000,000,000 

Total  for  Allies  and  United  States $123,000,000,000 

Germany $39,000,000,000 

Austria-Hungary 21,000,000,000 

Turkey  and  Bulgaria 3,000,000,000 

Total  for  Teutonic  ,(Yllie8 $63,000,000,000 

Grand  total $186,000,000,000 


From  the  above  it  will  bo  Fcon  that  the  total  cost  of  the  enemy  nations  was 
Just  one-half  that  of  the  United  States  and  Allies. 


412      AMEBICAN  ENGINEEES  IN  FRANCE 


DURATION  OF  THE  WAR. 


ALLIED  AND 

ASSOCIATED 

NATIONS 


WAR  DECLARED 

BT  CENTRAL 

POWERS 


WAR  DECLARED 
AGAINST  CEN- 
TRAL POWERS 


TEARS 

MONTHS 

4 

3 

3 

7 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

3 

4 

2 

3 

11 

3 

6 

3 

5 

6 

11 

7 

7 

7 

3 

3 

2 

'6 

, , 

6 

3 

•• 

3 

1. 

2. 
3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 


Serbia. . , 
Russia* , 
France . 
Belgium. 


Great  Britain . 
Montenegro. . . 

Japan 

Portugal 

Italy.... 

San  Marino. . . 
Roumaniaf . . . 

Greece 

United  States . 

Panama 

Cuba 

Siam 

Liberia 

China 

Brazil 

Guatemala. . . . 
Nicaragua . . . . 

Haiti 

Honduras 


July  28, 1914 
Aug.  1,  1914 
Aug.  3,  1914 
Aug.  4,1914 
Nov.  23,  1914 
Aug.  9,  1914 
Aug.  27, 1914 
Mar.    9,1016 


Aug.  20,  1916 


Aug.  9 
Nov.  3 
Aug.  3 
April  7 
Aug.  4 
Aug.  6 
Aug.  23 
Nov.  23 
May  23 
June  6 
Aug.  27 
Nov.  23 
April  6 
April  7 
April  7 
July  22 
Aug.  4 
Aug.  14 
Oct.  26 
April  21 
May  6 
July  12 
July  19 


1914 
1914 
1914 
1917 
1914 
1914 
1914 
1914 
1915 
1915 
1916 
1916 
1917 
1917 
1917 
1917 
1917 
1917 
1917 
1918 
1918 
1918 
1918 


14 

3 

8 

7 

7 

6 

19 

19 

19 

4 

10 

18 

5 

4 

4 

20 

8 

28 

16 

21 

5 

30 

23 


*  Peace  Treaty,  March  3,  1918.         f  Peace  Treaty,  March  6,  1918. 

ORDNANCE  PRODUCTION  BY  GREAT  BRITAIN,  FRANCE  AND 
THE  UNITED  STATES— DURING  THE  19  MONTHS  OFJ 

AMERICAN  PARTICIPATION— APRIL  6,  1917  i 

to  NOV.  11,  1918 


GREAT  BRITAIN 

FRANCE 

UNITED  STATES 

Rifles 

1,963,514 

179,127 

3,428,195,000 
291,700,000 
705,110,000 

1,396,938 

223,317 

2,959,285,000 
342,155,000 
702,964,000 

2,505,910 

Machine    Guns    and    Auto- 
matic Rifles 

i 
181,662 

Rifle  and  Machine  Gun  Am- 
munition Rounds 

Smokeless'  Powder  Pounds. . 
High  Explosives  Rounds  . . . 

2,879,148,000 
632,504,000 
375,656,000 

STATISTICS 


413 


EXTENT  OF  WESTERN  FR0NT:HELD  BY  ARMIES  OF  ALLIES 

AND  UNITED  STATES  DURING  1918  EXPRESSED 

IN    PERCENTAGES 

(Italian  troops  are  included  with  French,  and  Portuguese  with  British.) 


1918 

BELGIAN 

FRENCH 

BRITISH 

AMERICAN 

January .     31 

5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
3 
6 
4 
6 

69 

67 
66 
72 
70 
72 
72 
71 
74 
75 
73 
68 
69 
67 
67 
63 
58 
58 
56 
54 
56 
58 
55 
53 
60 
55 

25 
25 
25 
19 
19 
17 
17 
17 
17 
16 
16 
16 
16 
17 
18 
18 
20 
19 
19 
19 
20 
18 
19 
22 
17 
IS 

1 

February     28 

3 

March         21 

4 

March         30 

4 

April            10 

6 

April            20 

6 

April            30 

6 

Way            10 

7 

May            20 

4 

May            30 

5 

Juno            10 

7 

June            20 

12 

June            30 

11 

July             10 

12 

July             20 

11 

July             30 

14 

August        10 

17 

August        20 

18 

August        30 

20 

September  10 

22 

September  20 

19 

September  30 

18 

October       10 

23 

October       20 

19 

October       30 

19 

November  11 

21 

COMPARATIVE  RIFLE  STRENGTH  OF  ALLIED  AND  GERMAN 
ARMIES  ON  THE  WESTERN  FRONT,  191S 


1918 

GERMAN 

ALLIED 

April           1 

1,569,000 
1,600,000 
1,039,000 
1,412,000 
1,395,000 
1,339,000 
1,223,000 
866,000 

1,245,000 

N:  ay             1 

1,313,000 

June            1 

1,490.000 

July             1 

1,550,000 

August        1 

1,672,000 

Scpt<»mber  1 

1,682,000 

October        1 

1,594,000 

November  1 

1,485,000 

414      AMERICAN  ENGINEERS  IN  FRANCE 


GUNS  ORGANIZED  IN  BATTERIES  AT  DATE  OF  THE  ARMISTICE 

French 1 1,638 

Italian 7,709 

British 6,993 

American 3,008 

BATTLE  AIRPLANES  IN  EACH  ARMY  AT  DATE  OF  THE 
ARMISTICE 

French 3,321 

German 2,730 

British 1,758 

Italian 812 

American 740 

Austrian 622 

Belgian 153 

BATTLE  PLANES  FOR  EACH  100,000  MEN  IN  EACH  ARMY  AT 
DATE  OF  THE  ARMISTICE 

French 130 

British 102 

German 77 

American 38 


PERCENTAGES    OF    COMPARATIVE    STRENGTH    OF    FRENCH 
£     BRITISH  AND  AMERICAN  ARMIES  AT  THE  DATE  OF  THE 

ARMISTICE 

WEST  FRONT,  NOV.  11,  1918 


BHITISH 

FRENCH 

AMFRICAN 

26 

41 

31 

19 

59 

22 

32 

54 

14 

30 

57 

13 

Ration  strength 

Lenp:th  of  front  held. 
Artillery  in  batteries 
Airplano  strength . . . 


PERCENTAGES  OF  COMPARATIVE  EXPENDITURES  OF 
AMMUNITION,  DURING  1918 

AU.  FRONTS,  1918 


BRITISH 

FUENCn 

AMERICAN 

Artillery    Ammunition    fired,     in- 
cluding training 

43 
46 

51 
37 

6 

Small  arms  ammunition  fired,  in- 
cluding training 

17 

STATISTICS 


415 


MERCHANT  SHIPPING  LOST  THROUGH  ACTS  OF  WAR 
(In  gross  tons) 

Great  Britain 7,757,000 

Norway 1,177,000 

France 889,000 

Italy 846,000 

United  States 395,000 

Greece 346,000 

Denmark 241,000 

Holland 203,000 

Sweden 201,000 

Germany 187,000 

Russia 183,000 

Spain 168,000 

Japan 120,000 

Portugal 93,000 

Belgium 84,000 

Brazil 25,000 

Austria 15,000 

Other  Nations 16,000 

Total 12,946,000 

Germany  and  Austria 202,000 

Belligerent 10,906,000 

Neutral 1,838,000  12,744,000 


SEAGOING  MERCHANT  SHIPPING  OF  THE  WORLD 
BEFORE    AND    AFTER    THE    WAR 
(In  groBS  tons) 


July  1,   1914 

Dec.  31,  1913 

Great  Britain 

20,100,000 
1,875,000 
7,675,000 
6,325,000 
6,640,000 

16,900,000 

United  States 

5,719,000 

Other  Allies 

6,840,000 

Enemy  Nations 

4,360,000 

Neutral  Nations 

5,786,000 

Total 

42,615,000 

39,605,000 

Net  Decrease  3,010,000  Tona. 

THE  END 


INDEX 


Abbeville,  147. 

Abbreviations,  199,  200. 

Ablainville,  293. 

Aigrefeuille,  96. 

Air  brakes,   84,   85,  102. 

Aire,  274,  356,   360. 

Airplane  detection,  256,  257. 

Airplanes,  129,  202,  407,  408,  411. 

Aisne,  145. 

Aldershot,  112. 

Alphabet,   telephone,  199. 

Alsace,  363. 

Ambulance  trains,   86. 

Ambulances,  129,  146. 

American  Bridge  Company,  271. 

America's  Munitions,  214,  261, 
389. 

Ammunition,  expenditure  of,  264, 
414;  storage  of,  95. 

Angers,   82. 

Anglo-Ainerican  relations,  133- 
152. 

Anglo-French  Commissions,  13, 
14,  155,  382. 

Angouleme,  58. 

Aprcmont,  351,  360. 

*'  Archies,"  245,  356,  260. 

Argonne,  18,  97. 

Argonne  Forest,  355. 

Argonne-Meuso  Offensive,  battle 
data,  404;  beginning  of,  356; 
camouflage,  206;  engineer 
work  during,  352,  358;  light 
railways,  359,  360;  maps, 
240,  241;  railways,  350,  358, 
359,  361;  roads,  303,  305, 
350;  water  supply,  179,  362. 

Armies,  Allied,  compared,  414. 

Army,  Ajnerican,  casualties  —  see 
Casualties,  composition,  37; 
size  of,  30,  43,  44,  73,  89,  347, 
395,    397,    414;    sources    of. 


397;  training  of,  399;  trans- 
portation of,  400. 

Army  cargo,  403. 

Army  chief  engineer,  37,  301,  314. 

Army  commander,  37,  41;  duties 
of,  38. 

Araiy  engineer,  40,  41. 

Army,  national,  13. 

Army  of  Occupation,  37  —  see 
Third  Army. 

Army  zone,  40. 

Arras,  22,  59,  111,  112,  113,  314, 
317. 

Artillery,  263-276;  Allied,  com- 
pared, 414;  American  in 
France,  405;  ammunition  ex- 
pended, 264,  414;  howitzer, 
265;  in  action,  140;  of  quick 
firing,  267 ;  light  railway,  269 ; 
mobile,  264,  265,  268;  naval, 
270,  271,  272,  273;  non- 
mobile,  264;  preparation,  116; 
railway,  6,  268,  269;  recoil, 
266,  267;  recuperator,  268; 
"  seventy-fives,"  265,  266 ;  sur- 
veying, 236;  tractors,  268. 

Atlanta,  14. 

Atlantic  Ocean,  22,  26,  30,  47,  48, 
50. 

Attcrbury,  Brig.  Gen.  W.  W.,  42, 
75,  77. 

Aubreville,  274,  275,  359,  360. 

Audruicq,  108. 

Aulonoy,  146. 

Aviators,  German,  117,  129.  261. 

Baccarat,  209. 

Baldu-in  Locomotive  Co.,  271. 

Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad,  62, 

69. 
Bajiaume,  131. 
Barber,  Colonel  A.  B.,  IS. 


417 


418 


INDEX 


Barges,  22,  23,  29. 

Bar-le-Duc,  147,  347. 

Barry,  52. 

Basins,  tidal,  26,  44. 

Bassens,  26,  46,  47,  49,  51,  52,  53, 

93,  95,  109;  berths,  number 
of,  44;  wharves,  dimensions 
of,  45;  battle,  American  par- 
ticipation, 404;  battle  casual- 
ties—  see  Casualties. 

Battle  front,  31. 

Bayonne,  52,  58. 

Beauvais,  69. 

B.  E.  F.,  71,  134,  138. 

Belfast,  52. 

Belfort,  59. 

Belgian  frontier,  113,  147. 

Belgian  Relief  Commission,  150. 

Belgium,  59,  60. 

Berlin,  74,  127. 

"Berthas,"  270. 

Bethune,  148,  317. 

Biarritz,  58. 

Black,  Major  General  Wm.  M.,  13, 

379. 
Blaye,  51. 

Bleaching  powder,  176,  177. 
Bliss,  Gen.  Tasker  H.,  12. 
Bonne  map  projection,  222,  223. 
Bordeaux,  25,  26,  27,  43,  44,  51, 

56,  58,  73,  80,  93,  95,  99,  112, 

104,     347;     telephones,     83; 

water,  supply  of,  174. 
Boston,  14,  28,  389. 
Boulogne,  22,  29,  60,  62,  72. 
Bourges,  73,  99;  telephones,  83. 
Bourlon,  124. 
Boursies,  127, 128. 
Brest,  25,  49,  51,  58,  59,  67,  80, 

94,  96;  railway  connections, 
47. 

Bridges  6;  destruction,  353. 
Brigades,  38. 
Bright's  Disease,  181. 
Bromine,  176,  186. 
Brooklyn,  389. 
Buffalo,  61,  388. 


Burgundy,  59. 
Business  Manager,  76. 
Busses,  287. 

Byng,    General    Sir    Julian,    115, 
116,  123. 

Caen,  51. 

Calais,  22,  23,  26,  29,  60,  62,  72. 

Calcium  chloro-hypochlorite,  176, 

177. 
Calcium  permanganate,  176. 
Cambrai,  113,  115,  118,  122,  125, 

127,  129;  battle  of,  117-125, 

128-132,  146,  229;  defensive, 

124-132;  offensive,  111-123. 
Camouflage,    42,    114,    198,    202, 

206,  246;  derivation  of,  202; 

colors,    204;    material,     206, 

246;  shop,  205. 
Camps,  construction  of,  88,  380, 

387,  388. 
Canadian    Forestry    Corps,    155, 

160. 
Canadian  railway  troops,  71,  125. 
Canals,  French,  22,  23,  41,  56,  99. 
Car  repairs,  41,  106. 
Carbon,  191. 
Carbon  monoxide,  185. 
Carey's  army,  317. 
Cargo,  delivery  of,  45,  47,  52,  403. 
Cars,  American,  19,  51,  57,  74,  84, 

102,  106;  dimensions  of,  108; 

number    of,    106,    107,    108, 

109;    French,   84,   106,   107, 

109. 
Casualties,   battle,    39,   114,   180, 

181,    408,    409;    first    battle, 

114;  Civil  War,  180;  in  four 

wars,   410;    see   Gaa. 
Cercy-la-Tour,  99,  109. 
Cctte,  50,  51,  52. 
Chalons,  147. 
Champagne,  59. 
Champagne  Offensive,  112. 
Channel,  the,  21,  23,  26,  27,  51, 

52,  58,  59,  315. 
Charente,  51. 


INDEX 


419 


Charleroi,  11, 
Chateaudun,  68. 
ChateauroiLX,  95,  109. 
Chateau-Thierry,  67, 145, 147,  239. 
Chaumont,  40,  72,  199. 
Chemical  engineers,  182-197. 
Chemical  Warfare  Service,  197. 
Chemins  da  Fer,   Ecolo  de,   158, 

368. 
Cherbourg,  51,  58. 
Cherokee,  Indians,  201. 
Chicago,  14. 
Chief  Engineer,  A.  E.  F.,  40,  41, 

42,    74,    92,    293;    report   on 

forestry,  156,  158,  161,  162. 
Chief    of    Engineers — see    Engi- 
neers,  Chief  of. 
Chlorine,  177,  184,  185,  188^  195, 

196;  liquid,  176. 
Chlorpicrin,  185,  186,  195. 
Cholera,  176. 

Church  services,  123,  149. 
Civil  War,  180,  264,  270,  317,  390. 
Claveille,  Albert,  67,  101. 
Clemenceau,  67. 
Clermont-Ferrand,  58,  59. 
Coal  fields,  French,  22,  59,  66. 
Cocoanuts,  192. 
Colorado,  railways  in,  60. 
Comite   Franco-Britannique,   154, 

155. 
Commander-in-Chief,   34,   35,    37, 

40,  54,  75,  77,  88,  348;  British, 

71. 
Commercy,  147,  351. 
Commissaires   railitaires,    63,    67; 

Under,  64. 
Commission       Foresti^re       d'Ex- 

pertises,  157,  160. 
Communion  procession,  girls,  149. 
Compiegne,  147. 
Confidence,   French,   in   Aniorican 

workmen,  104. 
Construction  and  Foresiry,  Direc- 
tor of,  40,   41,   42,  '78,   299, 

306. 
Construction  Division,  392. 


Construction,  Engineer  of,  76,77. 
Control  of  army,  33. 
Cordic,  52. 

Corps,  array,  38,  303. 
Corps  commander,  38. 
Corps  engineer,  38. 
Corps  engineer  troops,  38,  303. 
Corps    of    Engineers — see    Engi- 
neers, Corps  of. 
Coulommiers,  146. 
"  Coupes  "  of  timber,  162. 
CourcoUes,  357. 
Cranes,  wharf,  46. 
Crecy,  72. 
Crest,  military,  326. 

Danuemorie  Viaduct,  353,  364, 
355. 

Deadlock,  313,  314,  348,  361. 

Dcakyne,  Brig.  Gen.  Herbert,  41. 

Deaths  by  battle,  all  armies,  408. 

Deaths  by  disease,  410. 

Deaths,   causes   of,   409. 

Delaware,  61. 

Depots,  base,  90,  91,  93;  forward, 
91;  intermediate,  90,  91,  93. 

Destruction  to  France,  147,  150. 

Detroit,  14. 

Dieppe,  22,  58,  67. 

Dijon,  59,  82,  92;  camouilRge 
shop  at,  205. 

Direction  des  Etapes,  156,  159. 

Director  General  of  Military  Rail- 
way's, 382,  385. 

Director  General  of  Transporta- 
tion, 42,  54,  55.  77,  78,  79, 
100,  109,  293,  391;  assistant, 
British,  71;  British,  70,  71, 
72,  292;  deputy,  76,  81; 
deputy,   British,   71. 

Director  Military  Engineering  and 
Engineer  Supplies,  210. 

Distinguished  Service  Cross,  130. 

Division  commander,  38. 

Division  engineer,  38;  duties  of, 
39,  377.  378;  troops  38,  303, 
377,  378. 


420 


INDEX 


Divisions,  38,  399. 

Divisions,  railway,  grand,  80,  110. 

Donges,  51. 

Dordogne,  43. 

Duck  boards,  336. 

Dugouts,  139,  141,  212,  246,  318, 

339,  340,  341,  342,  346. 
Dumps,  91,  217,  279.' 
Dunkerque,  22,  72. 

Ecole  de  Chemins  de  Fer,  158, 
368. 

Eddy  stone  Lighthouse,  4. 

Edgewood  Arsenal,  387. 

Eighteenth  Engineers,  14,  17,  56, 
92,  112,  347. 

Electrical  and  Mechanical  Co., 
173. 

Electrical  plants,  206,  207,  208; 
capacity  of,  207. 

Electro-Mechanical  Regiment,  207. 

Electro-Mechanical  Troops, 
French,  208;  German,  209. 

Eleventh  Engineers,  14,  17,  18,  41, 
112,  113,  114,  117,  118,  120, 
125,  127,  229,  317,  355,  359. 

Emerson,  Colonel  G.  H.,  385. 

Engineer,  Chief,  A.  E.  F.  —  see 
Chief  Engineer. 

Engineer,  Chief  of  Port  Construc- 
tion, 71. 

Engineer,  civil,  4,  7. 

Engineer  Commission,  18,  24,  25, 
43,  49,  62,  73,  155. 

Engineer  committee,  12. 

Engineer  control,  37. 

Engineer  depot,  381,  382,  383. 

Engineer,  military,  3,  5,  6,  7. 

Engineer  of  port  construction, 
chief,   71. 

Engineer  officers,  creation  of,  17. 

Engineer  officers  from  civil  life, 
16. 

Engineer  organization,  33. 

Engineer  organization  and  engi- 
neer work  in  the  United 
States,  379-394;  business  ad- 


ministration,     381 ;      camps, 

380,  387,  388;  Director  Gen- 
eral of  Military  Railways, 
382,  383,  385;  Edgewood 
Arsenal,  387;  engineer  train- 
ing, 393;  gas  manufacture, 
386,  387;  locomotives,  ship- 
ping of,  390,  391,  393;  men, 
securing  of,  382;  port  facili- 
ties, 388,  389,  390;  organiza- 
tion, 380;  purchases,  amount 
of,  383,  384;  purchasing  de- 
partment, 380;  research  de- 
partment, 380,  385;  Russian 
Railway  Service  Corps,  380, 
385 ;  Washington  Barracks, 
381. 

Engineer  plants,  American,  210. 

Engineer  regiments,  original,  14, 
15,  17,  41,  133,  347,  373. 

Engineer  training,   393. 

Engineer  troops,  number  of,  8, 
9,  36,  39. 

Engineer  troops  in  the  field,  364- 
378;  American  organization, 
373,  374,  375;  British  or- 
ganization, 364,  366,  367; 
Canadian  railway  troops, 
365,  366,  367;  division  en- 
gineers, 377,  378;  French 
organization,  367,  369,  373; 
Railway  Construction  Engi- 
neers, 366,  367;  regional  en- 
gineers, 377;  suggested  reor- 
ganization, 373,  374,  375,  376, 
377;   work   trains,   370,    371. 

Engineers,  American,  task  of,  19. 

Engineers,  Chief  of,  8,  12,  13, 
209,  210,  215,  379,  382. 

Engineers,  Corps  of,  7,  16,  37, 
133,  198,  234,  277,  363,  380, 

381,  393. 
Engineers,  regional,  377. 
Engineers,  section,  299. 
Engineering,  civil,  4,  7;  military, 

3,  5,  6,  7. 
Epinal,  73. 


INDEX 


421 


Erie  Railroad,  62. 

Escaut  Canal,  126. 

Est  Railway,  57,  59,  60,  62,  67, 

68,  80,  92. 
Etat  Railway,  57,  58,  59,  67,  68, 

80. 
Expenditure,  rate  of,  30. 
Expenditures,  410,  41L 

Fay,  316. 

Felton,  Samuel  M.,  382. 

Field  service  regulations,  33,  34, 
35. 

Fifteenth  Engineers,  14,  17,  40, 
92,  94,  112,  317,  356,  359. 

Fifth  Army,  B.  E.  F.,  315,  316. 

Fifth  Engineers,  French,  163,  368, 
369,  376. 

Fiftieth  Engineers,  104,  110,  261. 

Fifty-sixth  Engineers,  261. 

First  Armv,  A.  E.  F.,  145,  207, 
237,  293,  298,  301,  347,  359. 

Flanders,  112,  113,  116,  135. 

Flash  and  sound  ranging,  42,  234, 
235,  236,  237,  244-262. 

Flash  location,  249,  250. 

Flying  officers,  404. 

Foch,  Marshal,  81,  348. 

Fontaine-Notre   Dame,   124. 

Football,  139. 

Forestry,  153-166;  acquisition  of 
forests,  158,  159;  American 
cut,  164,  165;  American 
needs,  155;  American  troops, 
163,  164,  165;  British  needs, 
153;  Canadian  troops,  155, 
160 ;  Co  mite  Franc  o- 
Britannique,  155;  Comite  Per- 
manent, 158,  160 ;  Commis- 
sion Forestih'e,  157,160,161; 
cutting,  161,  162;  Direction 
des  Etapes,  156,  159;  fires, 
154;  French  annual  crops, 
154;  French  regulations,  156, 
157,  158;  French  ownership, 
153;  Intor-Alliod  Committee, 
156,  159;  Service  des  Eaux 
et  Forets,  153,  154. 


Fortieth  Engineers,  205. 

Fortifications,  immobile,  4,  274; 
mobile,  273. 

Forty-ninth  Engineers,  104,  110. 

Fourteenth  Engineers,  14,  15,  17, 
112,  113,  314,  316,  356. 

Four-track  construction,  99. 

Freight  traffic  on  French  rail- 
ways, 62. 

Freight  train  runs,  82, 

French  calmness,  145. 

French  character,  143. 

French  dead,  147. 

French  railway  men  mobilized,  63. 

French  railways — see  Railways. 

French  women,  147. 

Front,  length  of,  held  by  Allies, 
413. 

Frontier,  Belgian,  59,  60. 

Frontier,  German,  59,  147. 

Frut,  51. 

Gallipoli,  111. 

Garchizy,   106. 

Gare,  Chefs  de,  83,  84. 

Garonne,  43. 

Garrett,  W.  A.,  18. 

Gas,  6 ;  chlorine,  quantity  of,  196 ; 
discharge  of,  193,  194;  effects 
of,  185,  186;  first  use  of,  184, 
193;  helmets,  189;  injury, 
treatment  of,  186;  lachryma- 
tor,  186;  liquid,  195;  manu- 
facture of,  386,  387,  406; 
masks,  140,  184,  189,  190, 
191;  mustard,  187,  188,  337; 
output,  196;  poisonous,  182, 
183,  184;  projectors,  193; 
protection  against,  188 ; 
shells,  194,  195;  tear,  186; 
training,  191 — see  also  Chlo- 
rine, Chlorpicrin,  and  Phos- 
gene. 

Gcddes,  Major  General  Sir  Eric, 
69,  70. 

General  Headquarters,  16,  40,  42, 
72,  80, 


422 


INDEX 


General     Headquarters,     French, 

66. 
Geology,  42. 
Geophone,  200,  202. 
German  lines,  112,  113,  114,  116, 

125,  126,  141,  148,  303,  351. 
German    Offensive,    March    1918, 

48,  89,  314,  315;  July  1918, 

145, 146. 
Germany,  61. 
Gettysburg,    artillery,    264,    405; 

troops  at,  9. 
Gibraltar,  25,  50. 
Gievres,  82,  93,  94,  95,  99,  109, 

210,  211;  railway  connection, 

94;  size  of,  94,  97. 
«  Giles,  Corp'l,"  312. 
Gironde,  25,  43,  45,  49,  51,  52,  95. 
Glasgow,  52. 
Gouzeaucourt,  127,  128,  129,  130, 

229. 
Grand  Pre,  360. 
Grant,  General,  316. 
Granville,  51. 

Great  Northern  Railway,  70. 
Grenades,  hand,  196. 
Guard,  National,  16. 
Guns,  blast  of,  246,  247;  naval, 

270,    271;    railway,    6,    268, 

269;   recoil,    267,    268;    sizes 

and  kinds,  264,  265 — see  also 

Artillery. 

Hague    Peace    Conference,    182, 

183. 
Haig,   Field   Marshal,   314,    315, 

317. 
Hartmanswillerkopf,  209. 
Havre,  22,  51,  52,  56,  58,  67. 
Havrincourt  Wood,  120,  122. 
Heudicourt,  139. 
Highlanders,  131,  132. 
Hindenburg  Line,  111,  113,  122, 

125. 
Hirson,  59. 
Holland,  60. 
Home,  French  attachment  to,  150. 


Honfleur,  51. 
Horse  masks,  192. 


India,  69. 

Infantry,  pioneer,  8. 

Influenza,  180. 

Injuries,  personal,  86. 

Inspecteur  G^n^ral  des  Services, 
156,  157. 

Intelligence  Section  G-S,  233,  235. 

Inter-Allied  Wood  Committee, 
156,  157,  158,  159,  160. 

Interstate  Commerce  Commission, 
61. 

Iodine,  176. 

Irish,  135. 

Issoudon,  95. 

Is-Eur-Tille,  59,  80,  82,  92,  96,  97, 
99,  109 ;  dimensions  of,  92,  97 ; 
repair  shop  at,  210,  211 ;  tele- 
phones, 83. 

Italy,  69. 


Jadwin,  Brig.  Gen.  Edgar,  40. 
Jersey  Central  Railroad,  62. 
Joffre,  Marshal,  11,  13. 
Jouarre,  146. 
July  14th,  review,  151. 
July  15th,  1918,  145,  146. 
Jura  Mountains,  timber  in,  160, 
164. 

Kaiser,  72. 
Kultur,  32, 

Lackawanna  Railroad,  62, 

La  Couzanoe,  356. 

La  Fere,  111. 

La  Ferte,  145. 

La  Martiniere,  45,  46,  49. 

La  Pallice,  44,  51,  96. 

LaRochclle,   25,   26,   51,   58,   59, 

108. 
La  Vacquerie  Farm,  122. 
Lambert  map  projection,  223,  224. 


INDEX 


423 


Lancers,   Bengal,   120. 

Landes,  164. 

Langfitt,  Major  Gen.  Wm.  C,  40, 
41,  77 — see  also  Chief  Engi- 
neer. 

Langres,  238. 

Laon,  59. 

Largue,  bridge  over,  353. 

L'Eufant,  Major,  363. 

Lehigh  Valley  Railroad,  62. 

Le  Mans,  47,  58. 

Le  Mesnil,  315. 

Los  Sables  d'  Olonne,  52, 

Lewis  g^ns,  115. 

Liffol-le-Grand,  80,  96,  99,  109; 
dimensions  of,  96 ;  telephones, 
83. 

Light  railways,  18,  209,  277-295; 
ambulance  trains,  288,  289; 
American  system,  290;  cars, 
283,  284;  construction,  284; 
de-struction,  315,  316;  Di- 
rector, British,  292;  equip- 
ment, 109;  gauge,  278,  285; 
locomotives,  280,  281,  282; 
locomotives,  gasoline,  281, 
283;  manager,  76,  77,  293; 
organization,  American,  292, 
293,  294;  organization,  Brit- 
ish, 291;  rails,  279;  shops, 
290;  track,  American,  280; 
track,  British,  280;  track, 
French,  279;  traffic,  286,  287. 

Light  Railways  and  Roads,  41,  61, 
113;  Director  of,  293,  299. 

Lighters,  47, 

Ligny,  347. 

Lille,  60. 

Lines,  British,  126,  127,  188; 
Gennan,  112,  113,  114,  116, 
125,  126,  141,  148. 

Livens  projector,  196. 

Liverpool,  52. 

Locomotives,  American,  10,  74,  81, 
102,  103.  107,  109;  dimon- 
sions  of,  107;  number  of,  109; 
French,  84,  109 ;  how  shipped. 


390,   391,  392,  393;   repairs, 

41. 
Logging  equipment,   164. 
Loire,  25,  43,  44,  46,  51,  81,  93, 

95,  98,  105. 
London,  52. 
Lorient,  51. 
Louvain,  11. 

Lumber,  quantity  cut,  165. 
Luxembourg,  59, 
Lyon,  59. 
Lys,  317. 

McKinistry,  Brig.  QeiL.  Chas.  H., 

41,  77. 
Machine  guns,  212. 
Mafeking,  144. 
Maintenance  of  way,  Engineer  of, 

76. 
Malaria,  181. 

Manager,  General,  79,  109. 
Maps,    42,     216-243;     American, 

218,    219,    220,    233;    battle, 

22fl,   232;   British,   216,   218, 

220,  226,  229,  232;  French, 
216,  218,  219,  220,  225,  232; 
German,  218,  220,  226,  232; 
grids,  222,  224,  225;  Inter- 
Allied,  229,  230,  231;  loca- 
tions, 225,  226;  organization 
of  department,  217,  233,  234, 
235,  236,  237;  production, 
240,     241,     242;     projection, 

221,  222,  223,  224;  scalw, 
216,  217,  218,  219,  221. 

"  Marches  "  (train),  82,  83, 

Marcoing,  126. 

Marcy,  82, 

Marennes,  51, 

Marine,  Minister  of,  French,  51. 

Marne,   145;   battle   of,   11,   216, 

220,  275,  318. 
Marseillaise,  152. 
Marseille,  25,  50,  52,  59,  96. 
Mars-sur-Allier,  ISO  . 
Maryland,  6L 
Masks,  189,  190,  191— sec  Gas  and 

IIorBC. 


424 


INDEX 


Maubeuge,  5. 

Maxfield,  Col.  H.  H.,  110. 

Meaux,  59. 

Mechanical  Engineer,  Chief,  71. 

Mediterranean,  22,  25,  50,  52,  58, 

59. 
Mehun,  95. 
Messines  Ridge,  112,  264;  water 

delivery,  171. 
Meter  gauge  railways,  60,  61,  351. 
Metz,  59,  348,  350. 
Meuse,    67,    274,    275,    348,    350, 

353,  355,  358. 
Mexican  war  casualties,  180. 
Microphone,  244. 
Midi  Railway,  57,  58,  61,  80. 
Military  Cross,  130. 
Military   Engineering   and   Engi- 
neer Supplies,  Director  of,  40. 
Military  Medal,  130. 
Mirimas,  96. 
Mont  Sec,  349,  351. 
Montdidier,  145. 
Montierchaume,   94,    95,   99;    size 

of,  95,  97. 
Montigny,  315. 
Montoir,  47,  49,  51,  82,  93,  95,  96, 

99,  109 ;  sLze  of,  46,  94,  97. 
Montpellier,  58,  59. 
Montreuil,  72. 
Morocco,  369. 
Mort  Homme,  Le,  359. 
Moselle,  349. 

Motive  Power,  Gen.  Superintend- 
ent of,  76,  79,  104,  109,  110. 
Motor  Transport  Corps,  42,  209, 

214. 
Motor  truck  trains,  370,  372. 

Namur,  5. 

Nancy,  67,  73,  147. 

Nantes,  25,  44,  47,  51,  52,  68,  59, 

96. 
Nash,  Maj.  Gen.  Sir  P.  A.  M.,  70. 
Naval  guns,  270,  271,  272,  273. 
Navy  Department,  50,  270,  271. 
Navy,  Secretary  of,  70. 


Nesle,  131. 
Nettings,  205. 
Neufchateau,  347. 
Nevers,  58,  59,  82,  98,  347. 
Nevers  shops,  103,  104,  105,  106, 

107,  109. 
New  Jersey,  61. 
New  Orleans,  389. 
New  York,   14,   26,   61,   62,  384, 

389,  392. 
Nimes,  58,  59. 
Nineteenth  Engineers,  14,  15,  17, 

41,  102,  103,  104,  110,  112, 

347,  376. 
No   Man's   Land,   124,   126,    201, 

303,  335,  344. 
Nocq,  72. 
Nord  Railway,  57,  59,  60,  62,  67, 

118,  125. 
Norfolk,  384,  389. 
North  Sea,  21,  147. 
Northeastern  Railway,  69. 
November  11,  144. 
Noyon,  131. 

Officer,  British,  137,  142. 
Officers,  Commissioned,  398,  399. 
Oise,  111,  314. 
Ordnance    Department,    29,    261, 

270. 
Ordnance  production,  412. 
Organization,  army,  34. 
Orleans,  58,  80,  94. 
Ostende,  270. 
Ouest  Railway,  57. 
"  Over  There,"  137. 
Oxygen,  186. 

Pacific  coast,  14. 

Painleve,  67. 

Paris,  17,  57,  58,  59,  60,  62,  66, 
68,  83,  112,  126,  144,  147, 
199,  270. 

Paris-Lyon-MediteiTanoe  Rail- 
way, 57,  59,  68,  80,  92,  96, 
98,  103. 

Passchendaele,  112- 


INDEX 


425 


Passenger  traffic,  French  rail- 
ways, 62. 

Pauillac,  25,  44,  45,  51. 

Pennsylvania,  61. 

Pennsylvania  R.  R.,42,  62,  75,110. 

Perigeux  99,  109. 

Peritonitis,  181. 

Peronne,  111,  113,  117,  131,  314. 

Pershing,  General,  113,  241  230, 
349 — see  Commander-in-Chief. 

"  Petrol  Tins  "  for  water,  170. 

Philadelphia,  14. 

Phosgene,  185,  186,  195. 

Photographic  surveying,  217. 

Photography,  aerial,  246,  247. 
248,  249,  250,  280,  346. 

Physical  examinations,  398. 

Pierrefitte,  147. 

Piles,  19. 

Pineries,  160,  161. 

Pittsburg,  14,  62. 

Pleybcr  Christ,  dimensions  of,  96. 

Poitiers,  58. 

Pont-a-Mouson,  349. 

Ponts  ct  Chausscps,  158. 

Ports,  19,  42,  88,  90;  British,  52; 
debarkation,  402 ;  embarka- 
tion, 402 ;  French,  25 ;  French, 
used  by  British,  22;  list  of, 
used,  51. 

Potash  permanganate,  176. 

Printing  plant,  army  mobile,  239, 
240,  241,  242;  base,  237,  238, 
240. 

Prisoners,  German,  121,  157. 

Prisoners  of  war,  9,  121. 

Problem,  American,  20,  24,  26,  31. 
43;  British,  20,  21,  22,  23, 
24;  French,  20,  21,  22,  24. 

Public  works,  ]\Iinister  of,  French, 
67,  85,  100,  101,  369,  370. 

Purchases,  amount  of,  383,  384. 

Purchasing  department,  380. 

Pyrenees  Mountains,  53. 

Quartermaster  Corps,  42,  53,  54, 
380,  381,  387. 


Quartermaster    General,    British, 

n. 

Rail-head,  German,  126. 

Rail-heads,  91,  127,  279,  285. 

Rail-removal,  28. 

Railway  construction,  88,  98,  99. 

Railway  Construction  Engineer, 
Chief,  71. 

Railway  control,  French,  65. 

Railway  co-operation,  American, 
15. 

Railway  equipment,  American,  74, 
85;  French,  28,  51,  84,  85, 
102,  103,  104— see  also  Cars, 
Locomotives. 

Railways,  French,  28,  57,  68,  69, 
73,  74,  79,  80,  81,  83,  86,  89, 
102;  French,  American  use 
of,  80,  100,  101 ;  French,  con- 
dition of,  62;  French,  gauge 
of,  57;  light,  see  light  rail- 
ways. 

Raihvay  operation,  American,  69, 
102;  American,  phases  of, 
79;  British,   69;   French,  82. 

Railway  operations,  American, 
control  of,  74. 

Raihvay  regulations,  French,  81. 

Railway  routes,  American,  68. 

Raihvay  telegraph,  superintendent 
of,  76. 

Railway  Transport  Officers  Ser\-- 
ice,  87. 

Raihvav  Transportation  Corps, 
42. 

Reading  Railroad.  62. 

Recoil  of  guns,  266,  267,  269. 

Recuperator,  268. 

Red  Cross,  30,  129. 

R.  E.'s,  133. 

Hoflectors,  paraboloid,  257,  258, 
259. 

Research  department,  380,  386. 

Reserve  Corps,  12,  13. 

Reserve,  P^ngineer,  12;  Medical, 
12;  regiments,  13,  14. 


426 


INDEX 


Respirators,  188. 

Rheinis,  27,  147. 

Rhine,  22,  239,  242,  350. 

Riflo  strength,  comparison  of, 
Allied,  413. 

Roads,  296-312;  advance  area, 
297,  299,  309 ;  Argonne-Meuse 
offensive,  303,  305 ;  construc- 
tion, 307,  308,  311;  corps 
officers,  301;  freezing,  309; 
French  standards,  296,  297, 
307;  maintenance,  300,  303, 
304,  305,  306,  311;  Manager 
of,  76,  77;  plank,  308,  309; 
road  regiment,  298 ;  St.  Mihiel 
offensive,  301,  305;  S.  0.  S., 
297,  298;  traffic,  305;  traffic 
control,  310,  311. 

Rochefort,  51. 

Rouen,  22,  51,  56,  58,  67. 

Roumania,  47. 

Russia,  47,  57,  61. 

Russian  Railway  Service  Corps, 
380,  385. 

Russian-Japanese  War,  light  rail- 
ways, 278;  trenches,  317. 

Russian-Turkish  War,  trenches, 
317. 

St.  Aignan,   81. 

St.  Dizier,  80,  97,  359. 

St.  Florentin  telephones,  83. 

St.  Loub^s,  51. 

St.  Louis,  14. 

St.  Luce,  96. 

St.  Malo,  51. 

St.  Mihiel,  67,  97,  349. 

St.  Mihiel  Offensive,  ammunition 
expended,  264;  battle  data, 
405;  camouflage,  206;  engi- 
neer work  during,  352 ;  maps, 
240,  241;  railways,  351; 
roads,  301,  302;  salient,  275, 
348,  355;  water  supply,  179, 
362. 

St.  Nazaire,  25,  26,  27,  51,  52,  56, 
58,  59,  93,  103,  112,  347,  392; 


available  draft,  47;  berths, 
number  of,  44;  railway  con- 
nections, 47,  53,  73,  95,  99; 
telephones,  83;  water  supply 
of,  174. 

St.  Omer,  147. 

St.  Pardon,  51. 

St.  Phalle,  F.  dc,  18. 

St.  Pierre  des  Corps,  82. 

St.  Pol,  147. 

St.  Quentin,  314. 

St.  Sulpice,  93,  95,  96;  dimen- 
sions of,  93,  97. 

Salvage,  213,  214,  215. 

San  Francisco,  388. 

Saumur,  82,  99. 

Scarpe,  111^  314. 

Searchlights,  260,  261. 

Second  Army,  41,  237,  294,  298, 
301,  350,  363. 

Sector,  American,  27,  47,  56,  67, 
80;  British,  23,  27,  72; 
French,  27,  208,  209. 

Sedan,  359,  360,  363. 

Seine,  25,  56. 

Sensee,  314. 

Service  des  Eaux  et  Forets,  153. 

Seventeenth  Engineers,  14,  17,  56, 
92,  112,  347. 

Seventy-fourth  Engineers,  200, 
201. 

Sforza,  Duke  Ludovico,  3. 

Shells,  design  of,  261,  262. 

Shipping,  comparison,  415. 

Shipping  Control  Committee,  54. 

Shipping  lost,  415. 

Shop  section,  210,  211. 

Shops,  ai-my,  211 ;  repair,  209. 

"  Show,"  138. 

Sickness,  31,  180,  181. 

Signal  Corps,  198,  200. 

Sixteenth  Engineers,  14,  17,  112. 

Sixth  Engineers,  314.  316. 

Sixty  cm.  gauge,  61  —  see  light 
railways. 

Smeaton,  4,  7. 

Sodium  bisulphate,  176,  178. 


INDEX 


427 


Soissons,  59,  67. 

Somme,  149,  317;  battle  of,  111, 
113,  114,  116,  131,  139,  264. 

Sound  detector,  252,  253,  264, 
255. 

Sound  ranging,  250,  251. 

Southampton,  52. 

Spain,  57,  58. 

Spanish  War  casualties,  180,  181. 

Sports,  120,  139,  141. 

Stanley,  Henry  M.,  120. 

Star-Spangled  Banner,  152. 

Station  master,  83. 

Stations,  Regulating,  80,  91,  96, 
97. 

Statistics,  395-415. 

Steam  shovels,  109. 

Stevens,  John  F.,  385. 

Storage,  covered,  89;  depot,  total, 
97;  dock,  total,  97;  miscel- 
laneous, total,  97;  open,  88, 
89 ;  per  man,  89 ;  space  to  be 
provided,  30;  units  of,  91. 

Storage  yards,  88-101;  planning 
of,  92,  93. 

Strasbourg,  59. 

Stretcher  bearers,  123. 

Submarines,  29,  31,  50. 

Suippes,  147. 

Superintendent,  Division,  80; 
General,  76,  80. 

Supplies,  quantity  of,  88,  90. 

Supplies  required,  29,  89. 

Supplies,  Service  of,  35,  3G,  37, 
39,  40,  54,  72,  77,  78,  80,  81, 
297;  Commanding  General, 
36,  39,  40,  42;  electrical 
plants,  207;  engineers,  37,  39; 
headquarters,  40,  72 ;  organ- 
ization, 35,  77;  shop  work, 
210;   water  supply,  179. 

Supply  depots,  30. 

Sursol,  51. 

Swansea,  52, 

Switzerland,  27,  59. 

Talmont,  49,  50,  51. 


Tanks,  114,  115,  122,  346. 

Task,  American,  19. 

Taylor,  Brig.  Gen.  Harr>',  40,  49. 

Tea,  137,  138. 

Telegraph    and    telephone    lines, 

198,  199,  200. 
Telephones  for  railways,  83, 
Tenth  Engineers,  163.' 
Thermite,  140. 
Third  Armv,  A.  E.   F.,  37,   242, 

298,  306;  B.  E.  F.,  115,  127. 
Thirteenth  Engineers,  14,  15,  17, 

40,  112,  352. 
Thirtieth  Engineers,  197. 
Thirty-fifth   Engineers,  103,   108, 

110. 
Thirty-fourth  Engineers,  210. 
Thirty-seventh  Engineers,  207. 
Tides,  French,  25,  26. 
Timber,  19;  American  needs,  155; 

areas,   153-158,   160;    British 

needs,    153,    155;    cut,    164; 

French   needs,   157;    in   war 

zone,  159;  waste  of,  161. 
"  Tommy,"  136,  142. 
Tonnay-Charente,  51. 
Topographical  Organization, 

American,  218,  233;  British, 

234 ;  French,  233. 
Toul,  27,  67,  92,  147,  350. 
Toulon,  50,  51,  52,  59. 
Tours,  40,  47,  58,  72,  80,  82,  94, 

199;  salvage  shops,  213,  214. 
Tractors,  268. 
Train  despatching,  83. 
Train  operation,  85,  86. 
Train  pilots,  82. 
Train  runs,  83. 
Train  signals,  84. 
Trainmen,   American,   19,   41,   74, 

80,  81,  82,  86. 
Trains,  ambulance,  109 ;  length  of, 

85. 
Transport  fleet,  401.  402. 
Transport  Militaire  (French),  370. 
Transport  Service,  Army,  53,  54, 

55,  56;  staff  of,  55. 


4:28 


INDEX 


Transportation  Corps,  41,  54,  79, 
83,  96. 

Transportation  Department,  40, 
41,  42,  72,  74,  75,  76,  77,  78, 
86,  92,  99,  209;  British,  71, 
72;  organization  of,  75,  78; 
staff,  76. 

Transportation,  Director  of,  see 
Director  General  Transporta- 
tion; Superintendent  of,  76, 
79,  80. 

Transports,  Secretary  of,  French, 
67. 

Traverses  in  trenches,  330. 

Trenches,  116,  313-346;  American, 
320,  332,  333;  bastion,  329, 
331,  337;  British,  319,  332, 
333 ;  communication,  328, 
329,  338 ;  design,  325 ;  digging 
by  tasks,  338,  339;  dimen- 
sions, 334,  335;  drainage, 
335,  336;  French,  319,  330; 
front,  325,  326,  327,  328,  334; 
German,  318,  319,  323,  324; 
in  forests,  337;  in  other  wars, 
317;  in  respect  to  crest,  326; 
naming,  345;  octagonal,  329; 
psychology,  320,  322,  323; 
rampart,  325-337 ;  reserve, 
325,  327,  328,  334,  338;  sit- 
ing, 327;  support,  325,   327, 

328,  334,  338;  trace,  329, 
338 ;  traversed,  329,  330,  331 ; 
wavy,  329,  333,  338;  zig-zag, 

329,  332,  338. 
Treport,  25,  59. 

Troops,  movement  of,  117. 
Troops,  sec  army,  corps,  division, 

etc. 
Troyes,  59. 

Tunnelling  troops,  212. 
Tunnels,  202,  212. 
Tuscania,   165. 
Twelfth   Engineers,   14,   17,   112, 

113,  118,  124,  314,  315. 
Twentieth    Engincci's,    163,    164, 

165. 


Twenty-fourth  Engineers,  210. 
Twenty-ninth  Engineers,  235,  241, 

242,  261,  376. 
Twenty-sixth  Engineers,  174. 
Twenty-third  Engineers,  298,  299, 

302,  304,  305,  361,  376. 
Typhoid,   180. 
Typhoid  casualties,  180. 

Uniforms,  French,  202. 
United  Kingdom,  61. 

Varennes,  360,  361. 

Vauban,  4. 

Verdun,   67,   348,   349,   352,   358, 

359,    360;    defence    of,    274, 

275,  276. 
Verneuil,  214. 
Versailles,  369,  370,  372. 
Vierzon,  82. 
Vierzon,  telephones,  83. 
Villers-Bretonneaux,  316. 
Vimy  Ridge,  112. 
Vinci,  Leonardo  da,  3. 
Vosges,  27,  47,  97,  147,  347,  353. 
Vosges  Mountains,  timber  in,  160, 

164. 
Vraincourt,  355,  356. 

War  Department,  7,  12,  14,  19, 
31,  34,  43,  54,  79,  233,  389. 

War,  duration  of,  412. 

War,  Minister  of,  French,  100. 

War,  Spanish,  16,  180,  181. 

Warehouse  design,  98. 

Warehouses,  17,  46,  89,  90,  91,  92. 

Washington,  19,  28,  34,  35,  54,  73, 
388. 

Waterloo,  troops  at,  9. 

Water  supply,  82, 167-181;  Ameri- 
can control,  173,  174  Ameri- 
can troops,  174;  British  con- 
trol, 172;  British  installa- 
tions, 168, 169 ;  chlorinization, 
177;  consumption,  179;  dis- 
eases, 180,  181;  distribution, 
169,    170;    French    control, 


INDEX 


429 


172;  French  installations,  168, 
169 ;  immediate  necessity, 
170 ;  "  petrol  "  tins,  170 ; 
pipe  lines,  1G9,  171;  purifica- 
tion, 175,  176,  177,  178; 
sources,  167,  171;  targets, 
168;  trenches,  in,  170;  wells, 
171. 

West  Point,  16. 

Wharf  tracks,  53. 

Wharves,  44,  45,  46,  47;  con- 
struction of,  25. 

Whippets,  115. 

Whitlock,  Brand,  150. 

Wilgus,  Colonel  Wm.  J.,  18,  72, 
77. 

Wire  entanglements,  116,  342, 
343,  344. 


Wires,  charged  electrically,  208. 
Woinville,  351. 
Woodruff,  Colonel  J.  A.,  163. 
Wounded,  31,  121. 

Yards,  storage,  88-101;  terminal, 

17. 
Yellow  fever,  181. 
Ypres,  112,  193;  gas  at,  184. 

Zero  hour,  118,  119,  138. 

Zone  of  the  advance,  35,  37,  39, 

40,  41,  70,  80,  173,  210,  297, 

299. 
Zone  of  the  armies,  37;  Frenchj 

66;  rear,  French,  66. 
Zone  of  tho  rear,  35,  70. 


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